Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
K.Venkatapaparao vs K.Ramulu on 21 January, 2025
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APHC010341782003
[3369]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY
TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 734/2003
Between:
K.venkatapaparao and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
K Ramulu ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. BOMMANA RAMAKRISHNA
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. Y SRINIVASA MURTHY
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellants / Appellants /
Defendants against the Decree and Judgment dated 09.06.2003,, in A.S.No.
A.S.No.75
of 1998 on the file of learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast
Track Court), Srikakulam (for short, ‘the First Appellate Court’) confirming the
decree and Judgment dated 20.04.1998, in O.S.No.108 of 1993 on the file of
learned Additional Senior
nior Civil Judge, Srikakulam (for short, ‘the Trial Court’).
Court
2. The Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.108
108 of 1993
seeking recovery of Rs.39,670.72
670.72 ps., being the principal and interest from the
Defendants based on the promissory note,
note dated 20.06.1991.
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3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is
expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
On 20.06.1991, Defendants 1 and 2 borrowed Rs.30,200/-, agreeing
ଶ
to pay with 14 % annual interest, and executed a promissory note in
ହfavour of the Plaintiff. On 19.07.1993, the Plaintiff sent a registered
notice to the Defendants demanding payment. The Defendants
acknowledged receipt of the notice, but the 1st Defendant responded
on 03.08.1993 with false claims. Despite this, the Defendants have
failed to repay the amount due on the promissory note.
5. The 1st Defendant filed a written statement adopted by the 2nd
Defendant, wherein, contended that the 2nd Defendant did not sign the alleged
promissory note, claiming her signature is forged. The promissory note is,
therefore, invalid. The 1st Defendant acknowledges borrowing Rs.6000/- from
Plaintiff in 1979, with interest paid until 1983. However, the 1 st Defendant
could not pay interest from 1984 to 1986 due to financial difficulties. The 1 st
Defendant alleges that under threat and coercion, he was forced to sign the
suit promissory note while confined in the Plaintiff’s father-in-law’s house. The
amount of Rs.30,200/- stated in the promissory note was not supported by any
legitimate monetary consideration. Furthermore, the 1 st Defendant claims that
a written endorsement, issued by the Plaintiff in the presence of elders on
22.06.1991, acknowledged that the actual accrued amount due was
Rs.20,000/-, not Rs.30,200/-. The 1st Defendant also asserts that he made
Rs.2,400/- payments on 10.08.1991, Rs.8,000/- on 05.01.1992 and Rs.6,000/-
on 10.03.1992, for which the Plaintiff provided unstamped receipts. These
payments, totalling Rs.16,400/-, have not been deducted from the alleged
amount of Rs.30,200/-, and the Plaintiff has suppressed these facts in the suit.
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Consequently, the 1st Defendant contends that he owes only Rs.3,600/-and
requests the dismissal of the suit with costs.
6. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court has framed the following issues:
1) Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and supported by
consideration?
2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to suit claim?
3) To what relief?
7. During the trial, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to
A.6 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DWs.1
to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.6.
8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the
Trial Court decreed the suit with costs in O.S.No.108 of 1993 for Rs.39,670.72
ଶ
ps., and subsequent interest at 14 % per annum from the date of the suit till
ହ
the date of decree and at 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date
of realization on the principal amount of Rs.30,200/-.
9. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants filed an Appeal in A.S.No.75 of
1998 on file of the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, being the
final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration:
1) Whether the 2nd Appellant / 2nd Defendant also signed Ex.A.1?
2) Whether the suit pronote was obtained under coercion and is
devoid of consideration to a tune of Rs.10,200/-?
3) Whether the part payments of Rs.2,400/-, dt.10.08.1991,
Rs.8,000/-, dt.05.01.1992, and Rs.6,000/-, dt.10.03.192 are true
and valid?
4) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Court is not
sustainable in Law?
5) To what relief?
10. The First Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary
evidence on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal with costs in
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A.S.No.75 of 1998 by its Judgment and Decree dated 09.06.2003. Assailing
the same, the Defendants preferred the present Second Appeal.
11. I heard Sri Bommana Ramakrishna, learned Counsel representing the
Appellants/Defendants and Sri Y. Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel for the
Respondent/Plaintiff.
12. The Appellant’s Counsel asserts that the Plaintiff approached the Court
with unclean hands. Plaintiff accepted the amounts paid under Ex.s.B.1 to B.5,
and thus, there is no justification for not deducting these amounts from the
decretal sum. Both Courts failed to consider that the promissory note was
obtained under threat and coercion, lacking valid consideration, and as such,
it does not meet the necessary ingredients under the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (for short, ‘N.I Act‘). The learned Counsel further contends that the
oral evidence presented by the Plaintiff was insufficient to prove that the
Defendants executed the promissory note. Additionally, the promissory note
lacks the signature of the 2nd Defendant, and the findings of both Courts on
this matter are claimed to be perverse and illegal.
13. Based on the Appellant’s contentions, the following substantial
questions of Law is involved in this Second Appeal:
Whether the Courts below are justified in considering Ex.A.1 as
a promissory note despite the fact the ingredients required for a
promissory note under the N.I. Act have not been satisfied.
14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100
CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of CPC.
15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others1, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of
the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions1
2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC)
5of Law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is
not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see
Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar
Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)……
16. Considerations in Section 100 of CPC arise only when there is a
substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based
on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of
Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the
documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in
second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of
Law.
17. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the CPC, this Court must confine itself to the substantial questions of Law
involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and
interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below
recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary
evidence. Further, the substantial questions of Law are the sine qua non for
the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless
the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the
evidence on record.
18. The 2nd Defendant is the spouse of the 1st Defendant, and their
relationship is undisputed. In support of the Ex.A.1 promissory note
transaction, the Plaintiff himself testified as PW.1 and further examined PW.2,
Simma Kameswararao, the attesting witness to Ex.A.1. Both PW.1 and PW.2
unequivocally testified that the Defendants borrowed Rs.30,200/- from the
Plaintiff, executing Ex.A.1 on 20.06.1991, with an agreement to repay the
amount along with interest at a rate of Rs.1.20 per hundred per month, having
duly received the consideration. It is evident that Plaintiff sent a registered
notice to the Defendants, as seen in Ex.A.2, duly accepted by the Defendants
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as indicated by Exs.A.3 and A.4 (Postal acknowledgements). In response, the
1st Defendant replied, as reflected in Ex.A.5.
19. On behalf of the Defendants, the 1st Defendant was examined as DW.1.
He admitted to executing the Ex.A.1 promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff.
DW.1’s testimony, in conjunction with Ex.A.1, confirms that he was the scribe
of the document. According to his version, however, the 2 nd Defendant did not
sign Ex.A.1, alleging that Plaintiff forged her signature. The contents of Ex.A.1
clearly state that the 1st Defendant and his wife, the 2nd Defendant, borrowed
Rs.30,200/- from the Plaintiff. The 2nd Defendant, who testified as DW.2,
denied her signature on Ex.A.1, the promissory note. It is not her case that
she had disputes with her husband, and he inserted her name in the
promissory note, falsely indicating that she had borrowed the money
alongside him. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant failed to explain why he
referred to the 2nd Defendant as one of the executants of the promissory note
alongside him. Without any explanation from the 1st Defendant, it can be
inferred that he acknowledged the 2 nd Defendant’s involvement by naming her
as an executant.
20. However, the 2nd Defendant did not take steps to prove that Ex.A.1
does not bear her signature or that it is a forgery. Once the testimony of
PWs.1 and 2 established the validity of the promissory note, the burden
shifted to the 2nd Defendant to demonstrate that her signature was not present
on Ex.A.1.
21. According to the testimony of DWs.1 and 2, elders resolved the dispute
between the Plaintiff and the Defendants on 22.06.1991, during which the
Plaintiff issued Ex.B.1, an undertaking acknowledging that the Defendants
owed a sum of Rs.20,000/-. Even if Ex.B.1 is considered authentic, it indicates
that the 2nd Defendant and the 1st Defendant became liable to repay the
Plaintiff. The Defendants also claim that after Ex.B.1, they paid Rs.2,400/- to
the Plaintiff’s brother-in-law and received a receipt in return, vide Ex.B.2.
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However, the Defendants failed to take steps to examine the Plaintiff’s
brother-in-law to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, it is not the Defendants’
case that the Plaintiff instructed them to make the payment to his brother-in-
law. Additionally, the Defendants assert that the 1st Defendant paid Rs.8,000/-
on 05.01.1992 and Rs.6,000/- on 10.03.1992, for which they obtained
receipts, Exs.B.3 and B.4, from the Plaintiff.
22. The Defendants also claim that mediation took place with DW.3 on
24.09.1994, during which the Defendants provided an undertaking vide Ex.B.5
to settle the dispute before the eldeRs.However, the Plaintiff allegedly failed to
attend. DW.3 testified that he sent Ex.B.6 notice to the Plaintiff, urging him to
settle the dispute with the Defendants. After evaluating the evidence, the Trial
Court found that the testimonies of DWs.1 to 3 did not sufficiently establish
that a settlement occurred on 22.06.1991 and 24.09.1994. The Trial Court
justified this conclusion by noting that the recitals in Ex.B.1 were vague. As
pointed out by the Trial Court, if the Plaintiff had obtained Ex.A.1 under
duress, such circumstances would likely have been reflected in the elders’
meeting. Additionally, Ex.B.1 does not include the names of the elders
involved, further weakening the Defendants’ claim.
23. As correctly noted by the Trial Court, the Defendants failed to examine
the so-called elders to authenticate Ex.B.1. Consequently, the Trial Court’s
finding that Ex.B.1 was not proven holds good. Additionally, the Defendants
did not call any witnesses to prove Exs.B.3 and B.4 receipts, and they
provided no satisfactory explanation for the absence of such testimony. The
Plaintiff, however, maintains that no mediation took place. Had mediation
occurred, as the Defendants claim, they would have obtained a written receipt
from the Plaintiff. As per the Defendants’ version, Ex.A.1 was obtained under
duress, with the Plaintiff allegedly threatening and coercing them at knife-
point. It is also evident that both Defendants 1 and 2 are teachers, while the
Plaintiff is an illiterate individual. Moreover, if Ex.A.1 had been obtained under
duress, the Defendants, being teachers, would not have remained silent; they
8
would have pursued legal remedies. The First Appellate Court pointed out that
if Ex.A.1 had been obtained under coercion, DW.1 would have reported the
matter to the police or sent a notice to PW.1 immediately. Similarly, had the
Defendants made payments under Ex.A.1, they would have endorsed on the
back side of the promissory note. The Defendants have failed to offer any
convincing explanation for obtaining receipts on unstamped papers instead of
making endorsements on the promissory notes. The Trial Court rejected the
Defendants’ claims regarding Exs.B.2 to B.4 documents by providing detailed
reasons.
24. The Trial Court appropriately refrained from comparing the signatures of
the 2nd Defendant as shown in Ex.A.6 and A.7 (the acquaintance register), as
the 2nd Defendant put initials, whereas Ex.A.1 contains her full signature. Both
the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court accepted PW.2’s testimony, as no
contradictions were drawn out during his cross-examination, and no evidence
was presented suggesting any ill will towards the Defendants. The First
Appellate Court also noted that DW.1 did not dispute PW.2’s presence during
the transaction. It rightly observed that there was no specific reason for PW.2
to depose on behalf of the Plaintiff falsely. Furthermore, the First Appellate
Court correctly pointed out that as the Plaintiff did not refer Ex.A.1 to an expert
for examination, it could not be viewed as a negative aspect of the Plaintiff’s
case. Ultimately, the First Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court’s
reasoning and upheld the finding that DW.2 signed the promissory note with
her husband.
25. The First Appellate Court noted that Ex.A.5, the reply notice sent by the
Defendants, does not indicate that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.A.1
promissory note under coercion. It further observed that the contents of Ex.A.5
were inconsistent with the defences raised by the Defendants in their
pleadings. After thoroughly examining the evidence, the First Appellate Court
found the Defendants’ claim regarding the holding of panchayats to be
implausible, based on the cross-examination of witnesses. Additionally, the
9
Defendants failed to provide a valid explanation as to why PW.1 was not
confronted with Ex.B.1 during his initial cross-examination. The First Appellate
Court also recorded reasons for not considering the evidence of PW.1
admitting that Ex.B.3 bore his signature.
26. The First Appellate Court, after evaluating the evidence, concluded that
even if DW.3’s testimony was accepted as true, there was no valid discharge
of the debt following the terms of the promissory note or Section 82 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court
rejected the Defendants’ defence, noting that DW.1 had failed to examine the
attestors of Exs.B.2 to B.4 despite having stated in cross-examination that he
would do so. After reviewing all the evidence, both Courts found that the
Defendants executed the promissory note upon receiving the consideration
amount. Both the Courts provided detailed reasoning for rejecting the
Defendants’ discharge claim.
27. It is well-established in Law that a mere denial of the receipt of
consideration does not constitute a valid defence. Defendants have failed to
present any substantial reason or evidence to challenge the credibility of the
testimonies of PWs.1 and 2 regarding executing the promissory note. The
evidence of PWs.1 and 2 was consistent regarding executing the promissory
note by the Defendants. Despite extensive cross-examination, nothing
emerged to undermine the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 about executing the
promissory note and passing consideration. Furthermore, Defendants failed to
establish the circumstances under which they executed Ex.A.1 without receipt
of consideration amount. Moreover, any rebuttal could have been based either
through direct evidence or by proving the preponderance of probabilities. In
this instance, the Defendants did not rebut the presumption even by the
preponderance of probabilities.
28. In light of the defence presented and the evidence submitted, the Trial
Court and the First Appellate Court observed that the Defendants failed to
10
discharge the initial burden of proof to demonstrate the non-existence of
consideration. Moreover, no other evidence refutes the presumption provided
under Section 118 of the N.I. Act. This Court has no hesitation in affirming that
the Plaintiff has successfully established the validity of Ex.A.1.
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in several cases, has held that the
exercise of powers under Section 100 of CPC can interfere with the findings of
fact only if the same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence.
Some of these judgments are Hajazat Hussain V. Abdul Majeed & others. 2,
Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin 3 , and Vishwanath Agrawal V. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal4.
30. The findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which
affirm that Plaintiff has established the execution of the suit promissory note
by Defendants after receiving the consideration amount, is neither perverse
nor a result of misinterpretation of documents or misreading of evidence. After
careful reading of the material on record, this Court finds that the Trial Court
and the First Appellate Court concurrently decreed the Plaintiff’s suit by
recording all the findings of facts against the Defendants enumerated above,
and the findings were neither against the pleadings nor evidence nor against
any provisions of Law.
31. This Court discerns no perversity in the Judgments rendered by the
learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning
provided by both the Courts are consistent with established legal principles.
Both the Courts meticulously reviewed all the evidence available on record.
32. This Court considers that the Trial and First Appellate Courts’
conclusions are not subject to interference under Section 100 of CPC. In
these circumstances, upon consideration of the decrees and judgments of the
Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, this Court is satisfied that the
2
2011 (7) SCC 189
3
2012 (8) SCC 148
4
2012 (7) SCC 288
11
arguments presented pertain solely to the factual matrix and do not involve
any substantial questions of Law. The Appellants have not raised any legal
issues in this Second Appeal that warrant consideration. There are no
sufficient grounds to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court. There is no question of Law, let alone the substantial
question of Law, involved in this Second Appeal, and therefore, the Appeal is
liable to be dismissed.
33. As a consequence, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs.
The judgment dated 09.06.2003 of learned II Additional District and Sessions
Judge, (Fast Track Court), Srikakulam, in A.S.No.75 of 1998, stands
confirmed.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand
closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 21.01.2025
SAK
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO. 734 OF 2003
Date: 21.01.2025
SAK
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