Telangana High Court
M/S Kshitij Infraventures Pvt Limited vs The State Of Telangana on 29 April, 2025
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 6754 OF 2024
O R D E R:
Heard Sri N. Sreedhar Reddy, learned counsel for
petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Labour on behalf
of respondents.
2. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the
proceedings in Crl.M.P.No. 1722 of 2023 on the file of Court of
Hon’ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad,
initiated by the 2nd respondent under Section 33-C (1) of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and consequently to quash the
same by declaring them to be illegal, arbitrary and without
jurisdiction.
3. It is the case of petitioner that it came into
existence by virtue of the orders passed by this Court dated
01-09-2015 in Company Petition Nos. 175 to 178 of 2015,
whereby a Scheme of Arrangement of Demerger was sanctioned.
Under this Scheme, M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited was
the demerged company and M/s Kshitij Infraventures Private
Limited was the resultant entity. It is further stated that
M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited itself came into
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existence by virtue of the Orders of Amalgamation passed by
this Court dated 22-03-2005 in Company Petition Nos. 201, 202
and 203 of 2004 concerning the amalgamation of M/s Ashish
Developers and Builders and M/s RKM Builders Private Limited.
It is stated that M/s Diwan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills (referred to
as ‘DBR Mills’) commenced its operations in 1920 at Tank Bund
Area in Hyderabad after entering into a lease deed with
landowners, namely Chenai family. The land in question
eventually devolved upon Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai, vendor
of petitioner, pursuant to a Compromise Decree dated
20-10-1967 in Civil Suit No. 38 of 1967 instituted by Mrs. Freny
Rashid Chenai, mother-in-law of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai,
on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
It is further stated that subsequently, the mill
became financially unsustainable, was declared a sick unit
under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act, 1985, and failed to remit lease rentals to the
landowner, Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai. This led to initiation
of eviction proceedings for recovery of possession and damages.
Eventually, the dispute culminated in a compromise, wherein
petitioner came to be impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No. 69
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of 2003, filed for eviction and damages, and facilitated a
settlement between the original landowner and tenant DBR
Mills. Under the terms of compromise, Mrs. Khorshed
Shapoorchenai agreed to retain Acs.6.00 and relinquished her
rights over Acs.16.00 in favour of the tenant, M/s DBR Mills, in
order to amicably resolve the dispute.
It is averred that M/s DBR Mills, in turn, executed a
Development Agreement with petitioner for the development of
Acs.16.00 of the land. Further, petitioner’s predecessor,
M/s Ashish Developers and Builders, entered into an Agreement
of Sale dated 03-12-1998 with Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai
for purchase of the entire extent of Acs.22.5 by paying full sale
consideration. It was based on this Agreement petitioner was
impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No. 69 of 2003. Petitioner
asserts that, while functioning as M/s Maheshwari
Megaventures Limited, it entered into a Development Agreement
dated 15-03-1999 with M/s DBR Mills Ltd. for development of
the land admeasuring Acs.16.00 on which mill was situated. In
consideration thereof, petitioner undertook the responsibility to
settle the monetary claims payable to workers of DBR Mills.
However, the said compromise entered into among petitioner,
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DBR Mills and landowner Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai could
not be effectuated and stood frustrated due to the conduct of
DBR Mills, rendering it null and void and incapable of being
enforced. Consequently, DBR Mills continued as a tenant at
sufferance, and the ownership of the entire leasehold property
reverted to Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai.
It is also mentioned that, out of the total land
admeasuring Acs.22.00, registered conveyance deeds were
executed by Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai in favour of
petitioner in respect of Acs.6.00 under Document Nos. 1349 of
2009 and 1350 of 2009, executed on 27-10-2006 and
28-10-2006 respectively. During the subsistence of the said
compromise and under the understanding among the parties,
petitioner, acting as developer of Acs.16.00 for which DBR Mills
held leasehold rights, entered into an arrangement for payment
of dues to the mill’s workmen.
It is stated that on 07-03-2017, six Workers’ Unions of
M/s DBR Mills entered into an agreement with petitioner
company, under which they undertook to pay Rs.7,00,000/-
(Rupees Seven Lakhs only) to each workman as full and final
settlement of all arrears of salary, back wages, and other dues.
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This agreement was recorded as a Memorandum of Settlement
under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and
Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958,
and was arrived at in the presence of the Conciliation Officer.
It is stated though the said agreement was entered
into, the same cannot be construed as a valid and binding
settlement under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, in strict legal
terms. Petitioner contends that it is merely a Development
Agreement Holder and not the employer of the said workmen,
and hence, not amenable to proceedings under the Industrial
Disputes Act in such capacity. It is stated that prolonged
disputes were pending before various Courts involving petitioner
and management of M/s DBR Mills. It is further stated that
there was no authentication or finalization of list of workers who
were employed at the time when DBR Mills ceased operations,
and due to this reason, petitioner was unable to effect any
payments under the agreement dated 07-03-2017.
Meanwhile, some workers purportedly filed Applications before
the 2nd respondent, who, without verifying the maintainability of
the claims under the Act, issued Certificate of Recovery and
forwarded the same to the Hon’ble Court of XII Additional
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Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No. 1722 of
2023, seeking to recover a sum of Rs.30,38,00,000/- from
petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that a
settlement under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, can only be
executed between an employer and its employees/workmen in
the course of an industrial dispute and not with a third party,
such as petitioner, who is merely a Development Agreement
Holder. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2nd respondent acted
without jurisdiction in issuing Certificate of Recovery and
referring the matter under Section 33-C(1) of the Act.
It is also argued that, assuming without admitting, even if any
terms of the Agreement dated 07-03-2017 were violated, the
only remedy available to the affected parties would be to
approach the competent Civil Court for appropriate relief, and
not to invoke the coercive mechanism available under the
Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel draws attention of this
Court to Section 33-C(1) and contends that the said provision
does not empower the 2nd respondent to issue Recovery
Certificate against a third party who is not an employer, and
especially in the absence of a valid employer-employee
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relationship under the Act. Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under::
” Where any money is due to a workman from an
employer under a settlement or an Award or under the provisions of
Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorized by
him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workman,
his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of
recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the
recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government is
satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a Certificate for that
amount to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate having jurisdiction and the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall proceed to
realize the money as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate.
Provided that every such application shall be made within
one year from the date on which money became due to the workman
from the employer.
Provided further that any such application may be
entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year if the
appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient
cause for not making the application within the said period”.
Learned counsel submits that a plain reading of the
relevant provision reveals that jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case
may be, to recover money under the Act is circumscribed by the
existence of a due amount payable to the workman by the
employer under either a settlement or an award or under the
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provisions of Chapter V-A of the said Act. It was contended that,
in the present case, petitioner is not the employer within the
meaning of the Act. The settlement in question is alleged to have
been entered into between the workmen unions and petitioner.
However, it is submitted that it is a development agreement
holder and does not fall within the definition of ’employer’ as per
the Act. It was further contended that Application filed by the
workmen or their representatives was made after a lapse of
more than three years from the date of the alleged settlement.
Therefore, it was urged that proceedings in Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of
2023, initiated before the Court of the Hon’ble XII Additional
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, should have been rejected
at the threshold on the ground of limitation. It was further
contended that the Magistrate entertained the Application and
took cognizance of the matter without proper application of
mind and mechanically, issued notice to petitioner based on the
reference made by the 2nd respondent.
Learned counsel further submitted that definition of
‘industrial dispute’ under Section 2(k) and ‘settlement’ under
Section 2(p) of the 1947 Act are applicable only in cases
involving employer and employees or between employer and
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workmen or even between workmen and workmen inter se. It
was asserted that a third party like petitioner, who is merely a
development agreement holder with no control or nexus with the
functioning of the industry, cannot be brought within the fold of
the said definitions. Therefore, it was submitted that the alleged
settlement dated 07.03.2017 between petitioner and workmen
unions cannot be treated as a settlement under the 1947 Act,
particularly not one falling under Section 12(3). Accordingly,
petitioner contends that jurisdiction exercised by the 2nd
respondent and the subsequent action of the criminal court in
Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 are wholly untenable and without
legal basis. Such a matter cannot be adjudicated under the
scheme of the Act, nor under the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code in the manner presently undertaken. It is thus
asserted that Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 pending before the
Hon’ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad is
liable to be quashed in its entirety.
Additionally, learned counsel submitted that even
assuming without admitting that any enforceable right arises
out of the agreement dated 07.03.2017, the proper remedy
available to workmen or their unions would be to seek redressal
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under the general civil law and not through invocation of
criminal jurisdiction or proceedings under the 1947 Act. It is
not the employer and has no privity with the industrial
establishment for the purposes of attracting the applicability of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, it was submitted
that reference application was filed before the Court only on
10.01.2023, which is more than five years after the date of the
agreement, i.e. 07.03.2017. Therefore, it is contended that
proceedings before the Hon’ble XII Additional Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad, vide Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 are
barred by limitation and are unsustainable.
Learned counsel submits that petitioner had
already filed Writ Petitions No. 1956 and 2011 of 2024 before
this Court, challenging the order dated 22.09.2023 passed in
I.A. No. 13 of 2021 in M.P. No. 5 of 2019 and I.A. No. 12 of 2021
in M.P. No. 4 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad. In the said
order, the petitioner was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.
49,00,000/- each in both cases to the credit of the respective
proceedings. It was further brought to the notice of this Court
that upon hearing petitioner, the impugned orders were
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suspended and writ petitions are pending final adjudication. In
addition, petitioner placed reliance on the fact that M/s DBR
Mills also filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of 2023 before the
Hon’ble High Court, in connection with the same or similar
subject matter, wherein the Hon’ble Court was pleased to grant
an interim order on 11.12.2023, directing all the parties to
maintain status quo in all respects until further orders. The
petitioner submits that the present criminal proceedings are
sought to be continued in contravention of the status quo order
granted in W.P. No. 33361 of 2023.
5. In the counter filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent,
it is stated that petitioner deliberately and willfully refrained
from impleading the management of M/s DBR Mills Limited and
the Joint Action Committee of DBR Mills, which represents six
trade unions and employees with whom petitioner had entered
into a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On this ground, the
maintainability of the writ petition is questioned.
It is further stated that petitioner executed a
Memorandum of Settlement on behalf of the management of
M/s DBR Mills Limited, pursuant to the Development
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Agreement dated 15-03-1999, which was entered into in favour
of M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited. This
entity was later merged with M/s Maheswari Megaventures
Limited by virtue of the orders of the Hon’ble High Court dated
22-03-2005 in Company Petition Nos. 201, 202, and 203 of
2004, and is presently known as M/s Kshitij Infraventures
Private Limited, i.e., the present petitioner. According to the
terms of the said agreement, before any development activities
could be initiated, the claims of the workers were to be settled
either by the management of DBR Mills or by the developer. In
the event that the developer settled the claims, it would be done
in the account of M/s DBR Mills Limited.
The counter further avers that, in accordance with the terms of
the Development Agreement and having regard to the prolonged
suffering of the workers due to pending litigation,
M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited (now M/s Kshitij
Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.), by virtue of the said agreement dated
15-03-1999, had given an undertaking to the Commissioner of
Labour to settle the workers’ claims subject to mutually agreed
terms and conditions.
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It is asserted that out of a total extent of Acs. 26.00
possessed by DBR Mills Limited, an extent of Acs. 6.00 of land
fell to the share of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited, now
M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd., by virtue of a compromise
that attained finality before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Petitioner acquired absolute rights of ownership and possession
over the said land and is free to deal with it. When petitioner
commenced development works over this land, objections were
raised by the Joint Action Committee representing various trade
unions and workers which led to law and order issues and
demands for settlement in accordance with the Development
Agreement. To avoid further litigation, petitioner entered into a
Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) read with Rule
60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. The
management of DBR Mills then filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of
2023 to quash Crl.M.P.No.1722 of 2023 and upon failing to
obtain relief, colluded with petitioner to file the present Writ
Petition to avoid compliance with the workers’ settlement.
Hence, the 2nd respondent contends that Writ Petition is liable
to be dismissed as devoid of merit.
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The 2nd respondent further states that in view of the
terms of the Development Agreement and continuing suffering
of workers due to the prolonged litigation, M/s Kshitij
Infraventures Pvt. Ltd. informed the Commissioner of Labour of
their undertaking to settle the claims of the workers of DBR
Mills Ltd. subject to mutually agreed terms. Therefore, they
cannot now deny its joint and several liability and responsibility
on account of the management’s failure to fulfil its obligations.
The counter also details that land bearing Survey Nos. 157/1 to
3, 158/1 & 2, 159/1, 28, 160/1 to 28, and 161/3 to 7,
measuring Acs. 34.00, situated at Elchiguda, Bakaram Village,
had fallen to the share of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenoy by
virtue of a compromise decree dated 20-10-1967 in O.S. No. 38
of 1967 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad. It is further stated that prior to the said compromise
decree, an extent of 26 acres forming part of these survey
numbers was leased to M/s DBR Mills Ltd. under a lease deed
dated 17th Aban 1328 Fasli (corresponding to the year 1918
A.D.). In 1994, M/s DBR Mills stopped paying rents and claimed
ownership under the Inams Abolition Act, prompting Mrs. K.S.
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Chenoy to file O.S. No. 1201 of 1995 for eviction and damages.
During pendency of the suit, Mrs. Chenoy entered into an
agreement of sale dated 03-12-1998 with M/s Ashish
Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd., which was subsequently
merged with M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. under orders of
this Court dated 22-03-2005 in C.P. Nos. 201, 202, and 203 of
2004. The said company then came on record as plaintiff No. 2
in the eviction suit. The counter further narrates that after
prolonged litigation, the issue relating to mill land attained
finality upon dismissal of SLP Nos. 13630-13633/2005 and SLP
No. 19446/2005 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thereafter,
Mrs. Chenoy executed two registered documents conveying 6
acres of land in favour of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd.
through Document Nos. 1349/2009 dated 27-10-2006 and
1350/2009 dated 28-10-2006. One of the conditions (Condition
No. 26) of these documents specifically states that the second
party (the developer) will settle and compromise with the
landlady, and this compromise was filed on 17-03-1999. These
documents were registered pursuant to the directions in Writ
Petition No. 25181 of 2005 dated 01-02-2007 and Contempt
Case No. 829 of 2009 dated 08-04-2009. Accordingly, in respect
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of this 6-acre land, M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. (now M/s
Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) possesses absolute rights of
ownership and possession and is free to deal with the same.
It is finally stated that pursuant to the offer made by M/s
Maheswari Megaventures Ltd., which was accepted by the
workers of the erstwhile DBR Mills Ltd. in the presence of all
parties and their representatives, a statutory settlement was
recorded under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, on mutually agreed terms and conditions in order to bring
about a fair and amicable resolution of the longstanding
dispute.
It is stated in the counter that although petitioner is
a party to the Certificate for Recovery Amount, which stems
from a Statutory Agreement and is binding on him, the
employees originally belonging to M/s DBR Mills Limited were
treated as the employees of petitioner. This treatment formed
the basis for execution of a Memorandum of Settlement. The
said settlement continued the employer-employee relationship
until final settlement of dues was made in full. Petitioner had
stepped into the picture by virtue of the Development Agreement
with M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited, a
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company that was subsequently merged into M/s Maheshwari
Megaventures Limited, which has since changed its name and is
now known as Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited, writ
petitioner. The counter further clarifies that one of the clauses
in the said Development Agreement expressly allowed
M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited the liberty
to enter into any Statutory Agreements required for the smooth
operation and completion of the project.
Following completion of the project, the procedure
for recovery of fine amounts imposed by Criminal Courts is
governed by Section 421(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
which mandates that Court shall issue a warrant for levy of
such amounts by attachment and sale of any immovable
property belonging to the offender. All parties who have a share
or interest in the said property are to be made parties to the
proceedings to the extent of their respective shares. In this
context, the execution of the Memorandum of Settlement with
the Joint Action Committee of M/s DBR Mills Limited was done
in good faith and in conformity with statutory procedure.
Petitioner, as per the counter, is bound to honour the same and
complete all pending and remaining transactions.
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The counter further states that as the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-201 was not
implemented in its entirety, the competent authority, i.e., the
Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
who also holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Labour, Twin
Cities, was within his statutory right to issue a Certificate of
Recovery. Accordingly, the said matter was referred to the Court
of the XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, under
Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, for effectuating
the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-201.
Petitioner is under a continuing obligation to settle the dues of
workers, as per the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement.
While full payments have been made to some workers, balance
amounts are yet to be paid to others.
6. In the reply filed by petitioner, it is denied that
rights of management of M/s DBR Mills Limited or the Joint
Action Committee representing six trade unions would be
affected by any order in the writ petition, as they were not
parties to the criminal proceedings initiated by the second
respondent. It is stated, it became the owner of Acs.6.00 of land
through a registered sale deed executed by Mrs. Khorshed
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Shapoor Chenai, pursuant to orders from this Court in Writ
Petition No. 25181 of 2006 and Contempt Case No. 1344 of
2007. Petitioner asserts that it did not step into the shoes of
M/s DBR Mills Limited and acquired the land independently,
and any settlement with labour unions could only be enforced
through a Civil Court, not under Section 12(3) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Additionally, M/s DBR Mills Limited filed
objections before the Joint Commissioner of Labour, stating that
petitioner had no rights to settle workers’ dues. Petitioner
argues that any settlement entered into with labour unions
cannot be treated as a settlement under the Industrial Disputes
Act, and the 2nd respondent lacks jurisdiction to invoke Section
33C(1) based on such a settlement.
7. The key issue in this writ petition is whether
petitioner, as a development agreement holder, can be held
liable for the workers’ claims under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, and whether the 2nd respondent acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the Certificate of Recovery under Section
33-C(1).
8. The record discloses that petitioner entered into a
Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017 with the six
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registered workers’ unions of M/s DBR Mills Limited in the
presence of the Conciliation Officer, under Section 12(3) of the
1947 Act and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial
Disputes Rules, 1958. A settlement arrived at during
conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer in terms of
Section 12(3) is binding not only on the parties to the settlement
but also on all workmen employed in the establishment. The
contention that petitioner is not an ’employer’ under the Act is
inconsequential in the light of the admitted fact that petitioner
voluntarily undertook liability to pay workmen as part of the
compromise and further participated in the conciliation process
leading to the settlement.
9. It is not in dispute that M/s Ashish Developers and
Builders Pvt. Ltd. (predecessor of petitioner) executed
Development Agreement dated 15-03-1999 with DBR Mills Ltd.,
under which petitioner undertook to settle the monetary claims
of workmen, subject to mutually agreed terms. Clause 6 of the
said agreement provides that repayment of liabilities, including
workers’ dues, was a pre-condition for commencement of any
development activity. Petitioner, having derived commercial
benefit and development rights under the said agreement,
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cannot now disclaim the obligations that form an integral part
of such commercial arrangement. Petitioner’s plea that 12(3)
settlement is not legally-binding on it, is contrary to the record
for they participated in the conciliation proceedings and
executed the settlement in the presence of the Conciliation
Officer. Once such a settlement is reached, its enforceability is
not contingent upon the petitioner’s classification as a statutory
employer under Section 2(g) or 2(k) of the Act. The doctrine of
estoppel would apply to preclude petitioner from challenging a
settlement it voluntarily entered into and acted upon.
10. Section 33-C(1) of the Act empowers the Labour
Commissioner to issue a Certificate of Recovery for amounts due
to workers, which are determined by an industrial adjudication
or settlement. In the present case, petitioner entered into a
settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act with the workers’
unions, agreeing to pay the workers a specified sum in full and
final settlement of their claims. The settlement was binding, and
petitioner, having voluntarily undertaken responsibility for the
settlement, cannot deny its obligations on the basis that it is not
the employer. The core purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act
is to ensure that workers are protected and their claims are
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enforced in a timely manner. The Act recognizes the principle of
justice and fairness for workers, even if the claims arise from
complex contractual relationships, as in this case where
petitioner entered into the settlement as part of its development
agreement. Petitioner’s claim of being a third party or not an
employer is, therefore, not sufficient to absolve it of its
obligations under the Act. They are not merely a passive third
party but a central participant in the process, assuming
responsibility for the workers’ claims in exchange for the
development rights granted by DBR Mills.
11. It is pertinent to observe that petitioner cannot rely
on the notion that it was not directly involved in the employer-
employee relationship, as the settlement was designed to
address workers’ dues directly with petitioner taking on the
responsibility of making payments. Petitioner thus assumed the
obligations of the employer in this context and the workers were
entitled to seek recovery from the party responsible for the
settlement. The recovery certificate issued by the 2nd respondent
is referable to Section 33-C(1), which allows recovery of money
due to a workman under a settlement. The existence of a
binding 12(3) settlement suffices to trigger the provisions of
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Section 33-C(1). The contention that petitioner is not an
employer is irrelevant once it is established that they voluntarily
accepted liability and undertook to make payments under a
statutory settlement. The Authority acted within its jurisdiction
in initiating recovery proceedings based on the settlement.
12. Further, petitioner has not impleaded either
management of DBR Mills or the Joint Action Committee
representing the workers’ unions, despite their direct
involvement in the matter. This suppression of necessary
parties renders Writ Petition liable to be dismissed on the
ground of non-joinder. Moreover, petitioner’s conduct, including
development activities undertaken on the land and negotiations
with the workers, belies the claim of being a mere third party.
The contention that workers must pursue a civil suit is
untenable. Section 33-C(1) is a complete statutory mechanism
for enforcing monetary claims under a settlement. The
availability of a civil remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of
statutory authorities to act under special legislation designed for
the benefit of workmen.
13. In that view of the matter, petitioner, despite not
being the direct employer of the workers, undertook
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responsibility for their claims under the settlement and cannot
escape liability on technical grounds. The settlement entered
into was binding and the Labour Commissioner’s issuance of
the Certificate of Recovery was well within the statutory powers
granted under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The Writ Petition therefore, must fail.
14. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed. No
costs.
15. Consequently, the interim order dated 14.03.2024
shall stand dissolved automatically.
——– —————————–
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
29th April 2025
ksld