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Supreme Court of India
K.P. Tamilmaran vs The State Rep. By Deputy Superintendent … on 28 April, 2025
Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia
Bench: Prashant Kumar Mishra, Sudhanshu Dhulia
1
2025 INSC 576
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.1522 OF 2023]
K. P. TAMILMARAN …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
THE STATE BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
…RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.123 OF 2023]
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.11241 OF 2022]
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.11242 OF 2022]
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.04.28
15:34:59 IST
Reason:
WITH
2
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.4151 OF 2023]
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.126 OF 2023]
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 124-125 OF 2023]
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.3616 OF 2023]
JUDGMENT
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge before this Court in all these Appeals is to the
decision of the Madras High Court dated 08.06.2022. Before
proceeding to the impugned judgment, it is necessary to trace
the trajectory of this case from the Trial Court onwards, since it
has passed through a maze of facts.
3
3. A total of fifteen accused had faced trial, and the Trial Court
ultimately convicted thirteen of them. Amongst them, A-1 to A-
3, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-13 were convicted primarily under
Sections 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
‘IPC’). They were all sentenced to life imprisonment, except A-2
(Maruthupandiyan), who was given death sentence by the Trial
Court. A-14 and A-15 were the police officers, who were convicted
by the Trial Court under Sections 217, 218 of IPC and Sections
3(2)(i), 4 of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘SC/ST Act’), and both of them
were sentenced to life imprisonment. A-4 (Ayyasamy) and A-9
(Gunasekaran) were acquitted by the Trial Court, and no appeal
against their acquittal was filed before the High Court.
4. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has modified the
conviction and sentence of A-14 (Sub-inspector K.P.
Tamilmaran), acquitting him for offences under Section 3(2)(i) of
the SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC, but maintaining his
conviction for offences under Section 4 of the SC/ST Act and
Section 217 of IPC, and thus reducing the sentence imposed from
life imprisonment to two years rigorous imprisonment. The
4
conviction and sentence of another police officer (A-15, Inspector
M. Sellamuthu) has been upheld. In the case of A-2, the
conviction by the Trial Court has been maintained but the
sentence was changed from death penalty to life imprisonment.
The High Court has also acquitted two other accused, i.e. A-3
(Rangasamy) and A-13 (Chinnadurai). The remaining appeals of
all other co-accused were dismissed, and their conviction and
sentence was upheld.
5. No appeal has been filed against the acquittal of the above-
mentioned accused by the High Court. Before us, now the
remaining eleven accused i.e. A-1, A-2, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-12,
A-14, A-15, have challenged their conviction and sentence.
6. At this stage, it is necessary to bring a few crucial aspects of this
case, in order to have a better perspective.
7. This is a case of a dastardly murder of a young couple,
Murugesan and Kannagi, who were only in their early twenties,
when they were killed. Both of them were administered poison in
full view of a large number of villagers. The masterminds and the
main perpetrators of this macabre act were none other than the
father and the brother of the girl Kannagi. The reason behind the
5
murder of this young couple was that Kannagi, belonging to the
‘Vanniyar’ community, had dared to marry Murugesan, who was
a ‘Dalit’ from the same village. So, at the root of this crime is the
deeply entrenched hierarchical caste system in India, and
ironically, this most dishonorable act goes by the name of
honour-killing!
8. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
i. Kannagi and Murugesan, both residents of village
‘Pudukoorapettai’ in District Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu, were
in love. Murugesan had just completed his B.E. (Chemical
Engineering) from a college in Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu,
and was employed in Bangalore, whereas Kannagi was
completing her B.Com. studies from the same college.
Knowing well that the Vanniyar community, to which
Kannagi’s family belonged, would never allow their union,
the two got secretly married before the Registrar of
Marriage at Cuddalore on 05.05.2003, and got their
marriage registered. The marriage certificate was marked
as Exhibit P-1 before the Trial Court.
6
ii. After performing their marriage, the two returned to their
village and were leading a normal life with their respective
families, but then in the first week of July, 2003, both left
their village quietly without attracting any attention.
iii. On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), brother of
Kannagi, reached the house of PW-1 Samikannu (father of
Murugesan), with a big sickle in his hand, and ordered
PW-1 to bring his son back to the village. The reason why
he was looking for Murugesan, A-2 said, was that
Murugesan had borrowed money from him which he was
now refusing to return. Samikannu (PW-1) leaves his
house the same day to look for Murugesan. He goes to his
sister-in-law’s house in the village Rasapalayam where he
met Murugesan and asked Murugesan to send Kannagi to
her parents. Thereafter, PW-1 returned to his house that
day. After a gap of four days, on 07.07.2003, A-2 again
comes to the house of PW-1 and threatens him for the
second time to bring Murugesan back to the village. On
07.07.2003, PW-1 again goes in search of Murugesan but
he returns only on 08.07.2003, and by that time, his son
7and Kannagi had already been murdered. It is further on
record that, on 07.07.2003, A-2 also threatened A-4
(Ayyasamy), who was made an accused by the
prosecution, though he was the uncle of Murugesan. A-2
repeats the same false story of Murugesan borrowing
money from him, which he had refused to return and
therefore he was on a lookout for him.
iv. The prosecution story then proceeds to state that on
07.07.2003, A-4 leaves his village Pudukoorapettai for the
house of PW-15 (Tamilarasi), sister of Murugesan, in
Vannangudikadu village, where Murugesan was hiding. A-
4 brings Murugesan back to Pudukoorapettai village and
presents him before A-1 (Duraisamy) and A-2
(Maruthupandiyan), father and brother of Kannagi,
respectively.
v. By the time Murugesan was brought to the village, it was
evening (on 07.07.2003). Thereafter, as per the
prosecution story, A-1 to A-13 undressed Murugesan, tied
him to a post and then he was mercilessly beaten by the
mob including A-1 to A-13. This was done in full view of
8
many villagers who were present there, yet there was no
attempt to stop this savage brutality. A-1 to A-13
continued to torture Murugesan compelling him to reveal
the whereabouts of Kannagi. After much physical torture
and beating, when Murugesan was unable to bear it any
longer, he finally revealed that Kannagi was in PW-23
Saroja’s house (who was the mother-in-law of A-4).
Immediately a Tata Sumo car was arranged by A-1, which
was driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan), in which A-4 to A-11
climbed and proceeded to Moongilthuraipattu village
where PW-23’s house was located, with the intention of
getting Kannagi back to Pudukoorapettai village.
vi. Kannagi was finally brought to her village, and by this time
it was about 5:30 AM in the morning (of 08.07.2003). Both
Kannagi and Murugesan were then taken to a cashew
grove near the village. Once there, A-1 gets Nuvacron1
(insecticide/poison) in a steel tumbler and gives it to his
1 Insecticide with common name “Monocrotophos”. Considered highly toxic by all routes of
exposure. The ingestion of even 120 mg of Monocrotophos can be fatal.
9
son A-2, and orders him to administer that to his daughter
Kannagi.
vii. A-2 then forced Nuvacron down Kannagi’s throat which
caused her death in minutes. The prosecution story here
though also suggests that A-2 tried to administer the
remaining Nuvacron to Murugesan but when Murugesan
resisted, this task was assigned to A-4. All the same, we
must note that this version of prosecution, that A-4
administered or tried to administer poison to Murugesan,
was not accepted in view of the evidence of PW-49
(Chinnapillai, step-mother of Murugesan) who had said
that she saw A-2 administering poison to her son
Murugesan. Like Kannagi, Murugesan too died minutes
after being forced to drink the poison. PW-49 is an eye-
witness who has stuck to her deposition that it was A-2
who had administered poison to her son Murugesan, and
not A-4. A-4 has ultimately been acquitted by the Trial
Court and as stated above, no appeal against his acquittal
was filed before the High Court. We will deal with this
aspect in greater detail at a later point in this judgment.
10
We must also point out here that PW-49 was not
mentioned in the charge-sheet as one of the prosecution
witnesses. It was only in the middle of the trial that an
application was moved under Section 311 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’) by the
prosecution to bring PW-49 as a witness.
viii. Returning to the facts of the case. The two bodies were
then burnt in different places-Kannagi in the village
cremation ground and Murugesan at a place nearby.
ix. Meanwhile, as per the prosecution case, A-14 and 15
(police officers) not only knew about these events but they
had also visited the crime scene, according to some of the
witnesses on 08.07.2003 itself, and yet they did not lodge
an FIR, which was their statutory duty under Section 154
and Section 157 CrPC. Not only this, but when PW-49 goes
to the police station to lodge an FIR on 08.07.2003, she
was rebuffed and abused at the police station, and
practically thrown out of the station.
x. It was only after a gap of nine days, when some leaders
belonging to the Dalit community raised this issue
11
through Press and Media and a support was gathered from
the public, that a case was finally registered on
17.07.2003 as Crime No.356 of 2003 under Sections 147,
302, 201 of IPC at police station Virudhachalam. The FIR,
however, was registered on the basis of the extra-judicial
confession of A-1 before PW-32 (Ashokan), who was the
Village Administrative Officer. In this FIR, eight accused
were named, four belonging to the Dalit community and
the other four belonging to the Vanniyar community. The
Dalits included PW-1 (Samikannu), who was none other
than the father of the deceased Murugesan; A-4
(Ayyasamy), who was the uncle of Murugesan and who
allegedly brought Murugesan back to Pudukoorapettai
village from his sister’s house; Ilayaperumal, another
uncle of Murugesan, and Kannadasan, who ultimately
became a prosecution witness as PW-33. The four
Vanniyars who were made accused were A-1, A-2 (who
were the father and brother of Kannagi, respectively), A-3
and Anbalagan, who later became a prosecution witness
as PW-29.
12
xi. Based on this FIR, an investigation was done by the local
police and a charge-sheet was filed on 16.09.2003 against
all the eight above-mentioned accused under Sections
xii. Meanwhile, the questionable manner in which the entire
investigation was carried out by the local police, compelled
the family of the deceased Murugesan to seek interference
from the Madras High Court where a petition was filed with
a prayer that the investigation in this case must be handed
over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘CBI’).
The High Court, by its order dated 22.04.2004, allowed
this application and directed that the investigation be
handed over to CBI.
xiii. On 21.05.2004, the CBI again registered its FIR under
Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC and started the
investigation. A charge-sheet was filed on 14.10.2005
against fifteen accused, which included two Dalits i.e. A-4
(Ayyasamy) and A-9 (Gunasekaran), two police officers i.e.
A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M. Sellamuthu). The
remaining accused belong to the Vanniyar community. As
13
we have already stated in the beginning, A-4 and A-9 were
acquitted by the Trial Court, while accused A-3 and A-13
were later acquitted by the High Court in Appeal.
xiv. There has been an inordinate delay caused in this case.
The incident is of 7th and 8th July, 2003, and the Trial was
concluded only on 24.09.2021. The delay on account of
the belated filing of the FIR, etc. we have already discussed
above, but the case was only committed to Sessions on
15.03.2010 i.e. after more than seven years. The
proceedings again remained stalled till charges were
ultimately framed on 14.07.2017. An additional charge
under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was framed by the Trial
Court against A-14 and A-15 in 2020.
As noticed by the High Court, the reason for this long and
inordinate delay was because of the multiple petitions filed
by the accused for one reason or the other primarily as a
challenge to the proceedings itself.
9. As mentioned in the beginning, the High Court in appeal, by the
impugned judgment, modified the sentence of A-2 from death
penalty to life imprisonment, while upholding his conviction. A-
14
3 and A-13 were acquitted by the High Court. A-14 was acquitted
for offences under Section 3 of SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC.
10. The eleven accused who stood convicted and sentenced by the
High Court are now before us. Their defence is based primarily
on the alleged weaknesses of the prosecution theory, the
inconsistencies and frequent contradictions in the statements of
key prosecution witnesses, including its star witness PW-49
(Chinnapillai), etc. The learned senior counsels for the
appellants, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Mr. Ratnakar Dash, Mr. M.
Sathyanarayanan, Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr. S.
Nagamuthu have tried to convince this Court that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unreliable and there
has been a total failure on the part of the prosecution to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt.
11. The contention on behalf of A-14 and A-15 (the two police
officers- K.P Tamilmaran and M. Sellamuthu, respectively),
raised by learned senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr.
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, respectively, is that none of the
witnesses have specifically identified them as the officers at the
police station who refused to lodge the FIR when apprised of the
15
incident. It is the contention of A-15, additionally, that merely
because he had filed the charge-sheet against persons belonging
to both the Dalit and Vanniyar community, the investigation
conducted by him cannot be said to be motivated by a desire to
falsely implicate members of the Dalit community.
12. We have heard learned senior counsels for the accused as well
as the learned counsel, Mr. Rahul Shyam Bhandari, for the
family of Murugesan and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned
Additional Solicitor General representing CBI.
13. In order to appreciate the sequence of events and the role of the
accused, it is important to look at the testimonies of PW-1
(Samikannu-father of Murugesan), PW-2 (Velmurugan-younger
brother of Murugesan), PW-3 (Palanivel-second younger brother
of Murugesan), PW-15 (Tamilarasi-sister of Murugesan), and PW-
49 (Chinnapillai-step-mother of Murugesan), who are the main
prosecution witnesses.
14. But before we do that, it may be necessary to say a few words
about some essential aspects of this case, in order to set the
context for the examination of testimonies of these key
prosecution witnesses.
16
Delay in Trial and evidentiary value of so-called “hostile
witness”
15. The long and inordinate delay which has been caused in this
case, right from the lodging of the FIR, speaks volumes about the
gross inefficiency at the hands of the prosecution on the one
hand and dilatory tactics employed by the defence on the other
hand, which together led to a slow trial.
16. The second and more crucial aspect is that many of the
prosecution witnesses in this case have turned, what has come
to be known as ‘hostile’; a fact which has been strongly pressed
by the defence in their favour. The defence would also argue that
the Trial Court and High Court have mainly relied on the
testimonies of the family members of Murugesan, who are
interested witnesses.
17. In our opinion, there is no force in these arguments and as will
be seen, there was enough material placed by the prosecution
before the Trial Court, which was sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. When a witness, produced on behalf of prosecution, deposes
against the prosecution version and goes against his/her own
17
previously recorded statements, the prosecution can request the
Court to declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission
from the Court to cross-examine its own witness. This is the
procedure followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case,
there are as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses and it is
also a fact that many of them have turned hostile by turning
against their earlier statements made before the police under
section 161 CrPC, and even before the Magistrate under section
164 CrPC, in some cases. This phenomenon is not new, in fact it
is sadly a common occurrence in our criminal Courts today,
much to the despair and frustration of the prosecution. This
case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this, however, there are
witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-
15 and PW-49, whose evidence, in the form of their testimonies
before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict the present
appellants. A word here about the evidentiary value of a so-called
hostile witness.
19. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter ‘Evidence Act’) allows
a party, with the leave of the Court, to cross-examine its own
18
witness. Section 154 of the Evidence Act originally read as
follows:
“154.Question by party to his own witness
The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person
who calls a witness to put any questions to him
which might be put in cross-examination by the
adverse party.”
20. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor
1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259, while interpreting Section 154 of
the Evidence Act, held that “When a witness who has been called
by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of
the prosecution under the provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence
Act, the result of that course being permitted is to discredit that
witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his
testimony”.
21. But this judgment in Khijiruddin was overruled by a five-Judge
bench of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar
v. Emperor 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7. The High Court was
answering a reference from a Division Bench regarding the
specific question of whether the testimony of a witness, who was
cross-examined by the party which produced him/her, should be
19
discarded totally, partially, or not discarded at all. Chief Justice
Rankin, speaking for three other Judges and himself, answered
the reference in the following terms:
“24. In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt
with under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, even
when under that Section he is “cross-examined”
to credit, in no way warrants a direction to the
jury that they are bound in law to place no
reliance on his evidence, or that the party who
called and cross-examined him can take no
advantage from any part of his evidence. There
is, moreover, no rule of law that if a jury thinks
that a witness has been discredited on one point
they may not give credit to him on another. The
rule of law is that it is for the jury to say.
Of the seven questions stated by the Division
Bench I propose that we should answer four,
viz.—(3) whether the evidence of a witness treated as
“hostile” must be rejected in whole or in part;
(4) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in
favour of the party calling the witness;
(5) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in
favour of the opposite party.
These three questions I would answer in the
negative.
20
(6) Whether the whole of the evidence so far as it
affects both parties favourably or unfavourably,
must go to the jury for what it is worth.
25. To this question, I would be content to answer
“yes,” …”
22. Justice Buckland, in the above case, in his concurring opinion
holds that there is no law which states that the evidence of a
witness, who has been cross-examined by its party, should be
entirely rejected. In his opinion, it is for the jury (or the Judge) to
form an opinion regarding the value of the testimony of such a
witness.
23. All the same, later this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi)
(1975) 3 SCC 562 held to the contrary and approved the decision
of the Calcutta High Court in Khijiruddin. This is what was said
in Jagir Singh by Justice Bhagwati:
“7. Now, it is apparent from the judgment of the
High Court that the conviction of the appellant
rested entirely on the evidence of Pritam Singh
(P.W. 10) and Sajjan Singh (P.W. 13). Swaran
Singh (P.W. 11) was also examined on behalf of
the prosecution but his evidence is of no help to
the prosecution because he went back on the
story of the prosecution and was permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution. It is
now well settled that when a witness, who has
21been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discredit
that witness altogether and not merely to get rid
of a part of his testimony. See Khijiruddin v.
Emperor….”
24. However, it is to be noted that Jagir Singh does not refer to the
five-Judge Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in
Praphullakumar Sarkar.
25. But then in a subsequent decision (of which Justice Bhagwati
was also a part) i.e., Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976)
1 SCC 727, it was held differently. Justice Sarkaria, speaking
for the Bench, clarified the earlier judgment in Jagir Singh, and
held that what has been held in Jagir Singh would only be
applicable where a witness through cross-examination by the
party which calls it, is totally discredited. It is only in such a
situation that the Court, as matter of prudence, discards his/her
evidence in its entirety.
26. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness who has been cross-
examined by the party which produced him/her will not stand
totally discredited, and it is for the Court to consider what value
22
should be attached to this testimony. After referring to a series
of judgments on this point, the Court in Sat Paul held as follows:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear
that even in a criminal prosecution when a
witness is cross-examined and contradicted with
the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his
evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as
washed off the record altogether. It is for the
Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as
a result of such cross-examination and
contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly
discredited or can still be believed in regard to a
part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the
process, the credit of the witness has not been
completely shaken, he may, after reading and
considering the evidence of the witness, as a
whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the
light of the other evidence on the record, that part
of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy
and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of
the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in
the process, the witness stands squarely and
totally discredited, the Judge should, as matter of
prudence, discard his evidence in toto.
53. It was in the context of such a case, where,
as a result of the cross-examination by the Public,
Prosecutor, the prosecution witness concerned
stood discredited altogether, that this Court
in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) with the
aforesaid rule of caution — which is not to be
treated as a rule of law — in mind, said that the
evidence of such a witness is to be rejected en
bloc.”
23(Emphasis Provided)
27. An examination of the cases referred above shows that there can
be no doubt about the fact that the evidence of a witness, who
has been cross-examined by the side which produced him/her,
cannot be totally discarded [Also see:Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731].
28. It may also be worthwhile to mention here that by the Criminal
Law Amendment Act of 2005, sub-section 2 was added to section
154 of the Evidence Act. The amended section 154 of the
Evidence Act now reads as under:
154. Question by party to his own witness.
— (1) The Court may, in its discretion, permit the
person who calls a witness to put any
questions to him which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall disentitle the
person so permitted under sub-section (1), to rely
on any part of the evidence of such witness.
(Emphasis Provided)
29. By way of the above amendment, the position which had been
reiterated by this Court has now come in the statute itself.
30. The word ‘hostile’ or ‘hostile witness’ has not been used anywhere
in the Evidence Act. The logic behind this exclusion seems to be
24
that the declaration of witness as ‘hostile witness’ carries a
specific significance under the English law, from where this term
has been derived, where liberty is only granted to a side to cross-
examine its own witness when such declaration of ‘hostility’ is
made. The position in India is different and here it is left to the
discretion of the Court to allow a party to cross-examine its own
witness, regardless of a declaration of ‘hostility’. This has been
explained by this Court in Sat Paul:
“38. To steer clear of the controversy over the
meaning of the terms “hostile” witness, “adverse”
witness, “unfavourable” witness which had given
rise to considerable difficulty and conflict of
opinion in England, the authors of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 seem to have advisedly
avoided the use of any of those terms so that, in
India, the grant of permission to cross-examine
his own witness by a party is not conditional on
the witness being declared “adverse” or “hostile”.
Whether it be the grant of permission under
Section 142 to put leading questions, or the leave
under Section 154 to ask questions which might
be put in cross-examination by the adverse party,
the Indian Evidence Act leaves the matter entirely
to the discretion of the court (see the observations
of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Baikuntha Nath v.
Prasannamoyi [AIR 1922 PC 409: 72IC 286]). The
discretion conferred by Section 154 on the court
is unqualified and untrammelled and is apart
from any question of “hostility”. It is to be liberally
25exercised whenever the court from the witnesses
demeanour, temper, attitude, bearing, or the
tenor and tendency of his answers, or from a
perusal of his previous inconsistent statement, or
otherwise, thinks that the grant of such
permission is expedient to extract the truth and to
do justice. The grant of such permission does not
amount to an adjudication by the court as to the
veracity of the witness. Therefore, in the order
granting such permission, it is preferable to avoid
the use of such expressions, such as “declared
hostile”, “declared unfavourable”, the significance
of which is still not free from the historical
cobwebs which, in their wake bring a misleading
legacy of confusion, and conflict that had so long
vexed the English Courts.”
(Emphasis Provided)
31. The phrase ‘hostile witness’ is commonly used in criminal
jurisprudence and court proceedings. We too cannot escape the
blame of using the term ‘hostile witness’ in our judgment. We do
it for pragmatic reasons. Some words like ‘hostile witness’ in this
case are now a part of our legal vocabulary. There is no point in
inventing or substituting new words or phrases, at least in the
present case, and we leave that for the future. But what is
necessary, however, is to explain the meaning of the term as it is
now to be understood. The phrase ‘hostile witness’ has come to
26
be used for a witness who gives a statement contrary to the story
of the side for which he/she is a witness. All the same, because
a witness has supported some, though not all, aspects of a case,
it would not automatically mean that this witness has to be
declared ‘hostile’. A party can cross-examine its own witness
under Section 154 Evidence Act, even without getting a
declaration of ‘hostility’. The only restriction to cross-
examination under Section 154 Evidence Act is that the party,
who seeks to cross-examine its own witness, must obtain the
leave of the Court. Whether there is a declaration of ‘hostility’ or
not, one thing is clear that evidence of witness, who has been
cross-examined under Section 154 Evidence Act by the party
who called such witness, cannot be washed off entirely and it is
for the Court to see what can be retrieved from such evidence.
32. This can be understood from another aspect. We shall now refer
to the definition of the term ‘evidence’ given under Section 3 of
the Evidence Act. It reads as follows:
“Evidence” – “Evidence” means and includes –
(1) all statements which the Court permits or
requires to be made before it by witnesses, in
27relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such
statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records
produced for the inspection of the Court; such
document are called documentary evidence.”
(Emphasis Provided)
33. The statements made by a witness in Court, including in cross-
examination, either conducted by the opposite party or by the
party who produced the witness, would come under the
definition of ‘evidence’ under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, since
this evidence has come before the Court with its permission.
Moreover, there is no specific bar under the Evidence Act which
mandates that such evidence has to be discarded. Thus, it would
form part of the entire evidence which the Court can examine
while arriving at its decision, and it is for the Court to determine
what value has to be given to that piece of evidence or how such
evidence has to be used in a given case.
34. Viewed from a different perspective, the rejection of the entire
testimony of a prosecution witness, who has been cross-
examined by the prosecution, would not only harm the case of
the prosecution but perhaps also of the defence in a given case.
28
This is because as the law stands today, the benefit of the
testimony of such witness can be taken by both the prosecution
and the defence, allowing them to use it to build their case [See:
Paulmeli v. State of T.N. (2014) 13 SCC 90, Ramesh Harijan
v. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 777]. In any case, ultimately, it
will be the cause of justice that will suffer if the testimony of such
witness is totally discarded. It is, therefore, rightly left to the
discretion of the Court to test the evidentiary value of such a
testimony.
35. Here, we may also take note of Section 155 of the Evidence Act2
which allows a party, with permission of the Court, to impeach
the credibility of its own witness as per the procedure laid down
therein.
36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim “falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus”3, is not applicable to our criminal justice
system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff
2 155. Impeaching credit of witness: The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following
ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:
(1) By the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the
witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit;
(2) By proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of a bribe, or
has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
(3) By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is
liable to be contradicted…
3 false in one thing, false in everything.
29
while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts
can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness
which is corroborated by other evidence on record. This Court in
Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327
discussed the worth of the evidence of a hostile witness in the
following words:
“36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile
witnesses can also be relied upon by the
prosecution to the extent to which it supports the
prosecution version of the incident. The evidence
of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed
off the records, it remains admissible in trial and
there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the
accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by
other reliable evidence…”If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates
with other reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is
admissible. Once a prosecution witness has been declared
hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, then it is
for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony. There
can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and the
court must also look into these factors while evaluating the
evidence given by a hostile witness. It is an uncomfortable
30reality in our criminal Courts for a prosecution witness to turn
hostile. But then the purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the
truth of the matter. Whatever evidence is there before the
Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever
necessary), before a verdict can be finally given.
37. One of the many reasons for witnesses turning hostile is the long
delay usually caused in a trial. This is again unfortunate but true
in our country. The present case is no exception. Here, the
incident occurred in the year 2003, the case was committed to
Sessions in the year 2010 and charges were framed as late as in
the year 2017, and the judgment was finally pronounced by the
Trial Court on 24.09.2021. It took eighteen years!
38. The role played here by the accused in delaying the trial cannot
be discounted, as already stated. The records also reveal that the
depositions of most of the prosecution witnesses were recorded
only towards the end of the year 2017. Moreover, CBI in this
case had filed its charge-sheet, inter alia, against two persons
belonging to Dalit community. Although, these two (A-4 and A-9)
were finally acquitted by Trial Court as there was absolutely
nothing against them, but in the process, prosecution had to
31declare many of its witnesses belonging to the Dalit community
as hostile simply because these witnesses did not depose against
A-4 and A-9. It is also clear now, in any case, that these two were
wrongly made accused by the prosecution. All the same, the
benefit of such witnesses turning hostile cannot be given to other
accused who were found involved in the offence, on the
overwhelming weight of other evidence.
Related witnesses are not necessarily interested witnesses
39. Another plea taken by the defence is that many witnesses who
have deposed against them, such as PW-49, PW-1, PW-15, are
interested witnesses. PW-49 for example being the step-mother
of Murugesan, the boy who was killed. Now, so far as witnesses
being interested witnesses is concerned, it is a settled position of
law that the Court cannot ignore the testimonies of witnesses
only because they are close relatives of the victim. A Three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13
SCC 716 notes:
“28…No doubt that, merely because the
witnesses are interested and related witnesses,
it cannot be a ground to disbelieve their
testimony. However, the testimony of such
32witnesses has to be scrutinised with due care
and caution. Upon scrutiny of the evidence of
such witnesses, if the court is satisfied that the
evidence is creditworthy, then there is no bar on
the court in relying on such evidence.”In cases where the crime is committed at the residence or
a place near the residence of the deceased, it is the close
relatives who are likely to be a witness to the crime. They are
natural witnesses. This Court in State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa,
(2006) 4 SCC 512, while noting the difference between
interested witness and related witness, observed as follows:
“6…By now it is a well-established principle of
law that testimony of a witness otherwise
inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on the
ground that he being a relation of the deceased is
an interested witness. A close relative who is a
very natural witness cannot be termed as an
interested witness. The term interested
postulates that the person concerned must have
some direct interest in seeing the accused person
being convicted somehow or the other either
because of animosity or some other reasons.
7. On the contrary it has now almost become a
fashion that the public is reluctant to appear and
depose before the court especially in criminal
case because of varied reasons. Criminal cases
are kept dragging for years to come and the
witnesses are harassed a lot. They are being
threatened, intimidated and at the top of all they
are subjected to lengthy cross-examination. In
33such a situation, the only natural witness
available to the prosecution would be the relative
witness. The relative witness is not necessarily
an interested witness. On the other hand, being a
close relation to the deceased they will try to
prosecute the real culprit by stating the truth.
There is no reason as to why a close relative will
implicate and depose falsely against somebody
and screen the real culprit to escape unpunished.
The only requirement is that the testimony of the
relative witnesses should be examined
cautiously…”
40. Keeping these principles in mind, we shall now discuss the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses:
i. PW-1 (Samikannu) is the father of Murugesan who was
made an accused in the first FIR filed by the local police
when A-15 was the I.O. PW-1 is one of the main witnesses
of the prosecution. PW-1 states that, five days prior to the
death of Murugesan i.e. on 03.07.2003, at around 5 PM,
A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), armed with a big sickle, comes to
his house and orders him to find Murugesan and bring
him to his house as Murugesan had borrowed money from
him which he now refuses to return. A-2 threatened PW-1
with dire consequences, if he did not bring Murugesan. On
03.07.2003 itself, PW-1 leaves his village for his sister-in-
34
law Dhanavalli’s house in Rasapalayam, where he found
Murugesan with Kannagi. Murugesan informed PW-1 that
Kannagi is A-1’s daughter. Upon hearing this, PW-1
pleaded with him to ask Kannagi to return to her family as
she belongs to a higher caste. On the same day, i.e.
03.07.2003, PW-1 returns to his village. Thereafter, four
days later, on 07.07.2003, A-2 again threatens PW-1 to
bring back Murugesan and PW-1 yet again leaves his
village in search of Murugesan. This time, since PW-1
could not find Murugesan, he delays his return to his
village, and when he reaches his village the next day (on
08.07.2003), Murugesan and Kannagi had already been
killed.
ii. PW-2 (Velmurugan), is the younger brother of Murugesan.
He was seventeen years old at the time of the incident. In
Court, PW-2 had deposed that at 11 AM on 07.07.2003, A-
2 and his aides intercepted PW-2 near the village water
tank while he was returning to his village from
Virudhachalam. They questioned him on the whereabouts
of Murugesan, repeating the story of the money which was
35
lent to Murugesan. PW-2 was then forcibly taken by them
and confined in a store-room near the water tank and was
only released in the evening, after Murugesan was brought
back to the village. When PW-2 went home, his mother
PW-49 (Chinnapillai) informed him that A-4 had brought
Murugesan back to the village. PW-2 then went to the
sugarcane field of A-1, where he was joined by PW-3
(Palanivel). At the sugarcane field, PW-2 saw that A-2 and
A-7 were threatening Murugesan to disclose the location
of Kannagi. He then saw A-4 (Ayyasamy) asking A-1 (C.
Duraisamy) as to why A-1 was inquiring Murugesan
regarding Kannagi, when the only reason given to A-4 for
their search of Murugesan was the money which was to be
recovered from him. To this, A-1 then answered that he
had to weave a story of ‘loan’, in order to bring Murugesan.
Later, PW-2 and PW-3 returned home. At around 7 PM on
07.07.2003, the villagers were heard saying that
Murugesan was being beaten near Mariamman temple.
PW-2 proceeded to the place near Mariamman temple.
There, he saw A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10, A-
36
11, and hundred other villagers gathered. PW-2 witnessed
Murugesan being tortured. He was hung upside down with
his leg tied by a rope to a borewell situated near the water
tank. PW-2 then states how Murugesan finally disclosed
the location of Kannagi who was in the house of PW-23
(Saroja) at Moongilthuraipattu. Having got this
information, A-1 asked PW-22 (Jayatharasan) to bring the
vehicle, which was a Tata Sumo Jeep, in which A-5, A-6,
A-7, A-8, A-9, and A-10 jumped in and also compelled A-
4 to sit with them, and then they all left for
Moongilthuraipattu. Murugesan was watched by A-1, A-2
and others. A-1 and A-2 then forced PW-2 to go back and
PW-2 further states that he, along with his brother PW-3,
slept in A-4’s motor shed that night, fearing they will be
harmed in case Kannagi was not found.
iii. PW-3 (Palanivel) is the second younger brother of
Murugesan. In his deposition, PW-3 speaks about A-2
threatening his father (PW-1) on 03.07.2003 to compel
PW-1 to bring Murugesan back to Pudukoorapettai village.
PW-3 has also testified to the fact that A-2 later threatened
37
A-4, asking him to bring Murugesan back to the village,
and that A-4 was the one who, in fact, brought Murugesan
to the village. PW-3 has also spoken about the wrongful
detention of PW-2 (Velmurugan) and his subsequent
release once Murugesan returned. PW-3 further deposed
that A-2 and his men had beaten Murugesan near the
water tank and village temple, which was witnessed by
nearly fifty villagers. PW-3 also confirmed the presence of
A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-12, and A-13 at the site
where Murugesan was beaten and tortured. He recollects
seeing that A-4 (Ayyasamy) (A-4, as we know, belongs to
the Dalit community and was the uncle of Murugesan,
who was made an accused by the prosecution, but later
acquitted by the Trial Court) was also tied along with
Murugesan. PW-3 then goes on to speak about the Tata
Sumo being driven by PW-22 coming to the scene and A-
4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10 boarding the vehicle, which
then headed towards Moongilthuraipattu. Like PW-2, PW-
3 also speaks about returning home later, but he says that
they (PW-2 and PW-3) slept in their backyard at night. He
38
also says that when he returned to the house at around 7
AM on 08.07.2003, his mother PW-49 (Chinnapillai), A-4,
PW-16 (Amaravathi) informed him that Murugesan had
been poisoned and killed.
iv. PW-15 (Tamilarasi), who is the sister of Murugesan,
deposed that at around 11 AM on 07.07.2003, Murugesan
was in her house in Vannangudikadu village. Later when
she found him missing, she along with PW-16
(Amaravathi-who also lived in Vannangudikadu village),
proceed for Pudukoorapettai, the village of Murugesan.
Once they reached the village she saw A-2, A-5 and A-12
beating Murugesan, and hurling casteist abuses at him.
PW-15 further says that there was a huge crowd of
villagers also present at the spot. Later when Murugesan
finally disclosed the location of Kannagi as he could not
stand the torture, a Tata Sumo vehicle was brought to the
spot, in which some of the accused went to bring Kannagi.
PW-15 along with PW-2, PW-3, PW-16, and PW-49 then
returned home. The next day i.e. 08.07.2003, PW-15 was
told by PW-16 and PW-49 that Murugesan had been killed.
39
v. PW-16 (Amaravathi), the aunt of Murugesan, has not fully
confirmed the prosecution story. She only states that she
saw Murugesan in PW-15’s house, where he told PW-16
that he had not borrowed any money from A-2. She denies
any knowledge of the events that took place thereafter, and
states that she was informed of the death of Murugesan
by other persons. This witness was also declared, what we
call ‘hostile’.
vi. PW-49 (Chinnapillai), the step-mother of Murugesan, is
the star witness of the prosecution. She states that A-2
threatened her husband, PW-1, to bring back Murugesan,
on 03.07.2003, and then how her husband PW-1 left the
village to find Murugesan but returns without Murugesan.
She further deposes that how again, on 07.07.2003, A-2
threatened PW-1 to bring back Murugesan and PW-1
again left the village in search of Murugesan and returned
on 08.07.2003, after the death of Murugesan and Kannagi.
PW-49 further testified that it was A-4 who finally brought
Murugesan to the village. She specifically identified A-2,
A-3, A-8, A-10, A-13 as the accused who had beaten and
40
tortured her son near the temple. PW-49 also states that
A-2, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-10, A-12 assaulted A-4 and
compelled him to get into the Tata Sumo vehicle which was
requisitioned to bring Kannagi. Thereafter, they forced
PW-49 to leave the place.
41. So far, the following facts emerge from the testimonies
reproduced above:
i. On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan) threatened PW-1
(Samikannu) to bring back Murugesan. PW-1 goes to his
sister-in-law’s house where he met Murugesan and asked
Murugesan to send Kannagi to her parental home. On the
same day, PW-1 returns to his village.
ii. On 07.07.2003, A-2 again threatened PW-1 to bring
Murugesan back to the village, and PW-1 once again
leaves his village in search of Murugesan. But this time,
he could not find Murugesan and fearing that A-2 would
harm him if he returns without Murugesan, PW-1 did not
return to his village that day.
41
iii. On 07.07.2003, A-2 also threatened A-4 (Ayyasamy) to
bring Murugesan back to the village and it was A-4 who
finally brought Murugesan back to the village
iv. Murugesan was battered and tortured by A-1, A-2 and
their men in order to elicit the location of Kannagi, which
he ultimately revealed after he was unable to bear the
torture. Many villagers were present when all this was
happening.
v. A Tata sumo vehicle, driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan),
went to find Kannagi and bring her back to the village.
42. It is from this point onwards that the case depends mainly on
the testimony of PW-49 (Chinnapillai), who is the step-mother of
Murugesan, and an eyewitness. She is the most important
witness, as she has seen the macabre act of the actual poisoning
of the two innocent lives. Although, PW-16 (Amaravathi), the
aunt of Murugesan, was also produced by the prosecution as an
eye-witness, but she has turned hostile and denies even being
present on the spot.
43. PW-49, all the same, states that after PW-2, PW-3, PW-15, PW-
16 and she were compelled to leave the place where Murugesan
42
was tortured, they returned home. At dawn on 08.07.2003, PW-
16 and PW-49 went near the temple, but did not find Murugesan
there. PW-49 heard some villagers saying that Murugesan would
be poisoned. PW-49 and PW-16 ran through the temple when
they heard a noise. They followed the sound which led them to a
place where PW-49 saw Murugesan tied to a tree in a cashew
grove. She says that A-4 was also tied to a tree. PW-49 further
states that barring A-14 and A-15, all the accused were present
there. She specifically states that A-2 poured poison down her
son’s throat. She tried to stop A-2 but was held back by the
accused. After A-2 had administered poison to Murugesan, PW-
49 fainted and it was PW-16 who sprinkled water on her face to
bring her back to consciousness. PW-49 then states that she
immediately went to the Virudhachalam police station, but no
one listened to her. On the contrary, she was given casteist slurs
and driven away. After she returned home, PW-1 also came back.
Then, A-3 and others told them that Murugesan’s body had been
set ablaze. Upon hearing this, PW-49, PW-1, PW-15 went to the
place where Murugesan’s body was being burnt. All that they
could recover was a ring that Murugesan used to wear.
43
44. From a perusal of the evidence, it is also clear that the accused
before us had brought Kannagi to Pudukoorapettai village, where
she was also killed by administration of poison along with
Murugesan.
45. In the present case, PW-49, who is an eyewitness, was not cited
as a witness in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI. What she
had said before the police during investigation under Section 161
CrPC is what she later deposed more or less as a witness in the
Court. There may be some discrepancies in PW-49’s deposition
but on overall consideration of the evidence, these will be of no
help to the defence.
46. The prosecution, however, was not confident that this witness
would withstand the cross-examination, considering she was
uneducated and extremely inarticulate. It was only later during
the trial that an application was moved on behalf of the
prosecution under Section 311 CrPC to summon PW-49 as an
additional witness, which was allowed, and PW-49 was made a
prosecution witness. This order of the Sessions Court was
44
challenged before the High Court by none other than PW-14, who
prayed that PW-49 ought to be examined as a ‘Court witness’
rather than a prosecution witness. PW-1 approached the High
Court with this prayer because the apprehensions weighing in
his mind were that if his wife (PW-49, Chinnapillai) is examined
as a prosecution witness, she may be declared hostile, and the
benefit thereof would ultimately be availed by the accused.
However, the High Court dismissed PW-1’s petition and affirmed
the decision of the Trial Court summoning Chinnapillai as a
prosecution witness. The High Court held that these
apprehensions have to be disregarded for the reason that the
Trial Court is empowered under Section 165 of the Evidence Act
to take care of any apprehensions as raised by PW-1 regarding
PW-49 turning hostile.
Prosecution Witness and Court Witness, and Section 311
CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act
4 PW-49 is the wife of PW-1 and step-mother of the deceased Murugesan
45
47. Before moving further, we consider it necessary to deal with the
law relating to section 311 CrPC under which PW-49 was
summoned as a witness.
Section 311 CrPC reads as follows:
“311. Power to summon material
witness, or examine person present.—
Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry,
trial or other proceeding under this Code,
summon any person as a witness, or
examine any person in attendance, though
not summoned as a witness, or recall and
re-examine any person already examined;
and the Court shall summon and examine
or recall and re-examine any such person if
his evidence appears to it to be essential to
the just decision of the case.”This Section 311 of CrPC provides wide powers to a Criminal
Court, to do the following:
i. Summon any person as a witness, or
ii. Examine any person present in court, though not
summoned as witness, or
iii. Recall and re-examine any person already examined
The above powers can be exercised ‘at any stage of any inquiry,
trial or other proceeding’ under the CrPC. The provision can be
46divided into two parts. The word ‘may’ is used in the first part of
the section which grants the Court the discretion to summon a
witness. In contrast, the second part of the Section uses the word
‘shall’ which casts a duty on the Court to summon and examine
or recall or re-examine any such person as a witness when it
appears to the Court that it is essential to do so for a just decision
in the case. In other words, the second part is mandatory, and
Courts are obligated to exercise their powers under Section 311
CrPC when the evidence of any person is essential for a just
decision of the case. (See: Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of
Maharashtra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19)
48. As is clear from the language of the provision itself, there is a
wide discretion with the Courts under Section 311 CrPC. These
powers can be exercised suo moto or on an application moved by
either side. After all, the object is that the Court must not be
deprived of the benefit of any valuable evidence. It is absolutely
necessary that the Court must be apprised of the best evidence
available. Thus, Courts have been given wide powers to decide
on their own if a witness is required to be called or recalled for
examination or re-examination. This power under Section 311
47
CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial, even after the
closing of the evidence. Section 311 CrPC can also be read along
with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, as the powers of the Court
under Section 165 of the Evidence Act are complementary to
Section 311 of CrPC. As discussed above, powers under Section
311 CrPC can either be exercised on an application moved by
either side to the case or suo moto by the Court. In case a person
is not listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but later, the
prosecution desires to bring that person as an additional
prosecution witness, then the prosecution can move an
application to bring this person as a prosecution witness. It is
then for the Court to decide whether such a person is required
as a witness or not. If the Court finds that such a person should
have been examined as a prosecution witness and he/she was
omitted from the list of witnesses due to some oversight, mistake
or for any other reason, the Court may allow the application and
such a person can be examined as a prosecution witness.
Thereafter, the normal course of examination-in-chief, cross-
examination, etc. would follow as per the procedure. On the other
hand, when the Court calls a person as a Court witness, there
48
are some restrictions regarding the cross-examination of such
witness.
49. In a case where neither party is interested in examining a person
as a witness yet the Court feels that the evidence of such a person
is necessary for a just decision, the Court though cannot compel
either the prosecution or the defence to call a witness, but it can
invoke its power under Section 311 CrPC, read with Section 165
of the Evidence Act and call such a person as a Court witness.
Whether a person is required to be examined as a witness for a
just decision is again a question which has to be decided by the
Court on the basis of the facts of that particular case. (See:
Rama Paswan v. State of Jharkhand (2007) 11 SCC 191)
50. As far as cross-examination of a Court witness is concerned, no
party can claim cross-examination of a Court witness as a matter
of right. A Court witness can only be examined with the leave of
the Court [See: Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of
Gujarat & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 374 and Jamatraj (Supra)].
Where a Court witness says something prejudicial to any party,
then such a party must be allowed to cross-examine that
witness.
49
51. Also, as discussed earlier, Court witnesses can be cross-
examined by either side but only with the leave of the Court.
Further, the cross-examination is to be restricted only to what
was stated by this witness in his/her reply to the questions of
the Court, and a Court witness cannot be contradicted to his/her
previous statements made before the police i.e. statements under
section 161 of CrPC. The proviso to section 162(1)5 of CrPC makes
it very clear that only prosecution witnesses can be contradicted
against their previous Section 161 CrPC statements. Under the
proviso to Section 162(1) of CrPC, Section 161 CrPC statements
of any prosecution witness can be used by the defence to
contradict such a witness during the cross-examination. The
prosecution may also contradict its own witness during cross-
examination regarding the previous statements made before the
5 162. Statements to police not to be signed: Use of statements in evidence.
(1)No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under
this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such
statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such
statement of record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial
in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose
statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved,
may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to
contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(1 of 1872); and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used
in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred
to in his cross-examination.
50
police, but again it can only be done with the leave of the Court.
[See: Mahabir Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1972) 1 SCC
748, Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat &
Anr. (2019) 16 SCC 547]
All the same, none of these restrictions apply to the Court,
which has wide power under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to
ask any questions. The Courts are not barred from putting
questions which may contradict the witness with the previous
statements made before the police. The special powers of the
Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act are not impaired or
controlled by the provisions of Section 162 of the CrPC. (See:
Raghunandan v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 186)
52. The powers of a Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and
the importance of Section 165 in the meaningful conduct of a
trial is brilliantly explained by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy with
distinctive clarity of his letters in Ram Chander v. State of
Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 191:
“What is the true role of a Judge trying a
criminal case? Is he to assume the role of a
referee in a football match or an umpire in a
cricket match, occasionally answering, as
Pollock and Maitland [ Pollock and Maitland :
51
The History of English Law] point out, the
question “How is that”, or, is he to, in the
words of Lord Denning “drop the mantle of a
Judge and assume the robe of an advocate?”
[Jones v. National Coal Board, (1957) 2 All ER
155 : (1957) 2 WLR 760] Is he to be a spectator
or a participant at the trial? Is passivity or
activity to mark his attitude? If he desires to
question any of the witnesses, how far can he
go? Can he put on the gloves and ‘have a go’
at the witness who he suspects is lying or is
he to be soft and suave? These are some of
the questions which we are compelled to ask
ourselves in this appeal on account of the
manner in which the Judge who tried the case
put questions to some of the witnesses.
2. The adversary system of trial being what it
is, there is an unfortunate tendency for a
Judge presiding over a trial to assume the role
of a referee or an umpire and to allow the trial
to develop into a contest between the
prosecution and the defence with the
inevitable distortions flowing from combative
and competitive elements entering the trial
procedure. If a criminal court is to be an
effective instrument in dispensing justice, the
presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator
and a mere recording machine. He must
become a participant in the trial by evincing
intelligent active interest by putting questions
to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. As
one of us had occasion to say in the past:
“Every criminal trial is a voyage of
discovery in which truth is the
quest. It is the duty of a presiding
Judge to explore every avenue open
to him in order to discover the truth
52and to advance the cause of justice.
For that purpose he is expressly
invested by Section 165 of the
Evidence Act with the right to put
questions to witnesses. Indeed the
right given to a Judge is so wide that
he may, ask any question he
pleases, in any form, at any time, of
any witness, or of the parties about
any fact, relevant or irrelevant.
Section 172(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure enables the
court to send for the police-diaries in
a case and use them to aid it in the
trial. The record of the proceedings
of the Committing Magistrate may
also be perused by the Sessions
Judge to further aid him in the trial.”
3. With such wide powers, the court must
actively participate in the trial to elicit the
truth and to protect the weak and the
innocent. It must, of course, not assume the
role of a prosecutor in putting questions. The
functions of the Counsel, particularly those of
the Public Prosecutor, are not to be usurped by
the judge, by descending into the arena, as it
were. Any questions put by the Judge must be
so as not to frighten, coerce, confuse or
intimidate the witnesses…”
53. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy then goes on to say that a judge can
“ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of
the parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant”. But then while
53doing this the Judge must take both the prosecution and the
defence with him.
54. In the present case, in our opinion, the High Court was right in
dismissing the apprehensions of PW-1 that the prosecution
would get PW-49 declared hostile to the benefit of the accused.
These apprehensions were not well-founded. PW-49 is an
eyewitness, she ought to have been made a prosecution witness
in the first instance. Theoretically speaking, the Trial Court could
have called her as a Court witness, in light of the facts of the
present case, as her evidence was absolutely essential for the just
decision of the case. All the same, before the Trial Court could
have done it, the prosecution itself moved an application to
summon her as a prosecution witness and therefore, in our
opinion, the Trial Court rightly made her a prosecution witness
by allowing such an application. In the present case, PW-49 did
not support the case of prosecution on some aspects, such as
the role of A-4 and A-9 (Dalits who were made accused), yet her
evidence in respect of other accused was correctly relied upon by
the Trial Court in convicting the other accused.
54
The findings of the Court on the role of A-14 & A-15 – the
Police Officers
55. Now coming to the role of A-14 (K.P. Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M.
Sellamuthu), who were the Sub-Inspector and Inspector,
respectively, of the Virudhachalam police station at the relevant
point of time.
56. A-14 and A-15 were convicted by the Trial Court under Sections
217 & 218 of IPC and Sections 3(2)(i) & 4 of SC/ST Act. However,
the High Court acquitted A-14 for offences under Sections 218
and Section 3(2)(i) of SC/ST Act. Whereas conviction and
sentence under other provisions were upheld by the High Court.
57. Before we proceed to examine their role, it is necessary to state
that the police station, where these two officers were posted and
which has the jurisdiction of the village, is not very far from the
village in any case as noticed by the High Court, it was about 3
kilometres from the village. It is very difficult to believe that a
dastardly double murder takes place in the village, and those in-
charge of the police station remain unaware of the crime. To the
contrary, it has come in the evidence that the police refused to
lodge the FIR against the accused villagers belonging to the
55
Vanniyar community, when the incident was reported by a Dalit
(PW-49). Further, as stated above, even though the incident
takes place on 07/08.07.2003, the police only registered the FIR
on 17.07.2003 i.e. after a delay of nine days, after political
pressure and the news having caught the attention of Press and
the Media.
58. PW-2, PW-3, PW-15, PW-49 have all spoken about going to the
Virudhachalam police station but being driven out after being
given casteist slurs by the policemen who were there.
59. The fact that A-14 and A-15 had knowledge of the incident, and
that A-15 purposely conducted a wrong and misleading
investigation, has been disclosed in the statements of PW-38 to
PW-44 and PW-47 to PW-49, to the CBI, though they did not
support the prosecution on this aspect in the Court. What they
said before the Court is as follows:
i. PW-38 (Sundarapandiyan) served as Head Constable in
Virudhachalam police station between 2002 and 2004. He
deposed that he had heard of A-14 having visited the scene
of crime upon receiving information regarding the incident.
56PW-38 further states that FIR No. 356 of 2003 was registered
by A-14, and A-15 conducted the investigation.
ii. PW-39 (Ramamoorthy) also served as Head Constable in
Virudhachalam police station at the time of the incident. He
deposed that he was the one who submitted the evidence in
the case, and that A-14 and A-15 were in-charge of the police
station at the relevant time.
iii. PW-40 (Antonysamy) served as Sub-Inspector in the Special
Branch when the incident dated 07/08.07.2003 had taken
place. He was informed about the incident by one PW-47
(Rajendran), Head Constable in the Special Branch. PW-40
ordered PW-47 to visit the scene of crime. PW-47 told PW-40
that he had visited the scene of crime, that it was not known
whether such an occurrence had taken place, and that he
would inquire further. PW-40 asked as to why the FIR has
not been lodged yet, to which PW-47 responded that nobody
has come forward to file a complaint yet.
iv. PW-41 (Anwar Baig) served as Head Constable in
Virudhachalam police station at the time of the incident. He
denies any knowledge of the complaint being received on
5708.07.2003 or FIR being registered on 17.07.2003, but
admits that he prepared the Observation Mahazar, to which
A-15 has attested his signatures.
v. PW-44 (Dhanapaul) was Sub-Inspector of Avinankudi police
station at the time of the incident. He deposed that the DSP,
Virudhachalam asked him to go to Virudhachalam police
station on 17.07.2003. When PW-44 reached there at around
4 PM, A-14 and A-15 were on duty. A-15 asked PW-44 to
assist A-14 with writing work. The FIR No. 356 of 2003 was
written by PW-44, on which A-14 put his signatures.
vi. PW-47 (Rajendran) worked as Head Constable in the Special
Branch when the incident occurred. While on duty, he
overheard people saying that two persons had died by taking
poison in Pudukoorapettai village. PW-47 gave this
information to his superior PW-40, who asked PW-47 to look
into the matter. When PW-47 went to Pudukoorapettai village
and inquired, he claims that nobody gave him correct
information. When PW-47 asked at the police station, he was
told that no complaint had been filed.
58
vii. PW-48 (Harishankar), who was a Head Constable in the
Virudhachalam police station when the double murders took
place, has said in his deposition that he came to know 3-4
days after 08.07.2003 that upon receiving information about
the incident, A-14 had gone to the spot but since nobody
lodged a complaint, he returned and kept quiet.
60. It is true that PW-49 has not specifically said that A-14 and A-
15 were the same police officers who refused to register the FIR
based on her complaint, hurled casteist abuses at her, and sent
her away on 08.07.2003. Also, though the police witnesses did
not completely support the prosecution’s case, but from their
evidence, it is clear that A-14 and A-15 both had knowledge of
the incident. Considering the proximity of the police station from
the village, it is also highly unlikely that the police officers in-
charge of the police station would not have known about the
incident. Besides, the investigation done by the local police itself
was motivated and downright dishonest, where the intention was
to show that the crime was jointly committed by the Vanniyar
and Dalit community, which is far from the truth. It puts the
perpetrators and the victim together as accused. The
59
investigation of CBI discloses quite another story which, by and
large, has placed the pieces together, except for a few
discrepancies here and there. The local police had also made PW-
1, who was none other than the father of the deceased
Murugesan, as one of the co-accused. This was a ruse.
61. In this regard, evidence given by PW-32 (Ashokan), who was the
suspended Village Administrative Officer at the relevant point in
time, assumes great significance. According to the investigation
done by A-15, PW-32 was the person before whom A-1 had given
an extra-judicial confession. According to the version of the local
police, it was PW-32 who took A-1 to the police station and on
the basis of the extra-judicial confession given before PW-32 by
A-1, the FIR was registered by the local police on 17.07.2003.
However, the deposition of this witness in Court will be of some
interest.
62. In his examination-in-chief, which was conducted on
18.09.2017, PW-32 states that during the relevant time he was
a Village Administrative Officer, but under suspension. In the
evening of 16.07.2003, he was asked by the Tahsildar to meet
the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who further asked PW-32
60
to meet the inspector of Virudhachalam police station i.e. A-15.
The next day i.e. 17.07.2003, PW-32 went to the police station
where he met A-15. PW-32 states that A-15 gave him two sheets
of paper with something written on them already and asked PW-
32 to write down the same contents on another sheet of paper.
Initially, PW-32 refused to oblige by saying that he is under
suspension but thereafter, the Revenue Officer directed PW-32
to comply. Finally, PW-32 agreed to do what was told to him. A-
15 gave the sheets of paper with something written on them to
PW-32 and whatever was written on those papers was copied by
PW-32 on another piece of paper, which PW-32 was later asked
to sign. This was the so called ‘extra-judicial confession’ of A-1,
on the basis of which the FIR was registered. A-1 signed the same
papers immediately thereafter.
63. Thus, it is clear from examination-in-chief of PW-32 that neither
did A-1 make any extra-judicial confession before PW-32, nor
was A-1 taken to the police station by PW-32 to make him
surrender. Contrary to this, the version put forth by A-15 in the
initial investigation was that, at some point in time the
conscience of A-1 started nagging him, after he had killed his
61
own daughter and thus he made an extra judicial confession
before a government servant, who was an officer connected with
the functioning of his village. The reality, however, is quite
different. It was all planned and executed to perfection, since the
registration of FIR became a necessity due to political and media
pressure.
64. Immediately after his examination-in-chief, PW-32 was cross-
examined on behalf of A-14 and A-15, but PW-32 stood by
whatever he had deposed in his examination-in-chief.
Four years after the cross-examination was over, PW-32 was
recalled for cross-examination on 03.03.2021 on an application
moved by A-14 & A-15. This time, PW-32 differs from his earlier
examination-in-chief and cross-examination recorded on
18.09.2017, as he now states that he recorded the confession as
made before him and gave it to the Police.
65. Similarly, examination-in-chief of PW-34, who was the Village
Administrative Officer of Virudhachalam, was conducted on
18.09.2017 where he deposed that at 4:30 pm on 17.07.2003, he
was summoned by A-15 to the police station. There, A-15 made
PW-34 affix his signatures on several documents relating to the
62
double murders. These included Mahazar, confessions etc. which
were shown to be signed at late night of 17.07.2003 and early
morning of 18.07.2003 at different places.
66. A-15 was behind this devious and dishonest investigation from
the very beginning, and he had falsely implicated the family
members of Murugesan, who belonged to a Schedule Caste
community of Tamil Nadu. There is conclusive evidence in this
regard.
67. The purpose of an investigation, like the purpose of a trial, is to
reach to the truth. The duty of an Investigating Officer is to
lawfully collect evidence. In the present case, the Investigating
Officer (A-15) not only covered evidence but fabricated his own.
Instead of collecting evidence, he created evidence and tried to
implicate the innocent and set the guilty loose. In order to fulfil
his wicked design, he has deliberately and willfully violated the
mandate of Sections 154 and 157(1) of CrPC as well as Section
23 and 24 of the Police Act, 1861.
68. Section 154(1) of CrPC provides that when an officer-in-charge of
a police station receives any information regarding the
commission of a cognizable offence, such information shall be
63
reduced in writing and be read over to the informant. The
relevant part of section 154(1) reads as follows:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1)
Every information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in
charge of a police station, shall be reduced to
writing by him or under his direction, and be read
over to the informant; and every such information,
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as
aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a
book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
State Government may prescribe in this behalf…”
69. Reading of the above provision should not be misunderstood to
mean that the police is empowered to register FIR only in cases
where some informant comes forward and provides information
regarding the commission of a cognizable offence to the police.
Once the police gets information regarding the commission
of a cognizable offence, whether it is through any
informant/complainant or otherwise, police is empowered to
register the case and proceed with the investigation. This
becomes clear from the bare reading of Sections 156 and 157 of
CrPC. Section 156(1) reads as under:
64
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate
cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a
police station may, without the order of a
Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which
a Court having jurisdiction over the local area
within the limits of such station would have power
to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter
XIII.”Relevant portion of Section 157(1) reads as follows:
“157. Procedure for investigation.—(1) If, from
information received or otherwise, an officer in
charge of a police station has reason to suspect the
commission of an offence which he is empowered
under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith
send a report of the same to a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon
a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall
depute one of his subordinate officers not being
below such rank as the State Government may, by
general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to
proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and
circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to
take measures for the discovery and arrest of the
offender…”
(Emphasis Supplied)The above provisions make it very clear that where an officer-
in-charge of a police station, from information received or
otherwise, has reason to suspect that a cognizable offence has
65been committed, he shall forthwith send a report to a Magistrate
and shall start the investigation.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari v.
Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 made it absolutely clear that an
FIR can be registered even if there is no formal informant. In fact,
it is obligatory for police to register the FIR when they receive any
information which is sufficient to suspect that some cognizable
offence has been committed. This is exactly what was said by this
Court:
“97. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs: the
duly signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the
informant to the officer concerned at the police
station. The second kind of FIR could be which is
registered by the police itself on any information
received or other than by way of an informant
[Section 157(1)] and even this information has to be
duly recorded and the copy should be sent to the
Magistrate forthwith. The registration of FIR either
on the basis of the information furnished by the
informant under Section 154(1) of the Code or
otherwise under Section 157(1) of the Code is
obligatory…”It is not the case that Lalita Kumari (Supra) had made the
registration of FIR obligatory for the first time; it was always there
in the statute. Thus, even in the absence of a formal informant,
66the police is duty-bound to register the case whenever they
receive any information regarding the commission of a cognizable
offence.
In the present case, as discussed earlier, there is no doubt
that A-14 and A-15 had the information regarding the death of
Murugesan and Kannagi on the day of the incident itself i.e. on
08.07.2003. However, they did not register the FIR, thereby
acting in violation of the provisions of law. Their defence that
nobody came forward to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR
cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, when members from
Murugesan’s family went to the police station to register an FIR,
they were rebuffed and were given caste-based abuses. Thus,
their plea that nobody came forward to lodge a complaint is
unsustainable in light of the facts of the case. Secondly, even if
we assume for the sake of argument that nobody went to the
police station to report the double murders, it was the duty of A-
14 and A-15 to register the FIR as it cannot be doubted that they
had information regarding the crime. Hence, their defence is
unacceptable in light of the law as well as the facts of the case,
and has rightly been disbelieved by the High Court.
67
70. When public, political, and media pressure builds up, A-15 (nine
days after the double murders had taken place), manufactures
an extra-judicial confession of A-1 and registers the FIR against
four Dalits (family members of Murugesan) and four Vanniyars.
A-15 then went further and manufactured the confessions of the
other accused. These facts are particularly glaring in light of the
fact that A-15 knew about the incident right from the date of its
occurrence i.e. 08.07.2003, but still took no action and made no
effort whatsoever to uncover the truth.
71. We have examined the provisions of law and the facts of the case,
particularly the role of A-15 in detail. Mr. Gopal
Sankaranarayanan, the learned Senior Counsel for A-15 would
argue that at worst, the case of A-15 can be treated on the same
footing as that of A-14, who has been acquitted of charges under
Section 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC though
convicted under other charges. All the same, we see no reason
how that can be done.
72. Sections 217 and 218 of IPC read as under:
“217. Public servant disobeying direction
of law with intent to save person from
punishment or property from forfeiture.—
68Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly
disobeys any direction of the law as to the way
in which he is to conduct himself as such public
servant, intending thereby to save, or knowing
it to be likely that he will thereby save, any
person from legal punishment, or subject him to
a less punishment than that to which he is
liable, or with intent to save, or knowing that he
is likely thereby to save, any property from
forfeiture or any charge to which it is liable by
law, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both.”“218. Public servant framing incorrect
record or writing with intent to save
person from punishment or property from
forfeiture.—Whoever, being a public servant,
and being as such public servant, charged with
the preparation of any record or other writing,
frames that record or writing in a manner
which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to
cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to
any person, or with intent thereby to save, or
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save,
any person from legal punishment, or with
intent to save, or knowing that he is likely
thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or
other charge to which it is liable by law, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.
(Emphasis provided)
73. Here, we would also like to reproduce the provisions of SC/ST
Act under which both the policemen (A-14 and A-15) were
69
convicted by the Trial Court. The relevant portions of sections
3(2)(i) and 4 of SC/ST Act are as follows:
“3. Punishments for offences of
atrocities.—
…..
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
(i) gives or fabricates false evidence
intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby cause, any member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to be
convicted of an offence which is capital by the
law for the time being in force shall be punished
with imprisonment for life and with fine; and if
an innocent member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe be convicted and executed in
consequence of such false or fabricated
evidence, the person who gives or fabricates
such false evidence, shall be punished with
death;”
“4. Punishment for neglect of duties.—(1)
Whoever, being a public servant but not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe, wilfully neglects his duties required to be
performed by him under this Act and the rules
made thereunder, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than six months but which may extend to one
year.
(2) The duties of public servant referred to in
sub-section (1) shall include—
(a) to read out to an informant the information
given orally, and reduced to writing by the
officer in charge of the police station, before
taking the signature of the informant;
70
(b) to register a complaint or a First Information
Report under this Act and other relevant
provisions and to register it under appropriate
sections of this Act;
(c) to furnish a copy of the information so
recorded forthwith to the informant;
(d) to record the statement of the victims or
witnesses;
(e) to conduct the investigation and file charge
sheet in the Special Court or the Exclusive
Special Court within a period of sixty days, and
to explain the delay if any, in writing;
(f) to correctly prepare, frame and translate any
document or electronic record;
(g) to perform any other duty specified in this Act
or the rules made thereunder:..”
(Emphasis provided)
74. Analyzing the above-quoted provisions of law in light of the facts
of the case, the following position would emerge:
(a) A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M. Sellamuthu) both had
committed the offences under Section 217 IPC and Section 4
of the SC/ST Act as they neglected their duties and disobeyed
the law by not registering the FIR at the first instance with
the intention to save the culprits.
(b) Now, coming to the role of A-15. Like A-14, A-15 too is guilty
of offences under section 217 of the IPC and under section 4
of the SC/ST Act but, in addition to these wrongdoings, it is
71also borne out from the record that it was A-15 who was the
main architect behind the FIR dated 17.07.2003, which
falsely implicated the four members of Schedule Caste
community. Further, it was A-15 who was in-charge of the
investigation which led to the filing of the chargesheet against
the innocent persons belonging to Dalit community. There is
no doubt that A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve culprits
belonging to the Vanniyar community of their complicity in
the crime, and he knowingly and deliberately falsely
implicated some of the Dalits in an offence punishable with
death. Evidence, as discussed earlier, makes it clear that A-
15 manufactured the extra-judicial confessions and evidence
and thereafter, filed the chargesheet against Dalits on the
basis of that evidence. Hence, the High Court rightly upheld
the conviction of A-15 under Sections 217, 218 of IPC and
Sections 4, 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and the sentence of life
imprisonment. There is no doubt in our mind that A-15 is
guilty of the offences as held both by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court in appeal.
72
75. We have also looked into the aspect of victim compensation in
this case. A crime is an act against the State. But a wicked and
odious crime, as the one we have just dealt with, is the ugly
reality of our deeply entrenched caste structure. Honour-killing,
as these are called, must get a strong measure of punishment.
We are also of the opinion that victim compensation here is
warranted. We thus award compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-
(Rupees Five Lakhs) to PW-1 (Samikannu-father of Murugesan)
and PW-49 (Chinnapillai – step-mother of Murugesan) jointly, or
to the nearest of their kins. This compensation is liable to be paid
by the State of Tamil Nadu to the above-mentioned persons. We
further clarify that this compensation would be in addition to the
amount awarded or directed to be paid as compensation by the
Sessions Court and High Court.
76. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the
Madras High Court, and these appeals are, accordingly,
dismissed.
77. All those appellants, who are on bail, are directed to surrender
within two weeks from today to undergo their remaining
sentence.
73
78. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated. Interlocutory
application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
……..……………………………., J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
………..…………………………., J.
[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
April 28, 2025;
New Delhi.
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