Jharkhand High Court
Junu Soy vs The State Of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) on 13 June, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (D.B) No.12 of 1999(R)
---------
[Against the Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence
dated 15.12.1998 passed by the learned District & Sessions
Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa, in Sessions Trial No.72
of 1998]
———
1. Junu Soy, Son of Late Samu Soy
2. Boby Gope Son of Late Rutu Gope,
Both Resident of Village Barahatu P.S. Muffasil District –
Singhbhum (West) ..... Appellants
Versus
The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) ..... Respondent
---------
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
---------
For the Appellants : Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Amicus Curiae
For the State : Mr. Vineet Kr. Vashistha, Spl.P.P
———
th
Order No.30/Dated: 13 June, 2025
1. The instant appeal is directed against the Judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 15.12.1998, passed by
learned District & Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at
Chaibasa, in Sessions Trial No.72 of 1998, arising out of
Chaibasa Muffasil P.S. Case No.127 of 1997 (G.R. Case
No.540 of 1997), registered under Sections 302/ 201/ 34 of
the Indian Penal Code by which both the appellants have been
convicted under Sections 302/ 201 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and have been directed to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C.
Factual Matrix
2. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality
and propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the background of
-1- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
institution of prosecution case.
3. The prosecution story in brief as per the allegation
made in the First Information Report reads as hereunder:-
4. According to prosecution case, as given in the First
Information Report (F.I.R.) (Ext.2), in short, is that on the
alleged date of occurrence i.e. 7/10/97, the informant’s son
Lalu Soy left the house from village Diliamarcha and stated to
his father that he was going to the garage of his owner where
he worked and thereafter Lalu Soy did not return to his house
on Tuesday and thereafter the informant started search of his
son on the next day. While the informant was searching his
son a few boys of the village, who had gone to catch fish in
the field, informed the informant on 9/10/97, that a dead body
was lying in the field and when the informant went to the
field to see the dead body he found that the dead body
belonged to his son Lalu Soy.
The informant has further stated that one Mute Mai
informed the informant that while she was selling handia on
Tuesday, Lalu Soy had come with accused Junu Soy and Bobi
Gope and both of them took handia alongwith Lalu Soy and
both the accused caught the hands of Lalu Soy and they took
Lalu towards the field. The motive of the alleged occurrence
is said to be the fact that the informant had sold a piece of
land near the railway station to one Dinbandhu Soy and Junu
Soy claimed that piece of land for which there was some
differences between the informant and accused Junu Soy and
it is alleged that accordingly Junu Soy in collusion with Bobi
Gope has committed the murder of Lalu Soy.
-2- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
The informant gave a written report of the alleged
occurrence to the Officer-in-Charge of Muffasil P.S. Chaibasa
and on the basis of the written report (Ext.2) one F.I.R. was
drawn up at Chaibasa Muffasil P.S. and accordingly
investigation was taken up.
5. After completing investigation, the police submitted
charge sheet against the accused persons and the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance in the case and
committed the case to the court of Sessions where charge has
been framed against the accused persons under Sections 302
and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and the trial has
accordingly commenced to which the accused persons
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution has altogether examined 08 witnesses,
namely, P.W-1 Sugna Soy, P.W-2 Dr. Lalit Minz, P.W- 3 Kandey
Soy, (informant), P.W-4 Sheo Charan Soy (cousin of the
informant), P.W-5 Dudhnath Tiu, P.W-6 Soban Munda, P.W-7
Ratibhan Singh (Investigating Officer) and P.W.-8 Mute Mai.
7. The trial Court, after recording the evidence of
witnesses, examination-in-chief and cross-examination,
recorded the statement of the accused person, found the
charge levelled against the appellants proved beyond all
reasonable doubts. Accordingly, the appellants had been
found guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under
Sections 302/ 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
8. The aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of
sentence is the subject matter of instant appeal.
Submission of the learned Amicus Curiae for the
-3- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
appellants:
9. Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, learned counsel, has submitted that
the impugned Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence,
passed by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained in the
eyes of law.
10. The following grounds have been taken by the learned
Amicus Curiae for the appellants in assailing the impugned
judgment of conviction:
(i) It is a case where the conviction is based
upon the principle of last seen theory and even the
principle which is to be made applicable in the case
of proving the charge in a case of circumstantial
evidence has not been made out by the prosecution,
but, even then the appellants have been convicted.
(ii) The learned trial court has not taken into
consideration that even the last seen theory will not
be applicable because there is gap in between the
last seen and the recovery of the dead body of the
deceased which is approximately more than 48
hours.
(iii) Learned Amicus, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted the impugned judgment,
therefore, suffers from error, and as such, is fit to be
quashed and set aside.
Submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor for
the State:
11. Per contra, Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashishtha, learned
Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, while
-4- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that the
post-mortem report is very much clarifying the accusation
made against both the appellants in commission of murder of
the deceased.
12. It has also been submitted that both the appellants had
been seen by the witnesses, P.W.-1 and P.W.-8 and basing
upon that the conviction is made and as such the judgment of
conviction cannot be said to suffer from an error and hence,
the present appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge in
the impugned judgment, and have also appreciated the rival
submissions made on behalf of the parties.
14. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect vis-
à-vis argument advanced on behalf of parties, is now
proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence by formulating
following questions to be answered by this Court: –
(i) As to whether the prosecution has been able
to prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubt.
(ii) Whether the learned trial Judge has been
able to appreciate the grounds basing the judgment
of conviction on the basis of last seen theory?
15. But, before considering the aforesaid issues, certain
factual aspects, i.e. the testimony of the witnesses are
required to be referred herein: –
16. In this case the prosecution has examined altogether
-5- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
eight witnesses namely, P.W-1 Sugna Soy, P.W-2 Dr. Lalit Minz,
P.W- 3 Kandey Soy, (informant), P.W-4 Sheo Charan Soy
(cousin of the informant), P.W-5 Dudhnath Tiu, P.W-6 Soban
Munda, P.W-7 Ratibhan Singh (Investigating Officer) and P.W.-
8 Mute Mai.
17. P.W.-1, Sugna Soy, has deposed about the prior enmity
between the appellant No.1, Junu Soy and the deceased. In
the cross-examination, he has deposed that he did not see the
murder, but he had seen the accused pulling the deceased at
the Station around 04:00 p.m.
18. P.W.-2, Dr. Lalit Minz, is the doctor, who had conducted
the post-mortem examination of the dead body of Lalu Soy,
and he found cut injury on the right upper leg size ½”
vertical, blood from nostrils, lacerated injuries right side of
face, lacerated injury on right ear, neck muscle congested,
hyoid bone fracture, blood present in trachea, blood present
in the right plural cavity, right lungs collapsed, left lung
congested, heart empty, stomach consisted of undigested
food. Age of injury – within 48 hours. Mode of injury –
throttling and cause of death – Asphyxia. The post-mortem
report is marked as Ext.-1.
In his cross-examination, he has stated that it is not
possible to cause lacerated wound on right side of face and
ear due to throttling.
19. P.W-3, Kandey Soy is the informant of this case and
father of the deceased. He has deposed that he was informed
by Mute Mai, the Handia seller (P.W.-8) that the appellants
were holding and taking the deceased. He has also deposed
-6- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
about the earlier dispute between the appellant No.1 and the
deceased.
20. P.W.-4, Sheo Charan Soy is the cousin of the informant.
He is the hearsay witness. He has deposed about the earlier
dispute between the appellant No.1 and the deceased. In his
cross-examination, he has stated that he did not see the
appellants with the deceased and he came to know about the
appellants from Mute Mai.
21. P.W.-5, Dudhnath Tiu, is the village Munda and an
inquest witness. He has deposed that he wrote the written
application as per the version of the informant. In cross-
examination, he has stated that he wrote the written
application in the police station as per the instruction of the
Bada Babu.
22. P.W.-6, Soban Munda is the father of P.W.-8 and he has
been declared hostile.
23. P.W.-7, Ratibhan Singh is the investigating officer of this
case. In his cross-examination, he has stated that there was
no case registered between the accused and the deceased
and he handed over the investigation of the case to the Sub-
inspector of Police, Gopal Singh.
24. P.W.-8 Mute Mai is 10 years old girl, who was selling
hadiya together with P.W.6. She has deposed in her evidence
that on the alleged date of occurrence, both the accused and
Lalu Soy (deceased) came to their handia shop and took
handiya and thereafter both the accused had taken Lalu Soy
towards the field.
25. The learned trial Court, based upon the testimonies of
-7- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
the prosecution witnesses, particularly, P.W.-1 and P.W.-8, who
have seen the deceased said to be the last seen along with
these two appellants, has convicted both the appellants under
Sections 302/ 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
26. It is evident from the impugned judgment and the
prosecution story which has been tried to substantiate the
accusation made against both the appellants for attracting
the ingredients of Sections 302/ 201 I.P.C that primarily the
last seen theory has been taken into consideration and
connecting the circumstances based upon the aforesaid last
seen theory, the judgment of conviction has been passed.
27. On perusal of the testimonies of the witnesses examined
on behalf of both sides, this Court found that this is a case of
circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to the
alleged crime.
28. As is evincible, the entire case rests on circumstantial
evidence. Before we analyze and appreciate the
circumstances that have weighed with the trial Court, we
think it apposite to refer to certain authorities pertaining to
delineation of cases that hinge on circumstantial evidence.
29. There is no quarrel with the settled position of law that
in the case of circumstantial evidence, the chain is to be
complete then only there will be conviction of the concerned
accused person, as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Hanumant son of Govind Nargundlar
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 wherein it
has been held that “It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances
-8- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in
the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be
of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so
far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
it must be such as to show that within all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused.”
30. The same view has been taken by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Bakhshish Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1971) 3
SCC 182 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that
the principle in a case resting on circumstantial evidence is
well settled that the circumstances put forward must be
satisfactorily proved and those circumstances should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. These circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude
every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be
such as to show that within all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.
31. The Hon’ble Apex Court while laying down such
proposition in the said case has considered the factual aspect
-9- Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
revolving around therein and while considering the fact has
only found the incriminating evidence against the appellant
was his pointing the place where the dead body of the
deceased had been thrown which the Hon’ble Apex Court has
not considered to be circumstantial evidence though
undoubtedly it raises a strong suspicion against the appellant.
the Hon’ble Apex Court while coming to such conclusion has
observed that even if he was not a party to the murder, the
appellant could have come to know the place where the dead
body of the deceased had been thrown. Hence anyone who
saw those parts could have inferred that the dead body must
have been thrown into the river near about that place. In that
pretext, the law has been laid down at paragraph-9 thereof,
which reads as under:
“9. The law relating to circumstantial evidence has been stated
by this Court in numerous decisions. It is needless to refer to
them as the law on the point is well-settled. In a case resting on
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances put forward must
be satisfactorily proved and those circumstances should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
Again those circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been done
by the accused.”
32. It is, thus, evident from the close analysis of the
aforesaid judgments the following conditions must be fulfilled
before a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
(ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
– 10 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBhypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty,
(iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved, and
(v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
33. The Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the said
principle again in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 holding all
the above five principles to be the golden principles which
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said
case as under paragraph-155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 has
been pleased to hold that if these conditions are fulfilled only
then a Court can use a false explanation or a false defence as
an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not
otherwise. Paragraphs-155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 of the said
judgment read as under:
“155. It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of
proof in a criminal case depending on circumstantial evidence,
in the absence of a corpus delicti, the statement of law as to
proof of the same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and concurred
by 3 more Judges) in King v. Horry [1952 NZLR 111] thus:
“Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved
by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime
morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt: the
circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as
to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than
murder can the facts be accounted for.”
156. Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression “morally
certain” by “such circumstances as render the commission of
the crime certain”.
157. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal
– 11 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
jurisprudence that a case can be said to be proved only when
there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be
convicted on pure moral conviction. Horry case [1952 NZLR
111] was approved by this Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu v.
State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 500] Lagu case [AIR 1960 SC
500] as also the principles enunciated by this Court in
Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71] have been uniformly and
consistently followed in all later decisions of this Court without
any single exception. To quote a few cases — Tufail case
[(1969) 3 SCC 198] , Ramgopal case [(1972) 4 SCC 625] ,
Chandrakant Nyalchand Seth v. State of Bombay [ Criminal
Appeal No 120 of 1957,], Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab
[ Criminal Appeal No 98 of 1958,]. There are a number of other
cases where although Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC] has not
been expressly noticed but the same principles have been
expounded and reiterated, as in Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi
Administration [(1974) 3 SCC 668, 670] , Mohan Lal Pangasa v.
State of U.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 607,] , Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v.
State of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 35, 39] and M.G. Agarwal
v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 2 SCR 405,]
— a five-Judge Bench decision.
158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful
argument submitted by the Additional Solicitor General relying
on a decision of this Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 801] to supplement his argument that if the
defence case is false it would constitute an additional link so as
to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect to the learned
Additional Solicitor-General we are unable to agree with the
interpretation given by him of the aforesaid case, the relevant
portion of which may be extracted thus: “But in a case like this
where the various links as stated above have been satisfactorily
made out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the
probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in
proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation. such
absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an
additional link which completes the chain.”
159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account
the absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that
it will amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but
these observations must be read in the light of what this Court
said earlier viz. before a false explanation can be used as
additional link, the following essential conditions must be
satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the
prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said
circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable
definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the
– 12 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
time and situation.”
34. The foremost requirement in the case of circumstantial
evidence is that the chain is to be completed. In Padala
Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. [1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706]
the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, the following tests must be satisfied:
“10. … (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency
unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the
circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that
within all human probability the crime was committed by the
accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in
order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with
the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his
innocence.”
35. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [1995 Supp
(4) SCC 259], it has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court as that the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and those
circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the
accused with the crime. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment is being quoted as under:
“4. … the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to
be drawn should be fully proved and those circumstances must
be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime.
All the links in the chain of events must be established beyond
a reasonable doubt and the established circumstances should
be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a case
based on circumstantial evidence, the court has to be on its
guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the
place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger
of being swayed by emotional considerations, howsoever strong
they may be, to take the place of proof.”
- 13 - Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
36. In Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of
Maharashtra [(2007) 11 SCC 436], while dealing with the
validity of inferences to be drawn from circumstantial
evidence, it has been emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court
that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence,
the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of
any other person and further the circumstances from which
an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be
closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred
from those circumstances.
37. In Ram Singh v. Sonia (2007) 3 SCC 1, while
referring to the settled proof pertaining to circumstantial
evidence, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the principles
about the caution to be kept in mind by Court. It has been
stated therein as follows:
“39. … in a case depending largely upon circumstantial
evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion
may take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself
that various circumstances in the chain of events have been
established clearly and such completed chain of events must be
such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of
the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important
link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the
other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt
of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts.”
38. In Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC
90, after referring to the aforesaid principles pertaining to
the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, the Hon’ble Apex
Court observed as under:
- 14 - Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
“14. … It must nonetheless be emphasised that whether a chain
is complete or not would depend on the facts of each case
emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should
ever be attempted.”
39. The judgment referred in Hanumant (supra) has been
consistently followed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment
rendered in Tufail (Alias) Simmi Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198]; Ram Gopal Vs. State of
Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625] and also in Musheer
Khan alias Badshah Khan & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 748].
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Musheer Khan (Supra)
while discussing the nature of circumstantial evidence and
the burden of proof of prosecution has held as under
paragraph nos. 39 to 46 as under:
“39. In a case of circumstantial evidence, one must look for
complete chain of circumstances and not on snapped and
scattered links which do not make a complete sequence. This
Court finds that this case is entirely based on circumstantial
evidence. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, the
Court must adopt a cautious approach as circumstantial
evidence is “inferential evidence” and proof in such a case is
derivable by inference from circumstances.
40. Chief Justice Fletcher Moulton once observed that “proof
does not mean rigid mathematical formula” since “that is
impossible”. However, proof must mean such evidence as would
induce a reasonable man to come to a definite conclusion.
Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, has been
compared by Lord Coleridge “like a gossamer thread, light and
as unsubstantial as the air itself and may vanish with the
merest of touches”. The learned Judge also observed that such
evidence may be strong in parts but it may also leave great
gaps and rents through which the accused may escape.
Therefore, certain rules have been judicially evolved for
appreciation of circumstantial evidence.
41. To my mind, the first rule is that the facts alleged as the
basis of any legal inference from circumstantial evidence must
be clearly proved beyond any reasonable doubt. If conviction
rests solely on circumstantial evidence, it must create a
– 15 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBnetwork from which there is no escape for the accused. The
facts evolving out of such circumstantial evidence must be such
as not to admit of any inference except that of guilt of the
accused. (See Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. [AIR
1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70] )
42. The second principle is that all the links in the chain of
evidence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and they
must exclude the evidence of guilt of any other person than the
accused. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal
[(1992) 3 SCC 300 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 642 : 1992 Cri LJ 3693] ,
SCC p. 309, para 20.)
43. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, we must
remember the principle laid down in Ashraf Ali v. King Emperor
[21 CWN 1152 : 43 IC 241] (IC at para 14) that when in a
criminal case there is conflict between presumption of
innocence and any other presumption, the former must prevail.
44. The next principle is that in order to justify the inference of
guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused and are incapable of explanation
upon any other reasonable hypothesis except his guilt.
45. When a murder charge is to be proved solely on
circumstantial evidence, as in this case, presumption of
innocence of the accused must have a dominant role. In
Nibaran Chandra Roy v. King Emperor [11 CWN 1085] it was
held that the fact that an accused person was found with a gun
in his hand immediately after a gun was fired and a man was
killed on the spot from which the gun was fired may be strong
circumstantial evidence against the accused, but it is an error
of law to hold that the burden of proving innocence lies upon
the accused under such circumstances. It seems, therefore, to
follow that whatever force a presumption arising under Section
106 of the Evidence Act may have in civil or in less serious
criminal cases, in a trial for murder it is extremely weak in
comparison with the dominant presumption of innocence.
46. The same principles have been followed by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Govinda Reddy v. State of Mysore [AIR
1960 SC 29 : 1960 Cri LJ 137] where the learned Judges quoted
the principles laid down in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v.
State of M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ
129] The ratio in Govind [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 :
1953 Cri LJ 129] quoted in AIR para 5, p. 30 of the Report in
Govinda Reddy [AIR 1960 SC 29 : 1960 Cri LJ 137] are: “5. …
„10. … in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances [which lead to the conclusion of guilt
should be in the first instance] fully established, and all the
facts so established should be consistent only with the
– 16 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBhypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to
be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so
far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it
must be [shown] that within all human probability the act must
have been [committed] by the accused.‟ [ As observed in
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC
71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 at pp. 345-46, para 10.]”
41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxman Prasad
@ Laxman vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal
Appeal No. 821 of 2012 dated 14.06.2023 has held at
paragraphs-3 & 4 as follows:
“3. We do not find such conclusion of the High Court to be
strictly in accordance with law. In a case of circumstantial
evidence, the chain has to be complete in all respects so as to
indicate the guilt of the accused and also exclude any other
theory of the crime. The law is well settled on the above point.
Reference may be had to the following cases: (i) Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda vs. -State of Maharashtra,(1984) 4 SCC 116;
(ii) Sailendra Rajdev Pasvan vs. State of Gujarat Etc., AIR 2020
SC 180.
4. Thus, if the High Court found one of the links to be missing
and not proved in view of the settled law on the point, the
conviction ought to have been interfered with.”
42. Thus, it is evident that for proving the charge on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, it would be necessary that
evidence so available must induce a reasonable man to come
to a definite conclusion of proving of guilt; meaning thereby
there must be a chain of evidence so far it is complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to
show that within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
43. A theory of “accused last seen in the company of the
deceased” is a strong circumstance against the accused while
– 17 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
appreciating the circumstantial evidence. In such cases,
unless the accused is able to explain properly the material
circumstances appearing against him, he can be held guilty
for commission of offence for which he is charged.
44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satpal v. State
of Haryana, (2018) 6 SCC 610 has observed that when
there is no eyewitness to the occurrence but only
circumstances coupled with the fact of the deceased having
been last seen with the appellant, the Criminal jurisprudence
and the plethora of judicial precedents leave little room for
reconsideration of the basic principles for invocation of the
last seen theory as a facet of circumstantial evidence.
Succinctly stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence by itself
to found conviction upon the same singularly. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“6. We have considered the respective submissions and the
evidence on record. There is no eyewitness to the occurrence
but only circumstances coupled with the fact of the deceased
having been last seen with the appellant. Criminal
jurisprudence and the plethora of judicial precedents leave
little room for reconsideration of the basic principles for
invocation of the last seen theory as a facet of circumstantial
evidence. Succinctly stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence
by itself to found conviction upon the same singularly. But when
it is coupled with other circumstances such as the time when
the deceased was last seen with the accused, and the recovery
of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accusedowes an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with
regard to the circumstances under which death may have taken
place. If the accused offers no explanation, or furnishes a
wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established, and there
is corroborative evidence available inter alia in the form of
recovery or otherwise forming a chain of circumstances leading
to the only inference for guilt of the accused, incompatible with
any possible hypothesis of innocence, conviction can be based
on the same. If there be any doubt or break in the link of chain
– 18 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBof circumstances, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
Each case will therefore have to be examined on its own facts
for invocation of the doctrine.”
45. Keeping in view the aforesaid settled connotation of law,
we shall presently proceed to scrutinize and evaluate the
circumstances, whether the said circumstances coupled with
the alleged “last seen theory” establish the guilt of the
accused/ appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
46. Adverting to the testimonies of the witnesses,
particularly, P.W.-1 and P.W.-8, this Court once again is
referring to the testimony of the said witnesses for the
appreciation of the aforesaid legal position as to whether the
prosecution has been able to prove the charge based upon the
aforesaid proposition of law to prove the accusation against
both the appellants said to be proved beyond all reasonable
doubt.
47. P.W.-1, Sugna Soy, has deposed about the prior enmity
between the appellant No.1, Junu Soy and the deceased. In
the cross-examination, he has deposed that he did not see the
murder, but he had seen the accused pulling the deceased at
the Station around 04:00 p.m.
48. P.W.-8 Mute Mai is 10 years old girl, who was selling
handiya together with P.W.6. She has deposed in her evidence
that on the alleged date of occurrence, both the accused and
Lalu Soy (deceased) came to their handiya shop and took
handiya and thereafter both the accused had taken Lalu Soy
towards the field.
49. It is evident from the testimonies of the aforesaid
witnesses that both the appellants admittedly had been seen
along with the deceased but we have not found any specific
– 19 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
time and date as to when the deceased was last seen along
with both the appellants.
50. It was the primary duty of the prosecution to come out
with specific time and date in order to have a conclusive
reason for connecting culpability of both the appellants in
commission of crime on the basis of last seen theory or
circumstantial evidence wherein the proximity of time is the
main essence in order to complete the chain of
circumstances.
51. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohibur
Rahman v. State of Assam (2002) 6 SCC 715 has
categorically observed that the circumstance of last seen
together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the
inference that it was the accused who committed the crime.
There must be something more establishing connectivity
between the accused and the crime, for ready reference the
relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted
as under:
“10. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself
and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused
who committed the crime. There must be something more
establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime.
There may be cases where, on account of close proximity of
place and time between the event of the accused having been
last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational
mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that
either the accused should explain how and in what
circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the
liability for the homicide. In the present case there is no such
proximity of time and place. As already noted the dead body
has been recovered about 14 days after the date on which the
deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. The
distance between the two places is about 30-40 km. The event
of the two accused persons having departed with the deceased
and thus last seen together (by Lilima Rajbongshi, PW 6) does
– 20 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBnot bear such close proximity with the death of the victim by
reference to time or place. According to Dr. Ratan Ch. Das the
death occurred 5 to 10 days before 9-2-1991. The medical
evidence does not establish, and there is no other evidence
available to hold, that the deceased had died on 24-1-1991 or
soon thereafter. So far as the accused Mohibur Rahman is
concerned this is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence
available against him. We have already discussed the evidence
as to recovery and held that he cannot be connected with any
recovery. Merely because he was last seen with the deceased a
few unascertainable number of days before his death, he
cannot be held liable for the offence of having caused the death
of the deceased. So far as the offence under Section 201 IPC is
concerned there is no evidence worth the name available
against him. He is entitled to an acquittal.”
52. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Malleshappa v.
State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 399 has observed on
the same line which reads as under:
24. In the present case also, there is no proximity of time and
place. We have already noted that the dead body, even if it is to
be accepted, was that of the deceased Yankanna, had been
recovered after 10 days after the date on which the deceased
was last seen in the company of the appellant. This singular
piece of circumstantial evidence available against the
appellant, even if the version of PW 10 is to be accepted, is not
enough—–.
53. Applying the aforesaid settled proposition of law, in fact
of the instant case, it is evident that the informant, who has
been examined as P.W.-3, has stated in the First Information
Report that the deceased was found to be missing from
07.10.1997. However, it is also admitted that P.W.-3 had not
seen the deceased along with the appellants, rather he is
hearsay on this point and has reported the same in the F.I.R.
The P.W.-1 and P.W.-8 in their testimony had deposed that they
had seen the deceased along with these two appellants.
54. This Court after going through the testimony and
evidence available on record in entirety as available in the
– 21 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
trial court records, has found save and except the aforesaid
testimonies, there is no other evidence said to substantiate
the charge of accusation against both the appellants to
connect culpability said to be committed by these two
appellants.
55. It needs to refer herein the settled connotation of law
that merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises, there
cannot be conviction of any person and it is the utmost duty
of the prosecution to prove the accusation against the
accused on basis of the cogent evidence and the accusation
has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
56. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in
catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the
criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the charge is
not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been
held in the case of ‘Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State
of U.P.”, (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has
been held as under: –
“22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain
regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much
more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that
acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of
satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind
ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty
person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person.
Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the
accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the
appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable
level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We
really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants
in the crime.”
57. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
“Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka” (2017)
– 22 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
13 SCC 98, has held at paragraph-26 as under:-
“26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we feel
that the High Court has failed to understand the fact that the
guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the
trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency
and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can
never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal
jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
58. Further, the principle of ‘benefit of doubt’ belongs
exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of
‘benefit of doubt’ can be invoked when there is reasonable
doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of “State of Haryana Vrs.
Bhagirath & Ors.”, (1999) 5 SCC 96, wherein, it has been
held at paragraph-7 as under:
“7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the
evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of
Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their
evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath
“as a matter of abundant caution”. Unfortunately, the High
Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt.
Any restraint by way of abundant caution need not be
entangled with the concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant
caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity. But
the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal
jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be
invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of
the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious
judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence
that the accused might not have committed the offence, which
affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal
trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered
at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be
afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of
the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably
entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused.”
- 23 - Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
59. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
“Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka” (Supra) at
paragraph-32 and 33 has held as under:-
“32. — — The minor variations and contradictions in the
evidence of the eyewitnesses will not tilt the benefit of doubt in
favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to the
prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root of the
matter and in such cases the accused gets the benefit of doubt.
33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of
evidence on record. As said by Bentham, “witnesses are the
eyes and ears of justice.— –
60. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in
the case of “Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat“,
(2002) 3 SCC 57 has laid down the principle that the golden
thread which runs through the web of administration of
justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted, for reference,
paragraph-6 thereof requires to be referred herein which
reads hereunder as :-
“6. ——The golden thread which runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. –”
61. It needs to refer herein before laying down the
aforesaid view, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
“Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra“,
(1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same view at
paragraph-163 which is required to be referred which read
hereunder as:
“163. We then pass on to another important point which seems
– 24 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DBto have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well
settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are
available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution
and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is
undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.—”
62. This Court, in view thereof and applying the principle of
last seen/ circumstantial evidence, is of the view that the
prosecution has not been able to substantiate the charge said
to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt due to absence of
connecting chain to prove the accusation against the
appellants.
63. Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, learned Special Public
Prosecutor, although has made opposition, but, he has not
disputed the proposition of law that in proving the accusation
in a case of circumstantial evidence wherein the requirement,
as per the law, is that the chain of circumstances is to be
completed.
64. This Court after having discussed the factual aspect as
well as the settled proposition of law as discussed
hereinabove, adverting to the impugned judgment where
from it is evident that the learned trial Court has only
considered the testimony of the witnesses to the effect that
the deceased and both the appellants have been last seen
together.
65. The learned trial Judge, therefore, has gone into the
premise of proving the accusation on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, but, while doing so to prove the
charge against both the appellants, committing the
commission of crime of murder of the deceased, has failed to
appreciate the connecting chain and merely on the basis of
– 25 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)
2025:JHHC: 15411-DB
principle of last seen theory, the judgment of conviction has
been passed.
66. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the
impugned judgment requires interference.
67. Accordingly, the Judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 15.12.1998, passed by learned District &
Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa, in Sessions
Trial No.72 of 1998, arising out of Chaibasa Muffasil P.S. Case
No.127 of 1997 (G.R. Case No.540 of 1997), is, hereby,
quashed and set aside.
68. Since the appellants are on bail, they are discharged
from all the criminal liability, henceforth.
69. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed.
70. Pending interlocutory application, if any, stands
disposed of.
71. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court
concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. )
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated, the 13th June, 2025
Ravi-Chandan/- AFR
– 26 – Cr. Appeal (DB) No.12 of 1999 (R)