Delhi High Court
Kishan Chand vs Bhagat Ram on 23 June, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on:23.06.2025
+ C.R.P. 146/2023 & CM APPL. 29713/2023
KISHAN CHAND .....Petitioner
versus
BHAGAT RAM .....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vikram Gujral, Ms. Akanksha Singh &
Mr. Aryan Kalia, Advs.
For the Respondent : Mr. Subhankar Sharma, Adv.
CORAM
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC‘) challenging the order dated 08.05.2023
(hereafter ‘the impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional
District Judge (‘ADJ’), Saket Courts, New Delhi, in CS No. 505/2022.
2. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Court dismissed the
application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint filed by the respondent, Bhagat
Ram.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows :
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a. The suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff, inter alia, seeking
recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 (‘SRA’), along with reliefs of permanent and
mandatory injunction and rendition of accounts in respect of
property bearing No. 491, Hardevpuri, Gautam Nagar, New
Delhi-110049 (hereafter ‘the suit property’).
b. It is the case of the respondent that the suit property was
originally owned by his father, Late Shri Prithi Singh, who
allegedly executed a Will dated 12.05.1982 bequeathing the
entire property to his wife Smt. Khimo Devi for life. Thereafter,
vide Will dated 14.05.1985, she bequeathed the property to the
plaintiff. Upon her death in 1999, the plaintiff claims to have
become the sole and absolute owner of the suit property.
c. The plaintiff states that in the 1970s, his father permitted his
daughter Smt. Shyama Devi and her husband Ved Prakash to
reside in 2-3 rooms, a kitchen, and toilet on the ground floor as
gratuitous licensees. Additional construction was allegedly
carried out in 1992, during which Ved Prakash contributed to
the costs, pursuant to which it was orally agreed that he could
reside without paying rent and collect rental income until
reimbursement of expenses. It is alleged that the arrangement
was temporary and revocable.
d. According to the plaintiff, Ved Prakash continued in occupation
after the death of the plaintiff’s sister and refused to vacate
when asked in July-August 2021. A police complaint datedSignature Not Verified
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24.08.2021 was filed by the plaintiff, alleging that Ved Prakash
forcibly dispossessed him from two rooms on the ground floor,
removed his personal belongings, and let out the rooms to
tenants.
e. It is further averred that on 17.04.2022, Ved Prakash vacated
the premises overnight. Upon visiting the property the next day,
the plaintiff allegedly found that the defendant, Kishan
Chand/petitioner (his brother), had entered the house, locked the
premises from inside, and threatened the plaintiff when he tried
to enter. The plaintiff alleges that his valuables, including cash,
a gold chain, a television, and a refrigerator, were missing and
that he was wrongfully restrained from accessing the suit
property.
f. The plaintiff claims that he was in constructive possession of
the entire property, and that Kishan Chand, in collusion with
Ved Prakash, forcibly entered and dispossessed him without
following due process of law.
g. The petitioner/defendant filed an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, inter alia, on the
grounds that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by limitation, does not
disclose any cause of action against the petitioner, and is vague
and lacking in material particulars such as site plan, area, and
proof of possession. It is also contended that the plaintiff
himself admitted being dispossessed by Ved Prakash on
24.08.2021, and not by the petitioner.
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h. By the impugned order dated 08.05.2023, the learned Trial
Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC,
holding that the plaintiff had pleaded a triable cause of action
and that the issues of limitation and valuation involved mixed
questions of law and fact.
i. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioner has preferred
the present revision petition before this Court.
4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the
impugned order under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, since
the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court is erroneous,
illegal and unjustified.
5. He submitted that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff under
Section 6 of the SRA is not only devoid of merit but is liable to be
rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. He
contended that the plaintiff was never in settled possession of the suit
property, and the facts disclosed in the plaint itself contradict the
essential legal ingredients required to maintain a suit under Section 6
of the SRA.
6. It was pointed out that the plaintiff in the suit claimed
possession over the entire house, yet simultaneously alleged that two
rooms on the ground floor were in his possession, while the rest of the
property was in the possession of his brother-in-law, Ved Prakash,
who was residing in the house as a gratuitous licensee. In his
complaint to the police dated 24.08.2021, the plaintiff specifically
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stated that Ved Prakash had dispossessed him from two rooms on the
ground floor. The rest of the house was already under Ved Prakash’s
occupation. Therefore, even according to the plaintiff’s own version,
he was not in possession of the entire house, but only of two rooms,
from which he claims to have been forcibly dispossessed.
7. He submitted that the plaint does not enclose any site plan or
description of the property that would demarcate or identify the
portion allegedly under the plaintiff’s possession. The suit was filed
for recovery of possession of the entire property, not limited to the two
rooms. He further submitted that lack of clarity in the plaint, absence
of demarcation, and shifting claims regarding possession, show that
the suit is vague, illusory, and does not disclose a clear cause of
action.
8. He emphasized that the plaintiff himself admitted in the police
complaint dated 24.08.2021 that Ved Prakash had dispossessed him
from two rooms, and that Ved Prakash had assured the police he
would return possession to the plaintiff or the defendant, depending on
mutual settlement. On this factual backdrop, the learned counsel
argued that even the plaintiff’s own narrative does not establish settled
or juridical possession, nor does it show that the petitioner ever used
force or unlawfully dispossessed the plaintiff.
9. He submitted that the plaintiff has claimed that he was
dispossessed on 17.04.2022, when he found the petitioner inside the
house and even this alleged entry by the petitioner was with the
knowledge and consent of Ved Prakash, who was in occupation of the
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house and had authority over it. Thus, even if Ved Prakash gave the
keys or possession to the petitioner, the same cannot amount to
“dispossession” under Section 6 of the SRA, as possession transferred
by an occupant to another does not give rise to a claim of illegal
dispossession by the new occupant.
10. He submitted that since the plaintiff himself admitted being
dispossessed on 24.08.2021, the suit, filed on 23.07.2022, is clearly
barred by limitation, having been instituted after the expiry of six
months as prescribed under Section 6(2) of the SRA.
11. Lastly, he submitted that the valuation of the suit is incorrect
and the suit is under-valued, with no site plan, area measurement, or
breakup of claims. Hence, it is submitted that the plaint is liable to be
rejected.
12. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was
misconceived and liable to be dismissed. It was contended that the suit
had been filed under Section 6 of the SRA, seeking possession of the
suit property from the petitioner, who had unlawfully taken over
possession without the consent of the respondent and without recourse
to due process of law.
13. It was submitted that the respondent had been in settled and
juridical possession of the suit property, including portions on the
ground floor and constructive possession of the entire property, prior
to the incident dated 17.04.2022, when the petitioner allegedly entered
the property unauthorisedly after Ved Prakash vacated the same. The
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respondent claimed that Ved Prakash was merely a gratuitous licensee
and had never held any ownership or legal interest in the suit property.
It was further argued that any act by Ved Prakash in delivering
possession to the petitioner was illegal and without authority, and thus
the entry of the petitioner amounted to dispossession as contemplated
under Section 6 of the SRA.
14. The learned counsel denied that the suit was time-barred and
contended that the question of limitation involved mixed questions of
law and fact, which could only be adjudicated upon trial and not at the
preliminary stage.
15. Lastly, it was contended that the plaint must be read as a whole,
and that on a meaningful reading, it clearly disclosed a triable cause of
action against the petitioner, and hence, could not be rejected at the
threshold. The respondent emphasized that disputed questions relating
to possession, title, and factual allegations could not be resolved
without evidence, and that the petitioner sought to pre-empt the
adjudication of these issues through a premature application.
Analysis
16. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the petitioner has
challenged the impugned order by invoking the revisional jurisdiction
of this Court. It is trite law that the scope of revision under Section
115 of the CPC is very limited and is to be exercised only if the
subordinate Court appears to have exceeded its jurisdiction or to have
failed to exercise its jurisdiction, or if the subordinate Court has
exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
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17. This Court also considers it apposite to appreciate the law in
relation to Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The said Rule provides for
summary dismissal of a suit at the threshold, before the parties have
led their evidence, if one of the grounds stipulated therein is made out.
The purpose of the said provision is to stifle sham civil actions and
quell bogus and meaningless suits at the outset when the said suits ex
facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law, without further
wasting judicial time.
18. In the present case, the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC was premised on the argument that the plaint does not
disclose a cause of action for dispossession under Section 6 of the
SRA, and that the suit is barred by limitation, having been instituted
beyond six months from the alleged date of dispossession.
19. Considering that the power to terminate the action without even
allowing the plaintiff to lead evidence and establish its case is a drastic
one, the Court is required to limit itself to discerning whether the
plaint prima facie discloses a cause of action by perusing the
substance of the averments, without paying any heed to the pleas taken
in the written statement. While the Court is not precluded from
intervening when the litigation is manifestly vexatious, at the same
time, if a prima facie case is made out, it is not open to the Court to
conduct an enquiry into the merit or trustworthiness of the allegations.
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dahiben Vs. Arvinbhai
Kalyanji Bhansai : (2020) 7 SCC 366 has succinctly discussed the
law in relation to Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The relevant portion
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of the same is reproduced hereunder:
“23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and
special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily
dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record
evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on
any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a
suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by
limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff
to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a
case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so
that further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315, this
Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under
this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless,
and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste
judicial time of the court….
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action
is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in
Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to
determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by
scrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P.
& I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512], read in
conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is
barred by any law.
xxx
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would
determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to
statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for
rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits,
would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into
consideration. [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3
SCC 137]
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is
that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, inSignature Not Verified
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conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same
result in a decree being passed…
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P)
Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that
it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read
it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which
has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands,
without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the
plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot
embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in
fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267;
See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962
SC 941].
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that
the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does
not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in
exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by
the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the
plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before
conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment
of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557. The
plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to
trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv
Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji
Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj
281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823.
23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It
states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds
specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that
the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is
barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the
plaint.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. In this backdrop, the short question before this Court is whether
the plaintiff/respondent has pleaded facts that constitute unlawful
dispossession within the meaning of Section 6(1) of the SRA, and
whether the plaint discloses any legally cognizable cause of action
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against the petitioner/defendant.
22. The subject suit No. CS 505/2022 was filed by the petitioner
under Section 6 of the SRA, which reads as under:
“6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.–
(1)If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable
property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming
through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding
any other title that may be set up in such suit.
(2)No suit under this section shall be brought–
(a)after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
(b)against the Government.
(3)No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit
instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or
decree be allowed.
(4)Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his
title to such property and to recover possession thereof.”
23. On a careful reading of the plaint, it becomes evident that the
plaintiff’s case rests on the premise that he was dispossessed from the
suit property when he found the petitioner inside the premises on
17.04.2022.
24. It is relevant to note that the plaintiff himself had filed a police
complaint on 24.08.2021 alleging that he has been dispossessed by his
Brother-in-Law, Ved Prakash, from two rooms on the ground floor.
The said complaint appears to have been settled. Ved Prakash, thus,
admittedly, is in possession of the suit property on being permitted by
the plaintiff. The petitioner is also stated to be brother of the plaintiff
who, even as per the case of the plaintiff, started residing on being
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permitted by Ved Prakash. The plaintiff’s own police complaint dated
24.08.2021, filed nearly eight months earlier, thus, contradicts the
claim as alleged in the plaint.
25. The plaintiff had admitted that the property apart from two
rooms were in the occupation of Ved Prakash, who was residing in the
house as a permissive occupant or gratuitous licensee since the 1970s.
As per the plaintiff’s own pleadings, Ved Prakash had been staying in
the property for decades, and even collected rent from tenants on the
first floor. Thus, actual physical possession of the property was not
with the plaintiff, either on the date of the suit or at any time within six
months prior to filing the suit.
26. Crucially, the plaintiff does not allege that the petitioner
forcibly entered the premises by ejecting the plaintiff. Instead, the
petitioner is said to have entered the property with the consent or
cooperation of Ved Prakash, who was in occupation of the suit
premises. Even if Ved Prakash had no legal authority to induct the
petitioner, such entry would not amount to unlawful dispossession
under Section 6 of the SRA, since no forcible removal of the plaintiff
occurred.
27. This distinction is significant. The concept of ‘dispossession’
under Section 6 of the SRA requires that the defendant must have
removed the plaintiff from settled possession by unlawful means.
Merely entering into possession through a third party who is already in
occupation — even if such third party has no legal right to induct
another person — does not constitute unlawful dispossession.
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28. It is well settled that in order to succeed in a suit under the said
provision, the plaintiff must establish that he was in possession of the
suit premises, six months prior to the institution of the suit.
29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi
Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das : (2020) 1 SCC 1, while discussing the
requirement of long, uninterrupted and peaceful enjoyment of an
incorporeal right for the applicability of the doctrine of lost grant,
described the general interpretation of the term ‘possession’, which
reads as under:
“312. In Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja,
(1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] , this Court observed that
“possession is a polymorphous term” and, therefore, it was not possible
to ascribe a meaning which would apply in every context. Drawing
sustenance from Salmond’s Jurisprudence, the Court noted that
possession implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the
right to property and the fact of the real intention. Possession as a
concept comprehends “corpus possessionis and animus possidendi”.
The former embraces the power to use the thing in possession and the
existence of a ground of expectation that the use of the possession shall
not be interfered with. The latter postulates the intent to appropriate to
oneself the exclusive use of the thing which is possessed.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Even assuming the plaintiff retained some legal claim or title
over the property, the remedy under Section 6 of the SRA is not
available unless there is an actual forcible dispossession. The entry of
the petitioner into the premises upon being permitted by Ved Prakash,
who was already in occupation, does not fulfill the essential element
of ‘dispossession’. At best, the plaintiff may have a civil remedy in
title or ownership, but not under Section 6 of the SRA, which is
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designed to preserve the sanctity of possession regardless of
ownership.
31. The plaintiff has also failed to file any site plan, measurement,
or proof of possession of any identifiable portion of the suit property.
The pleadings are vague and self-contradictory. A suit for possession
must be premised on demonstrable control over a defined area. Absent
such averments, the plaint lacks the material particulars necessary to
sustain an action for possession.
32. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that
the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit premises, that he was not
dispossessed by the petitioner, and that even assuming some grievance
exists, it does not amount to dispossession as understood under
Section 6 of the SRA.
33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is set
aside. Consequently, the plaint of the respondent is rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
34. The present petition is allowed. Pending application also stands
disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
JUNE 23, 2025
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