Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Krishan Gopal Sharma Son Of Shri Sanwar … vs The General Manager, Uco Bank on 9 June, 2025
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:22893] (1 of 15) [CW-2106/2021]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2106/2021
Krishan Gopal Sharma Son of Shri Sanwar Mal Sharma, Aged
About 37 Years, Resident Of Devaguda Bawari, Via Jahota, Tehsil
Amer, District Jaipur (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The General Manager, UCO Bank, Human Resource
Management Department, Head Office- 10 B.T. Sarani,
Kolkatta.
2. The Chief General Manager, UCO Bank, Regional Office,
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
3. The Principal (O), Regional Training Centre, Sco 55-57,
Bank Square, Section 178, UCO Bank Building, 2Nd Floor,
Chandigarh-160017.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Counsel with
Mr. Gaurav Sharma
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Anita Aggarwal
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
Reserved On :: 28.05.2025
Pronounced On :: 09.06.2025
1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, challenging the decision of the
respondent-Bank denying him appointment to the post of
Probationary Officer in Bank, despite his selection, premised on
the ground that the acquittal was not honorable but was granted
on the basis of benefit of doubt.
2. Facts in the case are not much in dispute. It has been
contended by the petitioner in his writ petition that the
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respondent-Bank initiated recruitment process on the post of
Probationary Officer in JMGS-I by way of issuing an advertisement
dated 07.02.2012. Since the petitioner was fulfilling the eligibility
criteria mentioned in the advertisement, therefore, he submitted
his application pursuant to the advertisement. After undergoing
the process, he was selected and consequently, an appointment
letter dated 18.02.2013 was issued by the respondent-Bank,
whereby the petitioner was appointed on provisional basis subject
to the conditions mentioned in the appointment letter.
3. As per instructions mentioned in the appointment letter, the
petitioner reported at the Regional Training Center of respondent-
Bank on 02.04.2013, where he was supplied one declaration form
to be filled in by the petitioner.
4. It has been averred by the petitioner that in the declaration
form, in addition to other informations, the petitioner was also
required to disclose about criminal antecedents. The petitioner
while filling up the form fairly disclosed that the criminal cases
were pending against him.
5. On such declaration made by the petitioner, vide letter dated
04.04.2013, the respondent-Bank communicated the petitioner
that on account of pendency of criminal case, Bank has decided
not to allow the petitioner to join.
6. The petitioner has stated that there were two criminal cases,
in which he was facing criminal trial. In one of the cases, he was
being tried under Sections 419/120, 420/120B and 120B IPC read
with Sections 65, 66 and 72 of the IT Act. Whereas another case
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was lodged against him for an offence under Sections 147, 341
and 323 IPC. Since at the relevant time, no final verdict was given
by the competent criminal court, therefore, the decision taken by
the Bank declining joining to the petitioner was based upon fake
assumption and against fundamental Rule of criminal
jurisprudence that a person is innocent till he is held guilty by the
criminal Court. Under the circumstances, the petitioner preferred
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7056/2013 before this Court assailing
communication letter dated 04.04.2013.
7. It has been contended by the petitioner that in the above
Writ Petition No. 7056/2013, an interim order dated 10.05.2013
was passed by the Court to the extent of directing the
respondents to keep one post vacant.
8. It has further been stated by the petitioner that during the
pendency of aforementioned writ petition, he was acquitted in
both the criminal cases.
9. Under these circumstances, this Court disposed of the earlier
petition No. 7056/2013 filed by the petitioner vide order dated
01.07.2020, by giving following observations:
"However, as subsequently the petitioner has been
acquitted in both the cases, it is the opinion of this Court
that the matter is required to be re-examined at the level of
the Bank itself and they must consider the candidature of
the petitioner independently of the earlier decision taken by
them and convey to the petitioner on4th April, 2013.
6. In view of the above, it is directed that the petitioner
shall now submit a detailed representation placing on record
the judgments passed in the criminal cases and the
concerned competent authority shall examine his case for
joining on the post as he already stood selected
independent to the earlier decision and one post is lying
vacant. It is expected that decision in this regard shall be
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taken expeditiously and conveyed to the petitioner within a
period of one month henceforth.7.With the said
observations and directions, the writ petition is disposed of.
It goes without saying that if the petitioner has any
grievance left, he can approach this Court afresh."
10. In compliance of order dated 01.07.2020, the petitioner filed
representation before the respondent-Bank highlighting therein
that since the only reason for denying him appointment was
pendency of criminal cases against him, therefore, in view of the
fact that the petitioner has been acquitted in the said criminal
cases after recording evidence and holding complete trial,
therefore, in the light of observations made by this Court vide
order dated 01.07.2020, the respondents were requested to
reconsider the decision of declining appointment to the petitioner.
It was mentioned in the representation that in both the cases, the
petitioner was falsely implicated in malicious manner. The
allegations levelled against him were totally frivolous and devoid
of any truth. The prosecution utterly failed to prove the allegations
before the competent Court and the baseless evidence led by the
petitioner was not at all reliable, hence, under these
circumstances, finding no criminality in the conduct of the
petitioner, he has been acquitted from the criminal charges. By
mentioning all such facts, the petitioner requested the
respondents to permit the petitioner to join on the post of
Probationary Officer.
11. Grievance of the petitioner is that despite there being clear-
cut verdict of the competent criminal Court in his favour and
inspite of the fact that apart from the alleged allegations levelled
in the said criminal cases, there was no piece of evidence, putting
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any suspicion whatsoever regarding character of the petitioner, yet
without giving any cogent or rational reasoning, in quite
mechanical manner, merely by giving reference of vague
recruitment policy, the representation submitted by the petitioner
has been rejected by the respondent-Bank vide order dated
24.07.2020; resultantly, the petitioner has been deprived of
appointment, despite being meritorious person, which is causing
grave prejudice and miscarriage of justice to the petitioner.
12. In the instant writ petition, while issuing notices on
23.02.2021, this Court again passed interim order, directing the
respondent-Bank to keep one post vacant for the petitioner.
13. After receiving notices of the writ petition, the respondent-
Bank filed reply to the writ petition, categorically denying the
averments made in the writ petition. It has been submitted in
reply to the writ petition that nature of job of the Probationary
Officer in Bank essentially requires integrity and honesty, hence
the respondent-Bank has framed a recruitment policy, which
mandates that only the persons having unblemished character and
spotless antecedents can be appointed on such post.
14. It has further been submitted in reply to the writ petition
that admittedly the petitioner was charged with criminal
allegations in two different cases involving element of moral
turpitude. Although, the petitioner has been acquitted in both the
criminal cases, yet such acquittal is merely on the basis of giving
benefit of doubt to the accused petitioner and such acquittal by no
stretch of imagination would fall within the ambit of ‘honourable
acquittal’. Such judgments may although save the petitioner from
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facing the rigour of punishment, yet are not conclusive proof of
innocence of the petitioner. Therefore, looking to the consistent
recruitment policy of the Bank and in larger public interest, the
respondent-Bank has taken right decision not to appoint the
petitioner on a post, which carries lot of responsibilities and trust
of the public. The respondents, at the outset, prayed to dismiss
the writ petition.
15. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Virendra Lodha assisted by Shri
Gaurav Sharma, while arguing on behalf of the petitioner submits
that the acquittal by the competent Criminal Court absolves the
petitioner of all criminal culpability, and therefore, the denial of
appointment is arbitrary and violative of his legitimate rights.
Public employment is indeed a significant facet of one’s right to
livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Respondent-
Bank cannot adopt an approach that is punitive in substance and
discriminatory in effect, without adhering to the touchstones of
fairness, reasonableness and proportionality.
16. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that in the present
case, the acquittal was rendered after a full-fledged trial. The
criminal Court, while extending benefit of doubt, did not record
any adverse comment against the petitioner’s credibility or
conduct and apart from aforementioned criminal case, which
ultimately culminated in acquittal, the respondent-Bank has not
produced any other material demonstrating moral turpitude or
habitual delinquency.
17. Learned Senior Counsel in order to press his submissions has
relied upon the case of Joginder Singh Vs. Union Territory of
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Chandigarh, (2015) 2 SCC 377, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that denial of appointment solely on the basis of a
criminal case, in which the accused has been acquitted, must
satisfy the test of proportionality and must not rest on vague
moralistic surmise. Following observations in the above case are
relevant:-
“19. Further, an acquittal of the appellant is an
“honourable” acquittal in every sense and purpose.
Therefore, the appellant should not be deprived from being
appointed to the post, in the public employment, by
declaring him as unsuitable to the post even though he was
honourably acquitted in the criminal case registered against
him.
20. Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of
concealment of the fact that a criminal case was registered
against him by the appellant. Thus, the appellant has
honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted
to the selection authority that there was a criminal case
registered against him and that it ended in an acquittal on
account of compromise between the parties involved in the
criminal case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify
for any post including the post of a Constable.”
18. Per contra, Smt. Anita Aggarwal, learned counsel for the
Respondent-Bank has vehemently argued that in the present case,
the acquittal of the petitioner was not based on a clear
exoneration but was granted due to lack of sufficient evidence,
leading to benefit of doubt. Such an acquittal does not equate to a
declaration of innocence and does not preclude the employer from
assessing the suitability of the candidate for public employment.
19. Learned counsel for the respondents further adds that Public
service in a Nationalized Bank, particularly where matters of trust
of public at large is involved, necessitates a high degree of probity
and trustworthiness as well as unimpeachable integrity. The
employer, therefore, is justified in exercising discretion to ensure
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that candidates appointed to such positions meet these stringent
standards. Hence, the decision of the respondent authority to
deny appointment to the petitioner cannot be termed arbitrary or
unjustified. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit and deserves
to be dismissed.
20. In support of her contentions, Smt. Aggrawal, learned
counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment
delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Avtar
Singh Vs. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, where the Apex
court has elucidated as under:-
“38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still
has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be
compelled to appoint the candidate.”
21. Further, leaned counsel for the Respondents has cited the
judgment of State of M.P. Vs. Bhupendra Yadav, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1181, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that:
“25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that mere acquittal of
the respondent in the criminal case would not automatically
entitle him to being declared fit for appointment to the
subject post. The appellant-State Government has
judiciously exercised its discretion after taking note of all
the relevant factors relating to the antecedents of the
respondent. In such a case, even one criminal case faced by
the respondent in which he was ultimately acquitted,
apparently on the basis of being extended benefit of doubt,
can make him unsuitable for appointment to the post of a
Constable.”
22. In continuation of above, learned counsel has also relied
upon judgment of this court in the case of State of Rajasthan
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Vs. Dinesh Singh Bithu, 2021 SCC online Raj. 790, where this
court has observed as under:
“11. As laid down by the Supreme Court, acquittal in a
criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate for
appointment to the post and the employer has right to
consider the antecedents of the candidate and decide
whether he is suitable for appointment to the post There
cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that the acquittal
or discharge by itself cannot lead to presumption that a
person has been honourably acquitted/completely
exonerated. But, at the same time, if a person is acquitted
of the charges for want of evidence, it would not necessarily
lead to inference that the acquittal of the person by the
Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction is not honourable.”
23. I have carefully heard rival submissions made at the bar and
meticulously examined the record.
24. The pivotal question for determination is whether, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, an acquittal based on benefit
of doubt can be equated with an honorable acquittal, thereby
entitling the petitioner to appointment in public service.
25. The petitioner, a candidate duly selected for appointment is
aggrieved by the decision of the respondent-Bank in declining him
appointment solely on the ground of his past involvement in a
criminal case, notwithstanding his acquittal therein.
26. It is not in dispute that the petitioner stood acquitted in the
said criminal cases. The acquittal, it is alleged by the respondents,
was not “honourable” in the strict forensic sense, but rather one
rendered on account of insufficiency of evidence, resulting in the
grant of benefit of doubt.
27. The rejection of the petitioner’s candidature is founded upon
the assertion that the nature of acquittal casts a lingering cloud of
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moral doubt and therefore dis-entitles him from public service,
particularly at a position that demands high ethical standards and
personal integrity.
28. At the outset, it is imperative to reiterate that an acquittal, of
whatever complexion, is a formal pronouncement by a competent
Court declaring the accused as not guilty. In Avtar Singh Vs.
Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that if a person is acquitted honourably, he may be
considered suitable. However, even if the acquittal is based on
benefit of doubt, there is no absolute prohibition and he may still
be considered if no moral turpitude or serious suspicion remains.
Each case must be considered on its own facts by the employer.
29. Before arriving at any conclusion, this court thinks it proper
to examine and analyze the observations of criminal courts in their
respective judgments:
30. In case no. 4323/2010, lodged against the petitioner under
Sections 419/120, 420/120B and 120B IPC read with Sections 65,
66 and 72 of the IT Act, the competent Court after recording
evidence, in it’s judgment dated 27.06.2013 has observed as
under:
**——–gLrxr izdj.k esa ,Q-,l-,y- fjiksVZ iw.kZr;k uSxsfVo gSa vkSj
mlesa ,slh dksbZ bysDVªkWfud lwpuk ugha gSa tks bu dEI;wVj ,oa
bysDVªkWfud lk/kuksa ds ek/;e ls eqfYteku dks vkjksfir vijk/kksa ls
la;ksftr djrh gks vfHk;kstu ds ekeys ds vuqlkj rhuksa eqfYteku
bUgha dEI;wVjksa vkSj dEI;wVjksa esa miyC/k baVjusV dusD’kuksa dk mi;ksx
djds e/kqcu lkbZcj dSQs esa ,l-ih- xzkeh.k o Mh-,l-ih- pkSew dh QthZ
ewy vkbZ-Mh- ds ek/;e ls lwpuk,a izkIr djrs Fks bUgha ds ek/;e ls
vfHk;kstu ds ekeys ds vuqlkj QthZ ewy vkbZ-Mh- cukbZ xbZ ijarq ,slh
dksbZ lwpuk bu bysDVªkWfud lk/kuksa esa ugha ikbZ xbZ ;g ,Q-,l-,y-
fjiksVZ ls lkfcr gSa bu lwpukvksa dks dEI;wVj ls eqfYteku }kjk gVk;k(Downloaded on 09/06/2025 at 09:50:27 PM)
[2025:RJ-JP:22893] (11 of 15) [CW-2106/2021]x;k ;k fdlh vU; O;fDr }kjk bl ckcr dksbZ rF; i=koyh ij
ekStwn ugha gSaA ,Q-,l-,y- fjiksVZ uSxsfVo vkus ls blh /kkj.kk dks cy
feyrk gS fd bu dEI;wVjksa ls dksbZ vijk/k ugha gqvk gS blds vykok
Hkh ;g ekeyk ifjoknh oksMkQksu daiuh ds vf/kd`r vf/kdkjh ds ikl
lajf{kr bysDVªkWfud lk/kuksa ls lkfcr fd;k tk ldrk Fkk fd mlls
dbZ ckj lwpuk ekaxh xbZ vkSj mlds }kjk lwpuk,a miyC/k djkbZ xbZ
ijarq vfHk;kstu i{k ifjoknh ds bysDVªkWfud lk/kuksa ds ek/;e ls Hkh
izdj.k dks eqfYteku ds fo:) lkfcr djus dk iz;Ru djrk izrhr
ugha gksrkA uD’kk fu’kknsgh ,oa vU; rF;ksa dks lkfcr djus ds fy,
vfHk;kstu }kjk izLrqr djk;s x;s lHkh vR;ar egRoiw.kZ vfHk;kstu ds
Lora= lk{kh vfHk;kstu dh dgkuh dk ys’kek= Hkh leFkZu ugha djrs gSa
tgka bysDVªkWfud lk/kuksa ls vijk/k fd;s tkus dk vkjksi lwpuk
rduhdh vf/kfu;e] 2000 ds varxZr eqfYteku ij yxk;k x;k gks ogka
,d Hkh ,slk bysDVªkWfud lk{; i=koyh esa izLrqr dj ;qfDr;qDr lansg
ls ijs izekf.kr ugha fd;k x;k gS ,sls esa lwpuk
izkS|ksfxdh vf/kfu;e] 2000 ds varxZr yxk;as x;s vkjksi /kkjk 65]
66 ,oa 72 vfHk;kstu i{k lkfcr dj ikus esa iw.kZr;k lQy ugha gks
ik;k gS lkFk gh vfHk;kstu dh vksj ls dsoy eqfYte d`”.kxksiky mDr
rFkkdfFkr QthZ Qksu dkWy djus okyk O;fDr Fkk] bl ckcr eksckbZy
fle ds mi;ksxdrkZ dk fle /kkjd d`”.kxksiky gksus ckcr fizaV vkmV
ds vykok vkSj dksbZ nLrkost i=koyh ij ekStwn ugha gSA vr% mijksDr
foospu fo’ys”k.k ds vuqlkj ge bl fu”d”kZ ij igqaps gSa fd
izfr:i.k }kjk Ny ;k Ny djus ds fy, vfHk;qDrx.k }kjk ,d
vkijkf/kd “kM;a= dk fuekZ.k djds ml “kM;a= ds vuqlj.k esa
eqfYteku }kjk Ny ,oa izfr:i.k }kjk Ny fd;k x;k gks ;g rF; Hkh
;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs lkfcr dj ikus esa vfHk;kstu iw.kZr;k lQy
ugha gks ik;k gSA vr% eqfYteku d`”.kxksiky] eqds’k o jkds’k dks lansg
dk ykHk nsdj vijk/k /kkjk 419] 420 o 120ch Hkk-na-la- ,oa /kkjk 65]
66 ,oa 72 vkbZ-Vh- ,DV ds vijk/k ds vkjksiksa ls nks”keqDr fd;k tkuk
U;k;ksfpr izrhr gksrk gSA**
31. Whereas in the case implicating the petitioner for charges
under Sections 147, 323 and 341 IPC although, the trial Court
initially convicted the petitioner yet granted benefit of Section 4 of
the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Resultantly, in view of
Section 12 of the Act of 1958, despite there being conviction, the
petitioner was absolved from all kind of disqualifications, if any,
attached with the conviction. However, even then feeling
aggrieved by the conviction the petitioner filed appeal before the
Appellate Court. Learned Appellate court while quashing the
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[2025:RJ-JP:22893] (12 of 15) [CW-2106/2021]conviction and acquitting the petitioner vide judgment dated
13.08.2019, has given the following observations:
**——- bl izdkj bl xokg }kjk vius iqfyl c;ku varxZr /kkjk 161
n-iz-la- ls badkj fd;k gSA bl xokg ds dFkuksa ls ;g Li”V ugha gksrk
gS fd lHkh vfHk;qDrx.k ,d jk; gksdj ekjihV ds mn~ns’; ls vk;s
gksA
bl izdkj vfHk;kstu ds xokgksa ds dFkuksa esa rkfRod fojks/kkHkkl
gksus ls o izFke lwpuk bRryk izn’kZ ih&01 ls rkfRod fojks/kkHkklh
dFku fd;s tkus ls o xokgksa ds dFkuksa dh rkbZn muds pksV izfrosnu
ls ugha gksus o vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh }kjk rkbZn ugha fd;s tkus ls
vfHk;kstu viuk izdj.k ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs lkfcr djus esa
vlQy jgk gSA vr% vihykFkhZx.k@vfHk;qDrx.k dh vksj ls izLrqr
vihy Lohdkj dh tkdj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vk{ksfir
fu.kZ; ,oa n.Mkns’k vikLr djrs gq, vihykFkhZx.k@vfHk;qDrx.k dks
vijk/k varxZr /kkjk 147] 341 o 323 Hkkjrh; naM lafgrk esa lansg dk
ykHk nsrs gq, nks”keqDr fd;k tkuk U;k;laxr izrhr gksrk gSA**
32. Bare perusal of the above observations in the context of the
instant case, it would be clear that before arriving at the
conclusion to acquit the Petitioner, the competent Courts have
discussed the evidence in detail and thereafter, found the same
not sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled
against him. Hence, such judgments are well considered and
based upon meticulous analysis of evidence. Hence, decision to
acquit on the basis of such sound findings cannot be weighed
lightly so as to deny removal of blot attached to the initial
accusations.
33. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of Inspector
General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiran, 2013(1) SCC 598,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“24……When the accused is acquitted after full consideration
of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had
miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the
accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was
honourably acquitted.”
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34. Furthermore, the respondents have failed to demonstrate the
existence of any additional compelling or discernible material
suggesting that the petitioner was involved in acts amounting to
moral turpitude or deliberate criminality. The decision to brand the
petitioner unsuitable appears to be based not on any evidence of
unfitness, but on a generalized apprehension.
35. It is settled preposition of law that the presumption of
innocence is a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence.
This presumption, once crystallized through acquittal, must be
given full legal effect unless explicitly rebutted. A “benefit of
doubt” acquittal does not create lingering suspicion for guilt,
rather it is a legal declaration that the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden.
36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of
India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, recognized that while employers may
assess the antecedents of a candidate, yet such discretion must
be judicious, not mechanical.
37. In the instant case, the Bank has not alleged any
suppression of material facts by the petitioner. Pendency of
criminal cases was admittedly disclosed at the time of application.
Moreover, there is no suggestion that the acquittal was vitiated or
that it was based on dubious grounds. The judgment of acquittal
does not indicate any finding suggestive of moral turpitude or
deliberate wrongdoing by the petitioner.
38. The invocation of “unsuitability” in such a situation becomes
problematic. The concept of suitability must be backed by
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objective parameters and must not be used as a tool for arbitrary
exclusion. The mere use of the phrase “not honourably acquitted”
cannot become a device to defeat a person’s chance at livelihood,
particularly when the criminal process has not held him guilty.
39. This Court is also mindful of the fact that employment in a
bank, though requiring integrity, cannot be regulated by an
unreasoned apprehension that casts indefinite suspicion. If every
person acquitted on benefit of doubt is deemed forever unsuitable,
the criminal process itself becomes a punishment rather than a
judicial arrangement for fair adjudication. It must be underscored
that employment in a public sector bank, though imbued with
fiduciary trust, cannot be governed by speculative apprehensions
or moralistic assumptions, but by constitutional discipline and
underlying principles of reasonableness. An acquitted person is
presumed innocent in the eyes of law and therefore, cannot be
made to suffer only on account of shadow casted upon him due to
initial allegations, which were never proved against him.
40. In the case of Neeraj Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan and
others (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 9517/2024 decided on
27.03.2025) this court has commented as under:
“31. Even otherwise, one ought to be mindful that the
youth need a reformative approach to the indiscretions
committed in heat of the moment, which may or may not
be intentional. Societal and so should the legal
perspective be, of course depending upon the nature of
delinquency, that youthful indiscretions should not
permanently tarnish an individual’s future. A
compassionate and reformative approach ought to be
adopted when dealing with young individuals who may
have committed minor transgressions. Young people are
still in the process of emotional and intellectual
development.”
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41. Further, the right to be considered for public employment is a
constitutional entitlement under Articles 14 and 16. The
respondent-Bank, being a State instrumentality under Article 12,
must act within the contours of constitutional discipline. Decisions
affecting the life and livelihood of a citizen cannot rest on vague
moral judgments or the employer’s uncanalized discretion.
42. In summation, the Court finds that the petitioner’s rejection
by the respondent-Bank suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and
non-application of mind. The decision appears to be predicated on
a mechanical invocation of the phrase “benefit of doubt”, without
any corroborative material suggesting that the petitioner poses a
threat to the integrity of the institution.
43. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed and the
impugned communication/order denying appointment to the
petitioner is hereby quashed. The respondent-Bank is directed to
process the petitioner’s appointment, subject to verification of
other formalities, within a period of 2 months from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
PCG/211
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