Gujarat High Court
Khimabhai Bhikabhai Sangadiya vs State Of Gujarat on 4 March, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/1608/2019 ORDER DATED: 04/03/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 1608 of 2019
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KHIMABHAI BHIKABHAI SANGADIYA & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR BM MANGUKIYA(437) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MS BELA A PRAJAPATI(1946) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR MANAN MEHTA APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 04/03/2025
ORAL ORDER
Learned advocate for the petitioner does not press for this petition
insofar as the offence punishable under the IPC. Permission as prayed for
is granted. Thus, this petition is confined to the offence punishable under
the Atrocities Act.
2. By way of this petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the petitioners have prayed for quashment of the FIR being
C.R. No.I-4 of 2019 with Gadhda Police Station for the offences
punishable under Sections 3 (1)(r) and 3(2)(v)(a) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,) 1989.
3. The short facts of the case as emerging from the FIR are that
keeping grudge over the dispute of vacating particular place, the accused
having armed with lethal weapons like stick and iron road came to the
spot and beaten the complainant side, as also gave kick and fist blows and
in furtherance insulted the caste of first informant which resulted into a
lodgment of the FIR.
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4. Heard learned advocate for the petitioners and learned APP for the
respondent – State. Though served, respondent no.2 has not appeared.
5. Learned Advocate for the petitioners taking to the FIR would
submit that general allegations are made against the petitioners and no
such ingredients of the alleged offence is attracted if the FIR is read at its
face value. In regards to the allegations made under the Atrocities Act,
learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that FIR does not
disclose the fact that any derogatory words was used by the petitioner to
lower the caste of the first informant. Learned advocate for the petitioner
would submit that if the FIR is read as it is no such ingredients of the
alleged offence is found prima facie to have been attracted qua the
petitioner and therefore by making above submissions, he would submit
to allow this petition and to quash the FIR.
6. Learned APP for the respondent – State would taking this Court
through the statement made in the FIR submitted that offence alleged to
have been made out against the petitioners as the petitioners have used
derogatory words to lower the caste of the complainant and therefore
prima-facie material is made out which constitute the offence as alleged
in the FIR. He would therefore submit to dismiss the present petition.
7. As noted herein above, respondent no.2 though served has not
appeared to contest the petition.
8. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties and examining the FIR as it is, it appears that keeping grudge over
the dispute of vacating particular place, the accused having armed with
lethal weapons like stick and iron road came to the spot and beaten the
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/1608/2019 ORDER DATED: 04/03/2025
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complainant side, as also gave kick and fist blows and in furtherance
insulted the caste of first informant which resulted into a lodgment of the
FIR.
9. Prima facie, reading of the FIR does not disclose any offence as
alleged under the Atrocities Act in the FIR. It could be noticed that
offence under under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(5)(a) of the Atrocities Act is
alleged; however none of the averments made in the FIR attracts the said
provision. What could be noticed that at no where it is stated in the FIR
that accused belongs to general caste and first informant belongs to
schedule caste and by using such derogatory remarks he had insulted his
caste in public place. Even, which kind of the words are used to derogate
the caste of the complainant is not coming out from the FIR. Baring
allegations nothing is coming from the FIR to satisfy the ingredient of the
offence alleged against the petitioners. To be noted that presence of third
party in whose presence if such derogatory remarks are made is also
missing in the present case and therefore also necessary ingredients to
satisfy the offence under the Atrocities Act are missing.
10. In Karuppudayar vs State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 215], the
Apex Court examined the terms public view and has held in paragraph 10
to 11 as under:
“9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that
for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that
the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence
under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that thePage 3 of 8
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NEUTRAL CITATIONR/CR.MA/1608/2019 ORDER DATED: 04/03/2025
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accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up for
consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh v.
State through Standing Counsel2. This Court in the case of Hitesh
Verma v. State of Uttarakhand3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra)
and reiterated the legal position as under:
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to
be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC
435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression “public place” and “in
any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence
is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary,
if the remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then
it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view
(sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is
stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this
principle in para 15, below:”Also, even if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of the public are
there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be
an offence since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held asPage 4 of 8
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NEUTRAL CITATIONR/CR.MA/1608/2019 ORDER DATED: 04/03/2025
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under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged
in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was
insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of
the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place
within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a
place within public view. It could have been a different
matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a
building, and also was not in the public view. However, if
the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from
the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members of the
public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it
would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public
view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a
private place but yet within the public view. On the other
hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is
owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or
other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the
State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’,
the place should be open where the members of the public can
witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If
the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall
where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said
that it has taken place at a place within public view.”
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11. Thus, the ingredients alleged under the Atrocities Act are missing
from the FIR. None of the allegations made in the FIR would attract the
offence under the Atrocities Act.
12. At this juncture, I may refer to the relevant observations made by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335].
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of aPage 6 of 8
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NEUTRAL CITATIONR/CR.MA/1608/2019 ORDER DATED: 04/03/2025
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Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
13. In view of above, allowing FIR further into trial would be abuse of
process of law. Criminal proceedings started is found to be initiated by
giving color of criminality. The petition deserves consideration.
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14. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. FIR being C.R.
No.I-4 of 2019 with Gadhda Police Station as well as consequential
proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof qua present petitioners for the
offences punishable under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(5)(a) of the Scheduled
Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is
quashed and set aside.
15. FIR in question and subsequent proceedings arising there-from in
respect of the offence punishable under the IPC stands continued; without
being influenced by any observations made in this order.
Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
sompura
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