Jharkhand High Court
Khemlal Sao Aged About 44 Yrs. Son Of … vs Surji Devi Wife Of Khemlal Sao And … on 1 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
( 2025:JHHC:17357-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 121 of 2024
with
I.A. No. 4011 of 2025
Khemlal Sao aged about 44 yrs. son of Chetlal Sao, resident
of Village-Singhpur, P.O.-Kamta, P.S.-Sadar, District-Chatra.
... ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Surji Devi wife of Khemlal Sao and daughter of Sitaram Sao,
resident of village-Singhpur, P.O. -Kamta,P.S.-Sadar,
District-Chatra, presently residing at Village-Lamta, P.O.-
Shivrajpur, P.S.-Lawalong, District-Chatra.
... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajiv N. Prasad, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. Manish Yadav, Advocate
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Order No. 05 : Dated 1st July, 2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. Today the matter has been listed under the heading for
orders for passing appropriate order on the delay
condonation application being I.A. No. 4011 of 2025.
2. At the outset it requires to refer herein that this Court
vide order dated 15.04.2025 has issued notice upon the
respondent-wife, both in the limitation as well as in main
petition.
3. In pursuant thereto, the respondent has put her
appearance by filing vakalatnama.
4. Mr. Rajiv N. Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant
has submitted by referring to paragraph 3 of the delay
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condonation application that there is sufficient cause to
condone the delay in filing the appeal. Submission has been
made that Original Suit was filed under Section 13(1)1-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the appellant-husband for
dissolution of marriage with respondent-wife, which was
dismissed vide judgment dated 28.02.2023 and decree signed
on 04.03.2023 but due to insufficient fund the appellant
could not come to Ranchi for filing the present appeal,
however, he instructed his lawyer at Chatra to obtain certified
copy of the order passed by the learned Principle Judge,
Family Court, Chatra, which was made available to him on
09.05.2024. Thereafter, the appellant after arranging the
money approached his counsel and accordingly filed the
present appeal which caused delay of 338 days.
5. It has further been submitted the delay in filing the
appeal is neither intentional nor willful rather it was beyond
the control of the appellant and if the delay in filing the
appeal is not condoned, the appeal shall suffer irreparable
loss and injury.
6. Therefore, submission has been made that the delay in
filing the appeal may be condoned and the Interlocutory
Application being filed for condontation in filing the appeal
may be allowed.
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7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on the
delay condonation application being I.A. No. 4011 of 2025
and gone through the explanation furnished in the
application.
8. This Court before considering the reason assigned in
paragraph 3 of the delay condonation application being I.A.
No. 4011 of 2025 needs to refer herein what constitutes
„sufficient cause‟.
9. Furthermore, there is no dispute about the fact that
generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground
of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from
inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the
application to condone the delay before entering into the
merit of the lis.
10. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
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11. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim,
(1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in
Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate
harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law
provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk
of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on
equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized
by law.”
12. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
under:
“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds.”
13. While considering the similar issue, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as
under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
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21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle
is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
14. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for
filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide motive and
gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which
should be taken into consideration while considering the
question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench
of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through
Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013
SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been
held that “Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation
of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot
ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was
never the intention of the legislature that there should be a
different period of limitation when the Government is the
appellant.”
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15. In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living
Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has
been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29
as under
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the Government
is a party before us
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession
has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
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Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
16. Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC
667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living
Media India Limited & Anr., (supra) has held at paragraphs
1 to 5 as hereunder:
“1.The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same
thing again and again and the conduct seems to be
incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a
delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such
inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of
Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order
dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and
we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again
except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the
delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that
the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the
judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and
the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the
impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department
took almost about 17 months’ time to decide whether the SLP
had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of
the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of
revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the
Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable-7-
( 2025:JHHC:17357-DB )period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of
excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1
SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of
the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the
issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in
default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation
where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these
files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in
which the application has been worded, the wastage of
judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State
of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and
Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the
files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also
filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put
to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any
successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up.”
17. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762,
has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the-8-
( 2025:JHHC:17357-DB )condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The
proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court
by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further
has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it
should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter
naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts
and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona
fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts
as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it. In this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always
material and relevant when the court is dealing with
applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5
and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have
been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions
of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to
be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section
14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that
the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant
because apart from the general criticism made against the
appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of limitation no
other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have
already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner
rejected the appellant’s application for condonation of delay
only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to file the
appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and
that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.
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18. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or
not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right
is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is
necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and
at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
19. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning
of „sufficient cause‟. The consideration of meaning of
„sufficient cause‟ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81],
wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at
paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that
which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices
to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances
of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the
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reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to
be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn.
Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 :
AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629]
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993]
this Court explained the difference between a “good cause”
and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient
cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that
of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or
not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on
the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil.
A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what
it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to
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a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its
aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.
28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a
stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired
in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7
SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705
: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907]
.
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation
amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93
: AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
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15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
20. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless
a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
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allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
21. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression „sufficient cause‟ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ram Nath
Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient
cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
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is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or
not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot
be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps.
But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule
and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not
taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected
when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and
law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon
the parties either way.”
22. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition
and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application to condone the inordinate delay of 338 days, is
proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation
furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for
condoning the delay.
23. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression „sufficient cause‟ has been dealt with
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which means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part
in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”.
24. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements
has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of
period of delay but the said consideration must be passed
upon the explanation if found to be sufficiently explained.
25. This Court, after considering the aforesaid judgment has
considered the ground taken in delay condonation
application, wherein it has been stated that the after
dismissal of the suit filed for decree of divorce on 28.02.2023,
but due to insufficient fund the appellant could not come to
Ranchi for filing the present appeal, however, he instructed
his lawyer at Chatra to obtain certified copy of the order
passed by the learned Principle Judge, Family Court, Chatra,
which was made available to him on 09.05.2024. Thereafter,
the appellant after arranging the money approached his
counsel and accordingly filed the present appeal which
caused delay of 338 days.
26. No other ground has been given by the appellant in the
delay condonation application which may said to be sufficient
to condone the huge delay of 338 days in filing the appeal.
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27. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order
in L.P.A. No. 86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay
condonation application since the appeal was filed after delay
of about 687 days without any sufficient cause to condone
the delay.
28. The reference of another case is required to be made
herein of an order passed by the coordinate Bench of this
Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of
condoning the delay of 568 days was under consideration.
29. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the
reason furnished by the State appellants therein to be
sufficient cause on the ground of movement of file from one
table to another by putting reliance upon the judgment
rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex as referred hereinabove.
30. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon‟ble Apex
Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has
challenged the order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the
said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has been dismissed as would
appear from the order dated 13.05.2022.
31. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has dismissed one Special
Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023
filed by the State of Jharkhand which was filed against the
order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein
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the coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said appeal
on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of the appeal.
32. Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has also dismissed
S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by
the State of Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023
passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the
delay of 259 days was not condoned.
33. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court as also considering the fact that the delay
of 338 days has not sufficiently been explained and as such,
the instant interlocutory application is deserves to be
dismissed.
34. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being
I.A. No.4011 of 2025 is hereby, dismissed.
35. In consequence thereof, the instant First Appeal also
stands dismissed.
36. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Alankar/
A.F.R.
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