Chattisgarh High Court
Jatashankar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 11 June, 2025
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2025:CGHC:23139
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No. 6368 of 2017
Jatashankar S/o Ramsai Kol , Aged About 58 Years Caste
Uraon , R/o Balrampur Water Resources Department
Balrampur Occupation Peon Water Resources Department
Balrampur , District Balrampur Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Water
Resources Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya New
Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2. Superintending Engineer, Shyam Barnai Project,
Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.
3. Chief Engineer, Hasdeo Ganga Kachhar, Water Resources
Department Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.
4. Executive Engineer, Water Resources Department
Balrampur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla and
Mr. Sharad Mishra, P.L.
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SB- Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Order On Board
11.06.2025
1. The petitioner herein was working as a Peon in the
respondent department and he was suspended by order
dated 10/03/1993 on account of his involvement in
commission of offence under Section 302 of IPC and since
he was convicted for the said offence by learned Sessions
Judge on 20/08/1998, he was consequently terminated
from service on 24/06/2006. However, his appeal against
the order of conviction was set aside by this Court by order
dated 17/10/2013 (Annexure P/3) and he was acquitted
and was further reinstated on the said post by order dated
06/05/2015 (Annexure P/1). He also made an application
for grant of back wages on 01/08/2016 but no action has
been taken which led to the filing of this writ petition.
2. Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, learned counsel for the petitioner,
would submit that petitioner is entitled for back wages as
he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court and he has
been reinstated on service, however, he has been refused
on the basis that the period from the date of his
suspension i.e. 10/03/1993 till the date of reinstatement
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i.e. 06/05/2015 is to be treated as “no work, no pay”,
which is absolutely unsustainable in law.
3. Per contra, Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned State counsel
would submit that since petitioner was involved in a
criminal offence for which he had undergone criminal trial
and though he has been acquitted but the period from the
date of his suspension till the date of joining will be treated
as non-working period and the claim of the petitioner with
regard to treating his non-service period as service period
and making payment for the same has already been
rejected by learned Labour Court vide order dated
23/0/8/2017(Annexure P/2) which is absolutely in
accordance with law, therefore, the instant writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered
their submissions and went through the records with
utmost circumspection.
5. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it
stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji
Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat
Electricity Board, Himmatnagar1 in which their
Lordships have considered a case where an employee was
1 (1996) 11 SCC 603
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dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a
criminal court for his involvement in an offence under
Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was
acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their
Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages
should be paid to the employee for the period between the
date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as
under: –
“The reinstatement of the petitioner into the
service has already been ordered by the High
Court. The only question is whether he is
entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of
involving himself in the crime that was taken
into account for his not being in service of the
respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he
is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that
his service was terminated on the basis of the
conviction by operation of proviso to the
statutory rules applicable to the situation. The
question of back wages would be considered
only if the respondents have taken action by
way of disciplinary proceedings and the
action was found to be unsustainable in law
and he was unlawfully prevented from
discharging the duties. In that context, his
conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to
be considered in its own backdrop. In this case,
since the petitioner had involved himself in a
crime, though he was later acquitted, he had
disabled himself from rendering the service
on account of conviction and incarceration in
jail. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner is not entitled to payment of back
wages.”
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6. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh 2,
the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji
Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval.
7. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India,
New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal 3, the Supreme Court
has considered a provision in the service regulation which
provided that an employee, who is absent from duty
without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and
allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R.
17) and held as under: –
“15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of
all blame and is treated by the competent
authority as being on duty during the period of
suspension that such employee is entitled to full
pay and allowances for the said period. In other
words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively
in the Bank to treat the period of such
suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The
power thus vested cannot be validly challenged.
During this period, the employee renders no
work. He is absent for reasons of his own
involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is
in no way responsible for keeping him away from
his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be
saddled with the liability to pay him his salary
and allowances for the period. That will be
against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and
positively inequitable to those who have to work
and earn their pay. …”
2 (2004) 1 SCC 121
3 AIR 1994 SC 552
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8. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v.
Mohammed Abdul Rahim4, the Supreme Court
considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji
Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh‘s case (supra) and Baldev
Singh v. Union of India5, held that subsequent acquittal of
Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does
not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal
consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed
as under: –
“11. … During the aforesaid period there was,
therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant
Bank from employing him. If the respondent
could not have remained employed with the
appellant Bank during the said period on
account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult
to visualise as to how he would be entitled to
payment of salary during that period. His
subsequent acquittal though obliterates his
conviction, does not operate retrospectively to
wipe out the legal consequences of the
conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the
respondent to back wages has to be judged on
the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement,
undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal
and the same has been granted by the appellant
Bank.”
9. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and
others6, their Lordships have relied upon the decision
rendered in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and
have held that the appellant therein shall be entitled for
4 (2013) 11 SCC 67
5 (2005) 8 SCC 747
6 (2019) 5 SCC 809
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back wages only from the date of acquittal till the date of
his reinstatement.
10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid
that petitioner was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal
court by order dated 20/08/1998 pursuant to which he
was terminated from service on 24/06/2006, however, on
his acquittal from the criminal charges by this Court on
17/10/2013 (Annexure P/3), he was reinstated by order
dated 06/05/2015 (Annexure P/1) but his claim for back
wages from the date of his suspension to the date of
reinstatement has been denied as it the said period has
been treated by the respondent department as ‘no work no
pay’ and in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid
down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh
(supra), Baldev Singh (supra), Mohammed Abdul Rahim
(supra) and Raj Narain (supra), subsequent acquittal of
the petitioner though obliterates his conviction, but it does
not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal
consequences of the conviction, however, the petitioner will
be entitled for back wages only from the date of his
acquittal i.e. 17/10/2013 till the date of his reinstatement
i.e. 06/05/2015 in light of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Raj Narain (supra).
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11. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition is allowed to the
extent indicated herein-above.
Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
Harneet
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