Irfan Solanki vs State Of U.P. on 10 March, 2025

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Allahabad High Court

Irfan Solanki vs State Of U.P. on 10 March, 2025

Author: Raj Beer Singh

Bench: Raj Beer Singh





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:34448
 
Reserved
 
Court No. - 73
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 17875 of 2023
 
Applicant :- Irfan Solanki
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P.
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Anil Kumar Pathak,Bhupendra Pal,Rajrshi Gupta,Rizwan Ahamad,Satyendra Kumar Tripathi,Sr. Advocate
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Anuj Kumar Mishra,Anuj Tripathi,G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh,J.
 

1. Heard Sri Dileep Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Rajrshi Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General for the State. None has appeared on behalf of the informant.

2. The present bail application has been filed on behalf of the applicant in Case Crime No. 0151 of 2022, under Section – 386 I.P.C., Police Station – Jajmau, District – Kanpur Nagar, with the prayer to enlarge the applicant-accused on bail.

3. The informant has lodged first information report on 06.12.2022 against applicant and co-accused Rizwan Solanki, Murasleen Khan @ Bholu and unknown persons, alleging that the accused persons wanted to take possession over the land of some poor persons and the informant had stood in favour of such land owners. Co-accused Murasleen Khan @ Bholu was trying to take possession on the land of a widow lady and informant has raised his voice against the attempts of co-accused Murasleen Khan @ Bholu. It was alleged that informant was continuously raising the voice of innocent persons against the accused persons and due to that reason accused persons have threatened to kill him. In the first week of November 2022, applicant accused Irfan Solanki M.L.A. has called the informant and consequently on the night of 05.11.2022 the informant reached at the house of accused Rizwan. There Murasleen Khan @ Bholu, Irfan and some other persons were also present. Applicant Irfan Solanki M.L.A. told the informant that due to acts of informant, he was suffering loss and his business has been ruined. The accused persons have threatened him. Co-accused Rizwan told the informant that he has to make good the loss suffered by them and he has to give 10 % MLA tax in every land deal. Accused persons have further demanded an amount of Rs. 10 lakhs from the informant within one month and to pay 10-15 % MLA tax. They have threatened the informant by saying that they have already disappeared several persons and the informant would also met with same fate. After investigation, the applicant and the co-accused persons were charge sheeted for offence under Section – 386 I.P.C.

4. Learned senior counsel for the applicant submitted that applicant is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in this case. The allegations levelled by the informant against applicant are wholly false. At the time of incident applicant was Member of Legislative Assembly and he has been targetted due to political enmity. Referring to provisions of Section – 383, 385 and 386 I.P.C., it was submitted that in the instant matter only an allegation has been made that the applicant and co-accused persons have made demand of an amount of Rs. 10 lakhs from the informant and to pay 10 % MLA tax but no delivery of any amount or any other property or valuable security has taken place and thus, no offence under Section – 386 I.P.C. is made out. In this connection, learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon following case laws :-

(i) Salib @ Shalu @ Salim Vs. State of U.P. and Others 2023 0 Supreme(SC) 694;

(ii) Mohammad Ubaid Vs. State of U.P. 2023:AHC:153946.

5. It is further submitted that investigation of the case is already complete and charge-sheet has been filed and that trial is in progress. Applicant is not a previous convict. The criminal history of 18 cases has been shown against applicant but applicant has previous criminal history of nine cases only and other nine cases were imposed upon applicant subsequent to this case. During pendency of this bail application applicant was convicted in one case and in he has been granted bail in that case. The criminal history has duly been explained, as mentioned in affidavit filed in support of the bail application. Learned senior counsel has referred first information report and statements of witnesses and submitted that in view of aforesaid position of law, no case under Section – 386 I.P.C. is made out and at the most the prosecution case would fall within the purview of Section – 385 I.P.C., which is punishable upto two years imprisonment. The applicant is in jail since 04.01.2023 and thus, he has already undergone the detention of about two years and two months. Co-accused Murasleen Khan @ Bholu has already been granted bail by this Court. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, applicant deserved to be released on bail. It was further submitted that in case applicant is released on bail, he shall not misuse the liberty of bail and will co-operate in trial. Learned senior counsel also referred case of Maulana Mohammed Amit Rashadi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2012) 2 SCC 382 and Prabhakar Tewari Vs State of U.P. and Anr 2020 (11) SCC 648.

6. Learned Additional Advocate General has opposed the prayer of bail and submitted that there are serious allegations against applicant and he has been charge-sheeted on the basis of evidence. The informant is a social worker and the applicant and co-accused persons were indulging in grabbing the property of innocent persons and when the informant raised his voice in favour of such persons and against the acts of accused persons, he was threatened and accused persons have made demand of Rs. 10 lakhs and to pay 10-15 % MLA tax. Specific role has been assigned to the applicant. Applicant is a habitual offender and he indulged in commission of crime for pecuniary benefits for himself and his brother Rizwan Solanki. Due to acts of applicant, a case under Section 3(1) Gangster Act was also registered against and that under Section – 14(1) Gangster Act, illegal property worth Rs. 103 crores of the gang was attached in favour of the State. The trial of the case is at advanced stage and five prosecution witness including informant have been examined before the Trial court and proceedings of the case are likely to be concluded soon. Applicant has long criminal history of 18 cases. It was further submitted that during pendency of this bail application, the applicant has been convicted in crime No. 127 of 2022 under section 147, 436/149, 427/149, 323/149, 506, 504 IPC vide judgment / order dated 03.06.2024. It was pointed out that this Court has already declined the prayer of applicant to stay the conviction in the said case. The applicant has been an MLA and he enjoys clout in the area and he is main accused and that in case of grant of bail, he may temper with evidence. Referring to first information report and statements of witnesses, it was submitted that in view of conduct and terror of applicant and the nature of allegations levelled against applicant, no case for bail is made out. In support of his contention, learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon following case laws :-

(i) Laxman Prasad Vs. State of U.P. Bail (Second) No. 4704 of 2013.

(ii) Ram Pratap Yadav Vs. Mitra Sen Yadav and Another (2003) 1 SCC 15.

(iii) Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Another (2004) 7 SCC 528.

(iv) Maulana Mohammed Amit Rashadi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2012) 2 SCC 382.

(v) Deepak Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and Another (2022) 4 S.C.R. 1.

(vi) Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh and Others (2003) 3 SCC 598.

(vii) Prasanta Kumar Sarkar VS. Ashis Chatterjee and Another (2010) 14 SCC 496.

7. I have considered rival submissions and perused the record including the case laws referred by learned counsel for the parties.

8. In case of Deepak Yadav Vs. State (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court observed that section 439 of the Cr.P.C is the guiding principle for adjudicating a Regular Bail Application wherein Court takes into consideration several aspects. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised cautiously on the basis of well- settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court held:

”20, In Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT of Delhi And Another6, a two-Judge Bench of this Court stated the principles which are to be considered while granting bail which are as follows : –

”8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”

21. As reiterated by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar Vs. Ashish Chatterjee And Another, it is well-settled that the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

22. The decision in Prasanta(Supra) has been consistently followed by this Court in Ash Mohammad Vs. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu And 7 (2010) 14 SCC 496 Another, Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh And Others, Neeru Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Another, Virupakshappa Gouda And Another Vs. State of Karnataka And Another, State of Orissa Vs. Mahimananda Mishra.

23. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of ‘Y’ Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. authored by one of us (Hon’ble N.V. Ramana, CJI), it has been observed as under :-

22. The impugned order passed by the High Court is cryptic, and does not suggest any application of mind. There is a recent trend of passing such orders granting or refusing to grant bail, where the Courts make a general observation that “the facts and the circumstances” have been considered. No specific reasons are indicated which precipitated the passing of the order by the Court.

23. Such a situation continues despite various judgments of this Court wherein this Court has disapproved of such a practice. In the case of Mahipal (Supra), this Court observed as follows:-

25. Merely recording “having perused the record” and “on the facts and circumstances of the case” does not subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this commitment. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a conclusion.” (emphasis supplied)

24. For grant or denial of bail, the “nature of crime” has a huge relevancy. The key consideration which govern the grant of bail were elucidated in the judgment of this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh, wherein it has been observed as under: –

”4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture, though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither there can be any. The considerations being:

(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail.

(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”

25. Similarly, the parameters to be taken into consideration for grant of bail by the courts has been described in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav And Another as under : –

”11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well-settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

(a) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

(b) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

(c) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”

B. Recording of reasons for grant of bail by the High Court of the Sessions Court

26. The importance of assigning reasoning for grant or denial of bail can never be undermined. There is prima facie need to indicate reasons particularly in cases of grant or denial of bail where the accused is charged with a serious offence. The sound reasoning in a particular case is a reassurance that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker after considering all the relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.”

9. In case of Ram Pratap Yadav Vs. Mitra Sen Yadav (supra), the Apex Court has stated that a prayer for bail having been rejected by the Sessions Court, although the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code is not acting as a Court of appeal or Court of revision over the order of the Sessions Court, nevertheless, the High Court should keep in mind, while hearing the application for bail, the factum of the prayer having been rejected by the Sessions Court and the reasons therefor expressly set out in the order of the Sessions Court. The order of the High Court, howsoever brief it may be, should make it appear that the High Court while forming opinion on prayer for bail was conscious of the reasons for rejection of prayer for bail as assigned by the Sessions Court. On facts of the case, the Apex Court observed that the order did not show the said requirement having been satisfied as the High Court had not said a word as to why the reasons assigned by the Sessions Court for rejecting the prayer for bail need to be ignored or were not relevant or why the High Court was inclined to exercise its power favourably to the accused inspite of the availability of grounds to the contrary set out in the order of the Sessions Court. The Apex Court has further observed that independently of the order of rejection passed by the Sessions Court, the High Court may grant bail to an accused person, yet it would be sound exercise of discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court if the order of the High Court reflects that the High Court had in mind the reasons assigned by the Sessions Court for refusing bail.

10. In case of Laxman Prasad (supra), it was observed that the provisions contained in Section 437 CrPC will fully apply while considering the bail application either by court of sessions or by High Court. Referring to facts of that case it was observed that the accused is a previous convict and has been released on bail in appeal is not in dispute but nothing has been brought on record on behalf of the applicant that his conviction was also suspended. It was further observed that ordinarily, the punishment awarded after conviction is suspended while granting the bail to the accused persons during appeal therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant is not a previous convict. In case of Maulana Mohammed Amir Rashidi (supra), which has relied by both parties, the accused was granted bail by the High court, which was challenged before the Apex Court. Considering facts of the matter the Apex Court held as under:

”8) Taking note of all these aspects, particularly, the fact that the second respondent was in jail since 24.08.2009, the trial has commenced by examining the two witnesses on the side of the prosecution and the assurance by the State that trial will not be prolonged and conclude within a reasonable time and also of the fact that the High Court while granting bail has imposed several conditions for strict adherence during the period of bail, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court. In fact, in the impugned order itself, the High Court has made it clear that in case of breach of any of the conditions, the trial Court will have liberty to take steps to send the applicant therein (respondent No.2 herein) to jail again. In addition to the same, it is further made clear that if the appellant receives any fresh threat from the second respondent or from his supporters, he is free to inform the trial Court and in such event the trial Court is free to take appropriate steps as observed by the High Court. We also direct the Trial Court to complete the trial within a period of four months from the date of the receipt of copy of this order without unnecessary adjournments.

9) With the above observation, finding no merit for interference with the order of the High Court, the appeal is dismissed.”

11. So far applicability of section 386 IPC is concerned, in case of Salib @ Shalu (supra) the court held:

Section 386 of the IPC relates to extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Section 386 of the IPC runs as follows:– “Section 386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. –Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

21. “Extortion” has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as follows:– “Section 383. Extortion.–Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion.

Illustrations

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z’s child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z’s field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.”

22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to say, the delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft, in extortion there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting the victim in fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to be overpowered by putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition. It has to be shown that the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear of injury. The illustrations to the Section given in the IPC make this perfectly clear.”

12. The Apex Court in Isaac Isanga Musumba and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (15) SCC 357 [ reference made in case of Mohammad Ubaid (supra)] has held:

“3. We have read the FIR which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-7 and we find therefrom that the complainants have alleged that the accused persons have shown copies of international warrants issued against the complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters written by Uganda Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs and the accused have threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent to Rs.110 crores). In the complaint, there is no mention whatsoever that pursuant to the demands made by the accused, any amount was delivered to the accused by the complainants. If that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of extortion as defined in Section 383 IPC is made out. Section 383 IPC states that :

”383. Extortion.- Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion’. ”

Hence, unless property is delivered to the accused person pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for the offence under Section 384 could not have been registered by the police.”

13. Keeping in view of the facts of matter as well as the position of law as referred above, in the instant matter following substantial aspects emerge from record:

(i) Alleged incident of extortion has been shown of 05.11.2022 but first information report has been lodged on 06.12.2022. In the first information report no explanation for delay has been shown.

(ii) In the alleged incident no injury has been caused to the informant or any other persons and no weapon was assigned to the applicant.

(iii) As per prosecution version only demand of Rs. 10 lakhs and to pay 10-15 % MLA tax was made from the informant but no delivery of any amount or any other property or valuable security has taken place. Referring to case of Isaac Isanga Musumba (supra), it was submitted on behalf of applicant that no case under section 386 IPC is made out and that prosecution case would not travel beyond purview of offence prescribed under section 385 I.P.C., which is punishable with imprisonment which may extend upto two years and that offence under section 385 IPC is a bailable offence.

(iv) The applicant is in jail since 04.01.2023 and thus, he has already undergone detention of more then two years.

(v) It was shown that applicant was not previous convict, however during pendency of this bail application, the applicant has been convicted in crime No. 127 of 2022 under section 147, 436/149, 427/149, 323/149, 506, 504 IPC vide judgment / order dated 03.06.2024. The prayer of applicant to stay the conviction in the said case has been rejected, however he has been released on bail under section 389 CrPC. The applicant has previous criminal history of nine cases and after this case he was shown involved in nine more cases. In the case of Prabhakar Tewari (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that pendency of several criminal cases against an accused may itself cannot be a basis for refusal of bail. Considering nature of accusations coupled with argument that no case under section 386 IPC, and period of detention, the bail application of applicant is not liable to be rejected merely on the ground of criminal history and conviction.

(vi) All the material witnesses have already been examined and thus, there is no possibility of tempering with evidence.

(vii) Co-accused Murasleen Khan @ Bholu has already been granted bail by this Court.

14. Considering cumulative effect of all aforesaid facts and position of law, I am of considered view that a case for grant of bail to the applicant is made out. Hence, the present bail application is hereby allowed.

15. Let the applicant Irfan Solanki involved in the aforesaid crime be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond and two local sureties each of the like amount to the satisfaction  of court concerned subject to the following conditions:

i. The applicant shall not tamper with the evidence during trial.

ii. The applicant shall not pressurize/intimidate the prosecution witnesses.

iii. The applicant shall appear before the trial court on the date fixed, unless personal presence is exempted.

iv. The applicant shall not try to contact, threat or otherwise influence the complainant or any of the witness of the case.

16. In case of breach of any of the above condition, the court concerned shall be at liberty to cancel the bail of applicant, in accordance with law.

17. It is clarified that any observation made in this order would have no bearing at all on the trial Court. The trial court shall decide the case without being influenced by any observation made in this order.

Order Date :- 10.03.2025

S Rawat/Anand

 

 



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