Jhabar Singh Jat Son Of Late Shri Ramnath … vs State Of Rajasthan on 11 March, 2025

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Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur

Jhabar Singh Jat Son Of Late Shri Ramnath … vs State Of Rajasthan on 11 March, 2025

Author: Sameer Jain

Bench: Sameer Jain

[2025:RJ-JP:10752]

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

                   S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3217/2025

Jhabar Singh Jat Son Of Late Shri Ramnath Jat, Aged About 59
Years, Resident Of 629, Shanti Nagar, Near Durgapura Railway
Station, Jaipur.
                                                                            ----Petitioner
                                          Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary,
         Energy       Department,               Government             Of     Rajasthan,
         Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.       Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited, Jaipur Through Its
         Chairman And Managing Director, Vidhyut Bhawan, Jan
         Path, Jaipur.
3.       Chief Controller Of Accounts-I, Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran
         Nigam Limited, Vidhyut Bhawan, Jan Path, Jaipur.
4.       Chief Accounts Officer (Fm-W And M), Jaipur Discom,
         Jaipur.
5.       Amit Saxena, Assistant Accounts Officer Ii, Now Posted In
         Place Of Petitioner In The Office Of Accounts Officer (Jcc
         North) Jpd, Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited, Vidhyut
         Bhawan, Jan Path, Jaipur.
                                                                       ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)               :     Mr.Ashok Bansal with
                                      Mr.Pawan Sharma
For Respondent(s)               :     Mr.Ankur Srivastava



                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

                                       Judgment

Reserved on           ::      05/03/2025

Pronounced on ::               11/03/2025

1.    At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

had apprised the Court with the brief factual narrative of the

instant petition along with the other germane facts that are

relevant for efficacious adjudication of the matter in hand. The

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primary contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner, inter alia others, were as follows:

1.1 That the petitioner who is holding the post of Assistant

Accounts Officer (Grade II); is at the verge of superannuation as

merely one year of service is remaining in completion of his tenure

with the respondent-department, was transferred vide impugned

transfer order dated 15.01.2025 from Jaipur to Alwar and

respondent no. 5 was posted in the petitioners’ place of posting

i.e. at Jaipur, at his own request.

1.2 That it can be inferred that the respondents whilst

acting arbitrarily with the settled position of law as even

enunciated in a catena of judgments passed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, various other High Courts and the transfer policy

of the respondent Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Nigam’) have passed the impugned

transfer order.

1.3 That the present is second round of litigation as the

erstwhile petition filed by the petitioner bearing no, SBCWP No.

1563/2025 titled as Jhabar Singh Jat vs. The State of Rajasthan

and Ors. was disposed of vide order dated 06.02.2025 with the

directions to the respondents therein to consider the

representation filed by the aggrieved petitioner, within an upper

limit period of fifteen days. However, the respondent-Nigam vide

its reply/letter (Annexure-8) to the representation filed by the

petitioner dated 07.02.2025 had upheld their decision and

affirmed the petitioners’ transfer.

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1.4 That the respondents have issued the impugned

transfer order dated 15.01.2025 and, in a perfunctory and

arbitrary manner, rejected the representation submitted by the

petitioner through their reply/letter dated 21.02.2025, merely for

the purpose of accommodating the private respondent herein,

without duly considering the respondents’ own transfer policy, the

medical condition of the petitioner, the period of service remaining

for the petitioner to attain the age of superannuation, and other

relevant factors and circumstances.

1.5 That the petitioner, being a diligent and compliant

employee of the respondent-Nigam, has consistently performed

his duties with the utmost sincerity and dedication. Throughout his

service spanning approximately 26 years, the petitioner has

demonstrated unwavering commitment to his responsibilities.

During the course of his employment, the petitioner was

transferred to Sawaimadhopur, where he joined and diligently

rendered his services for a period of eight months. Subsequently,

the petitioner was transferred back to Jaipur. These transfers,

which reflect the petitioner’s compliance with the respondent’s

administrative decisions, further illustrate the petitioner’s

steadfastness in fulfilling his professional obligations under the

respondent-Nigam’s directions.

2. In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the learned

counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, given the

petitioner’s imminent superannuation, coupled with the

petitioner’s unblemished record throughout his entire service, the

impugned transfer order passed by the respondents should be set

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aside. It was contended that the transfer order was issued in a

hasty and arbitrary manner, primarily aimed at accommodating

the private respondent, without giving due consideration to the

respondent-Nigam’s established transfer policy. Furthermore, the

petitioner’s impending retirement, his exemplary service record,

and the lack of proper consideration of relevant factors such as

the petitioner’s medical condition and the circumstances

surrounding the transfer warrant the quashing of the said transfer

order. The transfer, being issued without due regard for the

established policies and the petitioner’s long and dedicated

service, is in violation of principles of fairness and justice and,

thus, should be annulled.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has

vehemently argued that the petitioner’s transfer was carried out

only after an assiduous consideration of the administrative

exigencies and the broader public interest. It was further

contended that the transfer order in question is devoid of any

arbitrariness or illegality, as it was made in accordance with the

respondent-Nigam’s operational requirements. The respondents

assert that service transfers are an inherent and integral part of

the conditions of service, particularly when an employee holds a

position that is subject to transfer. Such transfers, are a necessary

component of the organizational framework and are made in the

interest of ensuring the efficient functioning of the respondent-

Nigam.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents had placed

reliance upon a catena of judgments, a few of which were, Sri

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Pubi Lombi Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.

reported in (2024) 3 SCR, Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. Vs.

State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659,

Rajendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2009) 15 SCC

178, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri

Bhagwan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574, Abani Kanta Ray Vs.

State of Orissa & Ors. reported in 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 169,

Union of India & Ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas reported in (1993) 4

SCC 357, Cipla Ltd. Vs. Jayakumar R. reported in (1999) 1

SCC 300 and Sk. Nausad Rahaman Vs. Union of India

reported in (2022) 12 SCC 1, and had contended that the scope

of judicial intervention in the transfer orders passed due to

administrative exigencies is miniscule. Nevertheless, transfers are

incidence of service and it is not an absolute right of an employee

to remain at single place of posting and the employee can be

rotated/transferred considering the administrative exigencies,

public interest, history of posting etc. by the competent authority.

5. On the facts of the instant matter, learned counsel

representing the respondents had contended that the private

respondent was posted at the relieving place of the petitioner i.e.

Jaipur on 16.01.2025 in the afternoon. Withal, the petitioner was

relieved vide order dated 24.01.2025 and the said order is not

assailed by the petitioner.

6. Consecutively, it was averred that the petitioner ever since

21.09.2016 was working at the Jaipur Branch of the respondent-

department and in the office of Accounts Officer (JCC-North),

JVVNL, Jaipur since 30.09.2019, thence considering the dire

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urgency and administrative exigency, the petitioner was

transferred to the vacant post of ARO in the Revenue Sub-Division

of Asst. Engineer (O&M), JVVNL, Bagadmev (Alwar Circle), to fill

up the vacant seat in the absolute interest of Nigam.

7. From the contentions made insofar, it can be concluded that

the petitioner had remained posted in Jaipur for a total period of

26 years 11 months out of his total service period in JVVNL of 28

years 9 months and has worked in Jaipur for continuously 8 years.

8. In pursuance of the letter dated 21.02.2025 i.e. the rejection

letter of the representation of the petitioner, it was contended that

the said rejection was accorded only after considering the

averments made by the incumbent during the personal hearing,

and taking note of material facts like the history of posting of the

petitioner, health of the petitioner, pleas made by the incumbent

and allied factors.

9. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of

the case, taking note of the judgments cited at the Bar and the

arguments averred by the learned counsel for the parties, and

upon a perusal of the relevant documents, this Court is of the

following view:

9.1 Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a plethora of judgments, has

consistently reiterated that the scope of judicial review against

transfer orders is limited and minimal. The rationale behind this

circumscribed approach to judicial intervention in transfer matters,

particularly when exercising writ jurisdiction, is grounded in the

recognition that any unchecked interference by the courts could

result in a disruptive and chaotic situation within the functioning of

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government affairs. This is especially true if employees, upon

being posted to locations as per administrative requirements, are

permitted to refuse or challenge their postings based on personal

preferences. Consequently, the only legitimate grounds for judicial

interference exist in cases where the transfer orders are shown to

have been issued on the basis of malafides or improper motives

by the transferring authority, thereby rendering the order

arbitrary, unjust, or capricious.

9.2 The determination of which employee should be posted

to a particular location, and at what time, lies exclusively within

the administrative domain of the competent authority or

department. Such decisions are made with the objective of

promoting the effective functioning of the department, ensuring

optimal service delivery, and enhancing operational efficiency. In

the absence of mala fides or a violation of any applicable statutory

provisions, the Courts should refrain from interfering with transfer

orders. Should the employee encounter any issues or grievances

arising from such decisions, it is the appropriate course for the

matter to be referred to the appellate authority for resolution,

rather than judicial intervention at the initial stage.

9.3 The issue in hand is not newfangled and is already

settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its judgment

encapsulated in Mrs. Shipli Bose (supra), the relevant extract

from the said ratio is reproduced herein below:

“3. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties
and having considered the facts and circumstances
of the case, we are of the opinion that the High
Court committed serious error in interfering with
the transfer Orders of primary school teachers. The

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High Court held that the District Education
Establishment Committee had no jurisdiction to
transfer the Primary School teachers on their
request. We find no justification for this conclusion.
There is no dispute that the District Education
Establishment Committee is competent to transfer
Primary School teachers from one place to the
other but merely because such transfers were
made on the request of teachers, the committee is
divested of its jurisdiction. The Director of the
Primary Education had issued directions that lady
teachers posted in distant areas or rural areas may
be accommodated to the place of their request to
avoid hardship to them. These directions are
reasonable, and the District Education
Establishment Committee followed the same
principles in transferring the appellants on their
requests to avoid hardship with was being caused
to them. The respondents challenged the validity of
the transfer before the High Court on another
ground also that Primary School teachers posted in
the urban areas were not liable to be transferred to
rural areas though the State Government had
issued circular on March 30, 1984 permitting
transfers from urban areas to rural areas. The High
Court did not interfere with the Order of the
transfer on this ground instead it held that the
transfer Orders were without jurisdiction as the
same had been made on the appellants’ request
with a view of accommodate them. We fail to
appreciate the reasoning recorded by the High
Court. If the competent authority issued transfer
Orders with a view to accommodate a public
servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and
should not be interfered by the Court merely
because the transfer Order were passed on the
request of the employees concerned. The
respondents have continued to be posted at
their respective places for the last several
years, they have no vested right to remain
posted at one place. Since they hold
transferable posts they are liable to be
transferred from one place to the other. The
transfer Orders had been issued by the competent
authority which did not violate any mandatory
Rule, therefore the High Court had no jurisdiction
to interfere with the transfer Orders.

4. In our opinion, the Courts should not
interfere with a transfer Order which are
made in public interest and for administrative
reasons unless the transfer Orders are made
in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule

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or on the ground of malafide. A Government
servant holding a transferable post has no
vested right to remain posted at one place or
the other, he is liable to be transferred from
one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued
by the competent authority do not violate any
of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is
passed in violation of executive instructions
or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not
interfere with the Order instead affected
party should approach the higher authorities
in the Department. If the Courts continue to
interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by
the Government and its subordinate authorities,
there will be complete chaos in the Administration
which would not be conducive to public interest.
The High Court over looked these aspects in
interfering with the transfer Orders.”

(Emphasis laid)

9.4 Nevertheless, in the present case, it is pertinent to note

that in compliance with the directions issued by this Court during

the first round of litigation, the respondent-Nigam has duly

considered the matter and, in a fair and transparent manner,

granted a personal hearing to the petitioner. Following such due

process, the respondent-Nigam, after taking into account all

relevant factors, including the petitioner’s health condition, the

history of the petitioner’s postings, and other pertinent

circumstances, has decided to uphold the transfer order. The

petitioner, as a result, is assigned a ‘desk job’ at the new place of

posting i.e. at Alwar, which reflects a balanced approach in

addressing the petitioner’s concerns. For the sake of convenience,

the relevant extract from the letter dated 21.02.2025 passed by

the respondent-Nigam (rejecting the representation of the

petitioner) is reproduced herein below:

“In compliance to the directions ibid, the petitioner
submitted his representation dated 7th February

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2025, praying for cancellation of his transfer made
vide Order dated 15th January 2025 referred above.
The incumbent was also called for personal hearing
and heard on 21st February 2025.

After having thoroughly gone through the
representation dated 7th February and averments
made by the incumbent during the personal
hearing, it has been concluded that he was
transferred from his present place of posting at
Jaipur to the office of AEN (O&M) Bagadmev in
Alwar circle to fill in the vacant post of ARO in
revenue earning O&M sub-division. Further, the
incumbent was one of the AAOs-II having the
longest stint at Jaipur. He has remained posted at
Jaipur for a total period of around 26 years and 11
months out of his total service of around 28 years
and 6 months up to the date of transfer order
referred above.

The incumbent reiterated two primary grounds in
his representation, first the alleged violation of
transfer policy and his health grounds being
suffering from diabetic and hypertension. As far as
clause 3.6 of the transfer policy referred by the
incumbent is concerned, it is worthy to recall that
the same is one of the guiding principles only to be
taken care of at the time of transfer of personnel.
As such, this is not binding one overriding the
administrative expediency. With regard to the
other ground of health, the incumbent was
performing the desk job in his present office and
the similar desk job is to be performed by him at
the new place of posting without any field
assignments. Hence, the reported ailment of
diabetic and hypertension with which he was
carrying out his assignments at Jaipur is hardly
supposed to come in the way, while performing at
his new place of posting.

In view of the above, the transfer of the incumbent
has been made in the large interest of the Nigam
to fill in the post lying vacant in the revenue
earning sub-division. As such, there appears to be
no convincing ground to review the transfer order
dated 15th January 2025 referred above qua the
incumbent. Hence, the incumbent is advised to
resume his new assignment without any further
delay so that the billing, collection and other day-
to-day functions including timely redressal of the
grievances of the consumers of the sub-division
may not suffer anymore.”

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9.5 It is also noteworthy that the petitioner has not

challenged the relieving order dated 24.01.2025, thereby tacitly

accepting the administrative decision and the circumstances

surrounding it. In this context, it is a settled principle that a party

cannot approbate and reprobate (nemo debet bis vexari), i.e. the

petitioner cannot both accept and challenge the decision at the

same time.

9.6 Additionally, it would serve no useful purpose to disturb

the position of the private respondent, who has already complied

with the transfer order by joining his new post in Jaipur, as such

disruption would amount to a waste of time and resources, which

should be avoided by the Court.

10. In light of these considerations, it is evident that no valid

grounds exist for revisiting or overturning the transfer order, and

any attempt to do so would be contrary to established legal

principles and judicial efficiency.

11. In light of the foregoing, the present petition is hereby

dismissed. The petitioner is directed to report to the new place of

posting within a period of five working days, from the date of

pronouncement of this judgment. Pending applications, if any,

shall stand disposed of accordingly.

(SAMEER JAIN),J

Preeti Asopa

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