Himachal Pradesh High Court
Lucky vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors on 21 June, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 5299 of 2025
Reserved on: 04.06.2025
Date of Decision: 21st June, 2025.
Lucky ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & ors. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Nitish, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State. : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking a
direction to the respondents to decide his case in a time-bound
manner and release him on parole for 28 days on terms and
conditions, which the Court may deem fit.
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was convicted for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376D & 392
read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC‘) by
learned District and Sessions Judge Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. in FIR
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
No. 59/2013 registered at Police Station Manali, District Kullu, H.P.
He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years
and to pay a fine of ₹ 15,000/-with default clause. The petitioner
has completed more than 10 years and two months behind the bars.
He applied for parole to meet his family members, but this
application was not decided within time; therefore, the present
petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a reply asserting that
the petitioner was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Kullu,
District Kullu, for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 376D & 392 read with Section 34 of the IPC. He was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and to
pay a fine of ₹ 15,000/- with a default sentence. The petitioner is
serving his sentence at Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmaur,
H.P. He had undergone a total substantive sentence of 11 years, 9
months and 19 days on 24.04.2025, excluding the period of
parole/remission. His conduct/behaviour in jail was found good. He
had applied for parole on 04 occasions, but his parole request was
rejected by the competent authority on the recommendation of the
concerned district authorities. He was released on 15 days’ parole
twice in compliance with the orders passed by this Court in CWP
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
No. 1014/2023 dated 03.04.2023 and CWP No. 2640 of 2024 dated
20.05.2024, respectively. He again applied for 42 days’ parole to
meet his family. His request was forwarded to the District
Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Kullu. The case was not
recommended by the District Magistrate, Kullu, vide his letter
dated 29.01.2025. The victim is a foreign national and could not be
contacted; hence, her consent/objection could not be obtained. The
petitioner is a resident of Nepal, and he is likely to abscond. Bhagat
Ram, the petitioner’s father, was not found at the given address.
Sunder Singh, the owner of the house, stated that Bhagat Ram
vacated the room after the death of his wife. Petitioner’s wife and
daughter reside in a shed near the dumping shed in Solangnalla.
She claimed that she did not want to maintain any relationship
with the petitioner; hence, it was prayed that the present petition
be dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr. Nitish, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Nitish, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted
that the petitioner had applied for parole on an earlier occasion as
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
well. The parole was rejected. He filed writ petitions before this
Court, which were allowed, and the petitioner was released on
parole. The apprehension expressed by the police that the
petitioner would abscond is not justified because the petitioner
surrendered after he was released on parole as per the orders of
this Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and that the petitioner be released on parole.
6. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is
not a permanent resident of India and is a resident of Nepal and can
abscond in case of his release on parole. The petitioner applied for
parole to meet his family members, but his father had left the
address mentioned by the petitioner. The petitioner’s wife does not
want to meet him; therefore, the very purpose of the petition does
not survive. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asfaq
v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 390: 2017
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
SCC OnLine SC 1092, that parole grants an opportunity to the convict
to maintain his links with society. Convicts must breathe fresh air
for at least some time. If they maintain good conduct during
incarceration and show a tendency to reform themselves, parole
should not be denied to them. It was observed at page 60:-
“10. In the first instance, it would be necessary to understand
the meaning and purpose of the grant of parole. It would be
better understood when considered in contrast with
furlough. These terms have been legally defined and
judicially explained by the courts from time to time.
11. There is a subtle distinction between parole and furlough.
A parole can be defined as the conditional release of
prisoners, i.e. an early release of a prisoner, conditional on
good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a
set period of time. It can also be defined as a form of
conditional pardon by which the convict is released before
the expiration of his term. Thus, the parole is granted for
good behaviour on the condition that the parolee regularly
reports to a supervising officer for a specified period. Such a
release of the prisoner on parole can also be temporary on
some basic grounds. In that eventuality, it is to be treated as
a mere suspension of the sentence for the time being,
keeping the quantum of sentence intact. Release on parole is
designed to afford some relief to the prisoners in certain
specified exigencies. Such paroles are normally granted in
certain situations, some of which may be as follows:
(i) a member of the prisoner’s family has died or is
seriously ill, or the prisoner himself is seriously ill; or
(ii) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son,
daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister,
sister’s son or daughter is to be celebrated; or
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
(iii) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary
for ploughing, sowing or harvesting or carrying on any
other agricultural operation of his land or his father’s
undivided land actually in possession of the prisoner;
or
(iv) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient
cause;
(v) parole can be granted only after a portion of the
sentence is already served;
(vi) if conditions of parole are not abided by, the
parolee may be returned to serve his sentence in
prison; such conditions may be such as those of
committing a new offence, and
(vii) parole may also be granted on the basis of aspects
related to the health of the convict himself.
12. Many State Governments have formulated guidelines on
parole in order to bring out objectivity in the decision making
and to decide as to whether parole needs to be granted in a
particular case or not. Such a decision in those cases is taken
in accordance with the guidelines framed. Guidelines of some
of the States stipulate two kinds of parole, namely, custody
parole and regular parole. “Custody parole” is generally
granted in emergent circumstances like:
(i) death of a family member;
(ii) marriage of a family member;
(iii) serious illness of a family member; or
(iv) any other emergent circumstances.
13. As far as “regular parole” is concerned, it may be given in
the following cases:
(i) serious illness of a family member;
(ii) critical conditions in the family on account of the
accident or death of a family member;
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
(iii) marriage of any member of the family of the
convict;
(iv) delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if there
is no other family member to take care of the spouse at
home;
(v) serious damage to the life or property of the family
of the convict, including damage caused by natural
calamities;
(vi) to maintain family and social ties;
(vii) to pursue the filing of a special leave petition
before this Court against a judgment delivered by the
High Court convicting or upholding the conviction, as
the case may be.
14. Furlough, on the other hand, is a brief release from
prison. It is conditional and is given in case of long-term
imprisonment. The period of sentence spent on furlough by
the prisoners need not be undergone by him as is done in the
case of parole. Furlough is granted as a good conduct
remission.
15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for the
period of sentence or rest of his life in case he is a life convict.
It is in this context that his release from jail for a short period
has to be considered as an opportunity afforded to him not
only to solve his personal and family problems but also to
maintain his links with society. Convicts, too, must breathe
fresh air for at least some time, provided they maintain good
conduct consistently during incarceration and show a
tendency to reform themselves and become good citizens.
Thus, the redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners
for the good of societies must receive due weightage while
they are undergoing a sentence of imprisonment.
16. This Court, through various pronouncements, has laid
down the differences between parole and furlough, a few of
which are as under:
(i) Both parole and furlough are conditional releases.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
(ii) Parole can be granted in case of short-term
imprisonment, whereas furlough it is granted in case
of long-term imprisonment.
(iii) Duration of parole extends to one month, whereas
in the case of furlough, it extends to fourteen days
maximum.
(iv) Parole is granted by the Divisional Commissioner,
and furlough is granted by the Deputy Inspector
General of Prisons.
(v) For parole, a specific reason is required, whereas
furlough is meant for breaking the monotony of
imprisonment.
(vi) The term of imprisonment is not included in the
computation of the term of parole, whereas it is vice
versa in furlough.
(vii) Parole can be granted a number of times, whereas
there is a limitation in the case of furlough.
(viii) Since furlough is not granted for any particular
reason, it can be denied in the interest of society.
(See State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Pandurang
Darvakar [State of Maharashtra v. Suresh
Pandurang Darvakar, (2006) 4 SCC 776: (2006) 2
SCC (Cri) 411] and State of Haryana v. Mohinder
Singh [State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, (2000)
3 SCC 394: 2000 SCC (Cri) 645].)
17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst
the various grounds on which parole can be granted, the
most important ground, which stands out, is that a prisoner
should be allowed to maintain family and social ties. For this
purpose, he has to come out for some time so that he can
maintain his family and social contact. This reason finds
justification in one of the objectives behind sentence and
punishment, namely, the reformation of the convict. The
theory of criminology, which is largely accepted, underlines
that the main objectives which a State intends to achieve by
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
punishing the culprit are: deterrence, prevention, retribution
and reformation. When we recognise reformation as one of
the objectives, it provides justification for letting out even
the life convicts for short periods, on parole, in order to
afford opportunities to such convicts not only to solve their
personal and family problems but also to maintain their links
with the society. Another objective which this theory
underlines is that even such convicts have the right to
breathe fresh air, albeit for (sic short periods. These gestures
on the part of the State, along with other measures, go a long
way for the redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners.
They are ultimately aimed for the good of society and,
therefore, are in the public interest.
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide for a
humanistic approach towards those lodged in jails. The main
purpose of such provisions is to afford them an opportunity
to solve their personal and family problems and to enable
them to maintain their links with society. Even citizens of
this country have a vested interest in preparing offenders for
successful re-entry into society. Those who leave prison
without strong networks of support, without employment
prospects, without a fundamental knowledge of the
communities to which they will return, and without
resources, stand a significantly higher chance of failure.
When offenders revert to criminal activity upon release, they
frequently do so because they lack hope of merging into
society as accepted citizens. Furloughs or parole can help
prepare offenders for success.
19. Having noted the aforesaid public purpose in granting
parole or furlough, ingrained in the reformation theory of
sentencing, other competing public interests has also to be
kept in mind while deciding as to whether, in a particular
case, parole or furlough is to be granted or not. This public
interest also demands that those who are habitual offenders
and may have the tendency to commit the crime again after
their release on parole, or have the tendency to become a
threat to the law and order of society, should not be released
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
on parole. This aspect takes care of other objectives of
sentencing, namely, deterrence and prevention. This side of
the coin is the experience that a great number of crimes are
committed by the offenders who have been put back in the
street after conviction. Therefore, while deciding as to
whether a particular prisoner deserves to be released on
parole or not, the aforesaid aspects have also to be kept in
mind. To put it tersely, the authorities are supposed to
address the question as to whether the convict is such a
person who has the tendency to commit such a crime, or he is
showing a tendency to reform himself to become a good
citizen.
20. Thus, not all people in prison are appropriate for the
grant of furlough or parole. Obviously, society must isolate
those who show patterns of preying upon victims. Yet
administrators ought to encourage those offenders who
demonstrate a commitment to reconcile with society and
whose behaviour shows that they aspire to live as law-
abiding citizens. Thus, the parole programme should be used
as a tool to shape such adjustments.
21. To sum up, in introducing penal reforms, the State that
runs the administration on behalf of the society and for the
benefit of the society at large cannot be unmindful of
safeguarding the legitimate rights of the citizens in regard to
their security in matters of life and liberty. It is for this
reason that in introducing such reforms, the authorities
cannot be oblivious of the obligation to the society to render
it immune from those who are prone to criminal tendencies
and have proved their susceptibility to indulge in criminal
activities by being found guilty (by a court) of having
perpetrated a criminal act. One of the discernible purposes of
imposing the penalty of imprisonment is to render society
immune from the criminal for a specified period. It is,
therefore, understandable that while meting out humane
treatment to the convicts, care has to be taken to ensure that
kindness to the convicts does not result in cruelty to society.
Naturally enough, the authorities would be anxious to ensure
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
that the convict who is released on furlough does not seize
the opportunity to commit another crime when he is at large
for the time being under the furlough leave granted to him by
way of a measure of penal reform.
22. Another vital aspect that needs to be discussed is as to
whether there can be any presumption that a person who is
convicted of a serious or heinous crime is to be, ipso facto,
treated as a hardened criminal. The hardened criminal would
be a person for whom it has become a habit or way of life, and
such a person would necessarily tend to commit crimes again
and again. Obviously, if a person has committed a serious
offence for which he is convicted, but at the same time it is
also found that it is the only crime he has committed, he
cannot be categorised as a hardened criminal. In his case,
consideration should be given as to whether he is showing
the signs to reform himself and become a good citizen, or
there are circumstances which would indicate that he has a
tendency to commit the crime again or that he would be a
threat to the society. The mere nature of the offence
committed by him should not be a factor to deny the parole
outrightly. Wherever a person convicted has suffered
incarceration for a long time, he can be granted temporary
parole, irrespective of the nature of the offence for which he
was sentenced. We may hasten to put a rider here viz. in
those cases where a person has been convicted for
committing a serious offence, the competent authority,
while examining such cases, can be well advised to have
stricter standards in mind while judging their cases on the
parameters of good conduct, habitual offender or while
judging whether he could be considered highly dangerous or
prejudicial to the public peace and tranquillity, etc.
23. There can be no cavil in saying that a society that believes
in the worth of the individuals can have the quality of its
belief judged, at least in part, by the quality of its prisons and
services and the recourse made available to the prisoners.
Being in a civilised society organised with law and a system
as such, it is essential to ensure every citizen a reasonably
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
dignified life. If a person commits any crime, it does not
mean that by committing a crime, he ceases to be a human
being and that he can be deprived of those aspects of life
which constitute human dignity. For a prisoner, all
fundamental rights are an enforceable reality, though
restricted by the fact of imprisonment. [See Sunil Batra
(2) v. State (UT of Delhi) [Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of Delhi),
(1980) 3 SCC 488: 1980 SCC (Cri) 777], Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248]
and Charles Sobraj v. Supt., Central Jail [Charles Sobraj v. Supt.,
Central Jail, (1978) 4 SCC 104: 1978 SCC (Cri) 542] .]
24. It is also to be kept in mind that by the time an
application for parole is moved by a prisoner, he would have
spent some time in jail. During this period, various
reformatory methods must have been applied. We can take
judicial note of this fact, having regard to such reformation
facilities available in modern jails. One would know by this
time as to whether there is a habit of relapsing into crime in
spite of having administered correctional treatment. This
habit, known as “recidivism”, reflects the fact that the
correctional therapy has not brought (sic any change in the
mind of the criminal. It also shows that a criminal is
hardcore, who is beyond correctional therapy. If the
correctional therapy has not been made in itself, in a
particular case, such a case can be rejected on the aforesaid
ground, i.e. on its merits.
25. We are not oblivious of the fact that there may be
hardcore criminals who, by reason of their crime and the
methods of dealing with the crime, form associations,
loyalties and attitudes which tend to persist. There may even
be peer pressure when such convicts are out to commit those
crimes again. There may be pressure of being ostracised from
delinquent groups, which may lead them to commit the
crime again. Persistence in criminal behaviour may also be
due to personality traits, most frequently due to pathological
traits of personality, such as mental defectiveness, emotional
instability, mental conflicts, egocentrism and psychosis. In
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
regard to relapse or recidivism, Frank Exner, a noted
criminologist and sociologist, points out that the chances of
repeating increase with the number of previous arrests and
the interval between the last and the next offence becomes
shortened as the number of previous crimes progresses
[ Frank Exner, Kriminologie, pp. 115-120]. The purpose of the
criminological study is the prognosis of the improvable
occasional offenders and that of the irredeemable habitual
offenders and hardcore criminals. To differentiate the
recidivists from non-recidivists and dangerous and hard-
core criminals from occasional criminals had been
enumerated by Exner in the following flowsheet:
(i) Hereditary weakness in the family life.
(ii) Increasing tempo of criminality.
(iii) Bad conditions in the parental home.
(iv) Bad school progress (especially in deportment and
industriousness).
(v) Failure to complete studies once begun.
(vi) Irregular work (work shyness).
(vii) Onset of criminality before 18 years of age.
(viii) More than four previous sentences.
(ix) Quick relapse of crime.
(x) Interlocal criminality (mobility).
(xi) Psychopathic personality (diagnosis of
institutional doctor).
(xii) Alcoholism.
(xiii) Release from the institution before 36 years of
age.
(xiv) Bad conduct in the institution.
(xv) Bad social and family relations during the period of
release.
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At the same time, as criminality is the expression of the
“symptom” of a certain disorder in the offenders, they can
be easily reformed if they are rightly diagnosed and the
correct treatment is administered to them.”
9. This Court also held in Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P.,
2019 SCC OnLine HP 3599, that the parole can be denied if the
release of the convict is likely to endanger the security of the State
or for the maintenance of public order. The mere nature of the
offence cannot be a ground to deny parole when the prisoner’s
conduct shows a tendency to reform himself. It was observed:
“17. For rejection of an application for parole, there are two
grounds set out in Section 6 of the Act. Firstly, in case a
prisoner is released, he will likely to endanger the security of
the State. Admittedly, the petitioner has been convicted for
the offence committed under Section 302 IPC. But, in no way,
it could be inferred that he is likely to endanger the security
of the State, and even if so, the State has got enormous
powers to put restrictions on the petitioner to protect the
Security of the State. The second ground is the maintenance
of public order. In this regard, in the response made by the
District Magistrate, there is no reference as to whether he
laid a threat to public order.
18. When these two grounds, set out in Section 6 of the Act,
are not reflected or mirrored in the report of the District
Magistrate, we have to presume that the District Magistrate
has given its report without application of mind. When a
provision or a statute directs an officer to do a particular job
in a particular manner, it shall be the duty of that officer to
do the said job in that particular manner only. When a
District Magistrate is directed to make a report on the basis
of assessment in an objective manner, he shall do it in that
manner only.
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19. Further, the rejection by the Government or the officer
authorized by the Government should be on two grounds,
namely, when it is likely to endanger the security of the State
or the maintenance of the public order, which are lacking in
the instant case.
20. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, UT
Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1981 SC 746, Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Marshal has aptly said and we quote. “I have previously
stated my views that a prisoner does not shed his basic
constitutional rights at the prison gate, and I fully support
the court’s holding that the interest of the inmate.”
21. In Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295, it has been
held that life means more than mere animal existence. The
right to live is not restricted to mere animal existence. It
means something more than just physical survival.
22. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR
1978 SC 597, which was followed in Francis Coralie v. Delhi
Administration, supra it has been held that right to live does
not mean mere confinement to physical existence but it
includes within its ambit the right to live with human
dignity.
23. Seeking parole/remission/pre-mature release or furlough
is not a right of a detinue. However, the same has to be
considered in the light of the observations made
hereinabove. The consideration should always keep in view
the rights of the prisoners. The release of a prisoner from jail
for a short period has to be considered as an opportunity
afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family
problems but also to maintain his links with society.
Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least some time,
provided they maintain good conduct during incarceration
and show a tendency to reform themselves and become good
citizens.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of
Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55, in para 15 of the judgment has
held as under:
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
“15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for
the period of sentence or rest of his life in case he is a life
convict. It is in this context that his release from jail for a
short period has to be considered as an opportunity
afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family
problems but also to maintain his links with society.
Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least some time,
provided they maintain good conduct consistently during
incarceration and show a tendency to reform themselves
and become good citizens. Thus, redemption and
rehabilitation of such prisoners for the good of societies
must receive due weightage while they are undergoing
sentence of imprisonment.”
25. From the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has propounded a reformative
theory. Under the said concept, an opportunity is to be
granted to a person to get himself reformed, and in case he
gets himself reformed, he will be a person to live in society. It
is also worthwhile to extract the relevant portions of paras 17
and 18 of the said judgment herein:
“17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst
the various grounds on which parole can be granted, the
most important ground, which stands out, is that a
prisoner should be allowed to maintain family and social
ties. For this purpose, he has to come out for some time so
that he is able to maintain his family and social contact.
This reason finds justification in one of the objectives
behind sentence and punishment, namely, the reformation
of the convict……
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide for
a humanistic approach towards those lodged in jails. The
main purpose of such provisions is to afford them an
opportunity to solve their personal and family problems
and to enable them to maintain their links with society…”
26. Many a time, the State takes up the ground that the
prisoner has committed a heinous offence and granting
parole/remission or pre-mature release is likely to endanger
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
the security of the State or the maintenance of the public
order. From the above discussion, we feel that the conviction
in a serious and heinous crime cannot be the reason for
denying parole per se. Having noted the aforesaid public
purpose in granting parole or furlough, ingrained in the
reformation theory of sentencing, other competing public
interests has also to be kept in mind while deciding as to
whether, in a particular case, parole or furlough is to be
granted or not. This public interest also demands that those
who are habitual offenders and may have the tendency to
commit the crime again after their release on parole, or have
the tendency to become a threat to the law and order of
society, should not be released on parole. Wherever a person
convicted has suffered incarceration for a long time, he can
be granted temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of the
offence for which he was sentenced.
27. In Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4 SCC
161, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the behaviour
of the prisoners shows responsibility and trustworthiness,
liberal though cautious, parole will be allowed to them so
that their family ties may be maintained and inner tensions
may not further build up.
28. In Shakuntala Devi v. State of Delhi, (1996) 36 DRJ 545, it
has been held as under:
“5. In Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan, it has been held by
their Lordship that’ “Release on parole is a wing of
reformative process and is expected to provide opportunity
to the prisoner to transform himself into a useful citizen.”
In Inder Singh v. State, the Apex Court has devised another
humanizing strategy, viz., a guarded parole release every
year, for at least a month, punctuating the total prison
term, for maintaining his family ties. A prisoner cannot
maintain his family ties by living in a small world of his
own cribbed, cabined and confined within the four walls of
the prison. In the case of Inder Singh (supra), their
lordships directed that:–
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“…….. if the behaviour of the prisoners shows
responsibility and trustworthiness, liberal though
cautious, parole will be allowed to them so that their
family ties may be maintained and inner tensions
may not further build up. After every period of one
year, they should be enlarged on parole for two
months. ‘Their lordships further added that “Article
21 of the Constitution is the jurisdiction root for this
legal liberalism.”
10. The parole was rejected because of the report submitted
by the police that there are chances of the petitioner’s absconding
in case of his release on parole. Earlier also, the parole was rejected
on the same ground, and this Court released the petitioner in CWP
No. 1014 of 2023, decided on 03.04.2023, and CWP No. 2640 of
2024, decided on 20.05.2024. It has not been mentioned in the reply
that the petitioner had violated the conditions mentioned in the
parole order or had failed to surrender within time. Thus, the
apprehension expressed by the State is not justified.
11. It was submitted that the petitioner’s wife did not want
to meet him, and his father had left the country. However, no
statement of the petitioner’s wife was recorded and the plea taken
by the respondent/State cannot be accepted to be correct.
12. Therefore, in view of the above, the present petition is
allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be released on parole for 28
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )days subject to his furnishing of personal bond in the sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- and two surety bonds in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the Superintendent Jail with an undertaking to
maintain good conduct during the period of parole and to surrender
before the Superintendent Jail after the expiry of the parole. The
Probation Officer is also directed to maintain a close watch on the
activities of the petitioner and to report any deviation from the
direction issued by the Court.
13. The Superintendent Jail is free to impose any other
suitable condition at the time of the release of the petitioner.
14. Before parting, it is necessary to observe here that the
petitioner’s case for parole was rejected on the same grounds which
were held to be untenable in the previous petitions filed by him.
This shows that the parole sanctioning authority does not go
through the orders passed by this Court or does not care for them.
Either of these possibilities flouts the Rule of Law and forces the
prisoners to knock at the door of the Court, which clogs the docket
of the Court. It is sincerely hoped and trusted that the parole
sanctioning authority shall go through the orders passed by this
Court in future to prevent the recurrence of such incidents lest the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:19168 )
Court may be constrained to impose costs recoverable from the
defaulting officers to uphold the Rule of Law.
15. The present petition stands disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
21 June 2025
st
Judge
(Saurav Pathania)