Jindal Cocoa Llp vs Reserve Bank Of India on 3 January, 2025

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Bombay High Court

Jindal Cocoa Llp vs Reserve Bank Of India on 3 January, 2025

Author: B.P. Colabawalla

Bench: B.P. Colabawalla

 2025:BHC-OS:75-DB


                                                                                    F-J- WPL-8980-2024.doc



                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                           ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                                              WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 8980 OF 2024

                               1. Jindal Cocoa LLP

                               2. Vijay Jindal

                               3. Jayshree Vijay Jindal                                 ...Petitioners

                                          Versus
                              1. Reserve Bank of India

                              2. Union of India

                              3. Banking Ombudsman

                              4. HDFC Bank Limited                                      ...Respondents



                          Mr. V. Sridharan, Senior Advocate, a/w Gopal Machiraju, Krusha
                          Maheshwari, Ruchi Wagaralkar, i/b Sriram Sridharan, Advocates
                          for Petitioners.
                          Mr. Y.R. Mishra, a/w Upendra Lokegaonkar, Shailendra Y.
                          Mishra, Advocates for Respondent No.2-UoI.
                          Mr. Prasad Shenoy, a/w Parag Sharma, Aditi Pathak, Vijay
                          Salokhe, Kirti Ojha, Megha More, Ankit Upadhyay, i/b BLAC &
                          Co., Advocates for Respondent No.3.
                          Mr. Mustafa Doctor, Senior Counsel, a/w Gaurav Mehta,
                          Chaitanya Mehta, Amir Ali Shaikh, Tanjul Sharma, i/b Dhruve
          Digitally
                          Liladhar & Co., Advocates for Respondent No.4.
          signed by
          ASHWINI
ASHWINI   JANARDAN
JANARDAN VALLAKATI
VALLAKATI Date:
          2025.01.03
          18:47:25
          +0530



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                           CORAM       : B.P. COLABAWALLA &
                                           SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, JJ.

                           Reserved on :        October 22, 2024
                           Pronounced on:       January 3, 2025


JUDGEMENT:

(Per, Somasekhar Sundaresan J.)

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Respondents waive

service. By consent, heard finally.

Introduction:

2. This Petition essentially challenges the interpretation of the

Reserve Bank of India’s Master Circular on Rupee/Foreign Currency

Export Credit & Customer Service to Exporters , dated July 1, 2015

(“Master Circular”) by the Banking Ombudsman (Respondent No.3)

appointed by the Reserve Bank of India (Respondent No.1, ” RBI”). The

Banking Ombudsman dismissed the Petitioners’ grievance against the

very same interpretation that had been taken by HDFC Bank Limited

(Respondent No.4, “HDFC Bank”).

3. Jindal Cocoa LLP (“Borrower”), is a limited liability

partnership engaged in the business of exporting cocoa and cocoa
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products. HDFC Bank had extended Indian Rupee-denominated pre-

shipment credit by way of a running account facility under the Master

Circular to the Borrower. The Borrower, along with its two partners Mr.

Vijay Jindal and Ms. Jayshree Vijay Jindal, are collectively the

Petitioners.

Regulatory Context and Background:

4. Under the Master Circular, banks extend credit to their

clients who are exporters, at a special interest rate applicable to export

credit, which is lower than the standard interest rates applicable to

normal borrowings by clients. The export credit availed of by the

Borrower was eligible for the benefit of further concessional interest due

to a subvention provided by the Government of India, under an Interest

Equalization Scheme notified by the Ministry of Commerce and

Industry, Government of India (Respondent No. 2) vide Trade Notice

dated December 8, 2015 (“Subvention Scheme”). The Government of

India would bear the value of the further discount on the interest rate,

through a mechanism put in place by the RBI to administer it. The RBI

had issued a circular dated December 4, 2015 (” RBI Circular on

Subvention”) on the subject, with detailed operational modalities.

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5. The maximum tenure of any export credit under the Master

Circular was stipulated at 360 days. On May 23, 2020, owing to the

outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the RBI extended the maximum

permissible tenure of export credit from one year to 15 months i.e. a

further 90 days was allowed, which would lead to the permissible period

expanding from 360 days to 450 days. At the time of the original

sanction of the advances, and at disbursement, differing tenures had

been envisaged between the parties, but the period of the credit was

extended to the maximum permissible limit under the Master Circular.

For all purposes of adjudicating this Petition, the maximum period

applicable under the Master Circular is 450 days (instead of 360 days)

and inter-changeable references are made.

6. At the heart of the dispute is the interpretation of one

paragraph and its implication for the entire Master Circular. It is placed

in the section that deals with tenure of pre-shipment credit – Paragraph

1.1.2 (ii), reads thus:-

(ii) If pre-shipment advances are not adjusted by submission of
export documents within [360]1 days from the date of advance, the
advances will cease to qualify for prescribed rate of interest for
export credit to the exporter ab initio.

[Emphasis Supplied]

1
As stated earlier, this period would be 450 days for all purposes of this Petition
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7. HDFC Bank has argued that in view of the aforesaid

paragraph, whether exports took place within the said timeframe and

whether the export credit was redeemed within the said timeframe are

not sufficiently relevant. What is truly relevant is whether the export

documents were provided within this period, failing which, the advances

given to finance the exports would never be regarded as “export credit”

ab initio i.e. right from the very first date of the advance being made.

Consequently, according to HDFC Bank, since the Subvention Scheme

provides Government-sponsored discount only to “export credit”, the

exporter would not be entitled to any benefit of the Subvention Scheme

where the advance ceases to be “export credit” ab initio.

8. In other words, HDFC Bank’s stance is that (i) exports should

be made; (ii) the advances should be redeemed; and (iii) the documents

proving exports must be delivered; all within 450 days. Under the

Master Circular, HDFC Bank would argue, even a day’s delay in

submission of the export documents (despite exports actually having

been effected within 450 days, and the export proceeds being used to

redeem the credit) would lead to the advances not qualifying as “export

credit” from the date of the advance, thereby losing the benefit of the

Subvention Scheme.

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9. Out of the 107 export orders bagged by the Borrower and

financed be HDFC Bank, the financing of 15 export orders, lies at the

core of the controversy in this Petition. In respect of four export orders

(“First Lot”), admittedly, the Borrower effected the exports within 450

days of the advance. However, delivery of the export documents to

HDFC Bank was delayed by a few days beyond such period. Therefore,

according to HDFC Bank, the entire set of advances that financed the

First Lot ceased to qualify as “export credit” ab initio, and therefore, the

full amount of subvention relating to the First Lot ought to be reversed.

The amount of subvention reversed and therefore charged to the

Borrower under the First Lot is Rs. 4,62,22,602.77 (Rs. ~4.62 crores).

10. In respect of the eleven remaining export orders (” Second

Lot”), admittedly, the exports did not take place within 450 days of the

advance – they indeed materialised well after this period. In fact, before

the exports were effected, the Borrower had asked HDFC Bank to

foreclose the advances relating to the Second Lot, stating that it would

submit proof of the exports as and when they eventually materialise.

The amount of subvention reversed and therefore charged to the

Borrower under the Second Lot is Rs. 3,52,22,945.45 (Rs. ~3.52 crores).

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11. According to the Petitioners, in sharp contrast, under the

Master Circular, there is no requirement at all for exports to materialise

within 450 days – the only requirement is that the exports must actually

materialise at some point of time. It was their submission that where the

exports have materialised within 450 days, the exports documents could

be supplied eventually without having to be given within 450 days. The

Petitioners would go a step further and submit that even where exports

have not materialised within 450 days, but eventually materialise

thereafter, the benefits of the Subvention Scheme ought to be available

for the 450-day period.

12. For reasons recorded in this judgement, we disagree with the

Banking Ombudsman and HDFC Bank in relation to the reversal of

subvention for export credit towards the First Lot. We disagree with the

Petitioners in relation to the Second Lot. We find their respective

positions that are contrary to our findings, unreasonable and arbitrary.

In our opinion, for the reasons articulated in this judgement, the Master

Circular, which is aimed at providing competitively-priced working

capital to help Indian exporters compete with the world, requires

exports to be effected within the stipulated period and the export credit

to be redeemed from permissible sources such as export proceeds and

purchase or discounting of export bills. A mere delay in submission of
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documents despite exports actually having been effected within 450

days, would not result in the credit ceasing to be “export credit”. Where

the export has not materialised at all within the 450-day period, we find

that the credit advanced would get disqualified as export credit. Any

other view, in our opinion, would result in the very objective of the

Master Circular being undermined (in relation to the First Lot) and the

Master Circular becoming a device for availing of long-term cheap debt

with no commitment to timely exports (in relation to the Second Lot).

Factual Matrix:

13. Against this backdrop, the specific facts relevant to this

Petition are summarised as follows: –

a) HDFC Bank sanctioned a running account facility for export

credit of Rs.390 crores to the Borrower between January 29,

2020 and June 5, 2020;

b) The Borrower received an upfront interest subvention benefit in

addition to a special interest rate applicable to export credit. The

export credit interest rate was 6% / 7.25%, with the subvention

under the Interest Equalisation Scheme lowering it further;

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c) For every advance at the discounted rate received under the

Master Circular, the Borrower had to create a fixed deposit of an

equivalent amount of cash with HDFC Bank, over which there

would be a charge – this arrangement provided the Borrower with

cheap credit, being at a special borrowing rate for export credit

coupled with the subvention; and it provided HDFC Bank with

full security on the loan as also a cheap cost of funds of the same

amount (at the fixed deposit rate);

d) On October 1, 2021, the Borrower requested HDFC Bank to

liquidate the pre-shipment credit to the extent of Rs. 75 crores,

submitting proof of exports in bulk at the time of requesting the

liquidation. All these exports were admittedly effected within 450

days of the respective advances, but as regards the export orders

of the First Lot, the period of 450 days had expired before October

1, 2021. The Subvention Scheme was scheduled to expire on

September 30, 2021 and no extension was announced;

e) On October 4, 2021, HDFC Bank liquidated the relevant export

credit, and did not disturb the subvention provided for the 450-

day period (the maximum period of entitlement for the
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subvention). However, HDFC Bank charged penal interest of 2%

for the period of the credit beyond 450 days. It is common

ground that the export documents demonstrated that the

underlying exports had been made within the permissible 450-

day period, although these export documents were delivered to

HDFC Bank after the expiry of 450 days. This is the First Lot of

export orders about which the Borrower is aggrieved;

f) HDFC Bank was also the Authorised Dealer under the Foreign

Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”), through whom the

export realisation was effected by the Borrower;

g) On February 14, 2022, the Borrower wrote to HDFC Bank stating

that certain exports were delayed beyond the 450-day period for

reasons outside its control. The Borrower expressed its desire to

foreclose the export credit outstanding and liquidate the fixed

deposits lying as cash collateral against such credit. None of the

export credit advances had run the course of 450 days. This is the

Second Lot of export orders about which the Borrower is

aggrieved;

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h) On February 24, 2022, the Borrower expressed its desire to

foreclose all the underlying export credit advances (in the sum of

Rs. 154.75 crores), on maturity of the fixed deposits (in the sum of

Rs. 154.78 crores). The Borrower submitted that documents to

prove the exports and realisation of proceeds would be submitted

in due course, also asserting that the special rate applicable to

export credit along with the benefits of the Interest Equalisation

Scheme should be made available to the Borrower;

i) On February 25, 2022, HDFC Bank reversed a sum of Rs. 3.52

crores under the head ‘miscellaneous debit’ in respect of the

export credit advanced towards exports that had not been

completed within the 450-day period i.e. the Second Lot;

j) On February 28, 2022, HDFC Bank wrote to the Borrower

confirming the specific export credit advances foreclosed and the

specific fixed deposits liquidated, and a computation to show that

applying the interest rate without subvention, export credit to the

extent of Rs. 151,43,75,548.19 (Rs. ~151.43 crores) stood

liquidated and only one contract with a principal amount of Rs.

8.5 crores with interest of Rs.23,05,479/- (Rs. ~23.05 lakhs) was
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due. HDFC Bank stated that in view of the aforesaid debit of

Rs.3.52 crores, there was insufficient balance in the Borrower’s

account to repay the residual export credit loan;

k) On March 8, 2022 (i.e. after the foreclosure of the entire export

credit by the Borrower in February 2022), the Interest

Equalisation Scheme was extended by the Government of India

with retrospective effect from October 1, 2021 to March 31, 2024.

The Borrower then claimed that the interest subvention benefit

that had been denied on the export credit underlying the Second

Lot, since October 1, 2021 should now be returned to the

Borrower;

l) On April 20, 2022, HDFC Bank revisited the treatment it had

accorded on October 4, 2021, to the export credit relating to the

First Lot. Another debit of Rs. 4.62 crores was effected by HDFC

Bank stating that HDFC Bank was required to reverse the interest

subvention amount right from the date of the disbursal of each

underlying export credit on the premise that they were not

“export credit” at all, since the export documents had not been

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submitted within the 450-day period, although the actual export

was done within the said period;

m) Between May 2022 and October 2022, the Borrower submitted

proof of exports under the Second Lot, and demanded that the

subvention reversal in the sum of Rs.3.52 crores be corrected;

n) On May 26, 2022, a complaint was filed by the Borrower with the

Banking Ombudsman against the two subvention reversals in

respect of the First Lot and the Second Lot; and

o) The Banking Ombudsman passed an order dated October 13,

2023 (“Impugned Order”) rejecting the Borrower’s complaint,

and endorsing the position canvassed by HDFC Bank, namely,

that the export documents ought to be filed within the time limit

of 450 days, failing which the credit would cease to be export

credit.

14. Against this backdrop, this Petition has been filed assailing

the Impugned Order as being arbitrary and unreasonable.

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Contentions and Submissions of Counsel:

15. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties at

significant length – Mr. V. Sridharan, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf

of the Petitioners, Mr. Prasad Shenoy, Learned Counsel on behalf of the

RBI and Mr. Mustafa Doctor, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of

HDFC Bank.

16. Mr. Sridharan essentially submitted that the fundamental

requirement of the Master Circular was that the export should

materialise, and that there was no firm mandatory deadline under the

Master Circular for it to materialise. Mr. Sridharan would submit that

so long as the exports indeed materialise, the special rate for export

credit further reduced by the subvention, ought to be available for the

period of 450 days from the advance of the credit. Consequently, he

would submit, the reversal of the subvention amount of Rs. 4.62 crores

in relation to the First Lot and of Rs. 3.52 crores in relation to the

Second Lot were per se contrary to the law. The reversals represent an

arbitrary and unreasonable denial of a statutory entitlement, and the

Impugned Order ought to be set aside.

17. Mr. Shenoy would submit that the object and purpose of the

Master Circular is to ensure that exporters are encouraged to
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manufacture and export within 450 days and to ensure that the banks

are repaid. If the proof of export is not substantiated with documents,

the consequence for the borrower would be that he would lose the

beneficial interest rate right from the date of disbursement of the credit,

forcing the exporter to pay the commercial lending rate. Pointing to

Paragraph 1.1.3(iv) of the Master Circular, Mr. Shenoy would submit

that exporting within 450 days is of the essence of the Master Circular.

He would submit that exports ought to have been actually effected; they

ought to have been proven with export documents; and the credit ought

to have been marked off – all within 450 days of disbursement.

Pointing to Paragraph 2(A)(iii) of the RBI Circular on Subvention, Mr.

Shenoy would point out that the subvention benefit would be available

only between the date of disbursement and the date on which the

redemption is due. Therefore, to qualify for the subvention too, he

would submit, the outer limit is 450 days from the disbursement.

18. Mr. Doctor stoutly defended what he called a bona fide

interpretation of the Master Circular by officials of HDFC Bank,

emphasising that HDFC Bank obtained no benefit from the two

subvention reversals – they simply sent the funds back to the RBI and

thereby the Government of India. He would point to the varying periods

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for the credit as per the agreements and sanctions executed by the

parties, but would agree that for all purposes of this Petition, the overall

time limit for the export and the liquidation of the export credit was the

maximum permissible period of 450 days. The crux of Mr. Doctor’s

contention is that Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) of the Master Circular imposes an

over-arching and clear requirement that not only the export credit ought

to have been liquidated in 450 days, but also it ought to have been done

in the manner stipulated i.e. by submission of export documents within

450 days. He would submit that the Master Circular had made a

conscious choice of words in requiring that the export credit ought to be

adjusted “by submission of the export documents within 360 days from

the date of advance”.

19. Mr. Doctor would submit that the credit extended would ab

initio have to be treated as normal domestic credit and not as “export

credit” since the export documents were not delivered within 450 days.

When asked if HDFC Bank’s stance would remain the same even if the

documents submitted a few days late indeed demonstrate that exports

were truly effected within 450 days of the advance, Mr. Doctor would

submit that HDFC Bank had to follow the stipulation spelt out in

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) without any room for reading it down or

extrapolating it. He would emphasise that the Master Circular was a
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regulatory directive under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (“BR Act“)

and it was as good as subordinate law, and consequently, HDFC Bank

was right in effecting the two reversals and debiting the Borrower’s

account by the amounts of the subvention that had been extended to the

Borrower.

20. In rejoinder, Mr. Sridharan would submit that it is common

ground and evident from the record that in October 2021, HDFC Bank

had reversed only the subvention amount and had not changed the

interest rate charged on the export credit, thereby undermining Mr.

Doctor’s submission that the “export credit” changed ab initio merely

due to delay in submission of the export documents. HDFC Bank

continued to charge interest at the same rate as had been applicable to

the export credit – only the subvention amount was reversed and penal

interest at 2% was added to it. Put differently, Mr. Sridharan would

submit that the very conduct of HDFC Bank contemporaneous with the

decision to reverse the subvention would show that it was not consistent

with the reading of the Master Circular that was now being canvassed on

its behalf.

21. Mr. Doctor would counter, that HDFC Bank had the fullest

commercial discretion on what rate to charge its prime customers who
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have good creditworthiness. He would submit that the conduct of

HDFC Bank based on its own bona fide reading at the relevant time,

would be of no consequence to the legal interpretation of the Master

Circular by the writ court.

Approach to Interpretation:

22. Mr. Sridharan and Mr. Doctor have both attempted to adopt

a literal and extreme reading of the specific provisions of the Master

Circular in a manner that would advance their client’s respective

positions. For instance, Mr. Sridharan would submit that the allusion

to exports not materialising “at all” in the Master Circular would mean

that exports may materialise whenever actually feasible. Until it

becomes clear that the export is impossible to materialise, the beneficial

rate and the subvention for the first 450 days could not be disturbed.

Likewise, Mr. Doctor would submit that the only means of a compliant

liquidation of export credit is by delivering the export documents within

450 days and not by the export documents proving that exports took

place within 450 days. Even a day’s delay in submission of documents

that actually prove exports within 450 days would lead to the credit not

being “export credit” ab initio i.e. right from the date of disbursement of

the credit.

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23. In our opinion, the Master Circular and the Subvention

Scheme, are both instruments of law that seek to implement the stated

economic policy objectives. It is not drafted by legislative draftsmen

who would draft subordinate law that would be tabled for review by the

legislature, but by regulatory and government officials, seeking to

propound a bundle of incentives and disincentives to further the State’s

policy choice. Therefore, when such instruments fall for interpretation,

they ought to be read purposively, contextually, and in a manner that

has due regard to the text as well as context, without inflicting violence

on the policy objective. If more than one view is possible in interpreting

such instruments, the interpretation that would further the object and

suppress the mischief sought to be addressed by them, is the one that

Courts should adopt.

24. In our view, these two instruments would need to be

interpreted not only with an “inter-textual” reading (whereby the

consequence under one instrument would have implications for the

other) but also with an “intra-textual” reading (whereby the concepts

covered by various portions within each instrument would draw their

meaning by necessary regard to other portions of the same instrument,

as an integral inter-woven whole). Therefore, to appreciate the issues
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at hand, it would be necessary to examine the overall scope and salient

features of the Master Circular and the Subvention Scheme.

Master Circular on Export Credit:

25. The Master Circular governs the provision of export credit at

a special rate, different from the rates charged for domestic borrowing.

The term “pre-shipment/packing credit” is defined to mean 2, among

others, any loan, advance or other credit provided by a scheduled

commercial bank to an exporter for financing the purchase, processing,

manufacture or packing of goods prior to their shipment for export.

Such credit is to be extended against evidence of an export order placed

on the exporter. The tenure of such credit is left to the parties, subject

to an outer limit of 360 days from the date of the advance (extended to

450 days on May 23, 2020).

26. The pre-shipment credit could be liquidated by the bank

discounting or purchasing the export bills on which receivables would

be due from the exporter’s clients. In such event, the pre-shipment

credit would stand redeemed and the new exposure of the bank to the

2
Defined in Paragraph 1.1.1 of the Master Circular.
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exporter (having paid the amount towards purchase of the receivables

under the bills) would be treated as post-shipment credit. Pre-shipment

credit may also be repaid or prepaid out of export proceeds kept in

Exchange Earners Foreign Currency Account (” EEFC Account”), an

account in which Indian resident exporters may deposit their foreign

exchange earnings. Indeed, rupee resources of the exporter, arising out

of export proceeds actually received, could also be utilized for

liquidating the pre-shipment credit3.

27. The Master Circular recognizes that in respect of export of

agro-based products (the Borrower exported cocoa products), the

exporter must necessarily purchase a larger quantity of raw agricultural

produce and grade it into varieties that are exportable and not

exportable. The non-exportable component would be sold in the

domestic market. The monies advanced as pre-shipment credit would

need to be proportionately bifurcated, with the credit covering the non-

exportable domestically-sold portion being charged at the interest rate

applicable to domestic advances, as opposed to the rates applicable to

export credit4. The relevance of this facet of the Master Circular to the

case at hand is that the interest rate for export credit is special and

3
Paragraph 1.1.4 (i)
4
Paragraph 1.1.4 (ii)
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cheaper, and that rate is not available for normal credit.

28. For clients having a good track record, banks are also

permitted to accept redemption of the pre-shipment credit from

proceeds of any other export order relating to the same commodity.

Such credit may be marked off with proceeds from exports for which no

pre-shipment credit has been drawn from any other bank, or by

ensuring that proceeds of exports on which other pre-shipment credit

had been availed of, are used to liquidate the other pre-shipment credit

as well.

29. The RBI has recognized that since the availability of raw

material could be seasonal in character, time taken for the manufacture

and shipment of goods could be longer than the delivery schedule under

the export orders. Therefore, the exporter may have to procure raw

material and manufacture products, in anticipation of potential export

orders from customers. Therefore, the Master Circular envisages

provision of a ‘running account’ facility5. For such facility, the banks

must not insist on prior lodgment of the export orders for the pre-

shipment credit to be disbursed. Running account facility can only be

5
Paragraph 1.1.5 of the Master Circular.

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granted to Export Oriented Units (” EOU”) and units in Free Trade

Zones, Export Processing Zones, and Special Economic Zones, enjoying

a good track record. In the instant case, the Borrower, being an EOU,

had a running account facility with HDFC Bank.

30. In a running account facility, export orders must be produced

within such reasonable period of time as decided by the banks. As and

when individual export bills are received for discounting, the

outstanding credit could be marked off on a ‘first-in-first-out’ basis –

the export credit first advanced would be redeemed first, and so on. In

the course of such redemption too, banks are required to ensure that the

individual pre-shipment credits advanced to an exporter do not stretch

beyond the maximum permissible period (360 days, extended to 450

days, from the date of the advance). Paragraph 1.1.5 (iii) of the Master

Circular, which governs a running account facility provides as follows:-

1.1.5 ‘Running Account’ Facility’

(i) As stated earlier, pre-shipment credit to exporters is normally
provided on lodgment of LCs or firm export orders. It is observed
that the availability of raw materials is seasonal in the facts of the
present case some cases. In some other cases, the time taken for
manufacture and shipment of goods is more than the delivery
schedule as per export contracts. In many cases, the exporters have
to procure raw material, manufacture the export product and keep
the same ready for shipment, in anticipation of receipt of letters of
credit I firm export orders from the overseas buyers. Having regard
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to difficulties being faced by the exporters in availing of adequate
pre-shipment credit in such cases, banks have been authorised to
extend Pre-shipment Credit ‘Running Account’ facility in respect of
any commodity, without insisting on prior lodgement of letters of
credit I firm export orders, depending on the bank’s judgement
regarding the need to extend such a facility and subject to the
following conditions:

(a) Banks may extend the ‘Running Account’ facility only to
those exporters whose track record has been good as also to
Export Oriented Units (EOUs)/ Units in Free Trade Zones /
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones
(SEZs)

(b) In all cases where Pre-shipment Credit ‘Running Account’
facility has been extended, letters of credit / firm orders should
be produced within a reasonable period of time to be decided
by the banks.

(c) Banks should mark off individual export bills, as and when
they are received for negotiation / collection, against the
earliest outstanding pre-shipment credit on ‘First In First Out’
(FIFO) basis. Needless to add that, while marking off the pre-

shipment credit in the manner indicated above, banks should
ensure that export credit available in respect of individual pre-
shipment credit does not go beyond the period of sanction or
360 days from the date of advance, whichever is earlier.

(d) Packing credit can also be marked-off with proceeds of
export documents against which no packing credit has been
drawn by the exporter.

(ii) If it is noticed that the exporter is found to be abusing
the facility, the facility should be withdrawn forthwith.

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(iii) In cases where exporters have not complied with the
terms and conditions, the advance will not be treated as
export credit ab initio.

(iv) Running account facility should not be granted to sub-
suppliers.

[Emphasis Supplied]

Subvention Scheme:

31. The Subvention Scheme entailed the Government of India

subsidising Indian Rupee-denominated export credit advanced in

conformity with stipulated criteria. Although introduced on December

8, 2015, it took retrospective effect from April 1, 2015 and was scheduled

to be in place for an initial period of five years. All eligible exporters who

had availed of such credit were entitled to the benefit through their

respective banks. The Government of India would bear a portion of the

interest burden by providing funds to the RBI, which would in turn

release the funds to banks on a monthly basis to the extent the banks

lent cheap to exporters. The introduction of the Subvention Scheme

with retrospective effect would play out again at one of its extensions –

on March 8, 2022, with retrospective effect from October 1, 2021. It was

on October 1, 2021, when the Subvention Scheme had not been

extended after its expiry on September 30, 2021, that the Borrower first

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repaid a bunch of export credits and eventually all the outstanding

export credit on February 14, 2022.

32. On December 4, 2015, the RBI Circular on Subvention was

issued, with a procedure for reimbursement of interest already borne by

the exporters. The special lower rate of interest for export credit would

stand further discounted due to the Subvention Scheme. Banks were

required to charge the discounted rate of interest and submit their

claims to the RBI for reimbursement of the differential attributable to

the discounted interest. The RBI would be given funds in advance by the

Ministry of Commerce and Industry, on a monthly basis. The

Subvention Scheme was extended from time to time, first until

September 30, 2021, and as stated above, with retrospective effect from

October 1, 2021 by a notification dated March 8, 2022, and thereafter

until March 31, 2024. Suffice it to say, all the export credit transactions

relevant to this Petition were transacted when the Subvention Scheme

was in force.

Analysis and Findings:

33. The Master Circular is explicit in terms of its purpose and

objective. The Master Circular seeks “to make short-term working

capital finance available to exporters at internationally comparable

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interest rates”. The Master Circular has been issued as a regulatory

direction in exercise of the powers of the RBI under Sections 21 and 35A

of the BR Act, which reads thus :

Section 21 Power of Reserve Bank to control advances by banking
companies.

(1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that it is necessary or
expedient in the public interest or in the interests of depositors or
banking policy so to do, it may determine the policy in relation to
advances to be followed by banking companies generally or by any
banking company in particular, and when the policy has been so
determined, all banking companies or the banking company
concerned, as the case may be, shall be bound to follow the policy as
so determined.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power vested in the
Reserve Bank under sub-section (1), the Reserve Bank may give
directions to banking companies, either generally or to any banking
company or group of banking companies in particular, as to–

(a) the purposes for which advances may or may not be made,

(b) the margins to be maintained in respect of secured advances,

(c) the maximum amount of advances or other financial
accommodation which, having regard to the paid-up capital, reserves
and deposits of a banking company and other relevant considerations,
may be made by that banking company to any one company, firm,
association of persons or individual,

(d) the maximum amount up to which, having regard to the
considerations referred to in clause (c), guarantees may be given by a
banking company on behalf of any one company, firm, association of
persons or individual, and

(e) the rate of interest and other terms and conditions on which

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advances or other financial accommodation may be made or
guarantees may be given.

(3) Every banking company shall be bound to comply with any
directions given to it under this section.

35A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.–(1) Where the
Reserve Bank is satisfied that–

(a) in the public interest; or

(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or

(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in
a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or in a manner
prejudicial to the interests of the banking company; or

(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company
generally,

it is necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or
to any banking company in particular, it may, from time to time, issue
such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the
banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound to comply with
such directions.

(2) The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on its own
motion, modify or cancel any direction issued under sub-section (1),
and in so modifying or cancelling any direction may impose such
conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the modification or
cancellation shall have effect.

[Emphasis Supplied]

34. Consequently, the Master Circular partakes the character of

a statutory instrument that furthers the regulatory policy objectives of

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the RBI. The Subvention Scheme too is in the nature of a policy on

providing subsidy on the interest burden shouldered by exporters, by

the Government of India through the Ministry of Commerce and

Industry to help Indian exporters compete in the international markets.

Since banks would have to deal with their own costs of borrowings, the

Government of India took on the burden of the discount on interest.

Therefore, indeed one must read these two instruments in a purposive

manner. Any interpretation that undermines the policy objectives of

these instruments would deserve to be shunned.

35. We find from a careful perusal of the Master Circular that the

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) is but one of multiple provisions in the finely inter-

woven fabric of the Master Circular. It is indeed correct that the

maximum tenure of export credit is an essential ingredient of the

Master Circular. The very objective of the Master Circular is to provide

“short-term” working capital. The maximum period (360 days,

extended to 450 days due to impact of the Covid-19 pandemic) has been

consciously chosen as the designated period to make this a window for

providing short-term working capital. With this context in mind, it

would be important to examine various ingredients of the Master

Circular.

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36. There is no doubt that Paragraph 1.1.2 deals with the

maximum period of the advance and in doing so, it refers to adjustment

of the advances in 360 days. However, HDFC Bank has argued that this

is a provision that would ensure that even for these 360 days, the credit

would not be export credit, despite exports actually having been

achieved and despite proceeds having been realised (all within 360

days) if there is a delay of even one day beyond 360 days in submission

of export documents that prove these facts. By necessary implication,

according to HDFC Bank and the Banking Ombudsman, if the export is

effected on the 360th day and proceeds are realised on the same day, but

it takes a day more to compile the documents, the financing would

simply stand disqualified for coverage as “export credit” under the

Master Circular.

37. We are unable to agree with such an extreme and absolute

proposition that is patently and manifestly unreasonable and therefore

arbitrary. Such a reading of one of the provisions in the Master Circular

in a manner that effaces the very objective of the instrument, misses the

substance for the form. Such an approach undermines the regulatory

objective of the Master Circular, which is to promote Indian exports,

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make them competitive in the world markets, and aid such exports with

short-term working capital at competitive interest rates.

38. The crux of the Master Circular is that export credit at

competitive interest rates must be made available to exporters in the

form of short-term working capital. The very same Master Circular

requires banks to keep a close watch on the end-use of funds advanced

and to ensure that the credit supplied at special rates under the Master

Circular are genuinely used for the purposes of exports. 6 Banks are also

required to monitor the progress made by exporters in timely fulfillment

of the export orders. Each of these provisions point to the need to

export within the stipulated time being of the essence of the Master

Circular. If all that banks have to do is look for delivery of export

documents within 360 days, there would be no requirement for them to

monitor the performance of export obligations.

39. That apart, the Master Circular has expressed the period in

days (360 days) and not as “one year” which could have then meant 365

days7. However, when the RBI extended this period on May 23, 2020, it

was stated that the “maximum permissible period of pre-shipment and

6
Paragraph 1.1.3(iv) of the Master Circular
7
Section 3(66) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines a “year” in terms of the
British calendar year, which would mean 365 days in a non-leap year
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post-shipment export credit sanctioned by banks from one year to 15

months, for disbursements made upto July 31, 2020″ indicating that it

meant “one year” as the maximum period. Likewise, the extension was

to “15 months” and not by “90 days”. All of this indicates that these are

instruments of law that are drafted, not by legislative draftsmen but by

policy draftsmen, and that would necessitate searching for the real

import of the principle expressed and shunning a pedantic, narrow and

literal reading of these instruments. If every single day was so

sacrosanct, the RBI would not have referred to the period in years and

months when extending the period. However, in light of the nature of

the submissions before us, to adopt a conservative approach, for

purposes of adjudicating this Petition, we have treated the period of

“three months” as 90 days and maintained the reference to “one year” as

“360 days” and conservatively adopted the period of 450 days as the

maximum permissible period of export credit.

40. The Master Circular also makes it clear that export credit and

pre-shipment credit may be liquidated out of the export bills being

purchased or discounted by the bank, thereby converting the pre-

shipment credit into post-shipment credit. As noted earlier, even

balances lying in the EEFC Account could be utilized for pre-paying or

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re-paying the export credit. Indeed, rupee resources of the exporter to

the extent such resources are proceeds of exports that had actually taken

place could also be used for repaying the export credit. 8 It is also

evident that under the running account facility 9, it was provided that

pre-shipment credit could be marked off on a first-in-first-out basis in

the manner described earlier in this judgment. So also, the Master

Circular also envisages that where an exporter has been granted

accommodation against cheques and demand drafts and other payment

instruments received from abroad at normal commercial interest rates,

banks may even retrospectively give effect to the special rate applicable

to export credit once it becomes clear that the conditions for availing of

export credit has been complied with. 10 This stipulation yet again makes

it clear that the substance of the Master Circular is incentivising the

performance of export obligations and exporters being given credit at

competitive rates to achieve such performance. Even where the

advances have been made by the bank at standard commercial interest

rates, upon evidence that exports had been effected by the exporter, the

exporter would be entitled to the special interest rate applicable to

export credit. All these features yet again point to the fact that the

8
Paragraph 1.1.4(i) of the Master Circular
9
Paragraph 1.1.5 of the Master Circular
10
Paragraph 1.1.6 of the Master Circular
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Master Circular ought to be interpreted in a purposive manner, and not

in the manner that one would interpret a fiscal statute.

41. Likewise, the provisions of the Master Circular governing

export credit in foreign exchange are noteworthy. The provisions

governing export credit in Indian Rupees have been mutatis mutandis

applicable to foreign currency-denominated export credit. Paragraph

5.5 of the Master Circular, which deals with the period of foreign

currency-denominated export credit uses the phrase ” if no export takes

place within 360 days” in connection with the obligation to adjust and

mark off the export credit. This is a clear pointer to the substance of the

Master Circular, namely, that exports must take place within the

stipulated 450 days. Such usage severely and firmly counteracts and

reduces the force of Mr. Doctor’s submission that such a phrase has not

been used in Paragraph 1.1.2(ii). There is no plausible reason for the

Master Circular to mean different things by use of the phrase ” if no

export takes place within 360 days” for foreign exchange-denominated

export credit and use of the phrase ” submission of export documents

within 360 days” when it comes to Indian Rupee-denominated export

credit. None of the Counsel have been able to explain the differences

between lending in Indian Rupees and in foreign currency with

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implications having to be different for the specific facet of the maximum

period of the export credit.

42. In our opinion, the objective of both provisions dealing with

tenure (in relation to Indian Rupee and foreign currency lending) is one

and the same. With Indian Rupee-denominated export credit too, the

requirement is that exports must take place within 360 days, which is

what the export documents would have to evidence. There is no

intelligible differentia on the treatment of the loan as export credit, on

the basis of the currency denomination. When export documents are

referred to in the language of Paragraph 1.1.2(ii), it is evidently to

demonstrate that exports have indeed taken place. When Paragraph 5.5

refers to exports having taken place, it is aligned with the same

objective. As stated earlier, while the Master Circular is a regulatory

instrument, it is a policy document that is not drafted by legislative

draftsmen, but by regulatory officials. The most commonsensical,

reasonable and logical meaning ought to be given to its contents in a

manner that furthers the regulatory objective of the instrument.

43. In our opinion, to hold that Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) of the Master

Circular mandates that despite exports actually having materialised
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within 450 days and regardless of the proceeds being realized, even one

day’s delay in submission of the export documents would be fatal to the

very status of “export credit”, inflicts serious violence to the very policy

objective of the Master Circular. It is trite law that in interpreting

beneficial legislation, if two views are possible, the view that advances

the objective of the legislation and suppresses the mischief is the view

that must be adopted. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that

the Banking Ombudsman’s endorsement of HDFC Bank’s reading of

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) of the Master Circular, is untenable and does not

lend itself to acceptance.

44. It is also noteworthy that the Master Circular deals with a

situation where exports do not materialise ” at all”.11 Paragraph 4 of the

Master Circular governs the interest rate applicable to Indian Rupee-

denominated export credit. A ‘Base Rate’ is required to be applied for

the provision of such export credit sanctioned on or after July 1, 2010.

Paragraph 4.2.2(ii) provides that if pre-shipment advances are not

liquidated from: (a) proceeds of purchase or discounting of export bills;

(b) on submission of export documents within 360 days from the date of

the advance; or (c) as stipulated for other means of liquidating pre-

shipment credit, the advances would not be treated as “export credit” ab

11
Paragraph 4.2.2 of the Master Circular
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initio. Paragraph 4.2.2(iii) provides that if exports do not materialise at

all, banks should charge the domestic lending rate plus penal rate of

interest, if any, in terms of a transparent policy adopted by the bank’s

Board of Directors. Mr. Sridharan argued that the use of the words “at

all” would mean that one should wait to see whether it becomes

impossible that the exports would materialise. On the other hand, Mr.

Doctor emphasised the use of the phrase “on submission of export

documents within 360 days” used in Paragraph 4.2.2(ii) to state that it

is a reiteration of the sacrosanct requirement to produce export

documents within 360 days regardless of whether exports have taken

place in that period.

45. In our opinion, the very analysis set out above in relation to

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) would apply to Paragraph 4.2.2(ii). Any other

reading of Paragraph 4.2.2.(ii) would render Paragraph 4.2.2(iii)

meaningless – that paragraph provides the implications of exports not

materialising at all, which we read as not materialising within 360 days,

disagreeing with Mr. Sridharan’s thesis that one may have to wait until

the export is demonstrably impossible to materialise. These provisions,

read with Paragraph 5.5 and the host of other provisions analysed

above, are a concerted pointer that the crux of the Master Circular is

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that the maximum period of the export credit would be 360 days

(extended to 450 days); one of the multiple means of liquidating it may

be used; and the exports so financed would need to be performed within

360 days (extended to 450 days).

46. If one were to treat the submission of export documents no

later than the 360th day as an all-consuming essential requirement that

renders meaningless the performance of all the other obligations,

instead of looking to the substance of what the export documents are

meant for (to prove that exports indeed took place within 360 days), the

very policy objective of the Master Circular would be turned on its head

and be grossly undermined. From a conjoint intra-textual reading of

the Master Circular and its various provisions, as articulated above, in

our opinion, it is when exports do not materialise within 360 days, that

the domestic lending rate coupled with the penal interest would become

applicable to the amounts advanced. The reference, twice, to the

requirement of submitting export documents within 360 days (first in

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii); and next in Paragraph 4.2.2(ii) of the Master

Circular), in our opinion, relates to articulating the procedural means by

which the export credit advances may be liquidated and marked off, and

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not an all-encompassing stipulation that erodes the very objective of the

Master Circular.

47. The purpose of providing export documents is to prove that

exports indeed took place within 360 days. It is absurd to contend that

even when the export documents indeed prove the same, the fact that

they were delivered a few days after the 360-day period, would lead to

the advances not being “export credit” at all, amounts to saying that in

the eyes of the Master Circular, the exports are deemed to have never

taken place. The substance for which the credit is extended is to finance

exports, and when exports have indeed taken place within 360 days, the

credit would necessarily have to be valid “export credit”. Therefore, we

hold that the requirement to provide the export documents is aimed at

proving that exports indeed materialised within 360 days of the

disbursement of the export credit. The provision of such documents

within 360 days is therefore a directory requirement and not a

mandatory requirement inasmuch as a delay of a few days in submitting

the documents would not be fatal to the fact that exports indeed

materialised and such exports had been financed, and such finance is

“export credit”. The necessary corollary is that for the 360-day period

(extended to 450 days), being the maximum permissible period, the

credit would be export credit (provided exports indeed materialised
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within that period) and for the period thereafter, it would not be export

credit, since the maximum permissible period is 360 days (extended to

450 days). For the subsequent period, until actual redemption of the

credit, the exporter would be liable to pay interest at the normal interest

rate along with penal interest, as applicable under the bank’s policy

(required to be made under the Master Circular).

48. We also note with emphasis that Paragraph 8.3 of the Master

Circular deals with the procedure for delivery of export credit, whether

in foreign currency or in Indian Rupees, and stipulates guidelines with a

view to ensuring timely delivery of export credit to exporters and to

remove procedural hassles that may be faced by exporters. Under these

guidelines, banks have been asked to ensure that the Master Circular

must be implemented both in ” letter and spirit” so as to bring about a

perceptible improvement in credit delivery and related banking services

to the export sector. Therefore, the Master Circular leaves no room for

doubt that a robotic and literal reading of one sentence from the Master

Circular in a manner that undermines the very regulatory objective of

the Master Circular must be shunned. The Master Circular enjoins that

its provisions must be read in the spirit of the document and not just in

a literal manner. The instrument is indeed a beneficial regulatory

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instrument and it is envisaged that situations may emerge which would

require the spirit to be invoked in its implementation and

administration.

49. The spirit of the Master Circular is evident from the terms

noticed above – that short-term working capital must be made available

at competitive rates in a timely manner to exporters. Such export credit

must not exceed the maximum period of 360 days (extended to 450

days). Within such period, if the exports financed have indeed

materialised, banks may purchase the export bills or discount the export

bills, and thereby adhere to the period, simply converting the pre-

shipment credit into a post-shipment credit (which is also another form

of “export credit”). So also, if the exports did not materialise at all in

360 days, the credit extended to the exporter would have to be charged

interest at the domestic lending rate and not at the special rate

applicable to exports, for the entire period of the credit.

First Lot:

50. In the matter at hand, it is common ground that exports

relevant to the First Lot indeed had been effected and that too within

the maximum permissible period under the Master Circular. Evidence
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of such export was also provided, but with a delay of a few days.

Therefore, in our opinion, the Master Circular having to be read in the

manner we have explained above, the reversal of the subvention by

HDFC Bank in relation to export financing of the First Lot from the very

inception is indeed unreasonable, arbitrary, and liable to be interfered

with.

51. Consequently, we find that HDFC Bank and indeed the

Banking Ombudsman were completely in error in the interpretation of

the Master Circular insofar as export credit relating to the First Lot was

concerned, and basing their reading on their interpretation of

Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) and indeed, Paragraph 4.2.2.(ii). Since it is common

ground that all the underlying exports relating to the First Lot had been

effected within the maximum permissible period under the Master

Circular, there can be no question of disqualifying the advances made

from being regarded as “export credit”. Consequently, there is no

disqualification of such export credit from coverage under the

Subvention Scheme. The miscellaneous debit effected by HDFC Bank to

reverse the interest subsidy in relation to the First Lot is required to be

corrected, which we hereby direct. The Respondents are directed to

take steps to ensure that such subvention reversal in relation to the First

Lot is cancelled and remedied.

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52. There is also considerable force in the submission that in the

matter at hand, each of the exports underlying the First Lot was indeed

processed by the none other than HDFC Bank (in its capacity as an

authorized dealer under FEMA), which is also a legislation invoked by

the Master Circular. The Master Circular iterates the need to ensure

compliance with FEMA. HDFC Bank in its role as an authorized dealer

under FEMA was indeed aware of the exports having materialised

within the maximum permissible time limit. Yet, on a hyper-technical

reading of Paragraph 1.1.2(ii), ignoring the scheme emerging from

various other provisions referred to above, HDFC Bank has sought to

erode the very status of the credit advanced by arguing that it had

ceased to be “export credit”.

53. It is reasonably evident to any reader of the material on

record that HDFC Bank had indeed adopted the correct approach in

October 2021, when it reversed the subvention benefit only for the

period after the expiry of the maximum permissible tenure of export

credit. It is only on April 20, 2022, that HDFC Bank developed second

thoughts on the subject and purported to read Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) as an

entitlement to treat the entire advance as not constituting “export

credit” for the entire period. It is truly noteworthy that even at this
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stage, HDFC Bank did not charge the domestic lending rate for the

entire period despite purporting that the advances were not “export

credit” at all right from their disbursement. If HDFC Bank’s argument

that the phrase ‘ab initio’ used in Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) is to be read as

simply disqualifying the credit as export credit, the natural corollary

would be that such credit would have to be treated as normal domestic

credit. Indeed, the conduct of HDFC Bank cannot be the basis of the

Court’s opinion on the interpretation, but we would be remiss in not

noticing that HDFC Bank’s first reaction was the accurate one, which for

reasons best known to HDFC Bank, was changed completely in six

months.

54. We are in agreement with Mr. Sridharan in his reliance upon

a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation of

India Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar12, whereby even in an analysis of the

ingredients of a fiscal statute, a purposive reading of provisions that

make the machinery of the legislation workable was preferred as

opposed to a strictly technical and literal view of the requirements. In

that case, the question involved was the entitlement of an assessee to a

rebate under the Sales Tax Laws of Bihar, which was to be computed on

the basis of the returns filed. The Supreme Court ruled that since the
12
1988 Supp. SCC 73
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objective of the rebate provision was to confer a benefit to an assessee

for a prompt payment of tax, since it was found that the assessee had

indeed paid the tax before due dates and there was no dispute that the

tax paid was in conformity with the tax due on the basis of the returns

filed, a delay in filing the returns was not fatal to the entitlement to the

rebate. In this case, the High Court had taken a view that fiscal statutes

must be literally and strictly construed and if the returns had not been

filed in time, there can be no benefit of the rebate that could be made

available to the assessee. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of

the High Court, and ruled as follows :

8. Learned counsel for the assessee also suggests a different
kind of approach to the issue before us. He submits that all that
Section 15 aims at is to grant a tax rebate of 1 per cent of the
amount of tax admitted to be due as per the return filed by the
assessee. The further words used in Section 15 to describe the
return, namely, that it should be a return filed in the prescribed
manner and within the prescribed or extended period are merely
words descriptive of the procedure of filing a return. The basic
condition necessary for claiming the tax rebate is only that there
should be a valid return and that the tax on the basis of the valid
return should have been paid by the assessee. He submits that while
the substantive part of the condition should be strictly construed by
insisting upon the presence of a valid return, the procedural aspect
referred to can well receive a liberal construction. In the present
case, he points out, there is no dispute that the returns filed by the
assessee were valid. In fact the assessments have been made on the
basis of the returns filed. The tax has been paid even before the
submission of the returns. There is no suggestion that the tax paid
fell short of the tax due on the return. This is also not a case where
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the assessed tax is much higher than the tax admitted on the basis of
the returns. In these circumstances, he argues, the assessee must be
held to have fulfilled the conditions prescribed in Section 15.

9. Learned counsel for the assessee referred to certain
decisions in support of such a rule of construction. In CIT v. Kulu
Valley Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd.
the court had to construe a provision
intended to benefit the assessee. Under Section 22(2-A) of the
Income Tax Act, 1922
, a return of loss had to be filed within the
time prescribed for return under Section 22(1) if the assessee
wanted to carry forward the loss claimed. It was not so filed but was
nevertheless treated as a valid return by reading the provisions of
Section 22(1) and 22(3) of the Act jointly and giving a liberal
interpretation to Section 22(2-A). In the case of Gursahai Saigal v.

CIT the question was regarding the charge of interest under Section
18-A(8) of the same Act. This provision did reveal a lacuna but
reading the provision along with Section 18-A(6), the court gave
effect to the intendment of the legislature. It was explained that
Section 18-A(8) was not a provision creating a charge of tax but
only laying down the machinery for its calculation or procedure for
its collection. The dictum of Scott, L.J. in Allen v. Trehearne that
machinery provisions should be interpreted largely and generously
in order not to defeat the main object of liability laid down by the
statute was referred to. The following observations of the Privy
Council in CIT v. Mahaliram Ramjidas were also relied upon:

“The section, although it is part of a taxing Act, imposes no
charge on the subject, and deals merely with the machinery
of assessment. In interpreting provisions of this kind the rule
is that that construction should be preferred which makes the
machinery workable….”

10. Though the above decisions arose under a different enactment and on
different statutory language, they dealt with somewhat analogous
situations and furnish useful guidance here. They do lend support to the
assessee’s contention. It does seem that the condition in Section 15
referring to a return has a substantive as well as procedural content and it
may not be inappropriate to construe the latter somewhat liberally and

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generously so long as the principal object of the provision is not
frustrated.

[Emphasis Supplied]

55. In our opinion, the aforesaid principle would squarely apply

to interpreting the provisions of the Master Circular. Since the objective

of the Master Circular is to provide competitively-priced short-term

working capital to Indian exporters, and enjoins a maximum tenure of

credit (360 days, extended to 450 days), Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) stipulating

submission of export documents within 360 days is a machinery

provision to make the larger objective work. The larger essence is that

exports must be financed and be completed within the stipulated time.

When export documents in fact prove the same, and only have

submitted a few days after the said period, such machinery provisions

must be purposively construed, and a literal construction in a manner

that erodes the very purpose of the statutory instrument should always

be avoided.

56. In the result, we hold that the advances that financed the

exports forming part of the First Lot clearly constitute “export credit”

and are fully eligible for the subvention under the Subvention Scheme.

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Any subsequent period of the credit before its redemption i.e. the period

of delay in submission of the export documents after the expiry of the

maximum period of export credit, would be the period for which the

Borrower enjoyed subvention despite the expiry of the maximum

permissible period under the Master Circular. The Subvention Scheme

is very clear that the subvention would be available only until the date

on which the export credit becomes overdue. Reversal of any

subvention for such period of delay would be a natural requirement, and

we hold that HDFC Bank’s first reaction on October 4, 2021 i.e. of

reversing the subvention only for such delayed period was the correct

approach that would get support under the Master Circular. HDFC Bank

must compute the precise period of delay under each of the underlying

exports and charge and effect the reversal of the subvention only for

such period of delay insofar as export credit that financed the First Lot

is concerned.

Second Lot:

57. We also hold that the application of the domestic lending rate

along with penal interest can only come into effect, if exports do not

materialise at all within 450 days. Mr. Sridharan would submit that the

phrase “not materialized at all” should mean that so long as exports

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indeed materialise, whenever they do, the special rates applicable to

export credit, further reduced by the subvention must flow to the

Borrower for the first 450 days. We are unable to agree for the very

same reason that we hold in favour of the Borrower in relation to the

First Lot. We have already explained above that the term “at all” has to

necessarily bear reference to the maximum period of export credit under

the Master Circular. Any other reading would entail waiting, arguably

for eternity, to see if the exports actually materialise. Such a reading too

would make a mockery of the finely-balanced regulatory framework

implemented in the Master Circular.

58. In this context, we are in total agreement with Mr. Shenoy’s

submission that money being fungible, a wait for exports to materialise

until eternity would lead to abuse of the Master Circular. In our

opinion, such a reading would lead to the Master Circular enabling long-

term debt capital to exporters at special rates coupled with subvention,

which is not at all the policy objective evident from the two instruments

in question. Such an interpretation too would undermine the objective

of the Master Circular and further the mischief sought to be curtailed,

instead of furthering the objective and suppressing the mischief.

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59. It is common ground that the exports under the Second Lot

had not materialized within the maximum period stipulated under the

Master Circular. In fact, the Borrower wrote to HDFC Bank on

February 14, 2022 stating that the Borrower was unable to export for

reasons outside its control and consequently wanted to close the

outstanding loans by making payment in Rupees. On February 24,

2022, the Borrower actually listed the fixed deposits that constituted

cash collateral to be liquidated and marked off against the export credit.

This action is adequate to deal with the Second Lot – if the export credit

itself had been foreclosed, it evidences that even within the stipulated

period, the Borrower had no hope of exports materialising.

60. It is another matter that the Borrower hedged its stance by

stating that it would eventually provide export documents as and when

they materialise, and that the subvention ought to be kept available to

the Borrower. That would not further the case of the Borrower since

even such a request is untenable for the reason that although the 450-

day period had not expired in relation to any of the export orders in the

Second Lot when the export credit was foreclosed, even thereafter, the

exports did not materialise at all within the 450-day period. With no

subsisting credit continuing after February 24, 2022, and no export

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having materialised within the 450-day period, there is no occasion to

monitor and keep examining if the exports actually materialised at an

even later date. We are conscious that these exports indeed

materialised eventually. However, that is of no consequence for

interpreting the Master Circular, which has picked a specific period

(360 days, extended to 450 days) as the maximum period for which

“export credit” assistance is to be provided. We have already explained

above that if the exports are not effected within the stipulated period,

there would be no question of the export credit and the subvention

being available.

61. Here again, we must point out that the objective and spirit of

the Master Circular provides adequate guidance to resolve the

controversy. The Master Circular as interpreted in letter and spirit

would leave no manner of doubt that if exports do not materialize at all

(in our opinion, within the 450-day period), the credit extended to the

exporters must be treated as not constituting export credit.

62. We note that HDFC Bank has stoutly defended and justified

the charging of the same rate of interest as its sovereign commercial

prerogative, taking into account the track record and creditworthiness
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of the Borrower. In view of this stance taken by HDFC Bank and since

HDFC Bank has not at all taken any step to charge a different rate, we

refrain from commenting upon or adjudicating what the domestic

lending rate ought to be. Such an issue is not the subject matter of this

Petition. All that HDFC Bank has done is to reverse the subvention in

connection with the export credit underlying the Second Lot. Such

reversal was wholly justified since the exports did not materialize at all

within 450 days of disbursing the credit. In any case, the Borrower itself

effected a foreclosure of the export credit when it realized that it would

not be able to demonstrate that the exports materialised, and such

foreclosure in respect of the entire export credit was effected before the

expiry of the maximum permissible period.

63. Consequently, the special rate applicable to export credit, and

the benefits flowing from the Subvention Scheme would not be available

to the Borrower in relation to the Second Lot. In any case, HDFC Bank

had cash collateral in the form of the fixed deposits for the entire

amount, and on the instructions of the Borrower, the cash collateral was

to be liquidated and the loan was to be closed out. Any effect of the

subvention becoming inapplicable would indeed need to be charged to

the Borrower. It was the subvention reversal on the First Lot that led to

a mismatch of figures between the two parties. Consequently, we are of
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the opinion that just as the subvention ought to be made available to the

Borrower in relation to the First Lot, HDFC Bank was justified in

reversing the subvention amount applicable to the exports underlying

the Second Lot. We are unable to agree with Mr. Sridharan, who

moulded his argument to submit that as and when the export eventually

took place, at least the subvention for the first 450 days ought to be

available.

Principle for Drawing a Line:

64. Before parting with the matter, we must mention that in the

course of the hearing, we had requested the counsel for the parties to

address us on where one should draw the line on the period of delay –

both in terms of delay in submitting the export documents and in terms

of delay in effecting the exports. To deal with the issue, Mr. Sridharan

would draw reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector

of Central Excise, New Delhi Vs. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 13 to state that

it is neither necessary nor wise to enunciate principles of any general

validity that should cover all cases. According to him, the Court must

examine the facts of each case before it and rather than drawing a line of

demarcation, the Court should decide which side of a border-line, the

13
(1989) 4 SCC 566
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case before the court would fall in. The following extracts in the

judgment are noteworthy :

19. We are afraid, in the infinite variety of ways in which these
problems present themselves it is neither necessary nor wise to
enunciate principles of any general validity intended to cover all
cases. The matter must rest upon the facts of each case. Though in
many cases it might be difficult to draw a line of demarcation, it is
easy to discern on which side of the borderline a particular case falls.

20. Shri Ganguly’s insistence, however, serves to recall the pertinent
observations of an eminent author on the point. It was said :

“A common form of argument used by counsel in legal
cases is to suggest that if the court decides in favour of
the opposing counsel’s arguments, it will become
necessary to draw lines which may be very difficult or
impossible to draw. “Where will you draw the line?” is,
of course, a question which must be faced by a legislator
who is actually proposing to lay down lines for all future
cases, but it is not a question which needs in general to
be faced by common law courts who proceed in slow
stages, moving from case to case…”

The learned Author recalls Lord Lindley’s “robust answer” to the
question — Where will you draw the line?

“Nothing is more common in life than to be unable to
draw the line between two things. Who can draw the line
between plants and animals? And yet, who has any
difficulty in saying that an oak-tree is a plant and not an
animal?”

Again, Lord Coleridge in Mayor of Southport v. Morriss said:

“The Attorney General has asked where we are to draw
the line. The answer is that it is not necessary to draw it at
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any precise point. It is enough for us to say that the
present case is on the right side of any reasonable line that
could be drawn.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

65. The principles enunciated above are emphatic. In their

application to the matter at hand, we find that they are useful to affirm

our analysis. The Master Circular itself draws a line for the maximum

tenure of the export credit (360 days, extended to 450 days). The

controversy is only about whether the export documents should be

submitted within 450 days and whether the exports should materialize

within 450 days.

66. We have articulated above that in our view, considering the

objective of the Master Circular, the core requirement is for exports to

have materialised within 450 days and the export documents evidencing

the same ought to be submitted. If the export documents, even if

submitted later, demonstrate that the exports indeed took place within

450 days, the fact that they were filed a few days late would not be fatal.

One would be compelled to hold that the First Lot reasonably falls on

the right side of the line. However, where not only have the exports not

taken place at all within 450 days, but also the exporter himself has

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foreclosed the export credit within the 450-day period stating that it is

unlikely to be completed within the period, we have no hesitation in

holding that Second Lot does not reasonably fall on the right side of the

line.

Other Case Law Cited:

67. Mr. Doctor would rely on a Five-Judge Bench judgment of

the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v.

Dilip Kumar and Company and Others 14 (Dilip Kumar) to submit that if

there is an ambiguity in a tax exemption provision then the

interpretation must lie in favour of the Revenue, which is the direct

opposite of the rule of interpretation for charging provisions, where

ambiguity in the provision must be interpreted in favour of the

Assessee. However, the Supreme Court has hastened to explicitly clarify,

in Dilip Kumar, that even when interpreting exemption provisions, the

Court has to distinguish between conditions that require strict

compliance to avail of the exemption, and those that require substantial

compliance to avail of the said exemption. The Supreme Court was clear

that it did not intend to lay down any absolute proposition of law

obviating the need to look to the substance of the provision to discern

14
(2018) 9 SCC 1
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whether it warranted substantial compliance or strict compliance. In

the Court’s words:-

“64. In Hari Chand case [CCE v.Hari Chand Shri Gopal, (2011) 1
SCC 236], as already discussed, the question was whether a person
claiming exemption is required to comply with the procedure strictly
to avail the benefit. The question posed and decided was indeed
different. The said decision, which we have already discussed supra,
however, indicates that while construing an exemption notification, the
Court has to distinguish the conditions which require strict
compliance, the non-compliance of which would render the assessee
ineligible to claim exemption and those which require substantial
compliance to be entitled for exemption. We are pointing out this
aspect to dispel any doubt about the legal position as explored in this
decision.

65. As already concluded in paras 53 to 55 and 63, above, we may
reiterate that we are only concerned in this case with a situation
where there is ambiguity in an exemption notification or exemption
clause, in which event the benefit of such ambiguity cannot be
extended to the subject/assessee by applying the principle that an
obscure and/or ambiguity or doubtful fiscal statute must receive a
construction favouring the assessee. Both the situations are different
and while considering an exemption notification, the distinction
cannot be ignored.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

68. That apart, while there can be no scope for ambiguity on the

declaration of the law by a Five-Judge Bench in Dilip Kumar, it ought to

be noted that it is a judgement on interpretation of a fiscal statute. The

Master Circular, far from being tax statute, is in fact an instrument of

banking regulation aimed at providing the benefit of competitive short-

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term working capital towards the welfare of exporters. The principles of

interpretation of a fiscal statute are of no assistance to the interpretation

of economic policy legislation or welfare legislation. We do note that

Mr. Doctor’s reliance on a judgement dealing with a tax statute is driven

by the fact that the Subvention Scheme partakes the characters of a

subsidy, which is typically seen as a fiscal measure. However, what falls

for interpretation in the instant case is not the Subvention Scheme so

much as the interpretation of the Master Circular. By interpreting the

Master Circular in the manner it has, HDFC Bank has sought to hold

that the credit advanced to the Borrower got disqualified from being

“export credit”. Based on such disqualification, HDFC Bank would

extrapolate such interpretation into determining the implications under

the Subvention Scheme, to reverse the subvention provided. However,

there is no ambiguity that emerges from the Subvention Scheme that

requires adjudication in this Petition. What falls for interpretation is the

Master Circular, which its own authors have mandated must be

interpreted and implemented in letter and spirit.

69. If anything, Clause 2(A)(iii) of the RBI Circular on

Subvention makes it clear that the subvention benefit would only be

available from the date of disbursement until the date of repayment, or

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the date beyond which the export credit become overdue. The necessary

implication of the aforesaid provision in the RBI Circular on Subvention

is that the benefit under the Subvention Scheme would be available for

the life of the export credit. The maximum life of export credit is

stipulated in the Master Circular. Consequently, it is upon the export

credit becoming overdue that the subvention would become unavailable.

Therefore, in our opinion, even if we were to treat the Subvention

Scheme as an instrument of fiscal law, Dilip Kumar does not undermine

our opinion expressed in this judgement. Dilip Kumar requires us to

necessarily distinguish conditions that require strict compliance, and

conditions of which substantial compliance would suffice. We have

done so and held that exports materialising within 450 days requires

strict compliance unless other forms of liquidating export credit are

adopted (such as discounting of the export bills to convert into post-

shipment credit). We have also held the submission of export

documents in 450 days requires substantial compliance – the

submission is meant to demonstrate the substance that exports

materialising has been strictly complied with.

70. Mr. Doctor would also rely on the decision of the Supreme

Court in Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior

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Adoration Convent15, where Dilip Kumar was cited and relied on. In this

judgement, the Supreme Court indeed held that Dilip Kumar did not

result in a literal formalistic interpretation being applied, without

regard to the facts of the case. The following extracts are noteworthy:-

25. A recent five-Judge Bench judgment was cited by Shri Gupta in
Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.. The five-Judge Bench was
set up as a three-Judge Bench in Sun Export Corpn. v. Collector of
Customs
was doubted, as the said judgment ruled that an ambiguity in
a tax exemption provision must be interpreted so as to favour the
assessee claiming the benefit of such exemption. This Court after
dealing with a number of judgments relating to exemption provisions
in tax statutes, ultimately concluded as follows : (Dilip Kumar & Co.

case, SCC p. 37, para 66)

“66. To sum up, we answer the reference holding as under:

66.1. Exemption notification should be interpreted strictly; the
burden of proving applicability would be on the assessee to show that
his case comes within the parameters of the exemption clause or
exemption notification.

66.2. When there is ambiguity in exemption notification which
is subject to strict interpretation, the benefit of such ambiguity cannot
be claimed by the subject/assessee and it must be interpreted in favour
of the Revenue.

66.3. The ratio in Sun Export case is not correct and all the
decisions which took similar view as in Sun Export case stand
overruled.”

26. It may be noticed that the five-Judge Bench judgment did not refer
to the line of authority which made a distinction between exemption
provisions generally and exemption provisions which have a
beneficial purpose. We cannot agree with Shri Gupta’s contention that
sub silentio the line of judgments qua beneficial exemptions has been
done away with by this five-Judge Bench. It is well settled that a
decision is only an authority for what it decides and not what may

15
(2021) 5 SCC 602
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logically follow from it (see Quinn v. Leathem as followed in State of
Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, SCR
at pp. 162-63 : AIR at pp. 651-

52, para 13).

27. This being the case, it is obvious that the beneficial purpose of the
exemption contained in Section 3(1)(b) must be given full effect to, the
line of authority being applicable to the facts of these cases being the
line of authority which deals with beneficial exemptions as opposed to
exemptions generally in tax statutes. This being the case, a literal
formalistic interpretation of the statute at hand is to be eschewed. We
must first ask ourselves what is the object sought to be achieved by the
provision, and construe the statute in accord with such object. And on
the assumption that if any ambiguity arises in such construction, such
ambiguity must be in favour of that which is exempted. Consequently,
for the reasons given by us, we agree with the conclusions reached by
the impugned judgments of the Division Bench and the Full Bench.

[Emphasis Supplied]

71. Mr. Shenoy too cited a number of judgements, but again, all

of them deal with interpretation of fiscal statutes. To avoid prolixity, for

the very reasons articulated above, we are not burdening this judgement

any further with a judgement-wise differentiation of each of such

judgements on fiscal statutes. Suffice it to say, in our opinion, neither is

the Master Circular a fiscal statute making the application of the

principles of interpreting fiscal statutes relevant, nor do any of these

judgements turn the needle on the true import of the Master Circular,

which we have articulated above.

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Summary of Conclusions and Directions:

72. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of with the

following conclusions and directions:

a) The Master Circular is required to be read purposively, and is
to be implemented in letter and spirit, in a manner that does
not undermine its very objective and reason for introduction.

It must not be read in a narrow, technical and literal sense and
that too with one of its many provisions being read in a
manner that undermines its objective;

b) The maximum tenure of pre-shipment credit under the Master
Circular is 360 days (extended to 450 days during the Covid-19
pandemic) and exports have to materialise within such period;

c) If exports materialise within such period and export
documents demonstrate that the exports have materialised,
the credit advanced to the exporter would indeed not be
disqualified for being treated as “export credit”, merely on the
ground that the export documents that prove the timely
materialisation of exports were submitted late;

d) The period of delay in submission of export documents would
not be fatal to the treatment of the advances as “export credit”

– what is vital is that the export documents ought to prove that
exports took place within the stipulated period;

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e) The credit enjoyed after the maximum permissible period of
export credit i.e. during the period of the delay in submitting
the export documents, would attract interest at the normal
interest rate along with penal interest in terms of the bank’s
policy (published pursuant to the Master Circular);

f) If exports did not materialise within the stipulated period (360
days, extended to 450 days), for purposes of the Master
Circular, it would be treated as exports not materialising at all.

In such event, the very purpose of providing short-term
working capital to finance successful exports would be
undermined if the credit extended were to be treated as export
credit despite exports not having materialised. Therefore, the
credit advanced ought not to be treated as “export credit”. In
our opinion, any other reading of the position would enable
contrivances and devices that convert the short-term working
capital available under the Master Circular into a long-term or
even perpetual supply of cheap credit, abusing the Master
Circular;

g) Consequently, subvention would be available to the Borrower
in respect of the finance provided in relation to the First Lot;

h) Subvention would not be available to the Borrower in respect
of the finance provided in relation to the Second Lot;

i) HDFC Bank shall rectify the reversal of the subvention
pertaining to the First Lot within a period of four weeks from
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the date this judgement is uploaded on this Court’s official
website;

j) Consequently, the RBI and the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry shall reimburse HDFC Bank with the funds that
correspond to the subvention reversal in relation to the First
Lot having been corrected as above;

k) HDFC Bank shall within a period of four weeks from today,
provide to the Borrower, a detailed statement of account and
the computation of the manner in which it has worked out the
dues owed and owing between them, in accordance with the
declaration of the law in this judgement;

l) There shall be no change to the reversal of subvention in
relation to the advances made in connection with the Second
Lot.

73. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms and the Writ

Petition is also disposed of in terms thereof. However there shall be no

order as to costs.

74. In view of the disposal of the Writ Petition, nothing would

survive in any interim applications connected to this Writ Petition and

the same shall also be treated as finally disposed of.

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75. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/

Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by

fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.

[SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.] [B.P. COLABAWALLA]

76. After the judgment was pronounced, the Learned Advocates

appearing on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India as well as Union of India,

both requested for a stay of the operation of this judgment. Considering that

we have directed HDFC Bank to rectify the reversal of the subvention within a

period of four weeks from the date of this judgment being uploaded on this

Court’s official website, any party aggrieved by this order has sufficient time to

challenge the same. Hence, there is no question of granting any stay to the

operation of judgment and order passed today.

[SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.] [B.P. COLABAWALLA]

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