Himachal Pradesh High Court
Date Of Decision: July 18 vs Shiri Ram General Insurance on 18 July, 2025
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
1 2025:HHC:23397
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
CMP(M) No.1658 of 2024
Date of Decision: July 18, 2025
.
Rama Devi and others ....Applicants-Appellants.
Versus
Shiri Ram General Insurance
Company Limited and others
..Non applicants-Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellants: Ms.Tim Saran, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Nemo
Vivek Singh Thakur, J (Oral)
CMP(M) No.1658 of 2024
This application has been filed for condonation of 8
years 8 months and 14 days’ delay in filing the appeal.
2. Respondent No.1 is Insurance Company. Respondent
No.2 is owner-cum-driver of the vehicle involved in accident.
Respondent No.3 is mother-in-law of the appellant. Notices were
issued to the respondents, but despite service they have not chosen
to be represented.
3. The impugned Award proposed to be assailed in the
appeal for enhancement of compensation was announced on
01.08.2015. Claim Petition was preferred by the applicants-
1
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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appellants alongwith proforma respondent No.3 on account of death
of husband of appellant No.1, who was father of appellants No.2
and 3 and son of proforma respondent No.3.
.
4. As per averments made in the application, after
pronouncement of Award dated 01.08.2015, counsel representing
the claimants before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, namely
Mr.Harish Sharma, Advocate, had obtained signatures of applicant
No.1-appellant on blank papers with assurance that those
signatures were required for release of the amount of compensation
and further for filing appeal before the High Court for enhancement
of compensation.
5. It is further plea of applicants-appellants that they kept
on calling the Advocate and inquired about filing of appeal in the
High Court as well as release of amount of compensation.
Thereafter, she received first installment of compensation of
`6,00,000/-, out of which `3,50,000/- she paid as fee to Mr.Harish
Sharma, Advocate.
6. It has further been submitted on behalf of applicants-
appellants that counsel fee was paid to the Advocate after receiving
first installment of compensation in toto because counsel had told
that remaining amount shall only be released if the counsel fee
would be paid in advance.
7. Further that, despite making inquiries and request by
applicant No.1-appellant, even during COVID-19 when she was in
dire need of money for studies of her children, Advocate kept on
delaying the matter with assurance that balance amount of
compensation will be received by her shortly.
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8. It is further case of applicants-appellants that in the
year 2023 on visiting Branch of State Bank of India, where appellant
No.1 had opened her account, appellant No.1 was shocked to know
.
that an amount of `4,16,000/- was transmitted to her account, but
was withdrawn from her account through ATM issued in her name.
Thereafter, she immediately visited her counsel and apprised him
about misappropriation of her amount, but the Advocate had shown
his total ignorance. Thereafter, applicant No.1-appellant came to
know that no appeal was ever filed by her counsel for enhancement
of compensation and, in these circumstances, she apprehended
that amount released in her name had been misappropriated by her
counsel, who told her that no amount was released in her favour in
the year 2019, but on inquiry, applicant No.1-appellant found that
an amount of `4,16,000/- was released by the Court on the
application filed by her Advocate.
9. According to applicant No.1-appellant, her Advocate,
who was representing them before MACT appears to have misused
her signatures for releasing the amount of compensation from the
Court as well as from the Bank and also for issuing ATM in her name
from the Bank.
10. After disclosure of aforesaid facts, applicant No.1-
appellant has filed a complaint before Chairman, Bar Council of
Himachal Pradesh through registered A.D. dated 12.12.2023, copy
whereof has been placed on record alongwith postal receipt with
this application.
11. It is further case of applicants-appellants that a
complaint against misappropriation of amount of compensation was
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also submitted to the Superintendent of Police, Shimla, on
20.11.2023 giving details of mischief and fraud played upon
appellants by their Advocate.
.
12. It is further case of applicants-appellants that appellant
No.1 had visited Police Station Sunni, for more than twice and
during her visits, her statements were recorded, but thereafter
nothing has been communicated to her.
13. It has further been submitted on behalf of applicants-
appellants that nothing has been heard about fate of complaint
submitted to the Chairman, Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh as well
as Superintendent of Police, Shimla.
14. It has been submitted that in aforesaid facts and
circumstances, proposed appeal has been prepared alongwith
present application and has been filed in this Court in April 2024.
15. Application is duly supported by affidavit of applicant
No.1-appellant. Respondents have not chosen to contest the
application.
16. It has been submitted that length of delay becomes
immaterial when there is sufficient cause preventing the appellants
from filing the appeal. It has been further submitted that present
case is a fit case for condoning the delay for doing substantial
justice. To substantiate the plea, learned counsel for the appellants
has placed reliance on observation made by the Apex Court cited
hereinafter.
17. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another
versus Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , the Apex Court,
observed as under:-.
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“3.The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in
order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties
by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression
“sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately
.
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the
life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to
all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1.Ordinary a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late.
2.Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
18. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
State of Haryana versus Chandra Mani and others (1996) 3 SCC
132 has held as under:-
“7…..The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice andtechnical considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other
side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption
that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant
does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs
a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because
it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do
so……”
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19. In N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7
SCC 123, the Apex has observed as under:-
9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of
discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does.
not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay
is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.
Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable
due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the
explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts
the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive
exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should
not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,
unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter
when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such
cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause
shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior
court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the
conclusion of the lower court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The
primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute
between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The
time limit fixed for approaching the court in different
situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad
cause would transform into a good cause.
11.Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for
such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never
revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead
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to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in
the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties.
.
They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed
period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result
foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no
presumption that delay in approaching the court is always
deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient
cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide
Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and
State of West Bengal Vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality,
AIR 1972 SC 749.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there
can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That
alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the
door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala
fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the
court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when
there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was
occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the
court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.
While condoning delay the Count should not forget the
opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is
a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large
litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when
courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the
applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for
his loss.”
20. In S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and another
versus Narasamma (dead) through LRs. and others (2013) 11
SCC 341, the Apex Court has made the following observations:-
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“12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.
Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not
approaching the Court within the prescribed period of
.
limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be
condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the
matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more
towards condoning delay and directing the parties to
contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such
technicalities have been given a go-by.
… … … …
14. We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching
the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair
and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits
rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold.
Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the
courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the
conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing
sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is
whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and
had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of
the matter. In the instant case, we find that the appellants
have shown sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay
and the same has been explained satisfactorily.”
21. In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the
Apex Court has laid down the following guidelines:-
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the
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fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given
a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized
and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
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(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”
22. A two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
.
Dhiraj Singh (dead) through legal representatives and others
versus State of Haryana and others (2014) 14 SCC 127 has
observed as under:-
“15…….The substantive rights of the appellants should not be
allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper
technical view of self-imposed limitations…..”
23.
In B.S. Sheshagiri Setty and others versus State of
Karnataka and others, (2016) 2 SCC 123, the Apex Court has
observed as under:-
“28. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise
of revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable
time frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constantlitigation has been carried on by the appellants, and
therefore they cannot be accused of suddenly waking up after
13 years to claim their land. Further, in the context oflimitation, it has been held by this Court in a catena of cases
that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical orpedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do
justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a publiclitigant.”
24. In a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of the
Apex Court in Brahampal vs. National Insurance Co., (2021) 6
SCC 512, has observed as under:-
“16. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term
“sufficient cause” as a condition precedent for the
granting of the discretionary relief of allowing the appeal
beyond the statutory limit of ninety days. Although this::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:19:20 :::CIS
11 2025:HHC:23397Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor
Vehicles Act, but it is relevant to note that even while
interpreting “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act
Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court in.
the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu
Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC
321, observed that:
“13….The words “sufficient cause for not making
the application within the period of limitation”
should be understood and applied in a reasonable,
pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and
the type of case. The words “sufficient cause” in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a
r liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice, when the delay is not on account of any
dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate
inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of
Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8
SCC 685, wherein this Court held that:
“25. We may state that even if the term
“sufficient cause” has to receive liberal
construction, it must squarely fall within theconcept of reasonable time and proper conduct
of the party concerned. The purpose of
introducing liberal construction normally is to
introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it
is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and
has definite consequences on the right and
obligation of a party to arise. These principles
should be adhered to and applied appropriately
depending on the facts and circumstances of a
given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in
favour of one party as a result of the failure of the::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:19:20 :::CIS
12 2025:HHC:23397other party to explain the delay by showing
sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the
mere asking of the applicant, particularly when
the delay is directly a result of negligence,.
default or inaction of that party. Justice must be
done to both parties equally. Then alone the
ends of justice can be achieved. If a party hasbeen thoroughly negligent in implementing its
rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to
deprive the other party of a valuable right that
has accrued to it in law as a result of his actingvigilantly.” (emphasis supplied)
18. The Court in the abovementioned cases,
highlighted upon the importance introducing the
concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause
“sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In
furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned
regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases
where delay is of few days, as against the cases
where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to
the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such
cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the
same is attributable to the party’s inaction and
negligence, the Courts have to take a strict
approach so as to protect the substantial rights of
the parties. 19. The aforesaid view was taken by this
Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5
SCC 157 wherein the Court held that:
“23. What needs to be emphasised is that even
though a liberal and justiceoriented approach is
required to be adopted in the exercise of power
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the courts can neither become
oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant
has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
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13 2025:HHC:23397consumed at various stages of litigation apart
from the cost.
24. What colour the expression “sufficient
cause” would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona fide.
nature of the explanation. If the court finds
that there has been no negligence on the part
of the applicant and the cause shown for thedelay does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the
explanation given by the applicant is found to
be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent inprosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to
condone the delay.” (emphasis supplied)
20. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a
beneficial legislation, must be given liberal
interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in view the
substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis
should not be given to technicalities. In such casesdelay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly,
as compared to commercial claims under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or the
21. In P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC
445, wherein this Court while interpreting Section 34
of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to object to
an award itself is substantively bound with thelimitation period prescribed therein and the same
cannot merely a procedural prescription. In effect the
Court held that a complete petition, has to be filed
within the time prescribed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act and ‘not thereafter’. The Court while
coming to the aforesaid conclusion, reasoned as
under:
“36.1 First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was
to provide for a speedy dispute resolution
process. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
reveal that the legislative intent of enacting the
Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:19:20 :::CIS
14 2025:HHC:23397efficient alternative dispute resolution system
which gives litigants an expedited resolution of
disputes while reducing the burden on the
courts. Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it
defines the commencement and concluding.
period for challenging an award. This Court in
Popular Construction case [Union of India v.
Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470]highlighted the importance of the fixed periods
under the Arbitration Act. We may also add that
the finality is a fundamental principle enshrined
under the Arbitration Act and a definitive timelimit for challenging an award is necessary for
ensuring finality. If Section 17 were to be
applied, an award can be challenged even after
r 120 days. This would defeat the ArbitrationAct‘s objective of speedy resolution of disputes.
The finality of award would also be in a limbo
as a party can challenge an award even after
the 120 day period.” (emphasis supplied)Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative
intent is to provide appropriate compensation for thevictims and to protect their substantive rights, in
pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be asstrict as commercial claims as elucidated above.
22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts
with discretionary powers to condone the delay,
however at the same time it also places an obligation
upon the party to justify that he was prevented from
abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient
cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula
for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must
not only take into consideration the entire facts and
circumstances of case but also the conduct of the
parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that,
the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must
weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties.
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When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to
gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other,
this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid
discretionary relief.””
.
25. Though there is considerable extraordinary inordinate
delay in preferring the appeal, however, for the circumstances
narrated in the application, duly supported by affidavit of applicant
No.1-appellant, documents filed therewith which have been chosen
by respondents not to be contested, submissions made by learned
counsel for applicants as well as ratio of pronouncements of the
Apex Court preponderance of probability is in favour of plea of
applicant No.1-appellant, indicating that there is sufficient cause
which prevented her from filing the appeal for considerable long
period.
26. Before disposing of the application, for peculiar facts
and circumstances, I am constrained to direct the Chairman, Bar
Council of Himachal Pradesh as well as Superintendent of Police,
Shimla, to look into the matter personally and ensure to take
complaint/application to its logical end, in accordance with law, in a
time bound manner and to communicate the action taken on the
complaint to applicant No.1-appellant immediately as well as to this
Court through Registrar (Judicial) well before next date of hearing.
27. In view of above discussion, delay in filing the appeal is
condoned with aforesaid directions.
28. Registry is directed to transmit copy(ies) of this order
to the Chairman, Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh and
Superintendent of Police, Shimla, for necessary action on their part.
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29. Application is allowed and disposed of.
FAO No. of 2025 (FAOST/11710/2024)
Appeal be registered.
.
Notice to respondents, returnable on next date of
hearing, on taking steps within a week, be issued.
Records be requisitioned.
List for further orders on 10.09.2025.
(Vivek Singh Thakur),
Judge.
July 18, 2025
(Purohit) r
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