M/S Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills … vs The State Of Telangana on 29 April, 2025

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Telangana High Court

M/S Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills … vs The State Of Telangana on 29 April, 2025

Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka

Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka

       HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

              WRIT PETITION No. 33361 OF 2023

O R D E R:

Heard Sri A.K. Jayaprakash Rao, learned counsel

for petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Labour on

behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 and Sri K.V. Satya Ramachandra

Rao, learned counsel on behalf of the 4th respondent.

2. The Writ Petition filed by Petitioner challenging the

proceedings initiated by Respondent No.2 under Section 33-C(1)

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’) against

Petitioner and its properties in CRLMP No. 1722 of 2023 on the

file of the Hon’ble XII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

City Criminal Courts at Nampally, Hyderabad. These

proceedings were initiated for recovery of a sum of

Rs. 30,38,00,000/- (Rupees thirty crores thirty-eight lakhs only)

which was declared payable to the employees of Petitioner under

a Certificate for Recovery No. B/55/2021 dated 03.01.2023.

This certificate was issued based on an alleged settlement

between various recognized Employees’ Unions and Respondent

No.3. Petitioner contends that these proceedings are illegal,
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arbitrary, and not maintainable against Petitioner, hence, seeks

to quash them.

According to Respondent No.2, Petitioner company,

DBR Mills, located in Tank Bund area of Hyderabad, started its

operations in 1920 and later, faced financial difficulties. It was

declared as Sick Industrial Company under Section 15(1) of the

Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985. After a series of

litigations, Respondent No.3 entered into a Development

Agreement with Petitioner on 15-03-1999, where Respondent

No.3 allegedly undertook to settle monetary claims of workers of

the mill, as per the terms of the agreement. Furthermore,

Respondent No.2 contends that under two registered documents

executed by Mrs. K.S. Chenai (bearing Document No.1349 of

2009 dated 27-10-2006 and Document No.1350 of 2009 dated

28-10-2006), Respondent No.3 acquired Acs.6.00 guntas of

Petitioner’s land, making it the absolute owner, with full rights

to deal with it. Respondent No.2 also claims that Respondent

No.3, exercising its ownership over the land, entered into a

statutory settlement with the workers of DBR Mills under

Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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On 07-03-2017, Respondent No.3 allegedly entered

into a settlement with several trade unions of DBR Mills,

wherein Respondent No.3 agreed to pay Rs. 7,00,000/- each to

434 workers, amounting to Rs.30,38,00,000/- in total. However,

Respondent No.3 allegedly failed to comply with the terms of

this settlement. Following a representation from 142 out of the

434 workers requesting recovery of amounts payable to them

under the settlement, Respondent No.2 issued Certificate for

Recovery of Rs. 30,38,00,000/- against Respondent No.3 and

filed CRLMP against Petitioner (Opposite Party No.1) and

Respondent No.3 (Opposite Party No.2) for recovery of amount

as prescribed under Section 421(1) of the Criminal Procedure

Code. It is important to note that Government of Andhra

Pradesh amended Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act,

empowering the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate to recover money owed to workers as the result of a

settlement of an industrial dispute, in the same manner as a

fine imposed by criminal courts. Under Section 421(1) of the

Criminal Procedure Code, procedure for recovering such fine

amounts includes issuance of a warrant for attachment and

sale of any immovable property belonging to the offender.
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Respondent No.2 invoked this section to recover settlement

amount from the properties of Petitioner company, despite

Petitioner being neither a party to settlement nor to proceedings

before Respondent No.2. Petitioner contends that proceedings

initiated against it are illegal because it was not involved in the

settlement between Respondent No.3 and the workers and was

never made a party to the related agreements.

Petitioner submits that Respondent No.2 wrongly

presumed the validity of Development Agreement dated

15-03-1999 and the rights of ownership conferred upon

Respondent No.3. It is alleged that Respondent No.2 did not

verify the legality of the documents presented by Respondent

No.3 and failed to seek Petitioner’s response before making such

a presumption. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that the alleged

development agreement was superseded by a Compromise

Petition filed in O.S.No.69 of 2003, which led to a Compromise

Decree in 1999. This decree, however, never attained finality

and was challenged for over 11 years before being dismissed in

2015. An appeal filed by Respondent No.3 was also dismissed

by this Court in 2022, with strong remarks against Respondent
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No.3 for misleading the court. The Supreme Court similarly

rejected Respondent No.3’s Special Leave Petition in 2022,

further negating Respondent No.3’s claim over the land.

Additionally, Respondent No.2 is not competent to

adjudicate on the ownership rights over the land of Petitioner,

and the agreements entered into by Respondent No.3 with

various unions of DBR Mills under Section 12(3) of the

Industrial Disputes Act are also questioned. Petitioner argues

that none of the Unions involved in the alleged settlement had

the authority to represent the workers, as the officially-elected

unions had been representing the workers and staff of DBR

Mills since 1987. Furthermore, Petitioner asserts that no

meeting with the Joint Commissioner of Labour (TCs) was

attended by them and no third party had the authority to

represent DBR Mills. Therefore, the settlement, even if executed,

is not legally-binding on Petitioner.

In a memorandum dated 20-03-2017, Petitioner

raised strong objection to the Joint Commissioner of Labour

(TCs) regarding settlement agreement, clearly stating that DBR

Mills was not a party to the agreement and that any such
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settlement was made by unauthorized third parties. Petitioner

further emphasizes that Respondent No.2 failed to verify the

legitimacy of Respondent No.3’s representation of Petitioner

company before entering into any negotiations or settlements.

As a result, it is argued that Respondent No.2 violated basic

principles of natural justice and it amounts to misuse of

authority.

Respondent No.2 is also criticized for issuing a

verification report dated 25-05-2017, claiming that 434

employees were working at DBR Mills at the time of closure in

May 1991 and awarding Rs. 7,00,000/- per employee, totaling

Rs. 30.38 crores. Despite Petitioner being neither a party to the

agreement nor to the subsequent proceedings, they were

wrongfully named as the first respondent in CRLMP

proceedings. This is seen as an attempt to cover up the illegality

of Respondent No.2’s actions in allowing an unauthorized

settlement between third parties and unions without consulting

or informing Petitioner.

Furthermore, workers from the Union of DBR Mills

Displaced Workers Association filed a petition under Section
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33-C(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, claiming back wages for

18 years. This Petition was dismissed by this Court on

13.07.2021 and the workers subsequently filed Writ Petition No.

29970 of 2021. Some of the Unions involved in the settlement

filed separate petitions in 2019 claiming payments as agreed by

Respondent No.3, but Petitioner did not sign any settlement

under the Industrial Disputes Act. Petitioner argues that it was

wrongfully included in CRLMP proceedings.

Given these circumstances, Petitioner contends that

CRLMP No. 1722 of 2023 proceedings before the Hon’ble XII

Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad are illegal,

arbitrary, and initiated without following due process of law.

3. In the counter filed by the 2nd respondent, it is

stated, M/s DBR Mills Limited entered into a Development

Agreement dated 15-03-1999 in favour of M/s Ashish

Developers and Builders (P) Limited, which is now known as

Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd. (formerly Maheshwari

Megaventures Ltd.). Under the terms of the Development

Agreement, it was agreed that either the management of

M/s DBR Mills Limited or the developer, before undertaking any
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development activities on the property in question, must resolve

the claims of the workers. However, if the developer is to settle

the claims of the workers, this responsibility lies with the

developer and must be settled in the account of M/s DBR Mills

Limited. Clause (6) of the Agreement dated 15-03-1999 between

Respondents 1 and 2 outlines this arrangement. Furthermore,

Respondent No. 3, in accordance with the Development

Agreement, informed the Commissioner of Labour about their

undertaking to settle the workers’ claims, subject to mutually-

agreed terms and conditions. This action, taken in the interest

of the workers, was in line with the prolonged litigation and

difficulties faced by the workers. Thus, Petitioner cannot deny

its joint and several liabilities and responsibilities in light of the

actions taken by Respondent No. 3. This Respondent submits

that the landed property bearing Survey Nos. 157/1 to 3, 158/1

& 2, 159/1 and 28, 160/1 to 28, and 161/3 to 7, covering an

area of Acs.34 situated in Elchiguda, Bakaram Village was

allocated to Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai pursuant to the

compromise decree dated 20-10-1967 in the family partition

suit O.S. No. 38 of 1967 before the learned Chief Judge, City

Civil Court, Hyderabad. Prior to the family partition decree, the
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ancestors of Mrs. K.S. Shenoy had leased an extent of Acs.26.00

of land, part of the aforementioned survey numbers to M/s DBR

Mills Limited under a lease deed dated 17th Aban 1328 Fasli

(equivalent to 1918 A.D.). In 1994, M/s DBR Mills stopped

paying rent to Mrs. K.S. Chenai, claiming ownership of the

property under the Inams Abolition Act. This led to Mrs. Chenai

filing a civil suit for eviction and damages against M/s DBR

Mills (O.S. No. 1201/1995). During the pendency of the suit,

Mrs. Chenai entered into an agreement of sale dated

03-12-1998 with M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd.

(subsequently merged with M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd.

as per the orders of this Court dated 22-03-2005 in C.P. Nos.

201, 202, and 203 of 2004). After the various litigations

concerning the mill land were resolved, culminating in the

dismissal of SLP Nos. 13630-13633/05 and SLP 19446/05

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Mrs. K.S. Chenai executed

two registered documents in favour of M/s Maheshwari

Megaventures Ltd. (now M/s Kshitij Infraventures Ltd.)

conveying an area of Acs.6.00 of land, registered under

documents No. 1349/2009 dated 27-10-2006 and No.

1350/2009 dated 28-10-2006. These documents were registered
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by the authorities as per the order of this Court in Writ Petition

No. 25181 of 2005 dated 01-02-2007 and in Contempt Case No.

829/2009 dated 08-04-2009. As a result of the Supreme Court’s

final judgment, M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd. (currently

known as Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) has full ownership and

possession of the 6-acre land and is free to deal with it as it sees

fit.

It is stated, though Petitioner is not a party to the

certificate for recovery amount nor to the statutory agreement,

the employees involved were employed by M/s DBR Mills

Limited and the employee-employer relationship exists until the

full and final settlement of the workers’ claims. Respondent No.

3, who entered into a development agreement with M/s Ashish

Developers & Builders (P) Ltd. and later with M/s Maheshwari

Megaventures Ltd. (now Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.), is

bound to the settlement. One of the clauses of the Development

Agreement grants M/s Ashish Developers and Builders the

liberty to enter into any statutory agreements necessary for the

smooth functioning and completion of the project. The

Petitioner, after completion of the project, is expected to receive
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more than 49% share in the project, along with other amenities.

According to Section 421(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code,

which prescribes the procedure for the recovery of fines imposed

by criminal courts, the Court may issue a warrant for levy of

amount through attachment and sale of any immovable

property belonging to the offender. As the project is a joint

venture under a development agreement, all parties to the

property must agree to the extent of the share of the offending

party (i.e. Respondent No. 3). Thus, Petitioner is a necessary

party in the petition filed before the Criminal Court.

It is also stated that these issues can be raised

before the Criminal Court with all material facts and evidence.

In fact, Petitioner is liable to clear full and final settlement for

the workers. Respondent No. 3 has come forward to implement

this settlement on behalf of Petitioner. Settlement under Section

12(3) of the Act, Condition 11, which was reproduced as

Paragraph (m) of this Affidavit, clearly states that the workers

have undertaken to file necessary affidavits in Writ Appeal No.

391 of 2008, Writ Petition No. 10801 of 2005 and Writ Petition

No. 11349 of 2014, which are pending before this Court.
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It is stated, Petitioner is evading the settlement of

statutory dues to the employees. Despite the Labour

Department and Respondent No. 3 coming forward to settle the

dues, Petitioner failed to cooperate. Furthermore, under the

BIFR rehabilitation scheme, Petitioner is obligated to settle both

the statutory dues and the creditors’ dues, including those of

the workers, which remains an ongoing obligation. As such,

Petitioner may agitate this issue before the Criminal Court with

all available material documents to facilitate their release in the

case.

4. Respondent No. 4 in the counter-affidavit states

that management of petitioner company was taken over in 1985

by S. Krishnam Raju, who serves as the Chairman and

Managing Director (CMD). It was soon discovered that petitioner

company’s mills were under the purview of the Board for

Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). It is clarified

that petitioner company has not been closed and for all legal

purposes, it continues to operate. This Respondent further

affirms that the employees of petitioner company are members

of the 4th Respondent Association. The petitioner company, a
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textile mill established in 1920, had flourished in the mid-1980s

with a workforce of about 5000 employees working in three

shifts. However, the company began to experience a downfall

due to various reasons shortly thereafter. This Respondent

provides information regarding a Development Agreement

executed by M/s DBR Mills Ltd. in favour of M/s Ashish

Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd. (now known as Kshitij

Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) on 15.03.1999. The agreement

stipulates that both the management of DBR Mills and the

developer are responsible for settling workers’ claims before

proceeding with the development activities on the subject

property. Should the developer settle these claims, it would do

so on behalf of DBR Mills Ltd., as per Clause (6) of the

Development Agreement. Therefore, Respondent argues that the

petitioner cannot deny its joint and several liabilities in the

settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947.

It is stated, the landed property, bearing Survey

Numbers 157/1 to 3, 158/1 & 2, 159/1 and 28, 160/1 to 28,

and 161/3 to 7, measuring a total area of 34 acres, is located at
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Elchiguda, Bakaram Village which was allotted to M/s

Khorshed Shapoor Chenai through a compromise deed dated

20.10.1967, following a family partition suit O.S. No. 38 of 1967

in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Prior to the partition decree,

the ancestors of Smt. K. S. Chenai had leased Acs.26.00 of this

land to M/s DBR Mills Ltd under a lease deed dated 17th Aban

1328 FASLI (corresponding to the year 1918 AD). In 1994, DBR

Mills ceased making rent payments to Mrs. K.S. Chenai,

claiming ownership of the land under the Inams Abolition Act,

leading to the filing of a civil suit for eviction (O.S. No.

1201/1995). In the course of the litigation, Mrs. Chenai entered

into an agreement to sell the property to M/s. Ashish

Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd., which later merged with M/s.

Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd (now Kshitij Infraventures Pvt.

Ltd.).

Further, after finalization of litigation surrounding

the mill land, including dismissal of SLP Nos. 13630, 13633/05,

and SLP 19446/05, Mrs. K.S. Chenai executed two registered

documents in favor of M/s. Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd,

conveying 6 acres of land, as per documents 1349/2009 (dated
15

27.10.2006) and 1350/2009 (dated 28.10.2006). These

documents were registered in accordance with the orders of the

Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P. No. 25181 of

2005 (dated 01.02.2007) and the directions in Contempt Case

(CC) No. 829/2009 (dated 08.04.2009). As per the final

settlement of this dispute, M/s. Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd

(now Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) holds absolute ownership

and possession of the said 6 acres of land and is free to deal

with the property. It is asserted that although petitioner is not

a direct party to the certificate for the recovery of amounts nor a

party to the statutory settlement agreement, the workers

involved are employees of the petitioner company. The

employer-employee relationship remains intact until full and

final settlement of the workers’ dues. Respondent No. 3 had

come forward to facilitate settlement of workers’ dues on behalf

of petitioner company under a development agreement between

M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd., later merged into

M/s. Maheshwari Megaventures Ltd (now Kshitij Infraventures

Pvt. Ltd.). One clause of the agreement permits the developer to

enter into statutory agreements for the smooth functioning and

completion of the project. Upon completion, petitioner company
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is entitled to receive more than 40% of the share in the project

along with other benefits. This Respondent highlights that

Section 421(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, dealing with

recovery of fines, allows the court to issue a warrant to levy

amounts via the attachment and sale of immovable property

owned by the offender. Therefore, as petitioner holds a share in

the project, it must be made a party in any proceedings before

the criminal court related to this matter. It is reiterated that

petitioner is obligated to clear workers’ dues. However,

Respondent No. 3 has come forward to handle the

implementation of the settlement on behalf of the petitioner

company. This Respondent asserts that settlement under

Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, clearly

stipulates that the workers have agreed to file necessary

affidavits, including W.A. No. 391/2008, W.P. No. 10801/2005,

and W.P. No. 11349/2014, all pending before this Hon’ble

Court.

It is argued that petitioner is avoiding the

settlement with the workers despite the fact that both the

second and third Respondents have come forward to settle the
17

statutory dues. The Respondent points out that prior to this

settlement, B. Sayanarayana, the President of the 4th

Respondent, and 216 workers had filed a case under the

Payment of Wages Act before the relevant authority, which

allowed the claim of 69 workers. Aggrieved by the decision, the

petitioner filed CMA No. 64 of 2017 before the Chief Judge, City

Civil Court, Hyderabad. During the proceedings, the petitioner

presented a memo and a copy of the 12(3) agreement and

communication between the Labour Commissioner and Kshitij

Infraventures Pvt. Ltd., indicating that the 4th Respondent and

the workers had entered into a Memorandum of Settlement

under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on

07.03.2017. According to the settlement, the workers agreed to

receive Rs. 7,00,000 each as full and final settlement. The

petitioner acknowledged this in cross-examination in M.P. No. 1

of 2013 before the Additional Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, where it was also admitted that the petitioner had not

challenged the agreement entered into by the third Respondent

with the workers in any court of law. Furthermore, the

petitioner admitted the existence of a development agreement

between the petitioner and the third Respondent.
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5. Petitioner filed reply to counter of the 4th

respondent stating that Respondent No.4 is not recognized as a

union of petitioner company. It was formed in 2009, long after

the closure of the factory in 1991. All employees are already

represented by other recognized unions in various forums such

as the BIFR, courts, and other judicial forums. Petitioner

company was taken over by the present management in 1985-

86 at the direction of the State Government to revive the

company, which was considered sick at that time. It was later

registered under SICA as BIFR Case No.109/1987. The

company’s operations were suspended in May 1991 following an

illegal disconnection of power by APSEB in violation of

Government G.O.Ms.No.498 dated 21.11.1985. The legality of

the closure of the mill is currently subjudice.

The employees of Petitioner have been represented

by their respective unions since 1987 in BIFR, AAIFR, and in

various court proceedings. In a related case ie. Writ Petition No.

11173 of 2007, this Court ordered Petitioner to deposit Rs. 50

lakhs towards the dues of workmen as decided by BIFR. This

amount was deposited with IFCI (OA of BIFR) in 2008 and it
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remains with IFCI available to be claimed by the workmen. The

company is not liable to pay any additional amount beyond

what has already been agreed upon by BIFR and ordered by this

Court. This sum has been lying with IFCI for over 16 years and

none of the employees or the unions have challenged the

decisions of BIFR or the High Court nor have they filed claims

for additional dues before BIFR, IFCI, or NCLT.

Petitioner denies the claims made by the

Association that its members are employees of the company.

Petitioner challenges the authenticity and validity of the

membership claims of the Association and insists that they be

held strictly accountable to provide evidence for their

membership and any claims made on behalf of the company.

Regarding the Agreement between petitioner and

Respondent No.3, dated 15.03.1999, it is stated that this

agreement was never acted upon. Moreover, it was overridden

by the compromise in OS.No.69 of 2003 between the same

parties. Even if the agreement dated 15.03.1999 were valid, it

did not authorize the 2nd party developer (Respondent No.3) to

negotiate or settle dues of the banks or employees of petitioner
20

company. The right to negotiate these dues was solely the

prerogative of petitioner company. Therefore, the claims made

by Respondent No.3 in the alleged memorandum of settlement

under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, asserting

their rights to negotiate and settle the dues of petitioner

company, are completely false, baseless, and not binding on the

petitioner.

Petitioner refers to a compromise dated 08.03.1999,

where they agreed to allocate Acs.6.00 of land to the 2nd

plaintiff in the eviction suit O.S.No.1201 of 1995 (new OS No.69

of 2003). This compromise was ordered by the court on

03.04.2003, but later remanded by this Court in CCCA No. 329

of 2003 on 12.04.2004 for payment of court fees by Respondent

No.3. The compromise was finally rejected on 28.04.2015 for

non-payment of court fees. In a later judgment, this Court in

CCCA No. 66 of 2020 filed by Respondent No.3 concluded that

compromise was never valid and no rights were conferred upon

Respondent No.3 concerning Acs. 6.00 of land. The orders of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 18.04.2022 upheld the decision,

and the alleged documents executed by Mrs. K.S. Chenai in
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2009 (documents 1349/2009 and 1350/2009) claiming rights

over the land are invalid and have no legal standing.

Petitioner emphasizes that the claims made by

Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 regarding the validity of the

compromise and the 3rd respondent’s ownership and

possession rights over Acs. 6.00 of land are misleading and

amounts to contempt of court. These claims violate the court’s

orders and the parties involved are liable for criminal action due

to misrepresentation and making false statements on oath. It is

argued that memorandum of settlement under Section 12(3)

signed between Respondent No.4 and petitioner Association

(which is an unrecognized union) along with five other old

unions, was executed without the knowledge of petitioner

company. This settlement was made with malicious intent of

signing unions to extract money from Respondent No.4 and

facilitate his attempts to unlawfully seize the property of

Petitioner. Upon discovering the settlement, Petitioner

addressed a letter to the Joint Commissioner of Labour (TCS),

stating that none of the parties involved had the authority to
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make any promises or meddle with the assets or liabilities of the

company.

It is stated, the Recovery Petition filed by

Respondent No.3 is not maintainable because Petitioner was not

a party to Memorandum of Settlement or the recovery order

passed by the 2nd respondent. Furthermore, the claims for dues

by employees/unions have already been addressed by BIFR,

and as per the orders of this Court in Writ Petition No. 11173 of

2007, petitioner deposited Rs. 50 lakhs in 2008, which is still

held by IFCI (OA of BIFR) for the last 16 years. None of the

unions or employees have challenged the BIFR or this Court’s

orders or made any claims for additional amounts before BIFR,

IFCI or NCLT.

6. The core issue in this case is whether Petitioner can

be held liable for the sum declared payable to the employees

under the settlement entered into by Respondent No. 3.

Petitioner denies any responsibility for the settlement, arguing

that it was not a party to the agreement nor to the proceedings

leading to issuance of Certificate for Recovery. The primary

issue in this Writ Petition is whether the proceedings initiated
23

by Respondent No. 2 under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial

Disputes Act for the recovery of workers’ dues are legally valid.

7. It is evident from the pleadings of Respondents 2

and 3 that development agreement between DBR Mills and M/s

Ashish Developers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. (now Kshitij

Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) explicitly outlines the responsibility for

settling workers’ claims. The agreement stipulates that the

developer, Respondent No. 3, undertook to settle workers’

claims on behalf of DBR Mills. Clause (6) of the development

agreement specifically provides that management of DBR Mills

or the developer must resolve the claims of workers before

undertaking any development activities. Therefore, Respondent

No. 3’s role in settling workers’ claims cannot be disregarded.

Moreover, the legal framework under Section 33-C(1) empowers

the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to

recover sums payable to workers under a settlement in the

same manner as a fine imposed by a criminal court. Section

421(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code further supports the

recovery mechanism. The settlement reached between

Respondent No. 3 and workers, under Section 12(3) of the Act
24

was a statutory settlement and workers’ dues were clearly

identified in the settlement. While Petitioner was not a direct

party to this settlement, the relationship between workers and

Petitioner remained intact and the obligations arising from the

employment contract could not be avoided by Petitioner,

especially given the terms of the development agreement. The

settlement under Section 12(3 was made in good faith to resolve

long-pending workers’ claims and Petitioner cannot evade its

responsibility by relying on technicalities related to the

agreement.

8. The issuance of Certificate for Recovery of

Rs. 30,38,00,000/- under Section 33-C(1) is a procedural

mechanism available for recovery of dues owed to workers

under a statutory settlement. Section 33-C(1) authorizes the

authority to issue a certificate for recovery in the same manner

as a decree of the Court. Petitioner’s argument that it is not a

party to the settlement and therefore, cannot be subject to

recovery proceedings is unsubstantiated. The workers are

entitled to the dues owed to them and issuance of recovery
25

certificate was a necessary step in ensuring that they receive

their rightful compensation.

9. In the light of these provisions, this Court finds that

proceedings before Respondent No. 2 are not illegal per se. The

fact that Petitioner was not a direct party to settlement does not

preclude the possibility of its involvement in the recovery

process, especially considering that workers involved were

employed by Petitioner and settlement pertains to claims arising

from their employment. It is also relevant that Petitioner and

Respondent No. 3 had a joint responsibility under development

agreement for resolving workers’ claims, which implies that

Petitioner cannot evade liability for settlement.

10. Furthermore, while Petitioner raises concerns

regarding the legality of land transactions and the authority of

unions involved in the settlement, these issues are peripheral to

the central matter of workers’ claims and recovery proceedings.

The ownership dispute over the land as well as Petitioner’s

involvement in the agreements, is a separate legal issue that

does not negate Petitioner’s obligation to settle workers’ claims.
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11. For the reasons outlined above, this Court finds no

merit in Petitioner’s claims. The Writ Petition is therefore,

dismissed. No costs.

12. Consequently, Miscellaneous Applications, if any

shall stand closed.

——– —————————–

NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J

29th April 2025

ksld



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