Kashmir Singh vs Ut Of Jammu And Kashmir And Another on 25 March, 2025

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Kashmir Singh vs Ut Of Jammu And Kashmir And Another on 25 March, 2025

Author: Sanjay Dhar

Bench: Sanjay Dhar

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
                  LADAKH AT JAMMU


                                             CRM(M) No. 321/2023


Kashmir Singh                          ...petitioner
                          Through: -Mr.Amit Gupta Advocate


      Vs.

UT of Jammu and Kashmir and another

                                       ...respondents
                          Through: - Ms Monika Kohli Sr. AAG

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE


                                JUDGMENT

1 Instant petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking

quashment of challan/chargesheet emanating from FIR bearing

No.40/2020 dated 10.04.2020 for offences under Sections 498-A & 323

IPC registered with Police Station, Kandi, pending disposal before the

Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Koteranka, Rajouri.

Quashment of challan/charge-sheet is sought on the ground that the

parties have amicably settled the matrimonial dispute.

2. The case set up by the petitioner is that his marriage with

respondent No.2 was solemnized on 19.04.2019 in accordance with

Hindu rituals. It is contended that due to some personal differences and

dispute arising between them, respondent No.2 came out of the

matrimonial society of the petitioner and started living separately,

whereafter, she lodged the impugned FIR against the petitioner, which,

after investigation, resulted in the presentation of a challan before the

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Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Koteranka, where it is

pending disposal.

3. It appears that, during the pendency of aforesaid challan,

good sense prevailed upon the parties and they settled their disputes.

Accordingly, they filed a petition for grant of divorce by mutual

consent before the Family Court, Jammu. The Family Court, after

recording the statements of the parties, wherein they have stated that

they have decided to dissolve their marriage, granted a decree of

divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage

Act. The petitioner has placed on record a copy judgment and decree

dated 08.10.2021.

4 During the pendency of this petition, a compromise deed

dated 15.03.2024 was filed by way of an application and taken on

record vide order dated 03.04.2024. It is stated in the compromise deed

that, on account of dissolution of marriage between the parties, the

complainant-respondent No.2 has undertaken not to pursue the

impugned FIR.

5 In order to verify the execution of the compromise arrived

at between the parties, this Court vide, order dated 03.04.2024, directed

the parties to appear before the Registrar Judicial of this Court for

recording their statements. Pursuant to the said direction, the Registrar

Judicial has recorded the statements of both the parties and the same

are placed on record. In their statements, both the parties have admitted

the contents of the compromise deed as well as its execution.

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6 Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the

impugned FIR may be quashed on the basis of the compromise arrived

at between the parties.

7 I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material on record.

8 So far as the facts alleged in the petition, particularly those

pertaining to the compromise arrived at between the parties in terms of

compromise deed dated 15.03.2024 are concerned, the same are not

disputed. However, according to the petitioner, some of the offences

are non-compoundable. In the backdrop of this position, the question

arises as to whether this Court has power to quash the proceedings,

particularly when some of the offences alleged to have been committed

by the petitioners are non-compoundable in nature.

9 The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh. v. State of

Punjab & another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, while

considering this aspect, has observed as under:

“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus:

The power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the
power given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz;

(i) to secure the ends of justice or
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(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding
or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the
offender and victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.

Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s
family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes
like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out
of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High
Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice
to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end
and if the answer to the above question(s) is in
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding..”

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10 Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case titled Narinder

Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & anr,(2014) 6 SCC 466, has laid

down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings. The guidelines

are reproduced as under:

“31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High
Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to
the settlement between c/w the parties and exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:

(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is
to be distinguished from the power which lies in the
Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code,
the High Court has inherent power to quash the
criminal proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have settled the
matter between themselves.However, this power is to
be exercised sparingly and with caution.

(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to
form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.

(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.

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(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.

(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is
to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by
the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the
basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
in the later case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.

(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play
a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is
arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to
quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
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because of the reason that at this stage the investigation
is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in
exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie
assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally
the High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial
court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already recorded by
the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage
before the High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a c/w ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already
been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved
under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a
crime.”

11 From a perusal of the aforesaid observations of the

Supreme Court, it is clear that the offences arising out of matrimony

relating to dowry or the family disputes where the wrong is basically

private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire

dispute, the High Court will be within its jurisdiction to quash the

criminal proceedings if it is shown that because of the compromise

arrived at between the parties, there is remote possibility of securing

conviction of the accused. It would amount to extreme injustice if

despite settlement having been arrived at by the parties, the criminal

proceedings are allowed to continue.

12 Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the

parties to the matrimonial dispute i.e., the petitioner and the
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complainant (respondent No. 2 herein), have entered into a

compromise. Merely because the offences alleged in the FIR are

non-compoundable in nature, if an end is not put to the criminal

proceedings, it would amount to grave injustice to the petitioner and, in

fact, it will amount to frittering away of the fruits of compromise that

has been arrived at between the parties. The continuance of criminal

proceedings against the petitioner, in these circumstances, will be

nothing but an abuse of process of law.

13 For the foregoing reasons, this is fit case where this Court

should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to bring to

an end the criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner, so as to

secure the ends of justice.

14. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the challan

emanating from FIR bearing No. 40/2020, dated 10.04.2020 for

offences under Sections 498-A & 323 IPC registered with Police

Station, Kandi as well as proceedings initiated thereon pending before

the Court of learned JMIC, Koteranka, Rajouri are quashed.





                                                    (Sanjay Dhar)
                                                         Judge
Jammu
25.03.2025

             Whether the order is speaking:         Yes/No
             Whether the order is reportable:       Yes/No
 

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