Kancha Ilaiah,Secunderabad vs The State Of Telangana,Home Deptand … on 13 December, 2024

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Telangana High Court

Kancha Ilaiah,Secunderabad vs The State Of Telangana,Home Deptand … on 13 December, 2024

Author: G. Radha Rani

Bench: G. Radha Rani

           HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
   WRIT PETITION Nos.36994, 36998, 37054 and 41207 of 2017

COMMON ORDER:

All these writ petitions are disposed of by a common order as the

petitioner in all the writ petitions is one and the same and he filed the

above writ petitions seeking issuance of an appropriate writ preferably a

writ in the nature of Mandamus to declare the FIRs / Calendar Cases

registered against him as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and consequently to quash the

same.

2. W.P. No.36994 of 2017 is filed to quash the proceedings in

Crime No.770 of 2017 on the file of Malkajgiri Police Station,

Rachakonda, registered for the offences under Sections 153A(c), 153B,

295A, 509 IPC and Section 3 (1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short ‘SC & ST Act‘) read

with Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.

3. W.P. No.36998 of 2017 is filed to quash the proceedings in

CC No.417 of 2017 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
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Korutla, Jagtial District, for the offences under Sections 153A(b), 295A,

298, 504, 505(1)(b)(c) of IPC.

4. W.P. No.37054 of 2017 is filed to quash the proceedings in

Crime No.438 of 2017 on the file of the Station House Officer,

Karimnagar I-Town Police Station, Karimnagar District, registered for

the offences under Sections 153A, 295A, 325, 500, 504 and 506 IPC

read with 156(3) Cr.P.C.

5. W.P. No.41207 of 2017 is filed to quash the proceedings in

CC No.537 of 2017 on the file of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad

at Neredmet, registered for the offences under Sections 153A(b), 295A

and 509 IPC.

6. Heard Sri A. Satyaprasad, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner, Sri K. Venumadhav, learned counsel for the respondent No.2

in WP No.36998 of 2017, Sri Somasi Srinivas, learned counsel for the

respondent No.2 in WP Nos.37054 and 41207 of 2017, Sri G.L.

Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 in WP

No.36994 of 2017 and the learned Government Pleader for the official

respondents in all the writ petitions.

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7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner

was a well known academician and author of various books including

‘Post-Hindu India’ (discussion on Dalit-Bahujana Social, Spiritual and

Scientific Revolution), published by SAGE, an International Publishing

House. The said book was published in the year 2009. It mainly deals

with the historical role of various castes and communities in production,

distribution, business and spiritual activities. The said work was an

internationally acclaimed one and received reviews from various

national and international newspapers appreciating and acknowledging

the book. The said book has as many as 13 chapters. Each chapter

deals with a community, its origin, role, production activities and

historical interaction between caste and caste, field and field, culture and

culture. It was a scholarly work. The said book was also published in

Telugu by EMESCO Publications, Hyderabad in 2011 which also

received wide appreciation. In order to reach a large segment of people,

each chapter was published as a separate book. Totally 9 books were

published in Telugu language by Bhoomi Book Press, Hyderabad. Since

the titles of the chapters did not indicate the caste names which every

chapter dealt with, the caste names had been indicated in the booklets

along with title used for the chapter to inform the reader as to what that
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book contained. If the entire book was published in Telugu, there would

have been no necessity to indicate the name of the community. But,

when it was published separately, it became necessary to indicate the

name of each caste/community for the benefit of the reader.

7.1. In that process, Chapter-9 of Post-Hindu India book was

published as ‘Saamajika Smugglerlu Komatollu’. The said booklet

contained what was the subject matter of the chapter in the above

mentioned book in Telugu version. However, the translator in Telugu

version had taken some liberty to make the reader to understand the

intention of the author. Neither the author nor the translator had any

intention to humiliate or malign a particular community, in the instant

case, the community publicly known as Vysyas/Baniyas/Komaties in

Telangana region. The petitioner, being author had traced the history of

the said community and their role in the Society and their economic

activity which was an academic exercise. The research of the petitioner

would show that the above community was mainly involved in the

business/sale of products, grain and goods and in that process, their

activity in the society. As a part of their business activity, the said

community had become prominent in transport and export of grain and

goods. The author himself explained as to why he used the word as
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‘social smugglers’ against the said community. The opinion of the

author was a part of the scholarly work to which one might differ, but

that could not be the basis for filing criminal cases against the petitioner

without keeping in mind the freedom of speech and expression ordained

under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India.

7.2. He further submitted that when the title of the book or

contents therein in Telugu were sought to be challenged seeking to

prohibit the book itself in Writ Petition (Civil) No.946 of 2017 filed by

one Sri KLNV Veeranjaneyulu, a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble

Apex Court headed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice rendered the

judgment on 13.10.2017 observing as follows:

“In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a
writ of mandamus to ban the book ‘Samajika
Smugglurlu Komatollu’ written by Professor Kancha
Ilaiah and further to ban chapter 9 of a book titled
‘Post-Hindu India’ and chapter 9 of ‘Hindutv-Mukt
Bharat”.

We do not intend to state the facts in detail. Reason:

Suffice it to say that when an author writes a book, it
is his or her right of expression. We do not think that it
would be appropriate under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India that this Court should ban the
book/books. Any request for banning a book of the
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present nature has to be strictly scrutinized because
every author or writer has a fundamental right to speak
out ideas freely and express thoughts adequately.
Curtailment of an individual writer/ author’s right to
freedom of speech and expression should never be
lightly viewed.

Keeping in view the sanctity of the said right and also
bearing in mind that the same has been put on the
highest pedestal by this Court, we decline the
ambitious prayer made by the petitioner.

The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.”

7.3. He further submitted that a fair reading of the above

judgment would make it clear that any request for banning a book of the

present nature had to be strictly scrutinized. Every author or writer had

a fundamental right to speak out ideas freely and express thoughts

adequately. The Hon’ble Apex Court in view of the sanctity of the said

right, declined the petitioner’s prayer to ban the book. But, however, a

series of criminal petitions were filed against the petitioner for

writing/publishing the said book. A fair reading of the complaints

lodged by the unofficial respondents would show that the complainants

made omnibus allegations without bringing any specific instances

constituting the offences alleged against the petitioner. Indian State was

primarily a secular State. It had no religion. The constitution did not
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provide any special treatment for any religion, except stating that all the

citizens were having religious freedom to choose any religion of their

own belief. The context of the book published in Telugu had to be

comprehensively looked into. The allegations made against the

petitioner were selective in nature. They were lifted out of context and

the complaints were lodged on an untenable basis. The book ‘Post-

Hindu India’ was in circulation right form 2009. The Telugu version of

the book was published in the year 2011. Since 2009, the books were

treated only as a work of scholarly nature and acclaimed thesis on the

subject. The conclusions arrived by the author in the said books were

out of serious study made in that behalf. The same was an academic

work. The petitioner had a right to express his views out of his study

and communicate the same to the society under Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution of India. The unofficial respondents had taken one singular

book out of one of the chapters of the main book and attributed

allegations against the petitioner without understanding the

comprehensive nature of the entire book and subject thereof. The issue

involved in the present writ petitions was no more resintergra. The

Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in a catena of judgments

declared that any prohibition of books, or speech was not permissible
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and violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and relied

upon the following judgments:

1) Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra and
another
1;

2) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Professor
Manbhai D. Shah
2;

                3)    Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla
                      Shyamsundar and another 3;
                4)    Gajanan Visheshwar Birjur v. Union of India and
                      others 4;
                5)    Javed Ahmed Hajam v. State of Maharashtra and
                      another 5;
                6)    Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 6

8. He further submitted that registering of multiple FIRs against

one issue was totally impermissible and relied upon the judgment of this

Court in Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. Government of A.P. 7. He further

submitted that various criminal proceedings were maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioner and

prayed to quash the FIRs or Criminal Cases against the petitioner, as

1
(2007) 5 SCC 1
2
(1992) 3 SCC 637
3
(2017) 7 SCC 760
4
(1994) 5 SCC 550
5
(2024) 4 SCC 156
6
(2015) 5 SCC 1
7
2013 (6) ALT 101
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being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the

Constitution of India.

9. Sri K. Venumadhav, learned counsel for the respondent No.2

in WP No.36998 of 2017 contended that the writ petition was not at all

maintainable as writ of Mandamus could only be issued against a

statutory authority if the authority was acting against law or not acting

in accordance with law in discharging public duty. The contents of the

complaint clearly constitute the offences alleged. On considering the

same only, the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla had

taken cognizance of the offences and numbered as CC 417 of 2017 and

issued summons to the petitioner. The words used by the petitioner in

the book authored and got published by him would not come under the

fundamental rights of freedom of speech enunciated under Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. They would attract the reasonable

restrictions imposed under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, the petitioner was liable for prosecution. The petitioner

could not get protection under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of

India as he had used offensive words in the book written, published and

circulated by him. The truth or otherwise of the contents of the
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complaint could be decided only after a full-fledged trial and prayed to

dismiss the writ petition in limini with costs.

10. Sri Somasi Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondent No.2

in WP Nos.37054 and 41207 of 2017, contended that private complaints

were filed basing on the entire book and also derogatory statements of

the petitioner made in various TV channels and in public speeches. The

learned X Metropolitan Magistrate (now Principal Junior Civil Judge

cum Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kushaiguda) at Neredmet had

taken cognizance of all the offences and issued summons to the accused.

When the petitioner has an alternative remedy under Section 482

Cr.P.C. for quashing the CC no.537 of 2017, availing the extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not

maintainable under law as decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State

of Himachal Pradesh v. Prithi Chand 8, State of Bihar v. Sri

Rajendra Agarwalla 9, State of Uttar Pradesh v. O.P. Sharma 10 and

of the High Court of Manipur in Vinod Kumar Sethi v. State of

Manipur 11 and of this Court in M.B. Rajanikanth & another v. The

8
AIR (SC) 1996-323
9
AIR (SCW)-1996-0-591)
10
(AIR (SC)-1996-2-919)
11
(LAWS (MANIP)-2017-7-5)
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State, Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Visakhapatnam & others 12.

He further contended that to consider the book as scholarly work, the

author should mention atleast the primary source like Government G.Os.

and Monographs; secondary source like published research books,

research methodology, questionnaires tablet, date of interviews and

interviewers names and addresses etc. When the research was

pertaining to history, it should be based on evidence of any sort for the

purpose of inferences and interpretations. He further contended that the

petitioner deliberately with a malicious intention was distorting facts

and attacking on faiths. The book published was from his self thought

to demoralize Hindu beliefs, but not a research work as claimed by the

petitioner. The contents of the book ‘Post-Hindu India’ or ‘Hindu

Mukth Bharath’ and speeches made by the petitioner were absolute

falsehood and baseless. He badly criticized some of the castes of Hindu

religion, which would attract hate-speech, which was restricted by

Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, as such, the writ petitions

were not maintainable. The petitioner was attributing un-ethical word

like ‘Smugglers’ to a caste and publishing a book itself in the said name

would indicate his real intentions. The respondent No.2 and his
12
WP No.18428/ 2009 decided on 09.06.2011.

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community (caste people) were having equal right to live in the society

with social dignity, respect and personal liberty. Through his hate

speeches and writings, the petitioner demoralized and demeaning the

caste of the respondent No.2. After releasing the said book, agitations

were made by Arya Vysya community people. There have been

protests, police and court cases and a split among the free speech

support groups, erupting huge violence in both the Telugu States i.e.

Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, where Arya Vysyas were residing.

Thus, the petitioner caused hindrance to public order, decency, morality

and disturbed public harmony among different sections of people,

demoralized, defamed, assaulted, insulted and wounded the religious

beliefs/sentiments of a section of people and provoked other section of

people on Arya Vysyas and caused breach of peace in two Telugu

States. He also intentionally insulted the modesty of women of certain

section of people in his book. Thus, the writ petitioner could not take

shelter under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and the writ

petitions were not maintainable and prayed to dismiss the same with

exemplary costs.

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11. Sri G.L. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the respondent

No.4 in WP No.36994 of 2017 also argued on the same lines as that of

the learned counsel representing the other un-official respondents.

12. Learned Government Pleader for Home contended that

basing on the private complaint forwarded to the SHO, Malkajgiri

Police Station, a case in Crime No.770 of 2017 for the offences under

Sections 153(A) (a), 153-B (a), 295-A, 509 and Section 3 of the SC &

ST (PoA) Act, was registered by the Malkajgiri police and on the private

complaint forwarded to the SHO, Korutla, a case in Crime No.537 of

2017 for the offences under Sections 133-A, B, 295-A and 505 IPC was

registered by the Korutla Police. As per the sum and substance of the

private complaints, the petitioner published a book titled as ‘Saamajika

Smugglerlu Komatollu’. In that book, he not only targeted Vysya

community but also targeted all Hindu communities with a view to

create divide and raise rifts in between the Hindu Society. Taking

advantage of caste system prevailing in Hindu religion, he intended to

outrage the religious feelings of the class by insulting its religion and

religious beliefs. His aim was to convert all BC, SC and ST

communities into Christianity, so that he would get one lakh crore
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dollars from the foreign countries. He also insulted the Scheduled Caste

people and intended to outrage their religious feelings.

12.1. Learned Government Pleader for Home further submitted

that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer

recorded the statements of the complainant and issued a notice under

Section 41-A Cr.P.C. to the petitioner requesting him to appear before

the Investigating Agency calling for his explanation. The petitioner

gave his reply to the said notice on 26.10.2017. While the explanation

was pending consideration, the petitioner approached the court, filed the

present writ petitions and obtained interim stay of all further

proceedings at the stage of admission, which was being extended from

time to time, due to which further course of action was stopped. The

Investigation was at the initial stage. The truth or otherwise would

come out depending on a full-fledged investigation into the case. Unless

a full-fledged investigation was conducted, it could not be said that the

petitioner had nothing to do with the criminal acts alleged against him.

To establish the offence, the Investigating Agency has to examine some

more witnesses and need to collect material evidence. Basing on the

total outcome of the investigation, appropriate report under Section 173

Cr.P.C. would be filed before the concerned courts. It was mandatory
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on the part of the police to register FIR and conduct investigation into

the case and file appropriate report before the concerned court. Hence,

registration of FIRs was legal, valid and prayed to dismiss the writ

petitions by vacating the interim orders granted in the writ petitions.

13. On considering the arguments of all the learned counsel, it is

considered necessary to deal with the preliminary objection raised by

the learned counsel for the unofficial respondents with regard to

maintainability of the writ petitions, particularly invoking the writ of

Mandamus, when there is an alternate remedy available to the petitioner

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The contention of the learned counsel for

the respondents in WP Nos.37054 and 41207 of 2017 is that when a

remedy is available under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court shall be

circumvent to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India for a similar relief and relied upon several

judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v.

Prithi Chand (supra), State of Bihar v. Sri Rajendra Agarwalla

(supra), State of Uttar Pradesh v. O.P. Sharma (supra) and of the

High Court of Manipur in Vinod Kumar Sethi v. State of Manipur

(supra) and of this Court in M.B. Rajanikanth & another v. The State,

Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Visakhapatnam & others (supra).
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14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, relied

upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kapil Agarwal and

others v. V. Sanjay Sharma and others 13, wherein it was held that:

“6.1 As observed and held by this Court in a catena of
decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is
designed to achieve salutary purpose that criminal
proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate
into weapon of harassment. When the Court is
satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse
of process of law or that it amounts to bringing
pressure upon accused, in exercise of inherent powers,
such proceedings can be quashed.

6.2 As held by this Court in the case of Parbatbhai
Aahir v. State of Gujarat
(2017) 9 SCC 641, Section
482
Cr.P.C. is prefaced with an overriding provision.
The statute saves the inherent power of the High
Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are
necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
Court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Same are the powers with the High Court, when it
exercises the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”

15. Article 226 of the Constitution of India encapsulates wider

powers to be exercised by the High Court than Section 482 Cr.P.C. A

13
LiveLaw 2021 SC 123
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writ can be issued against the State in any circumstance whereas Section

482 Cr.P.C. can be used only to cases or procedures under the Code.

Article 226 of the Constitution gives wide powers to the High Court to

see that the processes of the Courts below are not abused or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. The directions which can be issued under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. can also be issued by way of a writ petition under

Article 226. A Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can

be filed in the High Court when there is a violation of fundamental right

or in cases where an individual seeks the courts intervention to quash or

set aside the criminal proceedings initiated against him. Thus, a writ

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable

for quashing FIRs/Criminal proceedings enforcing the rights of an

accused or any other matter related to the criminal law to safeguard the

fundamental rights of the litigants.

16. Sri K. Venumadhav, the learned counsel for the respondent

No.2 in WP No.36998 of 2017 contended that a writ of Mandamus was

not maintainable as the same could be issued only against a statutory

authority, if the authority was acting against law or not acting in

accordance with law while discharging public duty and relied upon the
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judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Prakash Singh v. Union of

India and another 14, wherein it was held that:

“The writ of mandamus is not generally a remedy
against private wrongs. The scope of writ of
mandamus is against the private authority which might
be performing a public duty limited to the enforcement
of the public duty, and this Court cannot interfere with
the internal management of a private body. It is well
settled that a writ of mandamus lies only for the
purpose of a public or statutory duty. Writs are issued
for the performance of public duties. Though Article
226
of the Constitution of India is worded in such a
way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even
against a private authority but such private authority
must be discharging a public function and the right
sought to be enforced must be a public duty.”

17. As seen from the present writ petitions, the writ petitions

are filed seeking relief against the official respondents, who registered

cases against the petitioner basing on the complaints lodged by the

unofficial respondents. Thus, these writ petitions are filed against the

respondents, who were performing public duty. Multiple cases are filed

by the complainants from various places of the state alleging that their

religious feelings were hurt due to the publication of the present book or

14
2022 LawSuit (Del) 1865
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due to the opinion expressed by the author in the above book or in

various debates or public speeches made by him, some of which were

referred to police under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and some of which

were directly taken cognizance by the Magistrates.

18. This Court in a batch of Criminal Petitions in Akbaruddin

Owaisi v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (7 supra) after considering the

various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in T.T.Antony v. State

of Kerala 15 held that:

“24. There can be no second FIR and no fresh
investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence
or same occurrence, giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences.”

25. From the above, it is clearly discernable that
according to the Supreme Court, the sweeping power
of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to a fresh investigation by the police in
respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
successive FIRs, whether before or after filing the
final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. The Court
observed that case of fresh investigation based on the
consequent or successive FIRs not being counter-case,

15
(2001) 6 SCC 181
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filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in
the course of the same transaction and in respect of
which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is
under way or final report under Section 173 (2) has
been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for
exercise of power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., or under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. In the
circumstances of that case, it was held that registration
of the second FIR was not valid and consequently
investigation made pursuant thereto was of no legal
consequences. Those were accordingly quashed.

29. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India,
petitioner had complained that following a broadcast
on Republic Bharat TV on 21.04.2020, multiple FIRs
and criminal complaints were lodged against him, not
only in the State of Maharashtra but in different States
and Union Territories. The first FIR was lodged at
Sadar Police Station, Nagpur City, Maharashtra
whereafter as many as 14 other FIRs and complaints
were lodged in different places.
Delineating the aspect
of lodging of subsequent FIRs, Supreme Court on an
analysis of various judgments including in T.T.
Antony
‘s case (2 supra) and in Upkar Singh vs. Ved
Prakash
, held that there can be no second FIR when
the information concerns the same cognizable offence
alleged in the first FIR or the same occurrence or the
incident which gives rise to one or more cognizable
offences. Barring situations in which a counter-case is
filed, a fresh investigation or a second FIR on the
basis of the same or connected cognizable offence
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would constitute an abuse of the statutory power of
investigation and may be a fit case for exercise of
power either under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. However, it has
been clarified that when there are rival versions in
respect of the same episode, they would normally take
the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can
be carried out under both of them by the same
investigating agency. In the facts of that case, it was
found that all the FIRs or complaints lodged in diverse
jurisdiction arose out of one and the same incident,
i.e., broadcast by the petitioner in Republic Bharat on
21.04.2020.

Therefore, all the other FIRs/complaints were quashed
leaving open the investigation carried out by Sadar
Police Station, Nagpur City which was however
transferred to NM Joshi Marg Police Station in
Mumbai.

19. Thus, a Writ Petition for quashing of FIRs or complaints

lodged in diverse jurisdictions arising out of one and the same incident

is maintainable under Article 226 of Constitution, when it is considered

as an abuse of the statutory power of investigation.

20. Thus, this Court does not find any merit in the contention

of the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petitions are not

maintainable. The contention of the learned counsel for the unofficial

respondents in W.P.No.36998 of 2017 that writ of Mandamus could not
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be issued for quashing of criminal cases, wherein the Courts have taken

cognizance of the private complaints is also considered by this Court.

As the petitioner had sought for issuance of an appropriate writ and as

the Constitutional Courts are constituted for the protection and

guarantee of fundamental rights of citizens, it is considered not a good

ground to refuse to entertain the petitions. The mere existence of an

adequate alternative legal remedy is also considered as not a sufficient

ground for throwing out these petitions, as the petitioner is contending

that his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of

India is violated, and criminal cases were registered against him in

violation of his fundamental right.

21. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was

that the petitioner was an acclaimed author, he was a Retired Professor

at the Department of Political Science, Osmania University and a

Professor in Maulana Azad National Urdu University (MANUU),

Telangana. He was a prolific writer authored several books and

regularly contributes articles to national newspapers and magazines. He

was the author of the book “Why I am not a Hindu’, a thought

provoking critique of Brahmanism and caste system in India and

challenges Hinduisms interpretation of history, which received reviews
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from various international newspapers, which appreciated and

acknowledged the book. The book “Post-Hindu India” (A Discourse on

Dalit-Bahujan Socio-Spiritual and Scientific Revolution) published by

SAGE publishers, an international publishing house, received critical

acclaim. The widely circulated Hindu Newspaper had acclaimed it as ‘a

war against ignorance’. The Economic and Political Weekly acclaimed

it as ‘An argument to break the caste barriers that separated the

community groups, in the belief that the shared characters of a life of

production will provide an experiential basis for the common battle

against upper-caste hegemony’. It was recognized as a work challenging

Hinduism’s interpretation of history, with a virulent attack on caste

politics which takes a refreshing look at the necessity of encouraging

indigenous scientific thought for the sake of national progress and that it

establishes Hinduism as a ‘backward’ religion that suppresses the latent

scientific and productive potential of the Dalit-Bahujan communities.

The critics acclaimed that as per the author, the oppressive system of

spiritual fascism is detrimental to both the future of religion and the

nation-state and the author criticizes the idea of spiritual justice or varna

dharma used to justify the caste system as rooted in spiritual inequality

and that on micro-analytical level, the book was considered as a
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thorough study of productive knowledge systems of Dalit-Bahujan

communities of Andhra Pradesh and provides a day to day analysis of

the scientific technological processes and events at work in the life of a

member of these communities. On a macro level, it shows how

Hinduism fails to negotiate between faith and reason, unlike other major

religions of the world. It was considered as a work which critiques the

intellectual imagination of the dominant communities and inspires the

marginalized. It is considered as a work of immense socio-political

interest which would appeal to academicians and to all those who are

concerned about contemporary India’s polity and social fabric.

22. Learned counsel for the petitioner also filed a review given

by Mark Tully, a well known author and Padmasree & Padma Bhushan

awardee, who stated that:

“This is a startling book, revealing the extent of the
anger and hurt of the author, a well-known OBC
academic and social activist. It’s a polemic on what
his experiences as an OBC as well as his academic
research on Dalit and Tribal communities have led
him to see as a centuries-old Brahmin Conspiracy.
The conspiracy to subjugate the Dalits, the Tribals and
the Shudras too. Kancha Ilaiah equates Hinduism
with Brahminism. He says, “For any external
observer Hinduism is nothing but an institutionalized
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image of the Brahmin self; although some people say
it is a religion that encompasses all the castes.”

Ilaiah attacks what he considers to be Hinduism for
imposing an order on society which is neither
egalitarian nor pluralist. The caste system is
responsible for this imposition, and it is still in place,
he says, because democracy has not affected the
domination of the upper castes. They are accused of
being “spiritual fascists”, and “intellectual goondas”.
Ilaiah maintains that the spiritual fascism was so
constructed by Brahmins that those who were its
victims could not comprehend its essence. In other
words, a confidence trick has been played on them.

He calls the Dalits, Tribals and the Shudras as Dalit-
Bahujans and sees them as the productive sections of
society while regarding the upper castes as mere
parasites. If they had not fostered the caste system
and prevented intermarriage, Ilaiah believes there
would have been an interchange of the technology
practiced by different castes in their professions and
India would have become a scientific society. He
quotes as an example of the Dalit’s technology of
tanning animal skins and manufacturing shoes and
other leather products. Brahminism is seen by him as
anti-scientific, and disinterested even in such basic
subjects as agriculture. He accuses it of seeing
“knowledge as ignorance, and ignorance as
knowledge”, and doesn’t credit it with a single
scientific discovery. In fact he believes the position is
even worse than that. The Brahmins are accused of
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stealing the discoveries of the Dalit-Bahujans. Ilaiah
maintains that zero was discovered by cattle herders
and many Ayurvedic medicines by Shudras, Dalits or
Tribals, but Brahmins have claimed them as their own.

Ilaiah does not merely concentrate on the economic
and other material problems created by the caste
system. He believes it is essential for the Dalits,
Tribals and Shudras to acquire a spirituality which is
egalitarian and pluralist. He says, “The first major
agenda for post-Hindu India is to build a spiritual
democratic basis… A religious structure that
guarantees their right to spiritual equality.” He
compares Hinduism with Christianity, Islam and
Buddhism, which he sees as egalitarian and pluralist
religions, and lays great emphasis on Ambedkar’s
rejection of Hinduism and adoption of Buddhism. But
the repressive role that all these religions have played
at times, and some would argue still do play,
particularly their repression of women, is not taken
into consideration.

The last chapter of the book is called Post-Hindu
India. Ilaiah believes Hinduism’s days are numbered,
and even talks of a civil war in which Hinduism will
be defeated by the combined forces of the Dalit-
Bahujans. When that happens, he believes “the
regeneration of India begins in multiple levels of
Indian society. The society and technology that the
productive masses nurtured for so long will take a new
life”. But Ilaiah recognizes that the Shudras have not
yet rejected Hinduism partly because those he calls the
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Brahminic forces linked Independence and democracy
with that religion. So there is still one major fissure in
the Dalit-Bahujan alliance he foresees. Nor of course
is there unity yet within the Dalit, Shudra, or Tribal
communities themselves. A recent report from rural
Gujarat pointed out that Dalits of the more highly
regarded castes treat other Dalits as untouchable while
the political geography of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh is
evidence that the OBCs are not united.

Because this book is a polemic, it’s one-sided and so
loses some of its impact. At one stage Ilaiah suggests
that because Hinduism is not egalitarian and pluralist,
it cannot last long. But it has, and that must surely be
because it has positive attributes. Ironically, just at the
time Ilaiah is prophesying the end of Hinduism,
admiration of its spiritual teaching and practices is
spreading in other parts of the world. Admittedly the
same cannot be said for the caste system which has
few defenders anywhere, and Ilaiah would argue that
the caste system is the essence of Hinduism. But
surely the Gita, revered by Gandhi as his Bible, and by
distinguished thinkers of different faiths too, cannot be
written off just because it is set in the context of a war.

Now that Ilaiah has got his polemic off his chest,
might he not think of publishing a reasoned dialogue
between himself and those who do not see Hinduism
as wholly inimical to egalitarian democracy? The
danger is that many people will write off this book as
extremist. It is a danger because we need to be aware
of the depth of anger and hurt it reveals. I have to say
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that, when I look back on what I have written, I have
not been as aware of this as I should have been.”

23. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners had provided

details wherein the book was recommended by various universities as

part of their syllabus. The Delhi University (DU) Political Science

Department has included this book in its Post Graduate syllabus. The

Mahatma Gandhi Antarrashtriya Hindi Vishwavidyalaya had included it

in its integrated Masters Programme in Social Sciences. Doctor

Harisingh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar, MP (A Central University)

had also recommended the book in its Syllabus for Post Graduation

Programme under CBCS conducted by the Department of Political

Science and Public Administration, School of Humanities and Social

Sciences for the year 2018-19. The Department of Sociology in

University of Mumbai had also recommended it in its Syllabus as a part

of reading Contemporary Indian Social Scientists along with the books

of Amartya Sen in Economics, Uma Chakravarthy in History and Sudhir

Kakkar in Social Psychology. The books of the petitioner were

recommended in its Syllabus in Political Science. Dr. Babasaheb

Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad, Department of English

recommended its reading in its paper ‘Literature of the Oppressed’.
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24. Thus, this book is considered as highly academic and

scholarly work by various Universities.

25. One of the Chapters of the book was published in Telugu by

EMESCO Publications, Hyderabad in 2011. The complainants were

offended by the use of the word ‘Social Smugglers’ against one

community i.e. Vysyas and lodged complaints against him in various

police stations considering that the petitioner was insulting Vedas,

Geetha and Upanishads and was criticizing the Gods and Goddesses of

the Hindus and was making demoralizing assault of Hindu women with

an intent to outrage their modesty and that he insulted the Father of the

Nation Mahatma Gandhi and the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

as a relation of Brahmin and Komati and tried to bring a rift in between

Brahmins and Vysyas and that he also made several derogatory

arguments with Sri Swami Paripoornanda in TV Channels insulting

Hindutwa and Hindu Gods and its caste system and that it caused hurt to

their religious feelings and creating rifts in between the castes of Hindu

Society.

26. The person, who lodged the complaint in CC No.537 of 2017,

which is the subject matter of WP No.41207 of 2017 on the file of the X

Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri at Neredmet has shown his caste as
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Vysya and that he was a Hindu by religion. The complainant in Crime

No.438 of 2017, which is the subject matter of WP No.37054 of 2017

on the file of the SHO, I-Town Police Station, Karimnagar, was an

Advocate. It was also on the same lines that the author was making

allegations against Hindu Gods Ganapathi and Kubera and on the entire

Vysya community commenting on their vegetarianism and that they

were ready to be slaves to the Britishers to protect their personal

property, wherein his feelings as a member of Vysya community were

hurt and that it would constitute the offences under Sections 153-A,

295-A, 325, 500, 504, 505 of IPC.

27. Likewise the complainant in CC No.417 of 2017 on the file

of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, Jagtial District also

stated that he belonged to Vysya Community and that his feelings were

hurt by the opinion of the author in the book expressed against Vysya

community. He stated that as the police failed to register the case, he

lodged the private complaint and the same was taken cognizance by the

Court and numbered as CC 417 of 2017 which was the subject matter of

WP No.36998 of 2017.

28. In WP No.36994 of 2017, the complainant described himself

as a student belonging to Schedule Caste and lodged the complaint
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stating that the publication of the book by the author titled as “Samajika

Smugglerlu Komatollu” not only targeted Vysya community but also

all Hindu communities with a view to divide and raise rifts in between

the Hindu Society by taking advantages of caste systems in Hindutva,

intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its

religion or religious beliefs with an aim to convert all BC, SC and ST

community into Christianity, so that he would get one lakh crore dollars

from foreign countries. He also stated that the author insulted

Scheduled Caste people, basing on which a case was registered as FIR

No.770 of 2017 by Malkajgiri Police of Rachakonda District for the

offences under Sections 153-A(a), 153-B(b), 295-A, 509 and Section 3

of the SC & ST (PoA) Act. A private complaint was referred to the

police, which was registered as the above crime.

29. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner was that to attract the offence under Section 153-A IPC,

intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is

sine qua non and the prosecution had to prove prima facie the existence

of mens rea on the part of the accused and relied upon the judgment of
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the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of

Maharashtra and another 16, wherein it was held that:

“16. Section 153A of IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a
case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or
by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes
or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities or acts
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or is likely to
disturb the public tranquility. The gist of the offence is the
intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between
different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or
incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the
offence under Section 153A of IPC and the prosecution has
to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of
the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the
language of the book and the circumstances in which the
book was written and published. The matter complained of
within the ambit of Section 153A must be read as a whole.
One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages
for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence
here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous
process of inferential reasoning.

17. In Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India & Others
[AIR 1988 SC 775], this Court held that TV serial “Tamas”

did not depict communal tension and violence and the
provisions of Section 153A of IPC would not apply to it. It

16
2007 (5) SCC (1)
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was also not prejudicial to the national integration falling
under Section 153B of IPC. Approving the observations of
Vivian Bose, J. in Bhagvati Charan Shukla v. Provincial
Government [AIR 1947 Nagpur 1], the Court observed that
the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and
not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who
scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the standard
of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English Law,
“the man on the top of a clapham omnibus”. (Emphasis
supplied).

18. Again in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [(1997) 7
SCC 431], it is held that the common feature in both the
Sections, viz., Sections 153A and 505 (2), being promotion
of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will “between different”

religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes
and communities, it is necessary that at least two such
groups or communities should be involved. Further, it was
observed that merely inciting the feeling of one community
or group without any reference to any other community or
group cannot attract either of the two Sections.”

30. Thus to attract the offences under Sections 153-A and 505

IPC, as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, there must be

involvement of atleast two groups or communities and merely inciting

the feelings of one community or group without any reference of any

community or any other group would not attract either of the two

sections.

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31. In the present cases, all the complainants belong to one

religion i.e. Hindu religion and alleged that their feelings were hurt by

the opinion of the author. But, there is no incitement of the feelings of

any other community against the said particular community to attract the

offences under Sections 153-A and 505 IPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court

also specified that the intention has to be judged primarily by the

language of the book and the matter complained of to fall within the

ambit of Section 153-A, must be read as a whole and isolated passages

cannot be relied on for proving the charge. The complainants had

picked up some of the isolated passages in one of the chapter to lodge

complaints against the petitioner herein. When the book “Post-Hindu

India” as a whole is considered, it criticizes not only one of the castes

like Vysyas, but also all other dominant castes. One caste or community

stating that their religious feelings were hurt would not attract the

offence under Section 153-A IPC. The book as a whole also would not

disclose the author inciting any of the caste against the other castes but

criticizes how the dominant communities were suppressing marginalized

communities. The book had not incited the persons belonging to other

religions like Christianity or Islam against Hindus or any of the castes in

one community against the people of other castes. The
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complaint being lodged by a Scheduled Caste person in one case would

disclose that he was not incited against the people of other castes, but,

he also felt insulted in the same manner as that of the people of other

castes.

32. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State

of Maharashtra and another 17, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

extracted paras 8 to 10 of its judgment in Patricia Mukhim v. State of

Meghalaya, as follows:

“8. “It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in
order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society.”–
Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very
valuable fundamental right. However, the right is not
absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the right
of free speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty
and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an
offence. Speech crime is punishable under Section 153-
A
IPC. Promotion of enmity between different groups on
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three
17
(2024) 4 SCC 156
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years or with fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we
are called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is made
out against the appellant for committing offences
under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to
reproduce the provisions which are as follows:

* * *

9. Only where the written or spoken words have the
tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law
and order or affecting public tranquility, the law needs to
step in to prevent such an activity. The intention to cause
disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of
the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has
to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed.

[Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214].

10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-A IPC is the
intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between
different classes of people. The intention has to be judged
primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the
circumstances in which it was written and published. The
matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-
A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly
worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor
indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and
connect them by a meticulous process of inferential
reasoning [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra,
(2007) 5 SCC 1).”

and held that:

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“10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A, clause (a) of sub-

section (1) of Section 153-A of the IPC is attracted when by
words, either spoken or written or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, an attempt is made to promote
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between
different religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities. The promotion of disharmony,
enmity, hatred or ill will must be on the grounds of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community or
any other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of Section 153-A of the IPC will apply only when an act is
committed which is prejudicial to the maintenance of
harmony between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities and which disturbs
or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity.”

33. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that:

“14. The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner
is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a).
Every individual must respect the right of others to
dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the
decisions of the Government is an essential part of
democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be
treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and
meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. But the protest or
dissent must be within four corners of the modes permissible
in a democratic set-up. It is subject to reasonable restrictions
imposed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 19. In the
present case, the appellant has not at all crossed the line.

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15. The High Court has held that the possibility of stirring
up the emotions of a group of people cannot be ruled out.
The appellant’s college teachers, students, and parents were
allegedly members of the WhatsApp group. As held by
Vivian Bose, J, the effect of the words used by the appellant
on his WhatsApp status will have to be judged from the
standards of reasonable women and men. We cannot apply
the standards of people with weak and vacillating minds. Our
country has been a democratic republic for more than 75
years. The people of our country know the importance of
democratic values. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude
that the words will promote disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups.
The test to be applied is not the effect of the words on some
individuals with weak minds or who see a danger in every
hostile point of view. The test is of the general impact of the
utterances on reasonable people who are significant in
numbers. Merely because a few individuals may develop
hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract clause (a)
of sub-section (1) of Section 153-A of the IPC.

17. Now, the time has come to enlighten and educate our
police machinery on the concept of freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
and the extent of reasonable restraint on their free speech and
expression. They must be sensitised about the democratic
values enshrined in our Constitution.”

34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of

India v. Prof.Manubhai D. Shah 18 further held that:

18

(1991) 3 SCC 637
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WP No.36994 of 2017&Batch

“8. The words “freedom of speech and expression” must,
therefore, be broadly construed to include the freedom to
circulate one’s views by words of mouth or in writing or
through audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes
the right to propagate one’s views through the print media or
through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and
the television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore,
has the right to air his or her views through the printing
and/or the electronic media subject of course to permissible
restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of
public educators, so vital to the growth of a healthy
democracy. Freedom to air one’s views is the lifeline of any
democratic institution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or
gag this right would sound a death-knell to democracy and
would help usher in autocracy or dictator-ship. It cannot be
gainsaid that modern communication mediums advance
public interest by informing the public of the events and
developments that have taken place and thereby educating
the voters, a role considered significant for the vibrant
functioning of a democracy. Therefore, in any set-up, more
so in a democratic set-up like ours, dissemination of news
and views for popular consumption is a must and any
attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon unless it
falls within the Mischief of Article 19(2) of the
Constitution. It follows that a citizen for propagation of his
or her ideas has a right to publish for circulation his views in
periodicals, magazines and journals or through the electronic
media since it is well known that these communication
channels are great purveyors of news and views and
make considerable impact on the minds of the readers and
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viewers and are known to mould public opinion on vital
issues of national importance. Once it is conceded, and it
cannot indeed be disputed, that freedom of speech and
expression includes freedom of circulation and propagation
of ideas, there can be no doubt that the right extends to the
citizen being permitted to use the media to answer the
criticism levelled against the view propagated by him. Every
free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; to forbid this, except to the extent
permitted by Article 19(2), b would be an inroad on his
freedom. This freedom must, however, be exercised with
circumspection and care must be taken not to trench on the
rights of other citizens or to jeopardize public interest. It is
manifest from Article 19(2) that the right conferred by
Article 19(1)(a) is subject to imposition of reasonable
restrictions in the interest of, amongst others, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to defamation or
incitement to an offense. It is, therefore, obvious that
subject to reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2)
a citizen has a right to publish, circulate and disseminate his
views and any attempt to thwart or deny the same would
offend Article 19(1)(a).

35. In Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntal Shyamsundar

and Ors. 19, the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering whether the

allegations made in the complaint constitute an offence under Section

295-A IPC, held that:

19

2017 (7) SCC 760
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“6. It is clear as crystal that Section 295-A does not stipulate
everything to be penalized and any and every act would
amount to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of a class of citizens. It penalises only those
acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the
religion or religious belief of a class of citizens which are
perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of that class of citizens.

Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or
without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the
religious feelings of that class do not come within the
section. The Constitution Bench has further clarified that the
said provision only punishes the aggravated form of insult to
religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that
class. Emphasis has been laid on the calculated tendency of
the said aggravated form of insult and also to disrupt the
public order to invite the penalty.

13. Before parting with the case, we would like to sound a
word of caution that the Magistrates who have been
conferred with the power of taking cognizance and issuing
summons are required to carefully scrutinize whether the
allegations made in the complaint proceeding meet the basic
ingredients of the offence; whether the concept of territorial
jurisdiction is satisfied; and further whether the accused is
really required to be summoned. This has to be treated as
the primary judicial responsibility of the court
issuing process.”

36. Section 196 Cr.P.C., prescribes that no Court shall take

cognizance of the offences under Sections 153A, 295A or
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sub-section (1) of Section 505 of IPC, except with the previous sanction

of the Central Government or of the State Government, which reads as

follows:

“196. Prosecution for offenses against the State and for
criminal conspiracy to commit such offence.-(1) No Court
shall take cognizance of-

(a) any offense punishable under Chapter VI or under
Section 153-A, Section 295-A or sub-section (1) of
Section 505 of the Penal Code, 1860, or

(b) a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, or

(c) any such abetment, as is described in Section 108-Aof
the Penal Code, 1860,except with the previous sanction
of the Central Government or of the State Government.

(1-A) No Court shall take cognizance of-

(a) any offense punishable under Section 153-B or sub-
section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 505 of the Penal
Code, 1860, oг

(b) a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence,

except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government or of the State Government or of the District
Magistrate.

(2) xxxx

(3) The Central Government or the State Government
may, before according sanction under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (1-A) and the District Magistrate may, before
according sanction under sub-section (1-A) and the State
Government or the District Magistrate may, before giving
consent under sub-section (2), order a preliminary
investigation by a police officer not being below the rank
of Inspector, in which case such police office shall have
the powers referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 155.”
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37. Thus, procedural safeguards are provided to conduct

preliminary investigation by a police officer not below the rank of

Inspector before according sanction to be issued by the respective

governments. The courts are also directed not to take cognizance of

these offences except with the previous sanction of the Central or State

Governments. But, in the present case, no preliminary investigation was

conducted and no sanction was obtained from the respective

Governments by the Courts before taking cognizance of the offences

under Sections 153A, 295 and 505 IPC, which was against the

procedural safeguards provided under Cr.P.C.

38. Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 also requires intentional insult of a

scheduled caste or scheduled tribe member by a non-member in any

place within the public view to attract the rigor of that section. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in Pradnya Pradeep Kenkar and others v. State

of Maharashtra 20 and Balu S/o. Bajirao Galande v. State of

Maharashtra and another 21 observed that:

“It is thus clear that the word “public” not only relates to the
location defined by the word “place” but also to the subjects

20
2005 (3) MHLJ 368
21
LAWS (BOM)-2006-4-104
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witnessing the incidence of insult or intimidation to the
member of scheduled caste or tribe. Presence of both the
ingredients is absolutely necessary for making out the
offence of atrocity. Abuse, insult or humiliation must take
place in the presence of or in the proximity of atleast one
independent person.”

39. As seen from the contents of the complaints lodged by the

unofficial respondents, none of the ingredients of the above offences

would attract. Intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate

a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe person in any

place within public view is required to attract the offence under Section

3(1)(r) of SC & ST (PoA) Act, 1989. Likewise, Section 295A or

Section 153A IPC does not penalize any or every act that tantamount to

insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class

of citizens. It penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of

attempts to insult the religion or religious belief of a class of citizens

which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of

outraging the religious feelings of that class. It only punishes the

aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the

deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings to

disrupt the public order and penalises such activities.
45

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WP No.36994 of 2017&Batch

40. In Gajanan Visheshwar Birjur v. Union of India 22, while

considering the books imported containing speeches and works of Mao,

besides the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, which were specifically

banned under notification No.77, to confiscate the same, Justice B. P.

Jeevan Reddy held that:

“Before parting with this case, we must express our
unhappiness with attempts at thought control in a democratic
society like ours. Human history is witness to the fact that all
evolution and all progress is because of power of thought
and that every attempt at thought control is doomed to
failure. An idea can never be killed. Suppression can never
be a successful permanent policy. Any surface serenity it
creates is a false one. It will erupt one day. Our Constitution
permits a free trade, if we can use the expression, in ideas
and ideologies. It guarantees freedom of thought and
expression – the only limitation being a law in terms of
Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Thought control
is alien to our constitutional scheme. To the same effect are
the observations of Robert Jackson, J. In American
Communications Association v. Douds 339 U.S. 382, 442-43
[1950], with reference to the U.S. Constitution:

“Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we
have no claim to it. It is not the function of our
Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it
is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from
falling into error. We could justify any censorship only
when the censors are better shielded against error than the
censored.”

22

1994 (5) SCC 550
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41. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 23, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that:

“15. Article 19(1)(a) protects not only the right of primary
expression but also freedom of secondary propagation of
ideas and the freedom of circulation. The freedom of speech
and expression includes the right to acquire information and
to disseminate it. It is submitted that freedom of speech and
expression is necessary for self-expression, which is an
important means of attaining free conscience and self-
fulfillment. .

16. Freedom of speech and expression of opinion are of
paramount importance to a democracy. There is nothing in
Article 19(2) which permits the State to abridge this right on
the ground of conferring benefits upon the public in general.
It is also not open to the State to curtail or infringe the
freedom of speech of one for promoting the general welfare
of a section or a group of people, unless such action could be
justified under a law contemplated under one of the heads of
Article 19 (2). “

It was further held that:

“Interpretation of law cannot be based on community
standards.”

23

2015 (5) SCC (1)
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42. While also referring to a case in S. Khushboo v.

Kanniammal [AIR 2010 SC 3196], it was held that:

“47. In the present case, the substance of the controversy
does not really touch on whether premarital sex is socially
acceptable. Instead, the real issue of concern is the
disproportionate response to the appellant’s remarks. If the
complainants vehemently disagreed with the appellant’s
views, then they should have contested her views through the
news media or any other public platform. The law should not
be used in a manner that has chilling effects on the `freedom
of speech and expression’.”

43. Thus, it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that “if the

complainants disagree with the views of the appellant, they should have

contested their views through any public platform, but should not use

the law in a manner that has effect on the freedom of speech and

expression, which is also applicable to the facts of the present case.

44. Every free citizen has a freedom to air one’s views. Every

citizen has an undoubted right to express his views. Freedom to air

one’s views is the lifeline of any democratic institution. Any attempt to

stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to

democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship, as laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of

India v. Manubhai D. Shah (2 supra). The Hon’ble Apex Court
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always placed a broad interpretation on the value and content of Article

19(1)(a), making it subject only to the restrictions permissible under

Article 19(2).

45. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in

Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of

India and others v. Cricket Association of Bengal and others 24, held

that:

“We may now summarise the law on the freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19(1)(a) as restricted by Article
19(2).
The freedom of speech and expression includes right
to acquire information and to disseminate it. Freedom of
speech and expression is necessary, for self expression
which is an important means of free conscience and self
fulfilment. It enables people to contribute to debates of social
and moral issues. It is the best way to find a truest model of
anything, since it is only through it, that the widest possible
range of ideas can circulate. It is the only vehicle of political
discourse so essential to democracy. Equally important is the
role it plays in facilitating artistic and scholarly endeavours
of all sorts. The right to communicate, therefore, includes
right to communicate through any media that is available
whether print or electronic or audio-visual such as
advertisement, movie, article, speech etc. That is why
freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the
press. The freedom of the press in terms includes right to

24
1995 (2) SCC 161
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circulate and also to determine the volume of such
circulation. This freedom includes the freedom to
communicate or circulate one’s opinion without interference
to as large a population in the country as well as abroad as is
possible to reach.”

46. Keeping in view the sanctity of the said right, which was

placed on a highest pedestal by the Hon’ble Apex Court, and the same

was also expressed, when the present book was sought to be banned in

WP (Civil) No.946 of 2017, wherein it was held that the book written by

an author is his/her right of expression and that every Author or Writer

has a fundamental right to speak out ideas freely and express his

thoughts adequately and curtailment of an individual writer/author’s

right of freedom of speech and expression should never be lightly

viewed and declined the prayer made by the petitioner therein, initiating

criminal cases against the petitioner basing on the views expressed by

him in the same book, is considered as illegal and violative of his

fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and

as such, considered fit to quash the same.

47. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed quashing the

proceedings in Crime No.770 of 2017 on the file of the Malkajgiri

Police Station, Rachakonda Commissionerate; CC No.417 of 2017 on
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the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Korutla, Jagtial

District; CrimeNo.438 of 2017 on the file of the I-Town Police Station,

Karimnagar, Karimnagar District and CC No.537 of 2017 on the file of

the X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad. No order as to costs.

Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.

___________________________
Dr. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI

Date:13.12.2024
KTL



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