Jharkhand Private School Association vs The State Of Jharkhand on 2 May, 2025

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Jharkhand High Court

Jharkhand Private School Association vs The State Of Jharkhand on 2 May, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                               2025:JHHC:13151-DB




 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                   W.P. (C) No. 5455 of 2019
Jharkhand Private School Association, Ranchi, a Society registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1860, having its registered office at Sanjay
Gandhi Memorial College Gate, Pandra, P.O. Kamre, P.S. Pandra O.P.,
District Ranchi-835222; through its General Secretary, Ramranjan Kumar
Singh, aged about 61 years, son of late Bashistha Narayan Singh, resident
of Thanapara, Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur, District- Pakur, PIN 816107.
                                      ....     ...    Petitioner
                          Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, Department of
   School Education and Literacy, having its office at MDI Building,
   Besides Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-
   Ranchi-834004.
2. Deputy Secretary, Department of School Education and Literacy, having
   its office at MDI Building, Besides Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and
   P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi-834004.
3. District Superintendent of Education, Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur,
   District Pakur.
4. District Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad, P.O. and P.S. Dhanbad,
   District Dhanbad.
5. District Superintendent of Education, Palamau, P.O. and P.S.
   Daltonganj, District Daltonganj.          ... ...        Respondents
                            With
                   W.P.(C) No. 4972 of 2019
Jharkhand Gair Sarkari Vidyalay Sangh having its office at Sana Complex,
Sakchi, P.O. & P.S. Sakchi, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum
through its President Md. Tahir Hussain, aged about 37 years, son of
Sohrab Ahmed, resident of House No. 43A, Road No. 13, Taiwa Nagar,
Jawahar Nagar, P.O. Azad Nagar, P.S. Mango, Town Jamshedpur, District
East Singhbhum                                    ....      ...   Petitioner
                        Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Department of Human Resources,
   Government of Jharkhand, having its office situated at Project Building,
   P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District Ranchi.
3. Director of Primary Education, Human Resource Development
   Department (Directorate of Primary Education), Jharkhand Government,

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   having its office situated at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,
   Town and District Ranchi.
4. District Superintendent of Education, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur,
   having its office situated at Stocking Road in front of Blood Bank, CH
   Area, P.O. & P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum
                                        ... ...      Respondents
                          With
                   W.P. (C) No. 5559 of 2019
Jharkhand Private School Trust, Hazaribag having its office at I.G.M.
Public School, Mandai Kalan, P.O., P.S. & District- Hazaribag, through its
Secretary Prabhu Dayal Mahto aged about 53 years, son of Bhatu Mahto,
resident of Sarouni Kala, Rolla Barkagaon, P.O.- Rolla, P.S. & District-
Hazaribag.                           ....     ...    Petitioners
                         Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Human
   Resource Development Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its
   Office at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
2. The Director, Human Resource Development Department (Primary
   Education), Govt. of Jharkhand, having its Office at Project Bhawan,
   P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. The District Superintendent of Education, Hazaribag, P.O.,P.S. &
   District- Hazaribag.               ... ...       Respondents
                         With
                    W.P.(C) No. 5966 of 2019
1. Akhilesh Kumar Giri, Aged about 48 years, son of Late Munilal Giri,
   Resident of Simaldih P.O. Damodarpur, P.S. Dhanbad, District-
   Dhanbad, President, Private School Association, Jharkhand having office
   at East End Convent, Bhuda, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District-
   Dhanbad.
2. Anil Kumar, Aged about 43 years, son of Late Rama Singh, Resident of
   New Colony, Duhatand, P.O. Dhanbad, P.S. Dhansar District- Dhanbad,
   Assistant Secretary, Private School Association, Jharkhand having office
   at East End Convent, Bhuda, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District-
   Dhanbad
                                             ....      ...  Petitioners
                           Versus
 1. State of Jharkhand.



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2. Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department having
   office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. Director, Primary Education, School Education and Literacy
   Department having office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,
   District-Ranchi.
4. Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chairman, District Elementary Education
   Committee, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad.
5. District Superintendent of Education-cum-Secretary, District Education
   Establishment Committee, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad.
6. Chairman, Jharkhand Academic Council having office at Gyandeep
   Campus, Bargama, Namkum, P.O. & P.S. Namkum, District-Ranchi.
7. Secretary, Jharkhand Academic Council having office at Gyandeep
   Campus, Bargama, Namkum, P.O. & P.S. Namkum, District-Ranchi.
                                        ... ...      Respondents
                          With
                   W.P.(C) No. 6097 of 2019
Ram Prakash Tiwari aged about 45 years Son of Late Jeet Narayan Tiwari,
Post- Kendriya Adhyaksh, Jharkhand Gair Sarkari School, Sanchalak
Sangh, having registered office at Swarnima Academy Parisar, Boreya,
Kanke, P.O. & P.S.- Kanke, Ranchi-834006, State-Jharkhand
                                           ....      ...   Petitioner
                         Versus
1. State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, Department of
   School Education and Literacy, Jharkhand Government having its office
   at MDI Building Besides Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S.
   Dhurwa, District Ranchi-834004.
2. Deputy Secretary, Department of School Education and Literacy,
   Jharkhand Government having its office at MDI Building, Besides
   Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi-
   834004.
3. District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi having its office at
   Collectorate Building, Block-A, Room No. 206, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S.-
   Kotwali, District- Ranchi.
4. District Superintendent of Education, Pakur, having its office at Pakur,
   P.O. & P.S.- Pakur, District- Pakur.
5. District Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad, having its office at
   Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S.- Dhanbad, District- Dhanbad.



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6. District Superintendent of Education, Sahibganj, having its office at
   Sahibganj, P.O. & P.S.- Sahibganj, District- Sahibganj
                                      ... ...        Respondents
                        With
                   W.P.( C) No. 6652 of 2019
Private Schools and Children Welfare Association, Deoghar through its
President Jaya Verma age-46 years w/o Raj Kumar Verma R/o Williams
Town, P.O., P.S. & Dist-Deoghar
                                     ....      ...  Petitioner
                          Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of
    School Education and Literacy, having its office at MDI Building,
    Besides Project building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist-Ranchi.
2. Deputy Secretary, Department of School Education and Literacy,
    having its office at MDI Building Besides Project building, Dhurwa
    P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist-Ranchi
3. District Superintendent of Education, Deoghar, P.O. & P.S. & Dist-
    Deoghar .             ... ...      Respondents
                          With
               Cont. (Civil) Case No. 281 of 2025
Ram Prakash Tiwari, aged about 51 years, Son of Late Jeet Narayan
Tiwari, Post- Kendriya Adhyaksh, Jharkhand Gair Sarkari School,
Sanchalak Sangh, Having registered office Swarnima Academy Parisar,
Boreya, Kanke, P.O. & P.S.-Kanke, Ranchi, (Jharkhand)
                                             ....    ...  Petitioner
                          Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Sri Umashankar Singh, Deputy Secretary, Department of School
   Education and Literacy, Jharkhand Government, Father's name not
   known to the petitioner, having its office at-MDI Building, Besides
   Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.+P.S. -Dhurwa, District- Ranchi-834004
                                             ... ...     Respondents
                          ---------
CORAM:           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
                          ---------
For the Petitioner(s):    Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
                          M/s Sumeet Gadodia, Ritesh Kumar Gupta,
                          Rishav Kaushal, Aditya Kumar, Rupendra Prasad,


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                              Rajiv N. Prasad, Bhanu Kumar, Bharti Kumari,
                              Abhay Kumar Singh, Rajesh Kumar, Onkar Nath
                              Tewary, Shahid Yunus, Manoj Kumar Sinha,
                              Talat Parween, Seema K. Singh, Krishna
                              Prajapati, Tanya Singh, Advocates
     For the State:           M/s D.P. Mishra (AAG-I), Sachin Kumar (AAG-
                              II), Gaurav Raj (AC to AAG-II), Ashok Kumar
                              (AAG-IV), Faisal Allam (A.C. to S.C. Mines-III),
                              Rakesh Kumar Shahi [AC to SC (L&C)-1],
                              Awanish Shekhar (A.C. to AAG-I),
     For the JAC:             M/s Richa Sanchita, Suman Roy, Advocates
                              --------
     Reserved on: 20.03.2025               Pronounced on: 02 / 05 /2025

     M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral)

1. Since common questions of law arise for consideration in this batch of

cases, they are being disposed of by this common order.

2. The basic facts as in W.P.(C) No. 5455 of 2019 are set out below.

3. The said Writ petition is filed by the Apex Association of Private Schools

registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 operating in the State of

Jharkhand.

4. All the members of the said Society are Private School Managements

running schools in various districts of the State of Jharkhand and the private

schools run by them have been granted from time to time recognition by the

State of Jharkhand under a Code known as Unified District Information System

of Education (U-DISE).

Back ground facts

5. The 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 inserted Article 21A in the

Constitution of India with an object to provide free and compulsory education to

all children of age groups of 6-14 years and this was also recognized as

‘fundamental right’ under Article 21A of the Constitution of India.

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The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

6. Pursuant to the said Constitutional Amendment, the Right of Children to

Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short ‘the Act’) had been

enacted. It casts obligation upon appropriate State Government to provide for

and ensure compulsory education to children belonging to the age groups of

6-14 years for providing free education if they had not been admitted to school

by their parents or if parents are not able to support the educational expenses of

their children.

7. Under Section 18 of the said Act, it is mandated for all schools to obtain

recognition from the appropriate government or local authority in such form and

manner as may be prescribed.

8. A Recognition certificate could be issued under Section 18(2) of the Act in

favour of schools only upon fulfillment of norms and standards specified under

Section 19 thereof.

9. Section 20 of the Act confers on the Central Government the power to

amend the Schedule by adding or omitting therefrom any norms and standards

and the said Schedule prescribes norms and standards for the school.

10. Section 38 of the said statute enables the appropriate Government, by

notification, to make rules for “carrying out the provisions of the Act”.

The 2011 Rules

11. In exercise of the said power conferred by Section 38 of the Act, the State

of Jharkhand framed the Jharkhand Right of Children to Free and Compulsory

Education Rules, 2011 (for short ‘the 2011 Rules’).

12. Rule 12(7) of the said Rules (as framed in 2011) stated that ‘schools

established after the commencement of Act shall have to conform to the norms,

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standards and conditions mentioned in the schedule to the Act in order to

qualify for recognition under the Rules’.

The 2019 amendment to the 2011 Rules

13. The State of Jharkhand issued a notification in Memo No. 629

dt. 25.4.2019 amending the 2011 Rules vide “Jharkhand Right of Children to

Free and Compulsory Education (First Amendment) Rules, 2019. (for short

‘2019 Amendment’)

A. New requirement of application fee and security deposit added in 2019

14. Rule 12(1) of the 2011 Rules as it originally stood is as under:

“12. Recognition of schools.

(1) Every category of schools established before the commencement of the Act
shall make a self declaration within a period of three months from the notified
date in Form 1 to the concerned District Education Superintendent regarding its
compliance or otherwise with the norms and standards specified in the Schedule
of the Act
and fulfillment of the following conditions namely –

(a) That the school is run by the State Government or a society registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or a public trust
constituted under any law for the time being in force;

(b) That the school is not run for profit to any individual, group or
association of persons;

(c) That the school conforms to the values enshrined in the constitution;

(d) That the school building or other structures or the grounds are used only
for the purposes of education and skill development;

(e) That the school is open to inspection by any Officer authorized by the
State Government or Local Authority;

(f) That the school shall furnish such reports and information as may be
required and comply with such instructions of the State Government or
Local Authority as may be issued to secure the continued fulfillment of the
condition of recognition.”

15. Clause (g) was added by the 2019 amendment to Clause 12(1) after clause

(f) . The English translation of the same is as under:

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“that the arrangement for online application from schools for recognition
would be made soon; and Offline application will be accepted till this
arrangement comes into effect. Applications/inspection fee will be Rs. 12500/-
(twenty thousand five hundred rupees) for class 1 to 5 and Rs. 25000/-(twenty five
thousand rupees) for class 1 to 8, which will be non refundable. The amount will
be deposited by the concerned school through treasury challan and a copy of the
challan will have to be submitted in the District Superintendent of Education
office along with the application.”

The head under which the said fee was to be deposited was also mentioned.

16. There was a further addition by a clause in Section 12(1) of a provision for

making a mandatory fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lakh rupees) by an

applicant for recognition of a school in the name of the said school as a

permanent security fund, and mandating its photocopy to be submitted to the

office of the competent authority for information.

B. New requirements as to ownership/lease hold/extent of land etc added

17. Sub Rule (7) of Rule 12 in the 2011 Rules (as it originally stood) stated

that “every school established after the commencement of the Act, shall have to

conform to the norms, standards and conditions mentioned in the schedule to

the Act in order to qualify for recognition under the Rules”.

18. Clauses (a) to (j) were added in sub-rule (7) of Rule 12 on the ground that

under Section 19 and 25 of the Act, provision for playground and boundary wall

has to be made in Schedule 2 (vi) and (vii) of the standards and norms

prescribed for the school.

19. But since Clauses (e) to (j) introduced by 2019 Rules are not in challenge in

these cases, we are not referring to the same and we are referring only to those

clauses (a) to (d) which have been challenged. They state:

“(a) For establishing a school, the land must be registered in the name of the
school.

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(b) In case of non-availability of registered Sale Deed of the land in the name
of the school, it will be mandatory to have a registered Lease Deed of at least 30
years in the name of the school. The certificate related to the land will be
obtained from the District Registration Office in the prescribed form and should
be attached with application form.

(c ) In case of middle school, 0.75 acre in urban area and 1.00 acre in rural
area.

(d) In case of primary school, 40 decimal in urban areas and 60 decimal in
rural areas.

(e ) to (j) …..”

C. Expansion of the Committee for considering recognition of private schools

20. Sub Rule (8) of Rule 12 in the 2011 Rules mentioned that “the District

Education Superintendent shall issue order regarding recognition of any school

only after getting approval of the State Government”.

21. This was substituted in 2019 by way of amendment after deleting the Sub-

Rule (8) of Rule 12 as framed in 2011 in the following manner:-

” (8) (i) The recognition of non-government private schools will be considered in
the District Elementary Education Committee. The District Elementary
Education Committee will be constituted in the following manner-

              a)         Deputy Commissioner-Chairman.
              b)         Deputy Development Commissioner-Member
              c)         District Education Officer-Member
              d)         District Education Superintendent is- Member Secretary.
              e)         District School Inspector-Member.
              f)         Sub-Division Education Officer-Member.
              g)         Four (04) MLAs/MPs nominated by the State Government (This
              will be covered under paragraph-5(iii)).
              h)         3 members interested in education who belong to that district will
              be nominated by the Chairman of the Committee.

(ii) Besides this, if the Deputy Commissioner wishes, the Chairman of the Zila
Parishad, or a technical officer of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education
Rules and a competent revenue officer such as Additional Collector (Revenue)
may be special invitee members, who will be responsible for verification of the
reported plot etc.

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(iii) All MLSs/MPs of the district will be invited.

(iv) Generally the post of Sub-Divisional Education Officer remains vacant
and in order to have adequate representation in the Education Department, it
can also be abolished.”

Contentions of counsel for petitioners

22. Sri Ajit Kumar, Senior Counsel and Sri Sumeet Gadodia, counsel for the

petitioners contended that the amendments made in Sub Rule (1) of Rule 12,

clause (a) to (d) of Sub Rule (7) of Rule 12 and the amendment made to Sub-

Rule (8) of Rule 12 of the 2011 Rules by the 2019 amendment have to be struck

down.

23. It is contended that under 2011 Rules no fee was originally prescribed for

making application seeking recognition and it was the responsibility of the State

to grant recognition by fulfilling its statutory duty, but in the 2019 amendment,

the respondents have prescribed a very high and exorbitant inspection fee of

Rs.12,500/- and Rs.25,000/- respectively apart from a fixed deposit of

Rs.1,00,000/-.

24. It is contended that the Act did not empower or authorize the State to

realize any application fee or inspection fee from a schools for processing

application of such school for grant of recognition; and in the absence of such

enabling power contained under the Act for demanding such levy or fee, the

said provision compelling the private school managements to pay the amount of

Rs. 12,500/- or Rs. 25,000/- along with a fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- would

be wholly without jurisdiction.

25. Alternatively, it is contended that the said rate fixed is exorbitant and

confiscating, and on that ground also, it is liable to be struck down particularly

when such amount is being charged every year for grant of recognition.

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26. Coming to the amendment made to clause (7) of Rule 12 prescribing

conditions relating to the land on which the private school is to be run, it is

contended that the requirement prescribed under the 2019 Amendment is

beyond the delegated power being exercised by the State under the Act and is

ultra vires to the provisions of Section 18 to 20 of the Act.

27. It is contended that the statute did not prescribe any minimum criteria of the

area of land required to be possessed by a private school, whether for middle or

primary school, for establishment in urban and/or rural area, and so the

prescription of minimum area of land under the amended rule is ultra vires the

Act and beyond the legislative competence of the State.

28. It is pointed out that the Schedule to the Act mentioned that the school

should have a playground and should make an arrangement of securing the

school building by boundary wall or fencing, and the extent of land over which

the school has to be situated or whether it should to be owned by the private

school or the duration of the lease for the land where the school is situated,

ought not to have been prescribed.

29. It is contended that under Section 20 of the Act only the Central

Government can amend the schedule and when it has not done so, the State

Government cannot make such amendments.

30. As regards to the amendments made in 2019 to sub rule (8) of Rule 12, it is

contended that prescription of more than 15 persons therein for forming the

District Elementary Education Committee, which would be considering grant of

recognition to non-Government private schools, causes grave hardship because

it involves the participation of Members of the Legislative Assembly and

Members of Parliament and several Government Officials; that if any of the

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posts of the Government Officials are unfilled, or if the officers mentioned are

not available, or if the members of the Parliament and members of the

Legislative Assembly are not available prior to the beginning of the academic

year when such applications for recognition are usually made, it would be

difficult for the full committee to meet and much inconvenience would be

caused to the applicants for recognition of schools.

31. It is contended that the State ought to have at least prescribed a minimum

quorum for the said Committee considering the large number of private schools

as they exceed more than 10000 in State and keeping in mind the fact that the

said exercise needs to be done every year.

32. It is contended that prescribing such a large number of persons to be the

members of the Committee, which would consider applications for grant of

recognition, will undoubtedly delay the process of decision making regarding

the grant of recognition to private schools.

33. Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the following decisions:-

Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and

another1, State of Kerala v. Mythri Vidya Bhavan English Medium School2,

State of Kerala and another v. Mythri Vidya Bhavan English Medium School

and others3, Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala

and Others4, Cellular Operators Association of India and others v. Telecom

Regulatory Authority of India and others5, Global Energy Limited and

1
(2012) 6 SCC 1
2
2012 SCC OnLine Ker 21698
3
2018 SCC OnLine 481
4
(2006) 4 SCC 327
5
(2016) 7 SCC 703

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Another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission6, Punjab Association v.

Director of Matriculation Schools7, Sunil Kumar Kori and Another v. Gopal

Das Kabra and Others8 and TISCO Limited and Another v. State of Bihar and

Ors9, Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema10 and the

decision of the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in 2014 SCC

OnLine Punjab & Haryana 8180.

34. Counsel also reiterated that an interim order had been issued on 21.10.2019

and on 22.8.2023 in WPC No. 4972 of 2019, 5559 of 2019, 5966 of 2019, 6097

of 2019, 6652 of 2019 and 5455 of 2019 mandating that no coercive steps

should be taken against the members of the petitioners’ association, but the

members of the petitioners’ association are being harassed by the respondents by

issuing certain notifications on 10.12.2024 and 24.12.2024.

35. It is further contended by the counsel for the petitioners that only the

private schools are being compelled to follow the above norms. They point out

that the norms prescribed in the 2019 Rules are being fulfilled by only 17983

Government Schools out of 32741 Schools in State of Jharkhand in 2018-2019,

and the respondents cannot be permitted to discriminate in the application of the

2019 Rules by enforcing them only against the private schools and not applying

them to the Government schools which have not fulfilled the norms. Reference

is made to Annexure-10 in W.P.(C) No. 5455 of 2019 wherein the above

information was furnished under the Right to Information Act to the petitioner

on 24.9.2019.

6

(2009) 15 SCC 570
7
W.P.No. 14498 of 2016 (Madras High Court)
8
(2016) 10 SCC 467
9
(2018) 12 SCC 107
10
AIR 1965 SC 1107

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Stand of the State Government

36. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government by the

Under Secretary to the Primary Education Department, it is contended that

under clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act, the State

Government is empowered to make rules by notification with regard to the

form, the period, the manner and conditions for issuing certificate of recognition

under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, and that under clause (g) of sub-

section (2) of Section 38, it is also empowered to prescribe form and manner of

making application for certificate of recognition, under sub-section (1) of

Section 18.

37. It is contended that Rule 12 is framed under Section 38 of the Act; that the

State has the power to decide the procedure for making applications for

recognition under Rule 12 of the Rules framed under the Act by the State

including levying of minimum fee as well as fixed deposit for application for

recognition by the private schools.

38. It is contended that the prescription of the minimum fee and the fixed

deposit is to ensure that frivolous and uninterested applicants do not submit

applications for recognition as it would lead to wastage of time as well as the

resources of the government.

39. While admitting that the norms laid down would apply to Government

schools also apart from private schools, it is contended that the petitioners

cannot question the jurisdiction and power of the State Government to make or

amend the rules laying down norms for recognition.

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40. It is contended that the subject of Education is in the Concurrent list and the

amendments made in 2019 cannot be said to have encroached upon the power

and jurisdiction of the Central Government under the Act.

41. It is contended that there is a tendency of private schools being opened in

large numbers without requisite infrastructure, capacity to impart education and

accommodate enough students; that parents of such students who are admitted

in the schools are duped by the private school owners; and to cut short the

malpractices and exploitation done by the private schools, the State Government

has laid down the norms to protect the right of children and parents under the

Act.

42. Reliance is also placed on the norms laid down in Uttar Pradesh and

Andhra Pradesh for running a private school where minimum area of land

required to set up the school based upon minimum student area, size of each

classroom, have been prescribed.

43. It is also defended that right to use any immovable property or land for the

purpose of school by the Managing Committee of a private school has to be

through a valid registered sale deed; that there are Tenancy Laws in the State of

Jharkhand prohibiting transaction of certain category of lands; in such

properties, private school cannot be run; and registration of such agreement or

lease deed is also mandatory under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

44. It is stated that the amendment to Rule 12 made by 2019 Rules is to ensure

transparency, fairness, accountability and uniformity across all the Districts with

respect to the procedure of recognition of private schools and control individual

decentralized decision making, leading to ambiguity and difference in the

procedure eventually converting into litigation.

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45. It is denied that the provisions contained in Section 20, which confers

power on the Central Government to amend the schedule by adding to or

omitting therefrom any norms and standards, restricts the power of the State

Government to amend the norms and standards given in the schedule.

46. It is also contended that there is immunity conferred by Section 37 of the

2009 Act of actions taken in good faith by the Central Government, State

Government etc., and, therefore, amendment made to the Rules prescribed under

the Act by the State of Jharkhand exercising power under Section 38 of the Act,

cannot be interfered with.

47. It is contended that the Court cannot substitute its wisdom for the

Government on the ground that a better formula or public policy could be

evolved; that the Executive authority of the State is competent to frame a policy;

and the Court cannot interfere with such policy unless it is patently arbitrary and

capricious thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution or where there is a

conflict with any statutory or constitutional provision.

48. It is stated that there is limited judicial review in policy related matters and

reliance is made on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India and

others v. M Selvakumar and anr11, State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v.

Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh12 and the

judgment of the Madras High Court in Parents Union for Students Educational

Rights v. State of Tamil Nadu13. It is contended that the petitioners are not

entitled to any relief and the Writ petitions should be dismissed.

11

(2017) 3 SCC 504
12
(2011) 6 SCC 597
13
W.P. No. 13536 of 2014

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49. It is also contended that there is no contempt committed by the respondents

in encouraging private schools to apply for recognition as per the norms

prescribed in the 2019 amendments and no contempt has been committed by the

respondents of the interim order prohibiting taking of coercive steps passed by

this Court.

The direction of this Court on 5.3.2021

50. During the course of the hearing of these Writ petitions on 5.3.2021, this

Court directed the respondents to a file supplementary counter affidavit on the

following aspects:

(a) What is the extent of tribal and non-tribal lands available in
the State of Jharkhand and in non-tribal land, what is the figure
which is available for such type of activity barring the forest area
and other prohibited areas?

(b) Whether the Government schools are also following the norms
and satisfying the amended provisions?

(c) If yes, then the details should be given especially when the
petitioner has brought on record the information given under the
Right to Information Act that more than 50% of the Government
Schools of the State of Jharkhand are not having play grounds.

(d) In such a situation, if Governments schools themselves are not
fulfilling the criteria, but they are allowed to run, whether it would be
reasonable and not arbitrary to expect everything from the private
institutions or minority institutions whatever the case may be?

First Supplementary affidavit filed by State

51. In response thereto, a supplementary counter affidavit is filed by the State

Government contending that:

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(i) the total tribal area in the State is 35,741.66 Sq. k.m.; total non tribal

area in the State is 3,98,235.44 Sq. k.m..; total non tribal area

available for education purpose is 24,576.95 Sq. k.m.;

(ii) the total number of schools in Jharkhand is more than 34850;

(iii) the amendment of 2019 would not apply retrospectively and that

they would apply only for the schools established after the making of

the Rules;

(iv) the amended rules would apply equally to government schools as

they are applicable to private schools; all government schools which

are currently operational in the State were built long before the

amendment;

(v) Government is taking steps for improving the infrastructure, land and

play ground conditions in the Government schools under school

consolidation which was done in two phases in 2018-2019 ;

(vi) and such consolidated schools are 4,600;

(vii) that the State is in the process of rolling out scheme of School of

Excellence called Leader Schools with proper infrastructure in

consonance with the Act and the Constitutional mandates in a

phased manner.

52. It is pointed out that State of Gujarat and Haryana have also prescribed

minimum per student area and size of the class room as well as condition for

providing recognition to private schools and that the High Court of Punjab &

Haryana in the case of Balraj Singh and another v. State of Punjab and

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another14 had upheld the actions of the State Government for closing down of

the schools which did not adhere to the norms which made by the Government

under the Act.

53. It is pleaded that the rules and regulations formulated by the State

Government with respect to minimum area of land and adequate play ground

requirement are in consonance with the CBSE Affiliation Rules as similar

norms are prescribed by the CBSE as well.

Second Supplementary affidavit filed by State

54. The Secretary of Department of School Education and Literacy of the

Government of Jharkhand filed another supplementary counter affidavit on

16.11.2022.

55. He first referred to the settled legal principle that Right to Education is a

fundamental right and part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed under

Article 21 of the Constitution of India; and that Article 21A introduced by the

86th Amendment Act, 2002 of the Constitution of India on 12.12.2002 created a

fundamental right for free and compulsory education to all children of the ages

of 6 to 14 years; and this is implemented through the 2009 Act.

56. Reference is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Society for

Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (1 supra) which upheld the validity of

2009 Act.

57. It is contended that that there is no merit in the plea of the petitioners’

Association that the State Government had exceeded its jurisdiction while

making amendments to the 2011 Rules.

14

C.W.P. 7388 of 2010

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58. It is contended that the Screening Committee was constituted under the

Chairmanship of the Director, Primary Education on 23.6.2016; the said

Committee decided to procure information regarding ownership and area of

private schools; that it also looked into the rules of affiliation/recognition

followed by CBSE, ICSE and other States with regard to ownership and area

requirement; meetings were also held with the Principals of schools affiliated to

CBSE/ICSE and representatives of 29 out of 86 such schools attended the

meeting.

59. It is contended that all the private schools are required to obtain recognition

from the Government under the provision of 2009 Act, but schools having

recognition for Classes 1 to 10 or 12 are not required to obtain such recognition;

after due deliberations, the Screening Committee decided to lay down terms,

conditions, rules and procedure requirement with respect to the registration,

ownership and the area of the schools seeking recognition from the State

Government. It is stated that the Rules were notified after being approved by the

Cabinet.

60. It is contended that the petitioners cannot challenge the prescription of fees

of Rs. 12,500/- and Rs. 25,000/- as the State machinery would have to be

deployed for processing, filtering, inspecting and visiting the school seeking

recognition within the State.

61. The stand taken in the earlier counter affidavits is again reiterated and

therefore, it is not being referred to avoid repetition.

Consideration by the Court

62. In these Writ Petitions certain amendments made in 2019 vide The

Jharkhand Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (First

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Amendment) Rules, 2019 through a notification issued bearing memo No. 629

dt. 25.04.2019 amending the Jharkhand Right of Children to Free and

Compulsory Education Rules, 2011, are in challenge.

63. These Rules, according to the respondents have been made in exercise of

power conferred on the State Government under Section 38 of Clause (h) of the

Act.

64. Section 38(1) permits the State Government, by notification to make rules

for carrying out the provisions of the Act and Clause (h) of Sub Section (2)

enables the State Government to prescribe the form, the period, the manner and

the conditions for issuing certificate of recognition under Sub Section (2) of

Section 18.

65. Sections 18 and 19 state as under:

“18. No School to be established without obtaining certificate of
recognition.–(1) No school, other than a school established, owned or controlled
by the appropriate Government or the local authority, shall, after the
commencement of this Act, be established or function, without obtaining a
certificate of recognition from such authority, by making an application in such
form and manner, as may be prescribed.

(2) The authority prescribed under sub-section (1) shall issue the
certificate of recognition in such form, within such period, in such manner, and
subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed:

Provided that no such recognition shall be granted to a school unless it
fulfils norms and standards specified under section 19.

(3) On the contravention of the conditions of recognition, the prescribed
authority shall, by an order in writing, withdraw recognition:

Provided that such order shall contain a direction as to which of the
neighbourhood school, the children studying in the derecognised school, shall be
admitted:

Provided further that no recognition shall be so withdrawn without giving
an opportunity of being heard to such school, in such manner, as may be
prescribed.

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(4) With effect from the date of withdrawal of the recognition under sub-
section (3), no such school shall continue to function.

(5) Any person who establishes or runs a school without obtaining
certificate of recognition, or continues to run a school after withdrawal of
recognition, shall be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and in
case of continuing contraventions, to a fine of ten thousand rupees for each day
during which such contravention continues.

19. Norms and standards for school.–(1) No school shall be established, or
recognised under section 18, unless it fulfils the norms and standards specified in
the Schedule.

(2) Where a school established before the commencement of this Act does
not fulfil the norms and standards specified in the Schedule, it shall take steps to
fulfil such norms and standards at its own expenses, within a period of three years
from the date of such commencement.

(3) Where a school fails to fulfil the norms and standards within the
period specified under sub-section (2), the authority prescribed under sub-section
(1) of section 18 shall withdraw recognition granted to such school in the manner
specified under sub-section (3) thereof.

(4) With effect from the date of withdrawal of recognition under sub-
section (3), no school shall continue to function.

(5) Any person who continues to run a school after the recognition is
withdrawn, shall be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and in
case of continuing contraventions, to a fine of ten thousand rupees for each day
during which such contravention continues.”

(emphasis supplied)

66. There is a Schedule to the Act prescribing the norms and standards for a

school. It enumerates the norms and standards for buildings and prescribes that

there should be all-weather building consisting of-

(a) at least one class-room for every teacher and an office-cum-store-

cum-Head teacher’s room;

    (b)    barrier-free access;

    (c)    separate toilets for boys and girls;

    (d)    safe and adequate drinking water facility to all children;



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    (e)       a kitchen where mid-day meal is cooked in the school;

    (f)       playground;

    (g)       arrangements for securing the school building by boundary wall or

    fencing.

67. Under Section 20 the Central Government is permitted to amend the

Schedule by adding to, or omitting therefrom any norms and standards.

68. No doubt normally policy decisions cannot be interfered with by the Courts

as contended by the respondents. But there is no absolute immunity to policy

decisions in our jurisprudence.

69. In Vishal Tiwari (Adani Group Investigation) v. Union of India and

others15 it was held as under:

“17. From the above exposition of law, the following principles emerge:

(a) Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the
correctness, suitability, and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors
to expert regulatory agencies on matters of policy which they are entitled to
formulate;

(b) The scope of judicial review, when examining a policy framed by a
specialised regulator, is to scrutinise whether it : (i) violates the fundamental
rights of the citizens; (ii) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution; (iii) is
opposed to a statutory provision; or (iv) is manifestly arbitrary. The legality of
the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of
judicial review;

(c) When technical questions arise — particularly in the domain of economic
or financial matters — and experts in the field have expressed their views and
such views are duly considered by the statutory regulator, the resultant policies
or subordinate legislative framework ought not to be interfered with;

(d) …” (emphasis supplied)

Similar view was taken in Federation Haj PTOs of India v. Union of

India16. It was held:

15

(2024) 4 SCC 115

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“19. The scope of judicial review is very limited in such matters. It is only
when a particular policy decision is found to be against a statute or it
offends any of the provisions of the Constitution or it is manifestly
arbitrary, capricious or mala fide, the Court would interfere with such
policy decisions.” (emphasis supplied)

Validity of prescription of application/inspection fee/security deposit

70. Firstly we shall deal with the prescription of norms for

application/inspection fee amounting to Rs. 12,500/- for Classes 1 to 5 and Rs.

25,000/- for Classes 1 to 8 which is to be non-refundable introduced by

amending Rule 12(1) by adding a clause to the original Rule as made in the year

2011 i.e. Clause (छ) in Rule 12(1); and also Clause (क) introducing the security

deposit requirement of Rs.1,00,000/-.

71. In the supplementary counter affidavit dt. 16.11.2022 filed by the Secretary

of the Department of School Education and Literacy of the Government of

Jharkhand, these are justified on the ground that the inspection fee is required as

the State machinery would have to be deployed on processing, filtering,

inspecting and visiting the school seeking recognition within the State.

72. However, as pointed out by the counsel for the petitioners there is no

provision in the Act empowering the State Government to impose such an

inspection fee or demand a security deposit, and in the absence of any power

conferred on the State Government under the statute to levy such inspection fee

or security fee, the question arises whether such imposition is valid.

73. It is settled law that the expression ‘fee’ is also comprehended in the

expression ‘tax’ for purpose of Article 265 of the Constitution of India which

prescribes that “no tax is levied or collected except by the authority of law”.

16

(2020) 18 SCC 527, at page 535

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74. In CIT Vs. MacDowell and Company Limited17 the Supreme Court held

while interpreting Article 366 (28) and also Article 265 of the Constitution of

India that ‘Law’ in the context of Article 265 means an Act of legislature and

cannot comprise an executive order or rule without express statutory authority;

the term ‘Tax’ under Article 265 read with Article 366(28) includes imposts of

every kind i.e. tax, duty, cess or fees. The Supreme Court held:

“21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class denotes to
various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise
revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression
denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they
are levied. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only
under any law authorising levy and collection of tax as envisaged under
Article 265 which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied
and collected except authorised by law. It in its elementary meaning
conveys that to support a tax legislative action is essential, it cannot be
levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of
executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by
the State.

22. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been defined to include the
imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and tax
shall be construed accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory levy. The
well-known and well-settled characteristic of “tax” in its wider sense
includes all imposts. Imposts in the context have following characteristics:

(i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty.

(ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act of legislature
and cannot comprise an executive order or rule without express
statutory authority.

(iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article 366(28)
includes imposts of every kind viz. tax, duty, cess or fees.

17

(2009) 10 SCC 755

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(iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of compulsory
exaction, a liability founded on principle of contract cannot be a
“tax” in its technical sense as an impost, general, local or special.”

(emphasis supplied)

75. This interpretation was also reiterated in Jindal Stainless Limited and

another Vs. State of Haryana and others18 and in TISCO Limited (9 supra).

76. Counsel for the respondents has not been able to point out any provision in

the Act which empowers the State to demand Rs.25,000/- or Rs.12,500/-

towards non-refundable application/inspection fee or a security deposit of Rs.

1,00,000/- by way of mandatory fixed deposit.

77. In the absence of any power conferred under the Act to levy such

inspection/application fee or security deposit, the prescription of the same by the

State Government by way of amendment in 2019 to 2011 Rules cannot be

sustained. It would in effect amount to levy of a ‘tax’ imposed by the State

which cannot be traced to the statute, and so it’s levy would violate Article 265

of the Constitution of India.

78. After all, under Section 38(1) the Government is empowered to make rules

for carrying out the provisions of the Act and any Rule made under Sub Section

(2) of Section 38 cannot be framed in matters that are not contemplated under

the Act.

79. In Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union (4 supra) the Supreme

Court held that in para-26, 27, 28, 37 and 38 as under:

“26. Its power, therefore, was to make rules only for the purpose of
carrying out the purposes of the Act and not dehors the same. In other

18
(2017) 12 SCC 1

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words, rules cannot be framed in matters that are not contemplated under
the Act.

27. The State may have unfettered power to regulate the manufacture,
sale or export-import sale of intoxicants but in the absence of any statutory
provision, it cannot, in purported exercise of the said power, direct a
particular class of workers to be employed in other categories of liquor
shops.

28. The Rules in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act, thus,
could be framed only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
Act. Both the power to frame rules and the power to impose terms and
conditions are, therefore, subject to the provisions of the Act. They must
conform to the legislative policy.They must not be contrary to the other
provisions of the Act. They must not be framed in contravention of the
constitutional or statutory scheme.

xxx xxx xxx

37. Furthermore, the terms and conditions which can be imposed by the
State for the purpose of parting with its right of exclusive privilege more or
less has been exhaustively dealt with in the illustrations in sub-section (2)
of Section 29 of the Act. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the
general power to make rules is contained in sub-section (1) of Section 29.
The provisions contained in sub-section (2) are illustrative in nature. But,
the factors enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 29 are indicative of the
heads under which the statutory framework should ordinarily be worked
out.

38. Neither Section 18-A nor sub-sections (c) and (d) of Section 24 of
the Act confer power upon the delegatee to encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the other department of the State and take upon its head something
which is not within its domain or which otherwise would not come within
the purview of the control and regulation of trade in liquor. The conditions
imposed must be such which would promote the policy or secure the object
of the Act. To grant employment to one arrack worker in each toddy shop in
preference to the toddy workers neither promotes the policy nor secures the
object of the Act. It is not in dispute that the purport and object of such
Rules is to rehabilitate the former employees of arrack shops.

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Rehabilitation of the employees is not within the statutory scheme and,
thus, the Rules are ultra vires the provisions of the Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

80. There is also another reason why the inspection fee cannot be sustained.

The work of inspection being done by the respondents is only to see that the

private schools fulfill the requirements provided in the Rules and in the schedule

to the Act. It is not a service being rendered to the applicants for recognition to

run the schools and so a ‘fee’ cannot be collected for that purpose.

81. In Corporation of Calcutta (10 Supra), the Supreme Court considered the

question under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Section 443 thereof and Sub

Section (2) of Section 548 of the said statute empowers the Corporation to grant

a licence to a person to open any cinema house for public amusement. The

Corporation was permitted to charge a fee for every licence under the Act at a

rate which may be prescribed.

It was contended in that case that the levy authorised by Sections 443 and

548 was a fee in return for services to be rendered and not a tax and it had

therefore, to be commensurate with the costs incurred by the Corporation in

providing those services and the levy of Rs. 6000/- per year as such licence fee

was far in excess of those costs and for that reason invalid.

The Corporation defended the same contending that the levy was a Tax and

not a fee taken in return for services and no question of its being proportionate

to any costs for services arises.

The Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Sections 443 and 548 of

the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 and held that the Sections do not refer to the

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rendering of any service by the Corporation and it cannot be said that the levy is

a fee in return for services.

It held that the work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to

see that the terms of licence are observed by the licensee is not a service to him.

Therefore, the justification offered by the State Government that such

amounts are required for inspection would practically amount to a tax for which

there is no power conferred on the State under the Act.

The Supreme Court held:

“13. It is however said that the by-law earlier quoted requires
inspection of the cinema houses by the Corporation and that that was the
service that the Corporation had to render in return for the licence fee. We
are unable to accept this contention. The inspection was not certainly a
service to the licensee; it was necessary only to make sure that he carried
out the conditions on which the licence had been granted to him. It was
something to be done to control the licensee’s activities and to make him
observe the conditions of the licence on pain of cancellation of the licence.
This is clear from sub-section (3) of Section 548 which states that “any
licence…. granted under this Act …. may at any time be suspended or
revoked … if any of its restrictions or conditions is infringed or evaded by
the grantee”. This non-observance of the conditions of the licence would
expose the licensee to penalty under Section 537 of the Act. The inspection
was therefore necessary also for enforcing the conditions of the licence by
penalising a breach of them by the licensee. We cannot imagine that an
inspection by the Corporation for such purposes can at all be said to be
rendering of service to the licensee.” (emphasis supplied)

82. According to the first supplementary counter affidavit filed by the State

Government there are more than 34850 schools within the State of Jharkhand. If

the levy at the rates referred to above both for inspection fee and for security

deposit for each school is taken into account, since it is not denied by the State

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that recognition process has to be undertaken every year, it would result in a

great windfall to the State which was certainly not the intention of the

Parliament when it enacted the law or Right of Children to Free and

Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

83. Therefore, the provisions enacted in the year 2019 Rules both with regard

to the application/inspection fee of Rs.25,000 or Rs.12,500/- and the security

deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- are declared unconstitutional and are struck down.

Validity of prescription in 2019 Rules of sale deed /lease deed registration and
prescription of area for starting/running a primary school/middle school.

84. The next challenge by the petitioners is to Clause (7) of Rule 12 and in

particular Clause (a) to (d) thereof requiring that for establishing a school, land

must be registered in the name of the school; and in absence of a sale deed, there

should at least be a lease deed of 30 years in the name of the school. Also

particular area for starting/running a middle school and primary school in urban

area and rural area is mentioned i.e. in case of middle school 0.75 acre in an

urban area and acre 1.00 in rural area; and in the case of primary school 40

decimal in an urban area, 60 decimal in a rural area.

85. The State had sought to justify the same contending that similar norms have

been prescribed by the CBSE, and after discussions with the private school

managements, and also after looking at the rules framed in other States like

Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Gujarat these requirements have been

introduced.

86. We do not see anything unreasonable on the part of the State in introducing

these requirements by way of amendment in 2019 in the 2011 Rules since the

same do not appear to be arbitrary or unreasonable and the State Government is

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empowered to prescribe such norms under Sub Section (2) of Section 18 read

with Section 38(2)(h) of the Act. After all, it is necessary to ensure that the

private school management is serious in establishing and continuing the school

for a long period in a spacious premises so that the parents of children who

study there feel secure that the school will not shut down suddenly within a

short time of it’s establishment and their children will get to study in a spacious

school which is not congested.

87. Though it is contended by the counsel for the petitioners that there are

many Government schools which do not fulfill these requirements and these

norms are not being applied to them, and so such requirements cannot be

applied to private schools, we do not agree with the said contention. This is

because, Section 18(1) specifically excludes school established, owned or

controlled by the appropriate Government or the local authority and only

private schools are required to get recognition. Therefore, the norms mentioned

in Rule 12 as amended in 2019 would not apply to such schools.

88. We are not however stating that standards of Government schools need no

improvement. True, necessary steps may also be required to be taken in that

direction by the State Government, but that does not imply that private schools

are not to comply with the mandate, when they collect more fees from the

students than what is charged in the Government Schools.

89. Therefore these norms prescribed by 2019 Rules are upheld.

Validity of clause in 2019 Rules expanding membership of the District Elementary
Education Committee

90. Coming to the substitution made in Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 12 in 2019 to the

original Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 12 prescribing consideration by District

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Elementary Education Committee of recognition of non-government private

schools, it is to be noticed that the said Committee consists of several employees

of the Education Department along with four Members of Legislative Assembly

or Members of Parliament and three other members interested in Education who

belong to that district nominated by the Chairman of the Committee.

91. All put together this makes the Committee consist of 13 people.

92. We may point out that while in principle there may be no objection as to

formation of a Committee for considering the recognition of the non-

Government private schools in each District, having such a large number of

persons in this Committee makes it unwieldy particularly when no quorum is

prescribed for the Committee to function.

93. It is possible that some of the posts mentioned in the amended Clause (8) of

Rule 12 may be vacant in a particular District. Also it may not be always

possible for the Members of Legislative Assembly or Members of Parliament to

attend the Committee meetings.

94. Since normally, the process of recognition is undertaken in each district

before the commencement of the academic year, if at that point of time there is a

situation where some of the posts of Government servants mentioned in the

amended clause are not vacant, then it would cause considerable inconvenience

and delay in considering the applications for recognition of non-Government

private schools.

95. We therefore, direct the respondents to consider amending this Rule by

prescribing either a lesser number of members in the Committee or prescribing a

quorum which would suffice for considering applications made for recognition

by non Government private schools in any academic year so that the process of

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such recognition can be taken up quickly and expeditiously and benefit the

District concerned.

Other provisions

96. Though there are several provisions in the Rules which are also challenged,

arguments are not advanced as regards them. Therefore, we have confined the

consideration only to the above referred three provisions in 2019 amending

Rules.

The Contempt Case No. 281 of 2025

97. As regards the contempt case filed by the petitioner therein is concerned, it

cannot be said that there is any willful disobedience of the interim direction

given by this Court not to take any coercive action against the petitioner/private

school management pending the hearing of the Writ petition merely because the

respondents have issued letters asking the respective schools to apply for

recognition under the amended Rules.

Conclusion

98. In the result:

    (a)      The Writ petitions are partly allowed;

    (b)      Clause (छ) in Rule 12(1) added by the 2019 amendment to Clause

12(1) prescribing application/inspection fee and the also Clause (क)

introducing the mandatory security deposit requirement of

Rs.1,00,000/- as permanent security fund are struck down;

(c) Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub Rule (7) of Rule 12 are valid;

(d) The respondents shall consider within 8 weeks amending Sub-Rule

(8) of Rule 12 (as amended in 2019) by either reducing the members

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of the District Elementary Education Committee or prescribing a

quorum of 5 or 6 members for it’s meetings, as deemed advisable.

(e) The private schools which have not yet adhered to the 2019 amended

Rules (except those norms which have now been struck down in this

judgment) are granted 6 months time from today to comply with the

same. This is because the academic year has already started and

several students who joined such private schools will suffer if the

recognition is now abruptly withdrawn on account of non-fulfilment

of the norms under the 2019 amended Rules.

99. Therefore, the contempt case is closed and the Writ Petitions are partly

allowed as above. No costs.

100. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.

(M. S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

(Deepak Roshan, J.)

N.A.F.R.
Sharda/VK

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