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Delhi District Court
Kuldeep Singh vs Badlu Ram on 9 June, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-003828-2023
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 63/2023
SHRI. KULDEEP SINGH,
S/o. Shri. Shyam Singh,
R/o. H. No. B-120,
Delhi Administrative Flats,
Timarpur, Delhi-110054. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
SHRI. BADLU RAM,
S/o. Late Shri. Sohan Lal,
R/o. H. No. 68, Gali No. 1,
Harijan Basti, Shahdat Pur,
Karawal Nagar, Delhi-100094. ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 16.03.2023
Date of institution : 17.03.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 26.03.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 09.06.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been preferred in terms of the
provisions under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’) against the
judgment dated 23.01.2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned
judgment’), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate-01 (NI
Act)/Ld. MM-01 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in
case bearing; ‘Badlu Ram v. Kuldeep Singh, Ct. Case No.
9259/2017’, convicting the appellant for the offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
(hereinafter referred to as ‘NI Act‘) and the consequent order on
sentence dated 16.02.2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned
order’), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, awarding the appellant
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 04 (four) months along with
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:42:47 +0530
fine of Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Sixty Thousand only), to
be paid/released as compensation to the respondent/complainant.
It was further directed that in the default of payment of the fine
amount, the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a further period of 02 (two) months (hereinafter
impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred
to as the ‘impugned judgment and order’).
2. Succinctly, the genesis of the present proceedings is a
complaint filed/on behalf of the respondent/complainant before
the Ld. Trial Court, wherein the respondent inter alia asserted that
the appellant, at the relevant point of time, was a government
employer in the District Court, Delhi. As per the respondent,
initially, in the year 2012, the appellant approached the respondent,
requesting him for a friendly loan of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
Thousand only). Consequently, the respondent proclaimed that
persuade by the request(s) of the appellant, he/the respondent gave
a friendly loan of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to the
appellant against an undertaking/agreement dated 20.01.2012,
with an understanding that the said loan amount would be repaid
by the appellant to the respondent by June, 2012. The complaint
further records that the appellant made part payment against the
said loan amount and again requested the respondent to lend him a
further sum/loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) as he
was in urgent need of money for the admission of his son in higher
studies as well as for the marriage of his niece. At that point of
time, as per the respondent, the appellant had asserted that he was
bed-ridden due to his accident and was unable to arrange for the
said amount. Consequently, considering the request of the
appellant, the respondent obtained a personal loan of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) from Sanjeevani Cooperative
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:42:51 +0530
Urban T&C Society Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Co-
operative Society’) and after receipt/withdrawal of the same from
his bank, the respondent had lent out a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh only), in cash, to the appellant. The respondent
further avowed that after taking such friendly loan, the appellant
had assured to the respondent that the same would be repaid as
soon as possible along with interest, as charged by the said Co-
operative Society, after his recovery from injuries and upon
him/the appellant joining his duty. Ergo, under such assurances
from the appellant, the respondent is asserted to have waited for
several months, however, no payment was made by the appellant.
In fact, it is the case of the respondent that the appellant kept on
delaying/postponing the payment of due amount to the respondent
on one or the other pretext. However, as per the respondent, only
part payment to a tune of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand
only), against interest on said loan amount, was made by the
appellant to the respondent in the year 2015. Consequently, it is
averred by the respondent that left with no option when the
respondent repeatedly asked the appellant to clear his dues in the
end of January, 2017, the appellant is asserted to have issued a
post-dated cheque bearing no. 005510, dated 29.03.2017 for a sum
of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), drawn on SBI, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘cheque in
question/dishonoured cheque’) in favour of the respondent,
towards discharge/debt of his liability. At that point of time, as per
the respondent, he was assured by the appellant that as and when
the said cheque would be presented for encashment, same would
be honored. Consequently, the respondent is asserted to have
deposited the said cheque with his banker, i.e., Allahabad Bank,
Timarpur Branch, Delhi for encashment on 30.03.2017, upon the
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
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request of the appellant. However, upon its presentation and re-
presentation, the said cheque returned dishonoured vide memos
dated 03.04.2017 and 03.05.2017 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘return memos/cheque return memos’) both time, with the
remarks, “Funds Insufficient”. Subsequently, the respondent
issued a legal demand notice dated 31.05.2017 ( hereinafter
referred to as the ‘legal demand notice/legal notice’) to the
appellant inter alia seeking payment of the dishonoured cheque
amount within a period of 15 (fifteen) days from the said notice.
Remarkably, the said notice was duly replied by the appellant vide
his reply dated 14.06.2017 (hereinafter referred to as ‘reply to the
notice’), denying his liability towards the respondent. However,
aggrieved by the failure of the appellant abide by the terms of the
undertaking as well as considering the non-payment of
dishonoured cheque amount, the respondent filed the aforenoted
complaint before the Ld. Trial Court, in terms of the provisions
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Sections 138/142 NI Act,
against the appellant herein.
2.1. Notably, consequent upon pre-summoning evidence
having been recorded and thereupon, Ld. Trial Court’s taking
cognizance of the offence on 24.07.2017, summons was issued to
the appellant/accused. Subsequently, upon the appellant’s entering
appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and on compliance of the
provision of Section 207 Cr.P.C., notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.
was framed against the appellant vide order dated 19.01.2019, to
which, the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, besides
the appellant admitted certain documents, in terms of the
provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. on the said date. Relevantly,
during the course of trial, the respondent examined himself as
CW-1, while adopting his pre-summoning evidence/evidence by
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.09
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way of affidavit (Ex.CW1/1) as well as relying on the documents,
i.e., photocopy of undertaking dated 20.01.2012 (Ex. CW1/A);
photocopy of loan-cum-account of Sanjeevani Cooperative Urban
T&C Society Ltd. (Ex. CW1/B); cheque bearing no. 005510, dated
29.03.2017 for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only),
drawn on SBI, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (Ex. CW1/C); cheque
return memo dated 03.04.2017 (Ex. CW1/D); cheque return memo
dated 03.05.2017 (Ex. CW1/E); legal demand notice dated
31.05.2017 (Ex. CW1/F); postal receipt (Ex. CW1/G) and proof of
delivery (Ex. CW1/H). Subsequently, on conclusion of
respondent’s evidence, recording of statement of the appellant
under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C. on 30.03.2022, as well as on
conclusion of arguments on behalf of the parties, as
aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and
order, while holding the appellant, guilty of the offence punishable
under Sections 138 NI Act, sentenced him in the manner, as noted
hereinabove.
3. Ld. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended
that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial
Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the
settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset.
As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment is incorrect both
on facts as well as in law, making the same liable to be set aside at
the outset. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in
not appreciating the facts and circumstances of the present case,
nor the submissions of/on behalf of the appellant, while passing
the impugned judgment and order. In this regard, Ld. Counsel
submitted that the impugned judgment as passed by the Ld. Trial
Court, unmindful of several material aspects, in particular, as per
the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court erred in holding the appellant
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
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guilty of the offence under Section 138 NI Act, only on the basis of
presumption and without taking in consideration of any evidence
of respondent/complainant. It was further submitted that the Ld.
Trial Court did not consider that no evidence was led by/on behalf
of the respondent/complainant to demonstrate that cheque in
question was issued by the appellant against discharge of any legal
debt and/or liability. Correspondingly, it was asserted that the Ld.
Trial Court erred in not allowing the appellant to cross examine the
respondent and the right of the appellant to cross examination the
respondent was closed, without any rhyme or reason, leading to
miscarriage of justice. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court overlooked the material on record and cited various
judgments/dictates, which were not applicable in the present case.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further strenuously
contended that the Ld. Trial Court further overlooked that alleged
transaction in question pertained to the year 2012 and admittedly
an agreement/undertaking between the parties existed in this
regard, besides the respondent had taken two cheques from the
appellant at the time of advancing loan which could have been
utilized by the respondent for recovery of the amount, however, all
in vain. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the
finding of guilt of the appellant, the Ld. Trial Court did not
consider that the material placed on record, in particular, the
passbook of the Cooperative Society, which clearly indicates that
no withdrawal had taken place from the account of respondent,
besides it was not considered that the respondent had not filed
another any passbook/document to show withdrawal of the said
amount. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not apply
its judicial mind by passing the impugned judgment of conviction
of the appellant only on the ground that the cheque in question was
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.09
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issued by the appellant and taking recourse to the provisions under
Section 139 NI Act. However, it was asserted that the Ld. Trial
Court did not consider the respondent’s admission in his
complaint, pre-summoning evidence/examination, evidence, etc.
Correspondingly, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that Ld.
Trial Court further overlooked the material on record, in particular,
respondent’s cross-examination where the respondent never
disclosed of multiple loans between him/the respondent and the
appellant. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the correct facts of the
instant case were not appreciated by the Ld. Trial Court, rather, the
Ld. Trial Court premised its findings only in the concocted version,
put forth by the respondent. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted
that the correct facts of the present case are that the respondent had
provided a loan to the appellant in the year 2012 and it is admitted
between the parties that the respondent had obtained two blank
cheques from the appellant. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel
asserted that after such loan was disbursed to the appellant, the
respondent continued to pay interest to the respondent regularly
and the appellant paid off the entire due amount to the respondent,
with the appellant making the last payment against installment to
the respondent on 07.12.2012. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, to
his utter shock, he/the appellant received a legal demand notice
from the respondent in the year 2017, without there being any debt
or liability. Ld. Counsel further asserted that the said legal demand
notice was duly responded by him, despite which the respondent
persevered to raise unjust/illegal claims against the appellant and
maliciously initiated the complaint proceedings against the
appellant. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel
that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that no liability could
have been attributed to the appellant for time barred debt,
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
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considering that as per the respondent’s own version the cheque in
question pertained to the year 2012, while the same was allegedly
dishonoured in the year 2017, way beyond the statutory prescribed
period of limitation.
3.2. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted
that the impugned judgment is manifestly erroneous in as much as
the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the defence of the appellant,
while reaching a conclusion of appellant’s guilt. In this regard, Ld.
Counsel fervently argued that while the appellant in his defence,
clearly stated that only one loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh only) was obtained by him, which he had already repaid to
the respondent along with interest, however, the said fact was not
considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment. In
fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, even the respondent admitted the
receipt of sum of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) and
Rs. 45,000/- (Rupees Forty Five Thousand only) from the
appellant against the said loan, however, the said facts have not
been duly given weightage by the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching a
finding of appellant’s guilt in the instant case. It was further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has further gone wrong in
holding the appellant guilty, as he could not lead any evidence in
his defence. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court erred in not holding that the cheque in question was issued as
a security and not against discharge of any legal debt and/or
liability, which the appellant had asserted at the time of framing of
notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel
for the appellant, the Ld. Trial Court reached its conclusion of guilt
of the appellant, while failing to appreciate that there is no cogent,
credible and reliable evidence on record for reaching an
unambiguous conclusion towards the guilt of the appellant. Even
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order on sentence
was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, inconsiderate of the correct
factual scenario, awarding an exorbitant sentence/fine and
compensation to the appellant. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel
inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the
impugned judgment and order be set aside, and the appellant be
acquitted of the alleged charges. In support of the said contentions,
reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Dashrathbhai
Trikambhai Patel v. Hitest Mahendrabhai Patel & Anr., Crl.
Appeal No. 1497/2022, dated 11.10.2022 (Hon’ble Supreme
Court); M/s. Jage Ram Karan Singh & Anr. v. State & Anr., Crl.
Rev. Pet. No. 82/2013, dated 31.07.2019 (Hon’ble DHC); Sri.
Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, Crl. Appeal No. 3257/2024, dated
07.08.2024 (SC); M/s. Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff &
Anr., (2024) 2 SCR 255; M/s. Vijay Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s.
Vinnay Aggarwal, Crl. MC No. 1682/2008, dated 24.04.2009
(Hon’ble DHC); Prajan Kumar Jain v. Ravi Malhotra, Crl. MC No.
1869/2007, dated 26.10.2009 (Hon’ble DHC); Rajender Valecha
& Anr. v. Satpal & Anr., RFA No. 590/2016, dated 02.02.2018
(Hon’ble DHC); Netrapal Singh v. Ravinder kumar Kalyanai &
Anr., CRP no. 37/2019, dated 25.03.2019 (Hon’ble DHC); Satish
Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, Crl. LP 95/2006, dated
01.08.2013 (Hon’ble DHC); R. Manikannu v. AR Bathruddin, Crl.
A. No. 253/2015, dated 20.09.2021 (Hon’ble Madras HC); Sri.
Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, Crl. Appeal No. 200193/2019, dated
03.03.2023 (Hon’ble Kerala HC); K. Shiju v. Nalini & Anr., Crl.
Rev. Pet. No. 1251/2005, dated 26.11.2016 (Hon’ble Kerala High
Court); Gopal, S/o. Vithalrao Bagade v. Sumant, S/o. Ganpatrai
Bagade, Crl. Appln. 1183/2007, dated 16.02.2008 (Hon’ble
Bombay High Court); Girdhari Lal Rathi v. PTV Ramanujachari
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
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& Anr., (1997) 01 AP CK 0034; and C. Rajasekaran v. S.
Padmavathi, Crl. RC No. 537/2019 & Crl. MP No. 7309-
7311/2019, dated 31.01.2022 (Hon’ble Madras High Court).
4. Per contra Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted
that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial
Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the
case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents.
As per the Ld. Counsel, grounds of appeal in the instant case are
falsely created and based on a concocted story. On the contrary, as
per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment and order passed by
the Ld. Trial Court are correct and the appellant was correctly
convicted as well as sentenced. It was further contended by the Ld.
Counsel that the material brought on record explicitly and cogently
point out towards the only finding of guilt of the appellant and
nothing has been placed on record to show that the appellant
rebutted the presumption under law/Section 118/139 NI Act.
Correspondingly, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that cheque
in question was issued by the appellant to the respondent against
his debt/liability towards the complainant/respondent in the year
2017, in terms of the provisions under Section 25(3)1 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Contract Act‘),
which was eventually dishonoured despite assurance. Even
otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the appellant
kept on postponing the refund of loan to the respondent even after
repeated requests made by the respondent and made part payment
of interest to Cooperative Society only in the year 2014 and further
issued the cheque in question in the year 2014. As per the Ld.
1
Section 25. Agreement without consideration void, unless it is in writing and registered, or is a promise to
compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law- “An agreement made without
consideration is void, unless-*** (3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged
therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part…” (Emphasis
supplied)
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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Counsel, during the trial proceedings, the appellant could not
prove contrary to his legally enforceable debt/liability and also did
not put any question towards the aspect of limitation in
recovery/presentation of cheques in question and has only raised
the said issue for the first time in the present appeal. Even
otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, with the issuance of cheque by
the appellant to the respondent, his liability stands fortified inter
alia in terms of the provisions under Section 25(3) of the Contract
Act and the appellant is precluded now to take advantage of his
own wrong.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further
submitted/strenuously reiterated that the appellant led no evidence
to rebut the presumption under Section 139 NI Act nor produce
any witness/evidence in support of his contention that the cheque
in question was misused by the respondent. On the contrary, as per
the Ld. Counsel, the respondent proved its case, beyond reasonable
doubt against the appellant. Further, Ld. Counsel fervently restated
that the facts and circumstances put forth as well as the evidence
placed on record, unerringly point out towards the guilt of the
appellant and that no fault can be attributed to the findings of the
Ld. Trial Court, which are based on proper appreciation of facts as
well as law. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel for the respondent
submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the
outset, as grossly malicious and devoid of merits. In support of the
said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; S.
Natarajan v. Sama Dharman, Crl. Appeal No. 1524/2014, dated
15.07.2014 (Hon’ble SC); K. Hymavathi v. State of AP & Anr.,
SPL (Crl.) No. 7455/2019, dated 06.09.2023 (SC); and A.V.
Murthy v. Nagabasavanna, AIR 2002 SC 985.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant as
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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well as that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent, heard and the
record(s), including the Trial Court Record, written
submission/written arguments as well as the case laws, relied upon
by the parties have been thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it prudent to enunciate
the extent of jurisdiction of this Court in appeal/appellate
jurisdiction. In this regard, this Court it is pertinent to outrightly
make a reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court, while delving into the ‘ scope and ambit’ of
appellate court’s jurisdiction inter alia noted as under;
“2. … It is the duty of an appellate court to look
into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an
independent conclusion as to whether the said
evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be
relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said
to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the
said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be
adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference
from proved and admitted facts. It must be
remembered that the appellate court, like the trial
court, has to be satisfied affirmatively that the
prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of
the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable
doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the
accused starts, continues right through until he is held
guilty by the final court of appeal and that
presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal
nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785, iterated
in respect of the foregoing as under;
“3. This Court has in a series of judgments held
that a court exercising appellate power must not only
consider questions of law but also questions of fact
and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a
critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must
show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts
of the case as particularly when the offence alleged isCA No. 63/2023 Kuldeep Singh v. Badlu Ram Page No. 12 of 41
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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of a serious nature and may attract a heavy
punishment.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the
aforenoted judicial dictates it is perspicuously deduced that the
jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal extends to reappreciation of
the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive
at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can
be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while
exercising appellate power is not only required to consider the
question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach
a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite
law1 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an
appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the
accused. Needless to reemphasize that the appellate court is to be
further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused,
even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of
appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by an
acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court.
9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid
principles, however, before proceeding with the determination of
the rival contentions of/on behalf of the parties, this Court deems it
pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/NI Act,
for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments-
Until the contrary is proved, the following
presumptions shall be made:
(a) of consideration: that every negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for consideration,
and that every such instrument when it has been
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for
consideration;
1
State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.
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indorsements appearing upon a negotiable
instrument were made in the order in which they
appear thereon;
*** *** ***
Provided that, where the instrument has been
obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in
lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or
fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or
acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for
unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the
holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.
*** *** ***
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc.,
of funds in the account-Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to another
person from out of that account for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account
is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by
an agreement made with that bank, such person shall
be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to
twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for
the payment of the said amount of money by
giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or as the case may be, to the holder in due course
of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of
the said notice.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section, “debt
or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or
other liability.
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139. Presumption in favour of holder-It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the
holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature
referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole
or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. At the outset, this Court observes that the objective
behind the introduction of the provision(s) under Section 138
under the NI Act, by virtue of amendment/insertion in the year
1989 is to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking operations and
credibility in transacting business on negotiable instrument.
Notably, at the time of introduction of the said provision(s), the
legislature was cognizant of the fact that the civil remedies were
proving to be inadequate to curb the menace on the part of
unscrupulous persons and a need was felt for introduction of a
penal provision to cease the propensity on the part of dishonest
persons to exploit negotiable instruments for personal gains.
Consequently, being wary of the imminent requirement for a penal
provision to bring about faith in monetary transactions, Chapter
XVII was introduced in the NI Act, comprising of the provisions
from Sections 138 to 148. In particular, penal provisions under
Section 138 NI Act were designed to1, “safeguard the faith of the
creditor in the drawer of the cheque, which is essential to the
economic life of a developing country like India. The provision
has been introduced with a view to curb cases of issuing cheques
indiscriminately by making stringent provisions and safeguarding
interest of creditors”. Notably, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goa
Plast (P.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’Souza, (2004) 2 SCC 235 , while
inter alia analyzing the intent of introduction of Section 138 NI Act
as well as scope and objective of the said provision(s) observed as
under;
1
Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 305.
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“26. The object and the ingredients under the
provisions, in particular, Sections 138 and 139 of the
Act cannot be ignored. Proper and smooth functioning
of all business transactions, particularly, of cheques as
instruments, primarily depends upon the integrity and
honesty of the parties. In our country, in a large
number of commercial transactions, it was noted that
the cheques were issued even merely as a device not
only to stall but even to defraud the creditors. The
sanctity and credibility of issuance of cheques in
commercial transactions was eroded to a large extent.
Undoubtedly, dishonour of a cheque by the bank
causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience to
the payee and the entire credibility of the business
transactions within and outside the country suffers a
serious setback. Parliament, in order to restore the
credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for
cash payment enacted the aforesaid provisions. The
remedy available in a civil court is a long-drawn
matter and an unscrupulous drawer normally takes
various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the
payee.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Relevantly, in order to attract culpability under the
provisions of 138 NI Act, the prosecution is inter alia required to
prove1 that; (a) the cheque was issued/drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him for payment of any sum of money to
another person from out of that account; (b) the cheque must have
been issued against the discharge, either in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability, though, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, it shall be presumed that it was issued for the same; and
(c) the cheque was returned by the bank unpaid either because the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account is
insufficient to honour the cheque; or because it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from the account by an agreement with that
bank. Reference in this regard is further made to the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar
Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 , wherein the Hon’ble
1
N. Doraisamy v. Archana Enterprises, 1995 SCC OnLine Mad 25
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Court, while conscientiously analyzing the provisions under
Section 138 NI Act inter alia explicated the ingredients of the said
provision/offence, as under;
“10. On a reading of the provisions of Section 138
of the NI Act it is clear that the ingredients which are
to be satisfied for making out a case under the
provision are:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for payment
of a certain amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge of any
debt or other liability;
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to honour
the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged
to be paid from that account by an agreement made
with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15
days of the receipt of information by him from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the said notice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Here, it is further pertinent to observe that the
statute/NI Act also provides for raising of a presumption/statutory
presumption, casting/permitting a reverse burden on an accused
and requiring the accused to prove the non-existence of the
presumed fact. Quite evidently, Section 139 NI Act provides
for/creates one such exception(s) to the general rule as to the
burden of proof and shifts the onus on an accused to rebut the
presumption envisaged under law, against him. Another such
presumption under law being, under Section 118 NI Act.
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Reference in this regard, is made to the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Court noted in regard the foregoing as under;
“33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions:
Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act
inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument
was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of
the Act stipulates that “unless the contrary is proved, it
shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque
received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or
part of any debt or liability”. It will be seen that the
“presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial
ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under
Section 138…
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the
form of a “shall presume” clause is illustrative of a
presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that
the Court “shall presume” the fact stated therein, it is
obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in
every case where the factual basis for the raising of the
presumption had been established. But this does not
preclude the person against whom the presumption is
drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is
clear from the use of the phrase “unless the contrary is
proved”…”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Strikingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa
v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441, while painstakingly evaluating
the intent and purpose behind the introduction of Section 139
under the Statute books/NI Act, observed as under;
“26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement
with the respondent claimant that the presumption
mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed
include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in
Krishna Janardhan Bhat [(2008) 4 SCC 54: (2008) 2
SCC (Cri) 166] may not be correct. However, this
does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of
the decision in that case since it was based on the
specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in
the citations, this is of course in the nature of a
rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to
raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
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However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial
presumption which favours the complainant.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in
furtherance of the legislative objective of improving
the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device
to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.
However, it must be remembered that the offence
made punishable by Section 138 can be better
described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong
whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard or proof.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Markedly, it is observed from above that the
presumption envisioned under Section 139 NI Act not only
pertains to the fact that the cheque in question was drawn in
discharge of debt or liability, rather, also includes a presumption
that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability at the time of
such drawing. Congruently, Section 118(a) NI Act provides for a
presumption in favour of the complainant1 inter alia to the effect
that the negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or
endorsed for consideration. Indisputably2, the burden to rebut the
presumption lies on an accused, by establishing probable defence.
Needless to further observe here that, though, in order to rebut the
statutory presumptions3, “an accused is not expected to prove his
defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the
complainant in a criminal trial”, however, the law is settled4 that a
bare denial of the passing of the consideration or of existence of
1
Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 10.
2
Rajaram v. Maruthachalam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 48.
3
Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 18 SCC 106.
4
Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165.
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debt/liability by an accused, would not serve the purpose or come
to the aid/rescue of an accused. In fact, law is well settled that
under such circumstances, it is expected from an accused to bring
‘something which is probable’, on record for getting the burden of
proof shifted to the complainant. Reference in this regard is made
to the decision in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC
513, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, explicated the law in regard
the foregoing as under;
“20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of
the Act has two options. He can either show that
consideration and debt did not exist or that under the
particular circumstances of the case the non-existence
of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent
man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt
existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an
accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond
reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in
a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct
evidence to prove that the note in question was not
supported by consideration and that there was no debt
or liability to be discharged by him . However, the
court need not insist in every case that the accused
should disprove the non-existence of consideration
and debt by leading direct evidence because the
existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor
contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare
denial of the passing of the consideration and
existence of debt, apparently would not serve the
purpose of the accused. Something which is probable
has to be brought on record for getting the burden of
proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the
presumptions, the accused should bring on record
such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of
which, the court may either believe that the
consideration and debt did not exist or their non-
existence was so probable that a prudent man would
under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct
evidence to prove that the note in question was not
supported by consideration or that he had not incurred
any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon
circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so
relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise
shift again on to the complainant. The accused may
also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance,
those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to
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rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and
139 of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, summarized the
principles governing the raising as well as rebuttal of statutory
presumption, provided under the law/NI Act, in the following
terms;
“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this
Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139,
we now summarise the principles enumerated by this
Court in following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted
Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that
the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other
liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a
rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused
to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof
for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance
of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the
accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused
can also rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise a probable defence.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be
drawn not only from the materials brought on record
by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to
come in the witness box in support of his defence,
Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a
persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in
the witness box to support his defence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Ergo, being cognizant of the aforenoted principles,
this Court would now proceed with the assessment of the rival
contentions by/on behalf of the appellant and the respondent.
Pertinently, Ld. Counsel for the appellant outrightly and
vehemently contended that the cheque in question pertained to
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time barred debt, for which, no criminality can be attributed
to/against the appellant herein. In particular, it is the case of the
appellant, whilst the complainant/respondent under his complaint
and cross-examination asserted that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh only) was advanced by the respondent to the
appellant in 2013, upon him/the respondent’s procuring the said
amount on loan from the Cooperative Society, however, the
cheque in question was issued only in the year 2017.
Consequently, as per the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, since the
dishonoured cheque pertains to a period beyond the statutory
period of limitation, i.e., against time barred debt, the appellant
cannot be held liable under Section 138 NI Act. However, the said
contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant does not find
favour with this Court in view of the dictate of the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in Rajeev Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.,
Crl. L.P. 212/2021 & Crl. M.A. 20429/2021, dated 11.09.2024 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Court whist confronted with an akin
conundrum, noted in unambiguous terms/remarked that furnishing
of a cheque of a time-barred debt effectively resurrects the debt
itself by a fresh agreement through the deeming provision under
Section 25 of the Contract Act. In fact, as per the Hon’ble Court,
under such situation, the original debt, by aid of the provisions
under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, becomes legally
enforceable to the extent of the amount the cheque has been given.
In this regard, it is pertinent to make reference to the relevant
extracts from the said dictate as under;
“20. The plea of ‘time bar’, in that the cheque was
issued on 31st December 2015, after four years of the
disbursement of loan in October 2011, is also
incorrectly analyzed by the Trial Court. The concept
relating to limitation in situations of Section 138 of NI
Act is that the furnishing of the cheque/negotiable
instrument in itself invites a presumption of liability.
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The liability even if of a previous period, gets revived,
due to the furnishing of the cheque, acknowledging
therefore, that the repayment is to take place.
21. The law relating to a time-barred debt and the
revival by virtue of furnishing a cheque by the drawer,
is well settled. This is based upon the concept that a
promise to pay wholly or in part a debt which cannot
be enforced by the creditor being barred by the law of
limitation, is a valid agreement, if it is made in writing
and signed by the person. This is encapsulated in
Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘the
ICA’) which when read along with Illustration (e),
crystallizes the concept clearly…
*** *** ***
31. In the opinion of this Court, the provisions of
Section 25(3) of ICA are squarely applicable. A
cheque as per section 6 of the NI Act is a “bill of
exchange”, which in turn is defined in section 5 of the
NI Act as an instrument in writing signed by the
maker directing payment of certain sum of money to a
certain person. The maker of the cheque is the
‘drawer’ and the person to be paid is the ‘drawee’ as
per section 7 of the NI Act.
32. Therefore, a priori the cheque itself becomes a
promise made in writing signed by the person to pay
wholly or in part debt, which otherwise, may not be
payable due to law of limitation. Per section 25(3) of
the ICA, this would be an agreement in itself. Section
139 presumption under the NI Act which presumes
that the cheque is in discharge in whole or part
liability of any debt or liability would therefore,
actually come into play. The contrary position of the
accused that no debt or liability subsists having
extinguished by the law of limitation, would be then
unmerited and untenable, since a fresh agreement
comes into operation by the tendering of the cheque.
By issuing the cheque, the drawer is acknowledging a
legally enforceable liability and he ought not be
entitled to claim that the debt had become barred by
limitation.
*** *** ***
37. The furnishing of a cheque of a time-barred
debt effectively resurrects the debt itself by a fresh
agreement through the deeming provision under
section 25(3) of ICA. The original debt therefore,
through section 25(3) of the ICA, becomes legally
enforceable to the extent of the amount the cheque has
been given. This resonates also with practical
considerations. Persons who have chosen to escape
liability, can draw a cheque, in order to clear an earlier
debt upon persuasion by the creditor. By the act of
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drawing a cheque, the promisor i.e. the drawer, is
effectively stating that he has a liability to pay the
drawee. Drawing of the cheque in itself, is
acknowledgment of a debt or liability. It is the
resurrection or the revival of the prior debt which
would trigger the provisions under section 138 of NI
Act. To deny a complainant/drawee of invoking the
penal provisions under section 138 of NI Act, despite
the categorical premise of section 25(3) of the ICA
recognizing a fresh agreement to pay, would be an
unfortunate disentitlement…”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Clearly, it is seen from above that the Hon’ble Court
in unequivocal terms observed that issuance of cheque, itself
becomes a promise in writing, signed by the person to pay wholly
or in part debt, which otherwise, may not be payable due to law of
limitation, in terms of the provisions under Section 25(3) of the
Contract Act. As a corollary, it was held by the Hon’ble Court,
quite lucidly that furnishing of a cheque of a time-barred debt
effectively resurrects the debt itself by a fresh agreement through
the deeming provision under section 25(3) of Contract Act,
attracting criminality against an accused. Here, this Court deems it
further pertinent to make a reference to decision of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court in Narendra V. Kanekar v. Bardez-Taluka Co-
operative Housing Society Ltd. & Anr., 2006 SCC OnLine Bom
457: 2006 Cri. LJ 3111, wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked that
the principles enunciated under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act
are applicable to proceedings under Section 138 NI Act, with equal
vigor and force as they apply to civil proceedings. In particular, the
Hon’ble Court, noted in this context as under;
“10. Mere giving a cheque, without anything
more, will not revive a barred debt, because cheque
has to be given, as contemplated by the explanatory in
discharge of a legally enforceable debt. There is not
doubt that in terms of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963,
a signed acknowledgement of liability made in
writing before the expiration of period of limitation, is
enough to start a fresh period of limitation. Likewise,
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when a debt has become barred by limitation, there is
also Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, by which, a
written promise to pay, furnishes a fresh cause of
action. In other words, what Clause (3) of Section 25
of the Indian Contract Act in substance does is not to
revive a dead right, for the right is never dead at any
time, but to resuscitate the remedy to enforce payment
by suit, and if the payment could be enforced by a suit,
it means that it still has the character of legally
enforceable debt as contemplated by the explanation
below Section 138 of the Act. As far as this aspect of
the case is concerned, the learned Division Bench
observed that to determine as to whether or not a
liability is legally enforceable, the provisions of the
Contract Act cannot be said to be irrelevant. This can
provide a cause for a legal liability. Although the
primary question answered by the Division Bench
was that a cheque becomes a promise to pay under
Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, this view need not
be followed by this Court in the light of judgment of
this Court in the case Ashwini Satish Bhat v.
Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra) and the other
two judgments referred to hereinabove. Nevertheless,
the Division Bench judgment is relevant to the extent
that it holds that a promise to pay in writing as per
Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
matures into an enforceable contract, which can be
enforced by filing a Civil Suit. If a suit could be filed
pursuant to a promise made in writing and signed by
the person to be charged therewith, as contemplated
by Clause (3) of Section 25 of the law of Contract,
then, in my view, the debt becomes legally
enforceable and if a cheque is given in payment of
such debt is dishonored and subsequently, the
statutory notice is not complied with, then the person
making promise in writing and issuing the cheque,
would still be liable to be punished under Section 138
of the Act…”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Proceeding further with the evaluation of the
contention of the Ld. Counsel for the parties, it is noted that it is
asserted by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court at the time of
recording of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. on 19.01.2019 that
the cheque in question and the name mentioned therein were filled-
in by him/the appellant, however, the date of the cheque is not in
his/appellant’s handwriting. Nonetheless, the appellant has
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conceded that the cheque in question bears his signatures. Apposite
to reproduce the relevant extracts of the said notice under Section
251 Cr.P.C. as under;
“…Q. Have the particulars in the cheque filled by
you?
A. Yes. The amount and the name has been filled
by me. I had not filled the date in cheque in question
(after perusal of cheque).
Q. Did you issue/sign the cheque in question?
A. The cheque in question bears my signatures…”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. However, it is seen from a conscientious perusal of
the statement of the appellant/accused, recorded under Section
313/218 Cr.P.C. on 30.03.2022 that the appellant asserted therein
that the cheque in question bears his signatures and that the “other
details have not been filled by me…”. Strikingly, under such
factual scenario, Ld. Counsel for the appellant has endeavored to
build up a case that no liability under Section 138 NI Act can be
attributed/attracted against the appellant, especially when (as per
the Ld. Counsel for the appellant) the particulars appearing on the
dishonoured cheque were not filled by the appellant. However, in
this regard, it is outrightly noted that the said contention is
contradictory to the assertion of the appellant at the time framing
of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis that at the time of
recording of the appellant’s statement under Section 313/281
Cr.P.C., as aforenoted. Nevertheless, this Court decidedly notes
that the said contention (even otherwise) fails to impress this
Court, especially when the law is settled that filling of particulars
of cheque by any person, other than the drawer does not invalidate
the cheque and the liability under Section 138 NI Act/presumption
under Section 139 NI Act would still be attracted under such
situation(s), when the signatures on the cheque in question is duly
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admitted by the drawer/accused. Reference in this regard is made
to decision in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under;
“33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular,
Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a
person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the
payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to
rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued
for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is
immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by
any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly
signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid,
the penal provisions of Section 138 would be
attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily
presented to a payee, towards some payment, the
payee may fill up the amount and other particulars.
This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The
onus would still be on the accused to prove that the
cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by
adducing evidence.
*** *** ***
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed
and handed over by the accused, which is towards
some payment, would attract presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act , in the
absence of any cogent evidence to show that the
cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Markedly, under the present situation, when both the
appellant and the respondent affirm that the cheque in
question/dishonoured cheque was signed and handed over by the
appellant to the respondent, the contention of the Ld. Counsel for
the appellant/appellant’s assertion under his statement recorded
under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C. that the cheque in question was not
filled in the appellant’s handwriting, i.e., the date of cheque, other
particulars and/or the payee’s details thereon were not filled by the
appellant, albeit only subsequent, would not, in the considered
opinion of this Court, come to any aid/rescue of the appellant, in
view of the aforenoted judicial dictate(s). Needless to reiterate that
CA No. 63/2023 Kuldeep Singh v. Badlu Ram Page No. 27 of 41
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:44:42 +0530
the law is well settled that even when a signed blank cheque is
voluntarily presented to a payee towards some payment, the payee
may fill up the amount and other particulars and that the same
would not, in itself, invalidate the cheque. On the contrary, even
under such circumstances, presumption under Section 139 NI Act
would be attracted, burden lying on the drawer of cheque to rebut
the same as per law/by preponderance of probabilities.
21. Apropos the present discourse, this Court deems it
pertinent to deal with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the
appellant inter alia to the effect that the dishonoured cheque was
not issued by him to the respondent against discharge of any debt
or liability. In order to deal with the said contention, it is apposite
to outrightly make a reference to the appellant’s defence/plea of
defence, raised/made at the time of framing of notice under
Section 251 Cr.P.C. on 19.01.2019, as under;
“…Q. Do have any defence to make, if yes, what
is your plea of defence?
A. I had taken a loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the
complainant in the year 2010. The cheque in question
was handed over to the complainant as security
cheque at the time of advancement of loan. I had
repaid the entire amount to the complainant by
December 2012. I had paid an amount of Rs. 30,000/-
& Rs. 20,000/- to the complainant in cash in the year
2010-11. Thereafter, I made payment of Rs. 50,000/-
by way of cheque in December 2012. I can also prove
the same. I requested the complainant to return the
cheque in question to me. However, complainant did
not return the same and I also trusted the complainant
as he is very old acquaintance.
Q. Do you have any liability towards the
complainant?
A. No, I do not have any liability towards the
complainant…”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Correspondingly, in the statement of the accused
persons, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 313/281
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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Cr.P.C. on 30.03.2020, the appellant asserted, as under;
“…I had taken loan from the complainant of Rs. 1
lac and had issued two cheques as blank signed
security cheques. I have already repaid whole of the
loan amount to the complainant with interest. I am
aware that my cheque was bounced. The receipt Ex.
CW1/A had been executed by me for Rs. 50,000/-.
The other amount of Rs. 50,000/- was given to me
without any receipt and I have repaid the same in cash.
I have also transferred Rs. 45,000/- from my bank
account.
Qn. Do you want to say anything else?
Ans. I have no liability towards the complainant.
Qn. Do you want to lead defence evidence?
Ans. No…”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Notably, from a conjoint reading of the above, it is
observed that the appellant admitted his signatures on the
dishonoured cheque as well as the execution and issuance
thereof/cheque in question. Undoubtedly, under such
circumstances, presumption under Section 139 NI Act would arise
in the instant case. However, in order to rebut the said presumption
appellant merely contended that the cheque in question was issued
as a security cheque and the entire liability for the earlier loan of
Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) was already paid by him.
However, in this regard, this Court outrightly notes that as a
general proposition of law1, repeated affirmed by superior courts,
the question whether a post-dated cheque is for ‘discharge of debt
or liability’ depends on the nature of the transaction. Consequently,
where on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the
amount has become legally recoverable, the provisions under
Section 138 NI Act would be attracted in a given case, otherwise
not. Reference in this regard is further made to the recent dictate of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sripati Singh (since deceased)
1
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458.
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.09
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+0530
through his Son Gaurav Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.,
MANU/SC/1002/2021, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
revaluating the issue regarding the maintainability of the
proceedings under Section 138 NI Act in the event of dishonour of
security cheque(s), noted as under;
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a
financial transaction cannot be considered as a
worthless piece of paper under every circumstance.
‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and
the security given for a loan is something given as a
pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to
make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which
the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower
agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe
and issues a cheque as security to secure such
repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any
other form before the due date or if there is no other
understanding or agreement between the parties to
defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is
issued as security would mature for presentation and
the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present
the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated Under
Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act
would flow.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Evidently, it is only when legal debt or liability exists
against a drawer on the date of presentation of cheque, which
eventually gets dishonoured, provisions under Section 138 NI Act
would be attracted in a case. As a corollary, no liability can be
attributed to a drawer where a security cheque is presented prior to
the loan or installment maturing for repayment against which the
cheque was issued or where the liability or debt is discharged prior
to such presentation or in the cases of (altered) understanding in
relation to such presentation. Consequently, for a drawer to avoid
its liability under Section 138 of the NI Act on the basis of
‘security deposit’ defence, is required to be demonstrated that on
the date of the cheque, no legally recoverable debt or liability was
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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under existence. As aforenoted, in the instant case, the respondent
has asserted that the cheque in question was issued by the appellant
in the year 2017 against the respondent’s past liability towards loan
of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) issued/given by the
respondent to the appellant, in terms of the provisions under
Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. Clearly, as hereinunder
observed, on the date of issuance of said cheque/cheque in
question when the appellant’s liability stands resurrected in view
of the said provision/provision under Section 25(3) of the Contract
Act, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to assert that on the
date of presentation of the dishonoured cheque for encashment, no
debt or liability existed or that the said cheque was merely issued
as ‘security’.
25. Here, it is further pertinent to note that though, on one
hand, the appellant opted not to lead any evidence in his defence
before the Ld. Trial Court, on the other hand, nothing material has
emerged even from the cross examination of the respondent. In this
regard, it is pertinent to reproduce the relevant extracts from the
respondent’s/CW-1’s cross-examination, as under;
“…The accused approached me for loan in the
year 2013. He had come for loan alone. I do not
remember the exact date, month and year when I gave
the loan to accused. Vol. I have already filed the
documentary proof of same on record. I have no
family relation with the accused. There were only
friendly relations with the accused. I had given a loan
of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the accused personally after
borrowing from the society in my name. One another
loan was given by the society to the accused upon my
insistence of Rs. 1,00,000/- in which, I was the
guarantor and on default of the accused to repay the
same that was also recovered from me by the society. I
had given the loan to the accused in cash after
withdrawing from bank account. I had given the loan
to the Accused at the house of accused as the accused
was bed-ridden due to accident. I do not remember the
exact date of the accident of accused. The wife of
accused and his two kids were also present in the same
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:45:03 +0530
house at the time of giving loan. The accused had
taken the loan since he needed money for higher study
of his son and due to his accident and also the Bhanji
of accused was getting married. The accused had
returned some money in year 2013-14 by way of
cheque of Rs. 45,000/-. No cash was given to me by
accused. I was not an income tax payee in year 2012. I
have not intimated my department for giving loan. I
had not taken any receipt from the accused for the loan
advanced to him. I have no licence for money lending.
I had given the loan without interest for one year. Vol.
The accused had promised to pay the society interest.
It is correct that the at the time of advancing the loan I
had taken two blank signed cheques from the accused
apart from the cheque in question. The cheque in
question was given by accused in year 2017. It is
incorrect that I had taken any other cheque from
accused. It is wrong to suggest that I had not given the
loan to the accused by taking the same from society. It
is wrong to suggest that accused had repaid Rs.
1,05,000/- to me. It is wrong to suggest that the cheque
in question was for security. It is wrong to suggest that
I have misused the cheque in question in order to
extort the money from the accused in any manner. It is
wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely…”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Significantly, as noted herein, the appellant took a
defence at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.
that he took loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) from
the respondent in 2010 and the cheque in question was handed to
the respondent as security against such loan. Correspondingly, it is
the case of the appellant that he paid a sum of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees
Thirty Thousand only) and Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand
only) to the respondent in cash, in the year 2010-2011 and
subsequently, made a payment of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
Thousand only) by way of cheque in December 2012. Needless to
mention that though, the appellant proclaimed at the time of
framing of notice that he would prove the said facts during trial,
however, from a scrupulous analysis of the material placed on
record, it is observed that the appellant miserably failed to do so.
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:45:08 +0530
On the contrary, during the cross examination of the respondent,
the appellant took altogether a different stand by asserting that he
had paid a sum of Rs. 45,000/- (Rupees Forty Five Thousand only)
to the respondent through cheque in the year 2013-14 and even
went ahead to suggest that he/the appellant paid a sum of Rs.
1,05,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Five Thousand only), cumulatively
to the respondent, which respondent denied. Quite lucidly, under
such circumstances, this Court is in concurrence with the finding
of the Ld. Trial Court that the respondent, in the facts of the present
case, has not been able to rebut the presumption under Section 139
NI Act, even on preponderance of probability(ies). As aforenoted,
this Court further concurs with the observation of the Ld. Trial
Court that the appellant took inconsistent/contradictory plea of
defence before the Ld. Trial Court, besides averring that the loan of
Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) was obtained by him/the
appellant from the respondent in the year 2010 for which he had
executed an undertaking (Ex. CW1/A) in the year 2012. Clearly,
under such circumstances, this Court also concedes that the
occasion for execution of the undertaking dated 20.01.2012 (Ex.
CW1/A) is not forthcoming from the material placed on record.
Needless to reiterate, even in the considered opinion of this Court,
a reasonably prudent man, similarly placed would not execute a
receipt on 20.01.2012 for a loan which he allegedly took in the
year 2010, with a specific undertaking under such receipt that the
said amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) was
received co-terminus with such execution of receipt (Ex. CW1/A)
on 20.01.2012. Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court further
concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the appellant’s
avowal that there was only one loan transaction between the
respondent/complainant and him/appellant is exceedingly
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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improbable.
27. Harmoniously, this Court finds itself in
concert/tandem with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the
appellant admitted at the time of framing of notice under Section
251 Cr.P.C. that he had filled the amount in the dishonoured
cheque, being the loan amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh only) as averred by the respondent under his complaint.
Clearly, it does not appeal to the senses of this Court that once the
appellant admitted the receipt Ex. CW1/A, indicating an amount of
Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) as due and payable by
the appellant to the respondent on such execution, the reason for
filling an amount in the cheque/dishonoured cheque, otherwise
than what was actually (allegedly) owed and payable, is neither
forthcoming from any material placed on record nor does it appeal
as a conduct of a reasonably prudent person. On the contrary, this
Court further concedes with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court
that from the material brought forth on record, that the loan
transaction in question, i.e., loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh only) and that specified under receipt (Ex. CW1/A), are
independent and separate transactions/loan transactions.
Synchronously, this Court further records that the appellant failed
to prove that the alleged payment of Rs. 45,000/- (Rupees Forty
Five Thousand) to the respondent, which the respondent admitted
under his cross examination, was for the loan in dispute and not for
the earlier transaction, as specified under Ex. CW1/A. Notably,
though, the appellant further proclaimed before the Ld. Trial Court
that he had repaid the entire loan in December 2012, however,
failed to adduce any independent witnesses in support of his said
avowal. Correspondingly, though, the appellant proclaimed that
besides the cheque in question, two other cheques were handed
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.09
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over by him to the respondent, however, no material has been
brought on record to demonstrate that the appellant at any point in
time requested for the return of the said cheques from the
respondent, except for mere oral assertion of the appellant before
the Ld. Trial Court. Needless to mention that the appellant has also
not brought on record, whether any complaint/criminal complaint
and/or proceedings were initiated by him against the respondent
upon the respondent’s refusal to return the cheques. The same is
notwithstanding the fact that the cheque in question was
dishonored for the reason for insufficiency of funds, in contrast to
the stoppage of payment by/at the behest of the appellant, upon
respondent’s alleged refusal to return the appellant’s cheque(s).
28. Pertinent to further note that during the course of
proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the appellant indirectly
endeavored to challenge the financial capacity of the respondent to
lend the loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). However,
in this regard it is outrightly observed that the law in aspect is trite1
that it is not obligatory on the complainant to first assert his
financial capacity in the case of cheque dishonour, unless an
accused sets up a case regarding such complainant’s wherewithal.
Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6
SCC 735, wherein the Hon’ble Court expounded the law regarding
the foregoing as under;
“10. The trial court and the first appellate court
have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI
Act the complainant need not show in the first
instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings
under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit. At
the time, when the complainant gives his evidence,
unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the
statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not
1
APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers, (2020) 12 SCC 724; and K. Ilayarajalingam v.
K. Karthikeyan, Crl. R.C. No. 1123 of 2017, dated 20.06.2022 (Madras HC).
CA No. 63/2023 Kuldeep Singh v. Badlu Ram Page No. 35 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09 16:45:20 +0530
have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the
complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he
had the financial capacity. To that extent, the courts in
our view were right in holding on those lines.
However, the accused has the right to demonstrate
that the complainant in a particular case did not have
the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is
acceptable which he can do by producing independent
materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and
producing documents. It is also open to him to
establish the very same aspect by pointing to the
materials produced by the complainant himself. He
can further, more importantly, achieve this result
through the cross-examination of the witnesses of the
complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the
courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality
of the evidence and then come to a conclusion
whether in the given case, the accused has shown that
the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason
that the accused has established a probable defence”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Strikingly, in the instant case, the appellant did not
challenge the financial capacity of the respondent to lend the
amount even under its reply to legal demand notice dated
14.06.2017, however, merely posed certain question to the
respondent in this regard under his cross examination, whereupon,
the respondent asserted that he loaned the amount, after obtaining
loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) from the
Cooperative Society vide Ex. CW1/B. Needless to mention,
nothing has been brought on record by the appellant to belie the
said assertion of the respondent, except for a blatant denial.
Clearly, under instant facts and circumstances, the appellant’s
feeble plea of ‘so called’ lack of financial capacity of the
respondent would not operate to the benefit of the appellant, when
the advance of loan is proved by credible material on record.
30. Conspicuously, in light of the foregoing, this Court
unambiguously reiterates that the various pleas of defence of the
appellant inter alia pertaining to the dishonoured cheque being
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.09
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issued for security or there being no debt or liability as the amount
against loan was allegedly repaid by the appellant to the
respondent or that the cheque in question was misused by the
respondent, do not appeal to the senses of this Court, for the
reasons noted hereinabove. On the contrary, the said pleas of
defence, in considered opinion of this Court, are not only
afterthoughts, flimsy and insubstantial, rather, unbelievable, and
unconvincing. Needless to reiterate that to rebut the statutory
presumption under Section 118/139 NI Act, it is not expected from
an accused/appellant herein to prove his defence ‘ beyond
reasonable doubt’ and that the same may be done by bringing
‘something which is probable’ on record for getting the burden of
proof shifted to the complainant. However, in the instant case, the
appellant has failed to bring forth any such facts and
circumstances, upon consideration of which, this Court may either
believe that the consideration and debt did not exist, or that its non-
existence was so probable that a, “prudent man would under the
circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not
exist.” On the contrary, as aforenoted, the inherent inconsistencies
and discordances in the various versions put forth by the appellant
in his defence, make the same highly implausible and trifling.
Correspondingly, this Court concurs with the finding of the Ld.
Trial Court that the appellant has not been able to rebut the initial
presumption raised against him.
31. Conclusively, in conspectus of the above and inter
alia keeping in view consistent testimony of the
complainant/respondent/CW-1 as well as the documents and
material placed on record, the only conclusion which can be
arrived at in the facts and circumstances brought forth pertains to
the guilt of the appellant for the commission of the offence under
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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Section 138 NI Act. Needless to reiterate that the defence/pleas of
defence raised by the appellant are not only uninspiring and
undeserving of any credence, rather, irreconcilable as well as
lackluster. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation in reasonably
reaching a conclusion that the respondent/complainant has proved
its case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ against the appellant for the
offence under Section 138 NI Act. On the contrary, the appellant
has failed to raise a probable defence/defence by ‘preponderance
of probabilities’ in his favour for the reasons hereinunder noted.
32. Significantly, in as much as the aspect of sentence
awarded to the appellant by the Ld. Trial Court is concerned, this
Court, at the outset, notes that the superior courts have persistently
cautioned towards the grant of just and appropriate sentence, post-
conviction, as well as cautioned1 that mere long pendency of case
is no ground to award lesser sentence. In fact, in the instances of
cheque dishonour cases, law is settled 2 that the sentence imposed
must be such as to give proper effect to the object of the legislation
and to dissuade unscrupulous drawers of such negotiable
instruments from taking advantage of their own wrongs. In this
regard, reference is made to the decision in Suganthi Suresh
Kumar v. Jagdeeshan, (2002) 2 SCC 420, wherein the Hon’ble
Apex Court unswervingly opined as under;
“12. The total amount covered by the cheques
involved in the present two cases was Rs 4,50,000.
There is no case for the respondent that the said
amount had been paid either during the pendency of
the cases before the trial court or revision before the
High Court or this Court. If the amounts had been paid
to the complainant there perhaps would have been
justification for imposing a flea-bite sentence as had
been chosen by the trial court. But in a case where the
amount covered by the cheque remained unpaid it
should be the lookout of the trial Magistrates that the1
State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh, (2003) 8 SCC 13.
2
H. Pukhraj v. D. Parasmal, (2015) 17 SCC 368.
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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sentence for the offence under Section 138 should be
of such a nature as to give proper effect to the object of
the legislation. No drawer of the cheque can be
allowed to take dishonour of the cheque issued by him
light-heartedly. The very object of enactment of
provisions like Section 138 of the Act would stand
defeated if the sentence is of the nature passed by the
trial Magistrate. It is a different matter if the accused
paid the amount at least during the pendency of the
case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.
Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260 , while fervently professing
towards the grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of
compensation to the complainant/victim in cheque dishonour
cases, avowed as under;
“17. The apparent intention is to ensure that not
only the offender is punished, but also ensure that the
complainant invariably receives the amount of the
cheque by way of compensation under Section 357(1)
(b) of the Code. Though a complaint under Section
138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the
offence of dishonouring the cheque and not for the
recovery of the cheque amount (which strictly
speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in
practice once the criminal complaint is lodged under
Section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed to
recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of
the provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to
the cheque amount and the usual direction in such
cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque
amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on
account of dishonour of cheque, under Section 357(1)
(b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the
offences under Section 138 of the Act. Most of the
cases (except those where liability is denied) get
compounded at one stage or the other by payment of
the cheque amount with or without interest. Even
where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend
to direct payment of compensation equal to the cheque
amount (or even something more towards interest) by
levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount.
A stage has reached when most of the complainants,
in particular the financing institutions (particularly
private financiers) view the proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the
recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour,
becoming secondary.
18. Having reached that stage, if some Magistrates
go by the traditional view that the criminal
proceedings are for imposing punishment on the
accused, either imprisonment or fine or both, and
there is no need to compensate the complainant,
particularly if the complainant is not a “victim” in the
real sense, but is a well-to-do financier or financing
institution, difficulties and complications arise. In
those cases where the discretion to direct payment of
compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable
difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the
time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for
filing civil cases would have expired. As the
provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean
towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of
compensation, the courts should, unless there are
special circumstances, in all cases of conviction,
uniformly exercise the power to levy fine up to twice
the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque
amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per
annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct
payment of such amount as compensation. Direction
to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to
the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should
be practical and realistic, which would mean not only
the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon
at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in
deciding similar cases by different courts, not only
increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable
instrument, but also the credibility of courts of
justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Ergo, wary of the aforenoted judicial dictates, facts
and circumstances of the present case as well as the arguments
addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as the
respondent, this Court unswervingly observes that the Ld. Trial
Court has acted quite leniently with the appellant by awarding
sentence/rigorous imprisonment for a period of 04 (four) months
along with fine of Rs. 1,60,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Sixty
Thousand only), to be paid/released as compensation to the
respondent/complainant, in the default of payment of which, the
appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
CA No. 63/2023 Kuldeep Singh v. Badlu Ram Page No. 40 of 41
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.06.09
16:45:45 +0530
further period of 02 (two) months. Needless to mention that in the
instant case, substantial time has lapsed since the initiation of the
complaint proceedings by the respondent in the year, 2017,
culminating in its adjudication in the present appeal, the
complainant/respondent, being embroiled in litigation for
dishonoured cheque during the interregnum. Needless to further
mention that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any mitigating
factor, convincing this Court to grant any relaxation in
his/appellant’s favour.
35. Conclusively, in view of the above discussion, the
present appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
The judgment dated judgment dated 23.01.2023 and the
consequent order of sentence dated 16.02.2023, passed by Ld.
MM-01 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case
bearing; ‘Badlu Ram v. Kuldeep Singh, Ct. Case No. 9259/2017’,
convicting and sentencing the appellant, respectively, for the
offence under Section 138 NI Act, are hereby upheld. Appellant is
directed to surrender before the Ld. Trial Court within a period of
seven days from today for serving the sentence/remainder period
thereof.
36. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of
this order/judgment, with direction to proceed against the
appellant as per law. Copy of this order/judgment be also given
dasti to the appellant. Further, compliance of the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (UOI)
& Ors., MANU/SC/1147/2024 has been carried out.
37. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due
compliance. ABHISHEK by
GOYAL
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK
GOYAL
Date: 2025.06.09
16:45:51 +0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 09.06.2025. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CA No. 63/2023 Kuldeep Singh v. Badlu Ram Page No. 41 of 41
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