Jharkhand High Court
Jayanti Devi Urmaliya vs Union Of India Through Secretary on 28 April, 2025
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2025:JHHC:12646
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.4236 of 2015
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Jayanti Devi Urmaliya, W/o Late Santosh Urmaliya, R/O- 16, Gram Shivrajpur,
P.O - Shivrajpur, Tahsil - Nagod, Shivrajpur, District - Stana, Madhya Pradesh,
485447
... Petitioner(s).
Versus
1.Union Of India through secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
2.The Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, (Ministry of Home
Affairs), Bharat Coking Coal Limited, P.O & P.S- Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad.
3.The Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Bharat Coking
Coal Limited, P.O & P.S- Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad.
4.The Commandant / Jelgora, Central Industrial Security Force, Bharat Coking
Coal Limited, P.O & P.S- Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad.
5.The Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Bharat
Coking Coal Limited, P.O & P.S- Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad.
...... Respondent(s)
......
PRESENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
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For the Petitioner(s) : Ms. Ritu Kumar, Advocate
For the Resp.-UOI : Mr. Anil Kumar, ASGI
Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, C.G.C.
..........
ORDER
Reserved on: 05.02.2025 Pronounced On: 28/04/2025
By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the
following relief-
“(a) For the issuance of an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders,
direction/directions or a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the Order
no. 38 dated 10.03.1999 Passed by the Commandant, C.I.S.F unit, B.C.C.L
Dhanbad (Respondent No. 4) whereby and whereunder the husband of
petitioner has been removed from service.
(b) Petitioners further prays for the issuance of an appropriate writ/writs,
order/orders, direction/directions for quashing of order 2608 dated
11.05.2000 passed by Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security
Force, Bharat Coking Coal Limited (Respondent No. 3) whereby and
whereunder upheld the order passed by the respondent no. 4 and removed
the husband of petitioner.
(c) Petitioners further prays for the issuance of an appropriate writ/writs,
order /orders, direction /directions in the nature of mandamus commanding
the respondent to issue family pension and other death cum retrial benefits to
the petitioner.
(d) Petitioners further prays to pass such other order or orders
as your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
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2025:JHHC:12646
2. The petitioner’s husband was posted at the C.I.S.F. Unit, B.C.C.L.
Dhanbad, and was jailed on June 16, 1997, leading to his suspension from
duty. He was served with a charge memo on October 13, 1997, with four
charges against him. A departmental inquiry was initiated, but the inquiry
officer was changed. Finally, the inquiry report was submitted in January
1999, and the petitioner’s husband gave a detailed reply on 17 th February
1999. He claimed that his request to examine key witnesses was denied. On
March 10, 1999, he was terminated from his service. He appealed to the
Deputy Inspector General, but the appeal was rejected in 11 th May 2000. The
petitioner’s husband was acquitted in the criminal case on November 4, 1998,
as the prosecution failed to prove the charges. After this, he submitted a
representation to the respondent, stating about the acquittal. He later on filed
Writ Petition no. 5297 of 2009, but the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed
it on September 10, 2014, on the ground of maintainability, leading to this
petition.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that
action of the respondents is grossly illegal and arbitrary and vitiated by mala
fide. She submitted that departmental inquiry was commenced by the
respondent authority in a very unfair manner as the enquiry officer was
changed in the middle of the inquiry process. She submitted that no reason
was asserted by the respondent on what was the need to change the previous
inquiry officer. She submitted that the respondent miserably failed to prove
the charges levelled against the husband of petitioner. Further the learned
Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Dhanbad has also acquitted the husband of the
petitioner in the criminal case. She further submitted that respondent authority
has failed to consider the reply of the husband of petitioner and his request for
giving chance to produce defense witnesses was not considered by the enquiry
officer. She claims that she is entitled to get family pension and other
consequential benefits on account of death of her husband.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner’s
husband has committed an act of gross misconduct when he was detailed for
‘C’ shift duty at Auto Garage Kustore, but he failed to turn up for duty without
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giving any information to the competent authority. Thus act of the petitioner’s
husband is highly prejudicial to the order and discipline of an Armed Force of
the Union. He further submitted that the petitioner’s husband was absent
without leave/permission which is a gross misconduct. He further submits that
due to some administrative reasons, the earlier enquiry officer was changed
and in his place another enquiry officer was appointed for holding further
inquiry from the stage left by his predecessor. The enquiry officer conducted
the enquiry as per procedure and under the relevant rules, giving ample
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner’s husband to defend his case. He also
submitted that on the intervening night of June 16, 1997, the petitioner’s
husband was found hiding in the bushes behind the Zonal Transport
Workshop under suspicious circumstances. Stolen pistons were found
scattered nearby, along with a bag containing other stolen items.
Subsequently, F.I.R. was lodged against him. He lastly submits that the
enquiry officer has correctly found him guilty and the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority commensurate with the proved misconduct and thus,
he prayed that the instant writ petitioner needs to be dismissed.
5. From the material available on record I find that the departmental
charges against the petitioner’s husband are four folds they are:-
(i) Firstly, that the he failed to turn up on duty,
(ii) Secondly that he allegedly pilfered 11 pistons from the Zonal
Transport Workshop on the night of June 15-16, 1997,
(iii) Thirdly that he remained absent without leave for 36 days and
(iv) The last charge being that inspite of the earlier misconducts he has not
shown any improvement in his behaviour which shows that he is a
habitual offender.
6. Acquittal in a criminal case ipso facto has no effect on departmental
enquiry as the standard of proof required in criminal trial and departmental
proceedings are different. In the criminal trial the charges has to be proved
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt whereas in departmental proceedings
charges can be proved on the basis of preponderance of probability.
7. In cases where one of the charges are same in departmental enquiry and
criminal trial courts can consider the outcome of criminal trial in certain
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circumstances. Admittedly, the petitioner’s husband in this case has been
acquitted by the learned trial court on 04.11.1998 of charges under Sections
379 and 411 IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Ram Lal v. State
of Rajasthan, reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175 has observed that if the
departmental charge and the criminal charge are same, constitutional courts
while exercising the power of judicial review can grant redress in certain
circumstances. The relevant paragraph needs to be reproduced here:-
“12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal
court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and
circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different
dimension. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the
criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence
and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in
judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The Court will be
entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that
allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust,
unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. (See G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State
Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : (2009) 2 SCC
(L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1
SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .”
Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Maharana
Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, reported in 2025 INSC 554
has reiterated the aforesaid proposition. The relevant paragraph of the
judgement is as follows:-
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the
accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the
departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such
cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be
unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G.
M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal
v. State of Rajasthan.
8. From the articles of charge, it is clear that second charge is of the
gravest in nature. The same has not been proved in the criminal case and
therefore the charge is liable to be dropped, in view of the aforesaid
judgments. If that charge is dropped, dismissal on the ground of other charges
will be strikingly disproportionate.
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9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others
v. Subrata Nath reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, has observed that
courts can interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority
in case the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. In paragraph
21 of the it was held that:-
“21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the
exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry
report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the
departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to
impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in
mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of
judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot
ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in
respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is
so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the
High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as
enumerated in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 If
the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks
the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the
Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the
penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be
mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose
appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.”
In this case as the delinquent employee has already expired so it cannot be
remanded back to the disciplinary authority. But this court is well
empowered to modify the punishment awarded in the disciplinary
proceedings.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Anand
Acharya reported in (2007) 9 SCC 310 has held that courts in rare cases can
modify the punishment awarded in disciplinary proceedings. In paragraph 15
of the said judgement, it was held as:-
15. The well-settled proposition of law that a court sitting in judicial
review against the quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary
proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty is
not in dispute. However, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court,
then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the
disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to
shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof
(see Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S)
342] , Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC
(L&S) 1] and U.P. SRTC v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra [(2000) 3 SCC 450 :
2000 SCC (L&S) 356]).
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11. This is a rare case as the husband of the petitioner is dead and it will not
be proper to relegate the widow to the disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly,
the punishment of dismissal is converted to compulsory retirement.
12. The Order No.38 passed by the respondent No. 04 dated 10.03.1999 and
the appellate order No.2608 dated 11.05.2000, accordingly, stands modified.
This writ petition is partly allowed with the modification in punishment to
the extent as stated above. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stands
disposed of.
(Ananda Sen, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated 28/04/2025
AFR/ R.S./Cp 03
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