Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh vs The Officer In Charge on 7 January, 2025

January 8, 2025

Manipur High Court

Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh vs The Officer In Charge on 7 January, 2025

Digitally signed by
KHOIROM KHOIROM
BIPINCHAND BIPINCHANDRA SINGH IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
Date: 2025.01.07
RA SINGH 12:26:47 +05'30' AT IMPHAL

AB No. 53 of 2024

Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh, aged about 28 years, S/o Ksh.
Ranjit Singh of Kakching Makha Leikai Irabot Pareng, P.O &
P.S. Kakchig, Kakching District, Manipur-795103.
...Petitioner
- Versus -

The Officer in Charge, Kakching Police Station, Office at
Kakching Chumnang, P.O & P.S. Kakching, Kakching
District, Manipur-795103.
...Respondent

BEFORE
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE GOLMEI GAIPHULSHILLU

For the petitioner : Mr. Hemchandra, Senior Advocate
For the respondent: Mr. M. Rarry, Senior Advocate
Date of hearing : 27.12.2024.
Date of judgment
& order : 07.01.2025

JUDGMENT & ORDER
(CAV)

[1] Heard Mr. Hemchandra, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the

petitioner and Mr. M. Rarry, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the

respondent at length.

[2] The present case has been filed under section 482 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksh Sanhita, 2023 with the following prayer:

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i) To admit the present application;
ii) Call for the records;
iii) After hearing the parties grant pre-arrest bail or
anticipatory bail to the petitioners/applicants u/s 482 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in its
absolute nature in connection with the above referred
FIR No. 81(11)2024 KCG PS U/s 132/133/3(5) BNSS
added Sec: 109/351(3) BNSS, 2023 for the ends of
justice;
iv) To pass any other order/direction as the Hon'ble Court
may deem fit.
[3] Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner

is an employee of HDB Finance Service now attached at HDFC Bank,

Kakching Branch as Sales Executive having no criminal record and no

connection with any illegal activities till date. It is submitted that on 10th

December, 2024, the IO of the case in FIR No. 81(11)2024 KCG-PS served

a Summon under section 179 of BNSS, 2023 with direction to appear on or

before 12th December, 2024 at 11:00 am. Apprehending arrest, the

petitioner approached the Court of Sessions Judge, Thoubal in Cril. Misc.

(AB) Case No. 65 of 2024, after hearing the parties, the Ld. Sessions Judge,

Thoubal granted interim bail to the petitioner vide order dated 13.12.2024.

Relevant portion of the order dated 13.12.2024 reads as follows:

"In the meantime, interim pre-arrest bail is granted to the
petitioner till 16.12.2024. Thus, it is directed that in the event of
arrest in connection with the matter, the petitioner be released on
interim ball on his furnishing PR bonds of Rs1,00,000/- (Rupees
One lakh) only with a surety of like amount on the condition that:
(i) the petitioner shall co-operate with the investigation.
(ii) the petitioner shall make himself available before the
investigation authority on or before 15.12.2024.
(iii) the petitioner shall not influence prosecution witnesses; and

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(iv) the petitioner shall not leave the State of Manipur without
prior permission of the Court."

[4] It is submitted that on 16.11.2024, Kakching Police Station

registered an FIR being FIR No. 81(11)2024 KCG PS U/s 132/133/3(5)

BNSS added Sec: 109/351(3) BNSS, 2023 against a large group of people

numbering more than 1000 numbers thereby causing damage to the

property of the MLA of Kakching AC. Relevant portion of FIR reads as

follows;

"12. First Information contents:

Today, i.e. 16/11/2024 at 8:50 PM received reliable
information that Hon'ble MLA Mayangjambam Rameshwor Singh
who had arrived at Kakching bazar area, at about 7:30 PM, to
conduct public meeting with a large group of people, numbering
more than 1000 numbers, had confined, manhandled and assaulted
him during the public gathering. On receipt of the information a
large security force led by SP Kakching along with CO-8 MR, Addl.
SSP (LO) & Ops, SDPO, Kakching, OC-CDO, KCG PS teams, and
others rushed to Kakching bazar at Naohanlai Lampak and tried to
rescue him from the huge crowd. After prolong and hectic efforts,
the police teams with the assistance of some workers of the
Hon'ble MLA and some public rescued the Hon'ble MLA and brought
him to a safer place.

Hence, a suo-motto case under FIR No. 81(11)2024 KCG-PS
U/S 132/133/3(5) BNS is registered for investigation."

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the

name of the petitioner does not appear anywhere in the above referred

FIR.

[5] It is submitted that the allegation leveled against the

petitioner is that on 16.11.2024, some 1000 number of people stormed the

residence of the local MLA of Kakching AC thereby causing damage to the

property and that the petitioner was involved in the said incident. However,

the petitioner was never involved in the said incident. It is also submitted

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that on 16.11.2024, while returning from his office, he saw a large

gathering of people at the Kakching Bazar wherein he saw some people

trying to meet the local MLA and the petitioner merely try to pacify the

gathering of people and protect the local MLA however he was not

successful in his attempt and the people overpowered him.

[6] It is also submitted that on 16.12.2024, the OC, Kakching P.S

has submitted a report through the Ld. PP before the Court of Sessions

Judge, Thoubal. Relevant portion of the report reads as follows:

"Subject: Submission of prayer for rejecting/cancel the interim
Anticipatory Bail in r/o the accused Kahetrimayum
Amarjit Singh (28) 8/0 Kah. Ranjit Singh of Kakching
Irabot Pareng Kakching Makha Leikai.

Ref.: FIR No. 81(11)2024 KCG-PS U/s 132/133/3(5) BNS
added 109/351(3) BNS.

The brief fact of the case is that on 16/11/2024 at 08.50
pm, received a reliable information that the Hon'ble MLA
Mayanglambam Rameshwor Singh who had arrived at Kakching
Bazar area at about 07.30 pm to conduct public meeting with a
large group of people, numbering more than 1000 numbers had
confined manhandled and assaulted him during the public
gathering. On receipt of the information, a large security force led
by SP Kakching along with CO-8 MR, Addl. S&P (LO) & Ops, SDPO,
Kakching, OC-CDO, KCG-PS teams, and others rushed to Kakching
Bazar at Naohanlai Lampak and tried to rescue him from the huge
crowd. After prolong and hectic efforts, the police teams with the
assistance of some workers of the Hon'ble MLA and some public
rescued the Hon'ble MLA and brought him to a safer place. Hence
the case.

During the course of investigation of the case, examined the
complainant very carefully and minutely who fully corroborated with
the contents of the O.E and recorded his statement U/s 180 BNSS
in c/w the case. Visited and inspected the spot very carefully and
minutely, drawn a rough sketch map of the PO supported with
indices. Examined minutely the affected Hon'ble MLA and other
persona (PWs) who were targeted during the incident and recorded
their statements u/s 180 BNSS. During the investigation and from
the examination of the witnesses, it is learnt that the culprits/mob
made an attempt on the life of Hon'ble MLA. So, section 109 and
3510) BNS were also added in this case. Analyzed CCTV footages

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installed at different locations as well as viral videos, which were
circulated in different platforms, regarding the assault on Hon'ble
MLA Kakching. From the eye witnesses as well as the videos two
accused persons, namely Yengkhom Chandrasekhor Singh (53) Sia
(L) Y. Khelendro Singh Kakching Khunyai Indrani Pareng and
Wahengbom Samson Singh (33) S/o (L.) W. Manglem Singh Huikap
Mayai Leikai A/P Kakching Wairi near Kha-Manipur College Kakching
have already been arrested on 22 November 2024 and remanded
into judicial custody. From the Investigation conducted so far it has
been established the above two accused persons were involved in
the referred case FIR.

It was established from examination of important witness
(statement enclosed) that the said accused person (present
petitioner), namely Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh, aged about 28
years, S/O Ksh. Ranjit Singh, a resident of Kakching Irabot Pareng
Kakching Makha Leikai was present in the commission of the crime
and that he had led the mob in instigating and attacking the
Hon'ble MLA and those who tried to protect him. He was also sent
notice to appear before the investigation officer but he never
appeared for recording his statement. Instead he did not cooperate
and went into hiding so as to evade police action. From the analysis
of the video which also became viral (video enclosed), it was clearly
seen that Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh was the one who was very
aggressive and appeared with premeditated action to attack the
Hon'ble MLA and those who tried to protect him when the Hon'ble
MLA was trying to make public address at Kakching bazaar. His
actions had instigated many others present at the crime scene and
his actions had influenced others to attack the Hon'ble MLA and
those who tried to protect him. From the video it was clearly seen
that he had repeatedly made attempts to hurt the Hon'ble MLA,
which consequently led to chaos as well as fight, and many mob
members pelting stones at the Hon'ble MLA. Thus his custodial
interrogation is very much needed in the case as he is one of the
main accused person(s) who committed the present case in
discussion.

It is to be highlighted again that two accused persons, who
were involved in the case have already remanded into judicial
custody, and that those two accused persons were part of the chain
of events which this present petitioner initiated and instigated.

In the course of further investigation, received an extract
copy of the order dated 13/12/2024 under Cril. Misc. (AB) Case No.
65 of 2024 vide Memo No. S.J./TBL/2024/207 dated 13/12/2024 for
granting an interim pre-arrest bail to the accused person
Kshetrimayum Amarjit Singh (28) yrs S/o Kah. Ranjit Singh of
Kakching Irabot Pareng Kakching Makha Leikai and the order stated
that he was to appear on or before 15/12/2024. But he has not
appeared before the 10 of the case till date. His motive and action
remain questionable as he has decided to not cooperate with the
investigation.

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Considering the above facts and circumstances, the present
petitioner is very much needed for custodial interrogation so that
the investigation can proceed smoothly by extracting more
evidence and ascertain the origin as well as chain of the crime. He
has not cooperated with the investigation earlier or now and there
is high possibility that he would evade police action and go into
hiding in near future as well. Therefore, the Hon'ble court is prayed
to cancel his pre arrest bail so that justice can be done thorough
interrogation and detailed investigation. I would like to also state
that granting pre arrest bail to the said accused person will set a
bad precedent when his active involvement in this case is clearly
visible and established. His action of dishonoring and attacking a
constitutionally elected public representative by exploiting the
prevailing law and order situation, with hidden motive, does not
hold water in the eyes of law and in front of celebrated democracy
like ours.

Hence, I want to humbly submit before the Hon'ble court
again that the pre arrest of the present petitioner be rejected on
the above ground."

It is submitted that on the ground of the report, the Ld.

Sessions Judge, Thoubal rejected the Anticipatory Bail application of the

petitioner on 16.12.2024. Relevant portion of the order dated 16.12.2024

reads as follows:

"The petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail on 13.12.2024
and was directed to appear before the investigating authority not
later than 15.12.2024 and the investigating authority was directed
to furnish report before this Court on 16.12.2024 for hearing.
The IO of the case has submitted his report today, i.e.
16.12.2024 stating that the petitioner never turned up before the
investigating authority and do not follow the direction of the Court
by not co-operating with the investigating authority.
Ld. Addl. PP for the State prays for rejecting the present
application as the petitioner do not comply with the Court's
direction.
On being heard and after having perused, it is evident that
the petitioner did not comply with the Court's direction. Hence, the
interim bail granted to the petitioner on 13.12.2024 is hereby
rejected."

[7] It is also submitted that the personnel of Kakching Police

Station have been regularly visiting the residence of the petitioner with an

intention to cause harassment to the petitioner and arrest him in

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connection with the said FIR case. It is also submitted that under section

35(3) of BNSS, 2023 Notice of appearance before a Police Officer is to be

given to a person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made but

the act of the personnel of Kakching Police Station clearly violate the

relevant provisions of the Act i.e. BNSS, 2023.

[8] It is also submitted that the Court of JMFC, Kakching granted

bail to similarly situated persons in (i) Cril. Misc (Bail) Case No. 8 of 2024

(in connection with FIR No. 80(11)2024 KCG-PS) order dated 07.12.2024

and (ii) Cril. Misc (Bail) Case No. 13 of 2024 (in connection with FIR No.

81(11)2024 KCG-PS) order dated 16.12.2024.

[9] It is also submitted that the petitioner is ready to fully

cooperate with any investigation however being arrested and to be kept

under police custody will seriously affect not only the applicant but also his

family members which include his aged parent, wife and two minor children

including an infant. Furthermore, the applicant/petitioner is the sole

breadwinner of the family. Further, it is also submitted that in the event of

arrest, it will cause serious prejudice to the service career of the petitioner.

Hence, the present AB is filed.

[10] Mr. M. Rarry, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent strongly

objected to the prayer of the petitioner stating that the petitioner is not

entitled to grant the relief sought for in the present application keeping in

mind the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and relied upon

the following judgment in support of his case:

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Mayanglambam Prabha Devi v. State of Manipur and
others, 2022 SCC Online Mani 449- para 28

"28. In so far as the grant of refusal of the anticipatory bail, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 has laid
down the parameters as under:

"112. The following factors and parameters can be taken
into consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail:

(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation
and the exact role of the accused must be
properly comprehended before arrest is
made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant including
the fact as to whether the accused has
previously undergone imprisonment on
conviction by a court in respect of any
cognizable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from
justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood
to repeat similar or other offences;
(v) Where the accusations have been made
only with the object of injuring or
humiliating the applicant by arresting him
or her;
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail
particularly in cases of large magnitude
affecting a very large number of people;
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire
available material against the accused very
carefully. The court must also clearly
comprehend the exact role of the accused
in the case. The cases in which the
accused is implicated with the help of
Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code,
1860 the court should consider with even
greater care and caution because over
implication in the cases is a matter of
common knowledge and concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for grant of
anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck
between two factors, namely, no prejudice
should be caused to the free, fair and full
investigation and there should be
prevention of harassment, humiliation and
unjustified detention of the accused;
(ix) The court to consider reasonable
apprehension of tampering of the witness

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or apprehension of threat to the
complainant;
(x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be
considered and it is only the element of
genuineness that shall have to be
considered in the matter of grant of bail
and in the event of there being some
doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of
events, the accused is entitled to an order
of bail."

Srikant Upadhyay and others v. State of Bihar and another,
2024 SCC Online SC 282- para 16, 21, 24.

21. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat
High Court that filing of an anticipatory bail through an advocate
would not and could not be treated as appearance before a court
by a person against whom such proceedings, as mentioned above
are instituted. The meaning of the term "absconded" has been dealt
by us hereinbefore. We found that its etymological and original
sense is that the accused is hiding himself. What is required as
proof for absconding is the evidence to the effect that the person
concerned was knowing that he was wanted and also about
pendency of warrant of arrest. A detailed discussion is not
warranted in this case to understand that the appellants were
actually absconding. It is not in dispute that they were served with
the "summons". The fact that bailable warrants were issued against
them on 12.04.2022 is also not disputed, as the appellants
themselves have produced the order whereunder bailable warrants
were issued against them. We have already referred to Section 70
(2), Cr. P.C. which would reveal the position that once a warrant is
issued it would remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court
which issued it or until its execution. There is no case for the
appellants that either of such events had occurred in this case to
make the warrants unenforceable. They also got no case that their
application was interfered with by a higher Court. That apart, it is a
fact that the appellants themselves on 23.08.2022, moved a bail-
cum-surrender application before the Trial Court but withdrew the

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same fearing arrest. It is also relevant to note that in the case on
hand even while contending that they were before a Court, the
appellants got no case that in terms of the provisions under Section
438 (1-B), Cr. P.C. an order for their presence before the Court was
ordered either suomotu by the Court or on an application by the
public prosecutor. When that be the circumstance, the appellants
cannot be allowed to contend that they were not hiding or
concealing themselves from arrest or that they were not knowing
that they were wanted in a Court of law.

24. There can be no room for raising a contention that when an
application is filed for anticipatory ball, it cannot be adjourned-
without passing an order of Interim protection. A bare perusal of
Section 438 (1), Cr. P.C., would reveal that taking into consideration
the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the
application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of
anticipatory ball. The proviso thereunder would reveal that if the
High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not
pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the
application for grant of anticipatory ball, it shall be open to an
officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned
without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in
such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.
P.C., it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the
matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application,
it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory
bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an
application without passing an interim order. This question was
considered in detail by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay,
in the decision in ShrenikJ ayantilal Jain v. State of Maharashtra
Through EOW Unit II, Mumbai and answered as above and we are
in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no
statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be
heard to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in
November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing
interim order. At any rate, the said application was rejected on
04.04.2023. Pending the application for anticipatory ball, in the
absence of an interim protection, if a police officer can arrest the
accused concerned how can it be contented that the court which
issued summons on account of non-obedience to comply with its
order for appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot
proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr..
P.C., merely because of the pendency of an application for
anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the same would be
adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact and consequences of
issuance of warrant for arrest and also from the issuance of
proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C., by filing successive
applications for anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, and in the
absence of any statutory prohibition and further, taking note of the
position of law which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant
for anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory bail
the matter is adjourned but no interim order was passed. We have

Page
10
no hesitation to answer the question posed for consideration in the
negative. In other words, it is made clear that in the absence of any
interim order, pendency of an application for anticipatory bail shall
not bar the Trial Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for
proclamation and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr. P.C., In
accordance with law."

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 1 SCC 694- para 112

"112. The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court,
namely that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit
himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail.
This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438
Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the 57 Constitution. The
test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to
custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his
personal liberty."

Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar and another, (2012) 4
SCC 379- para 19

"19. The case at hand, if considered in the light of the aforesaid
settled legal proposition, we reach an inescapable conclusion that
the High Court did not apply any of the aforesaid parameters,
rather dealt with a very serious matter in a most casual and cavalier
manner and showed underserving and unwarranted sympathy
towards the accused."

Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors vs. State of Punjab ,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 - para 12

"12. We find ourselves unable to accept, in their totality, the
submissions Full Bench of the High Court has engrafted on the
power conferred by Section 438. Clause (1) of Section 438 is
couched in terms, broad and unqualified. By any known canon of
construction, words of width and amplitude ought not generally to
be cut down s to read into the language so as of the statute
restraints and conditions which the legislature itself did not think it
proper or necessary to impose. This is especially true when the
statutory provision which falls for consideration is designed to
secure a valuable right like the right to personal freedom and
involves the application of a presumption as salutary and deep
grained in our criminal jurisprudence as the presumption of
innocence. Though the right to apply for anticipatory bail was
conferred for the first time by Section 438, while enacting that
provision the legislature was not writing on a clean slate in the
sense of taking an unprecedented step, insofar as the right to apply
for bail is concerned. It had before it two cognate provisions of the
Code: Section 437 which deals with the power of courts other than

Page
11
the Court of Session and the High Court to grant bail in non-bailable
cases and Section 439 which deals with the "special powers" of the
High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail. The whole of
Section 437 is riddled and hedged in by restrictions on the power of
certain courts to grant bail. That section reads thus:

437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.-
(1) When any person accused of or suspected of the
commission of any non- bailable offence is arrested or
detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police
station or appears or is brought before a court other than the
High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail,
but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable
grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life:

Provided that the court may direct that any person under the
age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm
person accused of such an offence be released on bail:

Provided further that the mere fact that an accused person
may be required for being identified by witnesses during
investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to
grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on with
such directions ball and gives an as may undertaking that he
be given by the court.

(2) If it appears to such officer or court at any stage of the
investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there
are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has
committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient
grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall,
pending such inquiry, be released on ball, or, at the discretion
of such officer or court, on the execution by him of a bond
without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.

(3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission
of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter
VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or
abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such
offence, is released on ball under sub. section (1), the court
may impose any condition which the court considers
necessary-
(a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in
accordance with the conditions of the bond
executed under this Chapter, or
(b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit
an offence similar to the offence of which he is
accused or of the commission of which he is
suspected, or
(c) otherwise in the interests of justice.

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(4) An officer or a court releasing any person on bail under
sub- section (1) or sub-section (.), shall record in writing his
or its reasons for so doing.
(5) Any court which has released a person on bail under
sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), may, if it considers it
necessary so to do, direct that such person be arrested and
commit him to custody.
(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a
person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded
within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for
taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in
custody during the whole of the said period, be released on
bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons
to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.
(7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a
person accused of a non-bailable offence and before
judgment is delivered, the court is of opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not
guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he
is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without
sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.
Section 439(1)(a) incorporates the conditions mentioned in Section
437(3) if the offence in respect of which the bail is sought is of the
nature specified in that sub-section. Section 439 reads thus:
439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding
bail.- (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct-

(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be
released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature
specified in sub-section (3) which it of Section 437, may
Impose any condition which it considers necessary for the
purposes mentioned that sub-section.
(b) that any condition Imposed by a Magistrate when
reloading any person on ball be set aside or modified :
Provided that the High Court or the Court of Beaton shall, before
granting ball in a person who is accused of an offence which i
exclusively by or which, thought not to triable, punishable with
imprisonment for life, give notice of the application Public
Prosecutor unless it is for reasons to be recorded in writing, of
opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice,
(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that say person
who has been released on ball under this Chapter be arrested and
commit him to custody.
The provisions of Sections 437 and 439 furnished a convenient
model for the legislature to copy while enacting Section 490. If it
has not done so and has departed from a pattern which could easily
be adopted with the necessary modifications, it would be wrong to
refuse to give to the departure its full effect by assuming that it was

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not intended to serve any particular or specific purpose. The
departure in our opinion, was made advisedly and purposefully
Advisedly, at least in part, because of the 41st Report of the Law
Commission which, while pointing out the necessity of Introducing a
provision in the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of
Session to grant anticipatory ball, said in paragraph 39.9 that it had
"considered carefully the question of laying down in the stature
certain conditions under which alone anticipatory ball could be
granted" but had come to the conclusion that the question of
granting such ball should be left "to the discretion of the court" and
ought not to be fettered by the statutory provision itself, since the
discretion was being conferred upon superior courts which were
expected to exercise it judicially. The legislature conferred a wide
discretion on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant
anticipatory bail because it evidently felt, firstly, that it would be
difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail
should or should not be granted and secondly, because the
intention was to allow the higher courts in the echelon a somewhat
free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail.
That is why, departing the terms of Sections 437 and 439, Section
438(1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of
Session "may, If it thinks fit" direct that the applicant be released
on bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer
manifestation of the same legislative Intent to confer a wide
discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. It provides that the
High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the
grant of anticipatory ball, "may include such conditions in such
directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may
think fit", including the conditions which are set out in clauses (i) to
(iv) of sub-section. (2).The proof of legislative Intent Can best be
found in the language which the legislature uses. Ambiguities can
undoubtedly be resolved by resort to extraneous aids but words, as
wide and explicit as have been used in Section 438, must be given
their full effect, especially when to refuse to do so will result in
undue impairment of the freedom of the individual and the
presumption of innocence. It has to be borne in mind that
anticipatory ball is sought when there is a mere apprehension of
arrest on the accusation that the applicant has committed a non-
bailable offence. A person who has yet to lose his freedom by being
arrested asks for freedom in the event of arrest. That is the stage
at which it is imperative to protect his freedom, insofar as one may,
and to give full play to the presumption that he is innocent. In fact,
the stage at which anticipatory bail is generally sought brings about
its striking dissimilarity with the situation in which a person who is
arrested for the commission of a non-bailable offence asks for bail.
In the latter situation, adequate data is available to the court, or
can be called for by it, in the light of which it can grant or refuse
relief and while granting it, modify it by the imposition of all or any
of the conditions mentioned in Section 437.

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14
[11] Learned counsel of the petitioner relied upon the following

judgments in support of his case:

1. Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.
and others, (2003) 2 SCC 111 - Para 59
"59. A decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is
decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also
well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may
make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision."

2. Priya Indoria v. State of Karnataka and others,
(2024) 4 SCC 749- para 39,44, 46, 50
"39. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab ("Gurbaksh Singh
Sebia"), a Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through
Chandrachud, CJ., observed that society has a vital stake in
preserving personal liberty as well as investigational powers of the
police and their relative importance at any given time depends upon
the complexion and restraints of political conditions. How best to
balance these interests while determining the scope of Section 438
CrPC was the focus of the said case while dealing with the historical
background of the said provision.
44. The concept of "anticipatory bail" was clearly explicated vide the
41st Law Commission Report year 1969, whereby the Law
Commission observed as such:
"39.9. Anticipatory bail. The suggestion for directing the
release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly
known as "anticipatory bail") was carefully considered by us.
Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power
of a court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that
there is no such power under the existing provisions of the
Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises
mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate
their rivals in false causes for the purpose of disgracing them
or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for
some days. In recent times, with the accentuation of political
rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase.
Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds
for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to
abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there
seems no justification to require him first to submit to
custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for
bail.
We recommend the acceptance of this suggestion. We are
further of the view that this special power should be conferred
only on the High Court and the Court of Session, and that the
order should take effect at the time of arrest or thereafter."
(emphasis added by us)

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15
46. Observing that the crimes, the criminals and even the
complainants can occasionally possess s extraordinary features, in
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia it was stated that "[w]hen the even flow of
life becomes turbid, the police can be called upon to inquire into
charges arising out of political antagonism" The powerful processes
of criminal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous
ends. Attendant upon such investigations, when the police are not
free agents within their sphere harassment and humiliation that of
duty, is a great amount of inconvenience, can even take the form of
the parading of a respectable person in handcuffs, apparently on
way to a court of justice. The d foul deed is done when an
adversary is exposed osed to social ridicule and obloquy, no matter
when and whether a conviction is secured or is at all possible. It is
in order to meet such situations, though not limited to these
contingencies, that the power to grant anticipatory bail was
introduced into the Code of 1973.
50. Thereafter, the law anticipatory bail was further crystallised by
on the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia
16, where it disagreed with the reasoning of the Full Bench19 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court. It was observed that since the
denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court
should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on
the scope of Section 438 CrPC, especially when not imposed by the
legislature in terms of the Section. It was observed that Section 438
CrPC is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal
liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his
application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect
of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous infusion c of constraints
and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 CrPC can
make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to
personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with
unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in
Section 438 CrPC must be saved, not jettisoned."
However, the learned counsel for the respondent contradicts
the reliance made by the petitioner in support of his case saying
that in the facts and circumstance of the case preserving personal
liberty and restraining the investigational powers of the police does
not arise at all.
3. Sushila Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi)
and another, (2020) 5 SCC 1- para 7.2
"7.2. While considering the issues referred to a larger Bench,
referred to hereinabove, the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia is required to be referred to and
considered in detail. The matter before the Constitution Bench in
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia arose out of the decision of the Full Bench of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court rejected the
application for bail after summarising, what according to it was the
true legal position, thus: (Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case, SCC pp. 576-
77, para 11)

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16
"(1) The power under Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code,
is of an extraordinary character and must be exercised
sparingly in exceptional cases only;
(2) Neither Section 438 nor any other provision of the Code
authorises 9 the grant of blanket anticipatory bail for
offences not yet committed or with regard to accusations
not so far levelled.
(3) The said power is not unguided or uncanalised but all
the limitations imposed in the preceding Section 437, are
implicit therein and must be read into Section 438.
(4) In addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 437,
the petitioner must make out a special case for the exercise
of the power to grant anticipatory bail.
(5) Where a legitimate case for the remand of the offender
to the police custody under Section 167(2) can be made out
by the investigating agency or a reasonable claim to secure
incriminating material from information likely to be received
from the offender under Section 27 of the Evidence Act can
be made out, the power under Section 438 should not be
exercised.
(6) The discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised
with regard to offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life unless the court at that very stage is
satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or
groundless.
(7) The larger interest of the public and State demand that
in serious cases like economic offences involving blatant
corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and political
power, the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should
not be exercised; and
(8) Mere general allegations of mala fides in the petition are
inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials before
it that the allegations of mala fides are substantial and the
accusation appears to be false and groundless."

The learned counsel for the respondent contradicts the

reliance made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

4. Satish v. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 509- para 1 - 3.

"1. Application for impleadment/intervention is rejected. Leave
granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 16-9-
2011 passed in the anticipatory bail application by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Satish v. State of Haryana.
The High Court has rejected the application for anticipatory bail.

Page
17
3. This Court, on 31-10-20112, while issuing notice, has ordered for
the release of the appellant on his furnishing the personal bond of
Rs 20,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of
the investigating officer, subject to the condition that he will join
the investigation as and when required and shall abide by the
provisions of Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. In our opinion, the aforesaid order should be made absolute
and is made absolute. The appeal is disposed of accordingly."

5. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors vs State of Punjab ,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 - para 10, 11

"10. Shri V. M. Tarkunde, appearing on behalf of some of the
appellants, while supporting the contentions of the other appellants,
said that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal
liberty, courts should lean against the imposition of unnecessary
restrictions on the scope of Section 438, when no such restrictions
are imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. The
learned counsel added a new dimension to the argument by
invoking Article 21 of the Constitution. He urged that Section 438 is
a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty
of an individual who has not been convicted of the offence in
respect of which he seeks bail and who must therefore be
presumed to be innocent. The validity of that section must
accordingly be examined by the test of fairness and reasonableness
which is implicit in Article 21. If the legislature itself were to impose
an unreasonable restriction on the grant of anticipatory bail, such a
restriction could have been struck down as being violative of Article
21. Therefore, while determining the scope of Section 438, the
court should not impose any unfair or unreasonable limitation on
the individual's right to obtain an order of anticipatory bail.
Imposition of an unfair or unreasonable limitation, according to the
learned counsel, would be violative of Article 21, irrespective of
whether it is imposed by legislation or by judicial decision.
11. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected
the appellants' applications for bail after summarising, what
according to it is the true legal position, thus:
(1) The power under Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, is
of an extraordinary character and must be exercised
sparingly in exceptional cases only;
(2) Neither Section 438 nor any other provision of the Code
authorises the grant of blanket anticipatory bail for
offences not yet com- mitred or with regard to accusations
not so far levelled.
(3) The said power is not unguided or uncanalised but all the
limitations imposed in the preceding Section 437. are
implicit therein and must be read into Section 438.
(4) In addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 137, the
petitioner must make out a special case for the exercise of
the power to grant anticipatory ball.

Page
18
(5) Where a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to
the police custody under Section 167 (2) can be made out
by the investigating agency or a reasonable claim to secure
incriminating material from information likely to be
received from the offender under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act can be made out, the power under Section
438 should not be exercised.
(6) The discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised with
regard to offences punishable with death or imprisonment
for life unless the court at that very stage is satisfied that
such a charge appears to be false or groundless,
(7) The larger interest of the public and State demand that in
serious cases like economic offences involving blatant
corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and political
power, the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should
not be exercised; and
(8) Mere general allegations of mala fides in the petition are
inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials
before it that the allegations of mala fides are substantial
and the accusation appears to be false and groundless.
It was urged before the Full Bench that the appellants were men of
substance and position who were hardly likely to abscond and
would be prepared willingly to face trial. This argument was
rejected with the observation that to accord differential treatment
to the appellants on account of their status will amount to negation
of the concept of equality before the law and that it could hardly be
contended that every man of status, who was intended to be
charged with serious crimes, including the one under Section 409,
IPC which was punishable with life imprisonment, "was entitled to
knock at the door of the court for anticipatory bail". The possession
of high status, according to the Full Bench, is not only an irrelevant
consideration for granting anticipatory bail but is, if anything, an
aggravating circumstance."

6. Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar &Anr (2014) 8 SCC
273 - para 5
"5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars
forever. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle
between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police
has not learnt its lesson: the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC.
It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of
Independence, it is largely considered Cas a tool of harassment,
oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need
for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been
emphasised time and again by the courts but has not yielded
desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance
so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the
power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption.
The attitude to arrest first and then d proceed with the rest is
despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who
lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive."

Page
19
7. Criminal Major Acts.
8. Criminal Manual (2022).
9. The Constitution of India.

[12] Perused the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the above citations made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and

also the reliance made in the above mentioned Acts & Rules, this Court is

of the view that considering the nature of case and the facts and

circumstances as set out by the petitioner and respondents and discussion

and observation made by this Court, this Court is of the view that the

Hon'ble Supreme Court's observation made herein above are not

maintainable/reliable in the petitioner's case.

[13] Mention is made here that due to apprehension of arrest the

petitioner filed AB before the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal. The Ld. Sessions

Judge, interim relief with the following conditions;

With condition to appear before the I.O. of the case on or

before 15.12.2024.

[14] Thereafter, the Ld. Sessions Judge after getting the bail

objection report and after hearing both sides rejected the earlier interim

bail order was rejected with the following observations:

Page
20
"The petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail on 13.12.2024
and was directed to appear before the investigating authority not
later than 15.12.2024 and the investigating authority was directed
to furnish report before this Court on 16.12.2024 for hearing.
The IO of the case has submitted his report today, i.e.
16.12.2024 stating that the petitioner never turned up before the
investigating authority and do not follow the direction of the Court
by not co-operating with the investigating authority.
Ld. Addl. PP for the State prays for rejecting the present
application as the petitioner do not comply with the Court's
direction.
On being heard and after having perused, it is evident that
the petitioner did not comply with the Court's direction. Hence, the
interim bail granted to the petitioner on 13.12.2024 is hereby
rejected."

[15] The relevant sections in the present case are 132/133/3(5)

BNSS added Sec: 109/351(3) BNSS, 2023. As per the law laid down in the

provisions, the alleged sections made in the present are serious in nature

and on top of that the nature of allegation set out in the prosecution case

as extracted above, the offence alleged against the accused/petitioner is of

serious in nature. For this matter, this Court is relying on the guidelines set

out in the above mentioned citations which were reproduced hereinabove.

Mayanglambam Prabha Devi v. State of Manipur and
others, 2022 SCC Online Mani 449- para 28
"28. In so far as the grant of refusal of the anticipatory bail, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 has laid
down the parameters as under:

"112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into
consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail:
(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact
role of the accused must be properly comprehended
before arrest is made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as
to whether the accused has previously undergone
imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of
any cognizable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat
similar or other offences;

Page
21
(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the
object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by
arresting him or her;
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases
of large magnitude affecting a very large number of
people;
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material
against the accused very carefully. The court must also
clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in
the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated
with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal
Code, 1860 the court should consider with even
greater care and caution because over implication in
the cases is a matter of common knowledge and
concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory
bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors,
namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair
and full investigation and there should be prevention
of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of
the accused;
(ix) The court to consider reasonable apprehension of
tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to
the complainant;
(x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall
have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail
and in the event of there being some doubt as to the
genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course
of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail."

Srikant Upadhyay and others v. State of Bihar and another,
2024 SCC Online SC 282- para 16, 21, 24.

"16. The core contention of the appellants is that the rejection of
the application for anticipatory bail without considering the
application on merits for the reason of issuance of proclamation
under Section 82, Cr.P.C., is unsustainable. It is the further
contended that at no stage, the appellants were "evading the
arrest" or "absconding" but were only exercising their legal right to
seek anticipatory bail. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants raised the
contention that when an application for anticipatory bail is pending,
the issuance of proclamation, following issuance of non-bailable
warrant could not be a reason for non-considering the application
for anticipatory bail on merits.
21. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat
High Court that filing of an anticipatory bail through an advocate
would not and could not be treated as appearance before a court
by a person against whom such proceedings, as mentioned above
are instituted. The meaning of the term "absconded" has been dealt

Page
22
by us hereinbefore. We found that its etymological and original
sense is that the accused is hiding himself. What is required as
proof for absconding is the evidence to the effect that the person
concerned was knowing that he was wanted and also about
pendency of warrant of arrest. A detailed discussion is not
warranted in this case to understand that the appellants were
actually absconding. It is not in dispute that they were served with
the "summons". The fact that bailable warrants were issued against
them on 12.04.2022 is also not disputed, as the appellants
themselves have produced the order whereunder bailable warrants
were issued against them. We have already referred to Section 70
(2), Cr. P.C. which would reveal the position that once a warrant is
issued it would remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court
which issued it or until its execution. There is no case for the
appellants that either of such events had occurred in this case to
make the warrants unenforceable. They also got no case that their
application was interfered with by a higher Court. That apart, it is a
fact that the appellants themselves on 23.08.2022, moved a bail-
cum-surrender application before the Trial Court but withdrew the
same fearing arrest. It is also relevant to note that in the case on
hand even while contending that they were before a Court, the
appellants got no case that in terms of the provisions under Section
438 (1-B), Cr. P.C. an order for their presence before the Court was
ordered either suo motu by the Court or on an application by the
public prosecutor. When that be the circumstance, the appellants
cannot be allowed to contend that they were not hiding or
concealing themselves from arrest or that they were not knowing
that they were wanted in a Court of law.
24. There can be no room for raising a contention that when an
application is filed for anticipatory ball, it cannot be adjourned-
without passing an order of Interim protection. A bare perusal of
Section 438 (1), Cr. P.C., would reveal that taking into consideration
the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the
application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of
anticipatory ball. The proviso thereunder would reveal that if the
High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not
pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the
application for grant of anticipatory ball, it shall be open to an
officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned
without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in
such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.
P.C., it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the
matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application,
it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory
bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an
application without passing an interim order. This question was
considered in detail by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay,
in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal Jain v. State of Maharashtra
Through EOW Unit II, Mumbai and answered as above and we are
in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no
statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be

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23
heard to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in
November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing
interim order. At any rate, the said application was rejected on
04.04.2023. Pending the application for anticipatory ball, in the
absence of an interim protection, if a police officer can arrest the
accused concerned how can it be contented that the court which
issued summons on account of non-obedience to comply with its
order for appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot
proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr..
P.C., merely because of the pendency of an application for
anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the same would be
adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact and consequences of
issuance of warrant for arrest and also from the issuance of
proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C., by filing successive
applications for anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, and in the
absence of any statutory prohibition and further, taking note of the
position of law which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant
for anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory bail
the matter is adjourned but no interim order was passed. We have
no hesitation to answer the question posed for consideration in the
negative. In other words, it is made clear that in the absence of any
interim order, pendency of an application for anticipatory bail shall
not bar the Trial Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for
proclamation and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr. P.C., In
accordance with law."

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC

379, the Hon'ble Apex Court elucidated the principles for consideration of

grant of anticipatory bail, which are as under:

"19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence
are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief,
the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be
granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima
facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the
crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v.
P.T. Manokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434, State of Maharashtra v. Mohd.
Sajid Hussain, (2008) 1 SCC 213, and Union of India v. Padam
Narain Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305)."

[16] Considering the guidelines set out in the above mentioned

Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgments, this Court is of the view that the

nature and allegations made in the present prosecution case alleged

against the accused/petitioner is of such a serious offence that the present

Page
24
case is squarely covered by the observation made herein above by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court because:

(i) The alleged offences made in the FIR are serious in
nature.
(ii) After getting the interim order from the Sessions
Judge, Thoubal, the present accused/petitioner failed
to comply with the conditions imposed in the said bail
order.
(iii) As per the accusation made in the FIR and nature of
the facts mentioned therein does not seem that the
object of the police for trying to arrest does not seem
to be for injury or humiliating the accused/petitioner.

Considering the prayer of the petitioner, the balance is in

favour of the prosecution to conduct free, fair and full investigation.

[17] On over all analysis of the materials produced by both sides,

this Court is of the view that considering the nature and gravity of the

offence leveled against the petitioner, this Court is of the view that granting

anticipatory bail to the petitioner who is not cooperating with the

investigation is in-appropriate.

[18] As per the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner, the accused/petitioner is ready to fully cooperate with any

investigation. However, being arrested and to be kept under police custody

will seriously affect not only the petitioner but also his family members,

which includes his aged parents, wife and two minor children including an

infant. The petitioner who is an employee of HDFC Bank Limited in the

Page
25
event of arrest, it will cause serious prejudice to the service career of

humble applicant.

[19] As per the prosecution and as mentioned in the bail objection

report and as reflected in the order of the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal, the

petitioner/accused did not/never appear before the I.O. of the case inspite

of the conditions put forth in the bail order of the Ld. Sessions Judge,

Thoubal. After going through the above mentioned development other

than the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the conditions

imposed on the petitioner/accused by the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal

while granting interim bail, this Court is of the considered view that the

petitioner violated the directions of the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal.

[20] As discussed earlier and as reflected in the order of the Ld.

Sessions Judge, Thoubal the interim protection was granted till 16.12.2024,

the accused/petitioner if at all desired to assist the investigation of the case

he should have visit the police station in subsequent days. In these

circumstances, this Court is of the view that the accused/petitioner

violated/disobeyed the condition put forth by the Ld. Sessions Judge,

Thoubal in this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the catena of

judgment observed as thus.

[21] In Srikant Upadhay and others vs. State of Bihar & Another,

[(2024) SCC Online SC 282], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:

"10. When a Court grants anticipatory bail what it actually does
is only to make an order that in the event of arrest, the arrestee
shall be released on bail, subject to the terms and conditions.
Taking note of the fact the said power is to be exercised in
exceptional circumstances and that it may cause some hindrance to
the normal flow of investigation method when called upon to

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26
exercise the power under section 438, Cr.P.C., courts must keep
reminded of the position that law aides only the abiding and
certainly not its resistant. By saying so, we mean that a person,
having subjected to investigation on a serious offence and upon
making out a case, is included in a charge sheet or even after filing
of a refer report, later, in accordance with law, the Court issues a
summons to a person, he is bound to submit himself to the
authority of law. It only mean that though he will still be at liberty,
rather, in his right, to take recourse to the legal remedies available
only in accordance with law, but not in its defiance. We will dilate
this discussion with reference to the factual matrix of this case.
However, we think that before dealing with the same, a small
deviation to have a glance at the scope and application of the
provisions under Section 82, Cr.P.C. will not be inappropriate.
16. The core contention of the appellants is that the rejection of
the application for anticipatory bail without considering the
application on merits for the reason of issuance of proclamation
under Section 82, Cr.P.C., is unsustainable. It is the further
contended that at no stage, the appellants were "evading the
arrest" or "absconding" but were only exercising their legal right to
seek anticipatory bail. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants raised the
contention that when an application for anticipatory bail is pending,
the issuance of proclamation, following issuance of nonbailable
warrant could not be a reason for non-considering the application
for anticipatory bail on merits.
18. Section 70 (2), Cr.P.C. mandates that every warrant issued
under Section 70(1), Cr.P.C. shall remain in force until it is cancelled
by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed. In this case, as
noticed hereinbefore, the bailable warrants and thereafter the non-
bailable warrants, were issued against the appellants. They were
neither cancelled by the Trial Court nor they were executed. It is
not their case that they have successfully challenged them. Sections
19, 20, 21, 174 and 174 A, IPC assume relevance in this context.
They insofar as relevant read thus:
19. "Judge". The word "Judge" denotes not only every person
who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person who is
empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal,
a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against,
would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some
other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body or
persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a
judgment.
20. "Court of Justice". The words "Court of Justice" denote a
Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of
Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when
a Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially.
21 "Public servant". The words "public servant denote a person
falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:-

Page
27
[Third-Every Judge including any person empowered by law to
discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of
persons, any adjudicatory functions:]
3/4. Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant.
Whoever, being legally bound to attend in person or by an agent at
a certain place and time in obedience to a summons, notice, order,
or proclamation proceeding from any public servant legally
competent, as such public servant, to issue the same, intentionally
omits to attend at that place or time, or departs from the place
where he is bound to attend before the time at which it is lawful for
him to depart, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both,or, if the summons,
notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent in a
Court of Justice, with simple imprisonment for a ferm which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.
174A. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section
82 of Act 2 of 1974. Whoever fails to appear at the specified place
and the specified time as required by a proclamation published
under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine or with both, and where a
declaration has been made under sub-section (4) of that section
pronouncing him as a proclaimed offender, he shall be punished
with Imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine.
19. Taking note of the aforesaid facts with respect to the
issuance of summons, warrants and subsequently the proclamation,
a conjoint reading of Sections 19, 20 and 21, IPC containing the
terms "Judge", "Court of Justice" and "Public Servant" and Sections
174 and 174A, IPC can make them liable even to face further
proceedings. Same is the position in case of non-attendance in
obedience to proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C.
20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid provisions and position, we
will refer to certain relevant decisions. In Savitaben Govindbhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat, the High Court of Gujarat observed thus:-
"9. Filing of an Anticipatory Ball Application by the petitioners-
accused through their advocate cannot be said to be an
appearance of the petitioners-accused in a competent Court, so
far as proceeding initiated under Section 82/83 of the Code is
concerned: otherwise each absconding accused would try to
create shelter by filing an Anticipatory Bail Application to avoid
obligation to appear before the court and raises the proceeding
under Section 83 of the Code claiming that he cannot be
termed as an absconder in the eve of law. Physical appearance
before the Court is most important, if relevant scheme of
Sections 82 and 83, is read closely."
(underline supplied)

Page
28
21. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat
High Court that filing of an anticipatory bail through an advocate
would not and could not be treated as appearance before a court
by a person against whom such proceedings, as mentioned above
are instituted. The meaning of the term "absconded" has been dealt
by us hereinbefore. We found that its etymological and original
sense is that the accused is hiding himself. What is required as
proof for absconding is the evidence to the effect that the person
concerned was knowing that he was wanted and also about
pendency of warrant of arrest. A detailed discussion is not
warranted in this case to understand that the appellants were
actually absconding. It is not in dispute that they were served with
the "summons". The fact that bailable warrants were issued against
them on 12.04.2022 is also not disputed, as the appellants
themselves have produced the order whereunder bailable warrants
were issued against them. We have already referred to Section 70
(2), Cr. P.C. which would reveal the position that once a warrant is
issued it would remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court
which issued it or until its execution. There is no case for the
appellants that either of such events had occurred in this case to
make the warrants unenforceable. They also got no case that their
application was Interfered with by a higher Court. That apart, it is a
fact that the appellants themselves on 23.08.2022, moved a bail-
cum-surrender application before the Trial Court but withdrew the
same fearing arrest. It is also relevant to note that in the case on
hand even while contending that they were before a Court, the
appellants got no case that in terms of the provisions under Section
438 (1-B), Cr. P.C. an order for their presence before the Court was
ordered either suo motu by the Court or on an application by the
public prosecutor. When that be the circumstance, the appellants
cannot be allowed to contend that they were not hiding or
concealing themselves from arrest or that they were not knowing
that they were wanted in a Court of law.
24. There can be no room for raising a contention that when an
application is filed for anticipatory ball, it cannot be adjourned-
without passing an order of Interim protection. A bare perusal of
Section 438 (1), Cr. P.C., would reveal that taking into consideration
the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the
application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of
anticipatory ball. The proviso thereunder would reveal that if the
High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not
pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the
application for grant of anticipatory ball, it shall be open to an
officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned
without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in
such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.
P.C., it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the
matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application,
it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory
bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an

Page
29
application without passing an interim order. This question was
considered in detall by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay,
in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal Jain v. State of Maharashtra
Through EOW Unit II, Mumbai and answered as above and we are
in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no
statutory inhibition forarrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be heard
to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in
November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing
interim order. At any rate, the said application was rejected on
04.04.2023. Pending the application for anticipatory ball, in the
absence of an interim protection, if a police officer can arrest the
accused concerned how can it be contented that the court which
issued summons on account of non-obedience to comply with its
order for appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot
proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr..
P.C., merely because of the pendency of an application for
anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the same would be
adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact and consequences of
issuance of warrant for arrest and also from the issuance of
proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C., by filing successive
applications for anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, and in the
absence of any statutory prohibition and further, taking note of the
position of law which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant
for anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory bail
the matter is adjourned but no interim order was passed. We have
no hesitation to answer the question posed for consideration in the
negative. In other words, it is made clear that in the absence of any
interim order, pendency of an application for anticipatory bail shall
not bar the Trial Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for
proclamation and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr. P.C., In
accordance with law.
25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory
bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held
that ball is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be
the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious
and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said
power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of
interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may
lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a
great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of
the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the
Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of
such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the
freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say
that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate,
when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is
not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will
not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in
extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. But then,

Page
30
person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep absconding is not
entitled to...."

[22] In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), [(2020) 5 SCC

1], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:

"34. It was argued that undoubtedly violation of a condition
imposed in an order passed under Section 438 can lead to a
direction of arrest under Section 439(2). However, the scope of
Section 439(2) is not limited to only cancellation of bail. The
counsel stated that this proposition of law was considered by this
Court in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, 2016 SCC Online Jhar
3254. In this case, this Court while considering an earlier judgment
in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 332
held that by virtue of Sections 437(5) and 439(2), a direction to
take a person into custody could be passed despite his being
released on bail, by a previous order. The Court held that under
Sections 437(5) and 439(2) a person could be directed to be taken
into custody without necessarily cancelling his earlier bail. The
difference between cancellation of bail and a direction to take a
person into custody under Section 439(2) was recognised. It was
also held in this case that if a graver offence is added to the FIR or
to the case after the person has been granted bail, a direction
under Section 439(2) or 437(5) is required before such person can
be arrested again for the new offences added to the case.
Therefore, this Court recognised the need for the court's
supervision after the bail had been granted.
............................................................................................................

………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………

68. The imposition of conditions under Section 438(2) with
reference to Section 437(3), in the opinion of this Court, is enough
safeguard for the authorities — including the police and other
investigating agencies, who have to investigate into crimes and the
possible complicity of the applicants who seek such relief. Taking
each concern i.e. the addition of more serious offences; presence of
a large number of individuals or complainants; possibility of non-
cooperation — non-cooperation in the investigation or the
requirement of the accused’s statement to aid the recovery of
articles and incriminating articles in the course of statements made
during investigations — it is noticeable, significantly, that each of
these is contemplated as a condition and is invariably included in
every order granting anticipatory bail. In the event of violation or
alleged violation of these, the authority concerned is not remediless
: recourse can be had to Section 438(2) read with Section 437(3).
Any violation of these terms would attract a direction to arrest him.
This power or direction to arrest is found in Section 437(5).
However, that provision has no textual application to regular bail
granted by the Court of Session or High Courts under Section 439

Page
31
or directions not to arrest i.e. order of anticipatory bail under
Section 438. Secondly, Section 439(2) which is cast in wide terms,
adequately covers situations when an accused does not cooperate
during the investigation or threatens to, or intimidates witness[es]
or tries to tamper with other evidence.

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………

77.4. At the same time, however, at any time during the
investigation were any occasion to arise calling for intervention of
the court for infraction of any of the conditions imposed under
Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) or the violation of any
other condition imposed in the given facts of a case, recourse can
always be had under Section 439(2).

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………

85.8. It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move
the court concerned, which granted anticipatory bail, in the first
instance, for a direction under Section 439(2) to arrest the accused,
in the event of violation of any term, such as absconding, non-
cooperating during investigation, evasion, intimidation or
inducement to witnesses with a view to influence outcome of the
investigation or trial, etc. The court, in this context, is the court
which grants anticipatory bail, in the first instance, according to
prevailing authorities.”

[23] In Himanshu Sharma v. State of M.P., [(2024) 4 SCC 222]

the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that:

“11. Law is well settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this
Court that the considerations for grant of bail and cancellation
thereof are entirely different. Bail granted to an accused can only
be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on
bail:

(a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him;

(b) flouted the conditions of bail order;

(c) that the bail was granted in ignorance of statutory
provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant
bail;

(d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or
fraud.”

[24] In Puran v. Rambilas, [(2001) 6 SCC 338] the Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed that:

Page
32
“10. Mr Lalit next submitted that once bail has been granted it
should not be cancelled unless there is evidence that the conditions
of bail are being infringed. In support of this submission he relies
upon the authority in the case of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1995) 1 SCC 349. In this case it has been held that rejection of bail
in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail
already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different
basis. It has been held that very cogent and overwhelming
circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation
of the bail already granted. It has been held that generally speaking
the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or
attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice
or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of
the concession granted to the accused in any manner. It is,
however, to be noted that this Court has clarified that these
instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such
ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material
and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a
heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any
reasons. Such an order would be against principles of law. Interest
of justice would also require that such a perverse order be set aside
and bail be cancelled. It must be remembered that such offences
are on the rise and have a very serious impact on the society.

Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial
court has to be corrected.”

[25] In 2023 Livelaw (SC) 731 : 2023 INSC 779 [Abhishekvs

State of Madhya Pradesh], the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that:

“17. In BhajanLal (Supra), this Court had set out, by way of
illustration, the broad categories of cases in which the inherent
power under section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised. Para 102 of
the decision reads as follows:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.

Page
33
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding 9 against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

[26] In 2022 SCC Online Mani 449 : (2023) 1 GLT 187 in

Mayanglambam Prabha Devi vs. State of Manipur, the High Court of

Manipur observed as follows:

“28. In so far as the grant of refusal of the anticipatory bail, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 has laid
down the parameters as under:

Page
34
“112.The following factors and parameters can be taken into
consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail:

(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the
exact role of the accused must be properly
comprehended before arrest is made;

(ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact
as to whether the accused has previously
undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in
respect of any cognizable offence;

(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;

(iv) The possibility of the accused’s likelihood to repeat
similar or other offences;

(v) Where the accusations have been made only with
the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by
arresting him or her;

(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in
cases of large magnitude affecting a very large
number of people;

(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available
material against the accused very carefully. The
court must also clearly comprehend the exact role
of the accused in the case. The cases in which the
accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34
and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 the court should
consider with even greater care and caution
because over implication in the cases is a matter of
common knowledge and concern;

(viii) While considering the prayer for grant of
anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck
between two factors, namely, no prejudice should
be caused to the free, fair and full investigation and
there should be prevention of harassment,
humiliation and unjustified detention of the
accused;

(ix) The court to consider reasonable apprehension of
tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat
to the complainant;

(x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall
have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail
and in the event of there being some doubt as to
the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal
course of events, the accused is entitled to an order
of bail.

29. In Jai Prakash Singh vs State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379,
the Hon’ble Apex Court elucidated the principles for consider of
grant of anticipatory bail, which are as under:

Page
35
“19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious
offence are required to be satisfied and further while
granting such relief, the court must record the reasons
therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in
exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie
of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in
the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K.
Ganesh Babu Vs. P.T. Monokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434,
State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S.
Susain, (2008) 1 SCC 213, and Uniond of India v Padam
Narain Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305).””

[27] The factual narration made herein before reveal the

consistence disobedience of the accused/petitioner to comply with the

orders of the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal as even knowing about the

protection was given till 16.12.2024, the accused/petitioner did not try to

appear before the IO of the case on the above mentioned date as well as

on subsequent dates. Such conduct of the accused/petitioner in the light of

the aforesaid circumstance leaves this Court with no hesitation to hold that

the accused/petitioner is not entitled to seek the benefit of pre-arrest bail.

[28] As the guidelines relied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court made

in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case are totally against the petitioner to get

his relief as considering the nature of power given under Section 438 which

is of an extraordinary character and the same must be exercised sparingly

in exceptional cases, the present case as set out by the petitioner for

getting relief does not come under exceptional cases, the limitation

imposed in the preceding Section 437, limits the exercise of Section 438,

the petitioner failed to make out a special case for exercise of the power to

grant anticipatory bail, considering the serious nature of the case, the

discretion under Section 438 of the Code should not be exercised, the

Page
36
investigating authority as well as the orders of Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal

did not commit malafide in their investigation as well as in the order.

[29] The present application for anticipatory bail is filed under

Section 482 of BNSS, 2023. The legal principles applicable apropos Section

482 therein, it was observed that an accused comes before the High Court,

invoking the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The submission of

the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the similarly situated

incumbents were already released by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Kakching, this Court considered the grounds taken herein above by the

accused/petitioner, but as per the available facts and circumstances of the

case and submissions made herein above by the learned counsel for the

petitioner, this Court is of the view that the grounds taken herein above by

the accused/petitioner are not acceptable.

In this regard, this Court is relying on the categories of cases

in which, the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. could be

exercised by the High Court as set out in Bhajan Lal’s case made at Para

No. 102 and the same is reproduced herein below:

“17. In Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court had set out, by way of
illustration, the broad categories of cases in which the inherent
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised. Para 102 of
the decision reads as follows:

‘102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 of the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to

Page
37
lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to
give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever each a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with malafide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”

[30] On over all analysis of the materials produced by both sides

and reliance made by both parties on the cited Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

cases and the discussion and observation in this regard made by this Court,

Page
38
this Court is of the view that the present application for granting

anticipatory bail is liable to be dismissed.

[31] Accordingly, this Court finds the accused/petitioner commits

violation of the condition imposed in the anticipatory bail orders passed by

the Ld. Sessions Judge, Thoubal. This Court is of the view that the above

extracted observation made in the Supreme Court Judgments are wholly

sufficient for this Court to come to the conclusion that the present

application filed by the accused/petitioner for anticipatory bail liable to be

dismissed.

[32] Accordingly, the present anticipatory bail application filed by

the accused/petitioner is rejected.

JUDGE

FR/NFR

Lucy/Bipin

Page
39

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