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Jharkhand High Court
M/S Maa Tara Stone Works vs The State Of Jharkhand on 21 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.3117 of 2025
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M/s Maa Tara Stone Works, a Partnership firm, having its office at
Anandpuri Colony, Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur, District Pakur,
(Jharkhand), through its Partner Krishna Kumar, aged about 43
years, son of Awadh Bihari Bhagat, resident of Anandpuri Colony,
Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, (Jharkhand), PIN 816107.
.... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, Mines and
Geology Department, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal
House), P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, PIN 834002
(Jharkhand).
2. Director, Mines and Geology Department, Government of
Jharkhand, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal House), P.O.
and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, PIN 834002 (Jharkhand).
3. Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Pakur, having its
office at District Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur, District
Pakur, PIN 816107 (Jharkhand).
4. District Mining Officer, Pakur, having its office at District
Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. and P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, PIN
816107 (Jharkhand). .... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Petitioner : Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Shray Mishra, AC to AG
------
C.A.V. on 04.08.2025 Pronounced on 21/08/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking for the following reliefs: –
“For issuance of an appropriate
writ/order/direction, including Writ of Certiorari,
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for quashing order passed by Respondent
No.3 contained in Memo No. 276/M, dated
04.03.2025, (Annexure-10) wherein application
filed by Petitioner for renewal of its mining
lease over an area of 2.80 acres, situated at
Mouza Suraidih, Thana Hiranpur, Plot No. 63
(part), 64(part) and 65(part) in the District of
Pakur, has been rejected in a most illegal and
arbitrary manner.
(ii) For issuance of further appropriate
writ/order/direction, including Writ of
Mandamus, directing Respondents to consider
and consequentially grant renewal of mining
lease in favour of Petitioner, pertaining to
mining lease of stone boulders over an area of
2.80 acres, situated at Mouza Suraidih, Thana
Hiranpur, Plot No. 63 (part), 64(part) and
65(part) in the District of Pakur, for a period of
10 years commencing from 01.04.2022 to
31.03.2032.
(iii) For issuance of further appropriate
writ/order/direction, including Writ of
Declaration, declaring that amendment carried
out under Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2004 (for short ‘JMMC
Rules’) vide Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017
(Annexure-2), Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2019
(Annexure-3) and Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2020
(Annexure-4) do not prohibit grant of renewal
of mining lease, but only provides, inter alia,
that any new lease over 3 hectares of land
would be granted in terms Jharkhand Minor
Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2017 (Annexure-5).
(iv) For issuance of any other appropriate
writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships
may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, requires to be enumerated, which read as under: –
(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that the petitioner
was granted mining lease over an area of 2.80 acres, situated at
Mouza Suraidih, Thana Hiranpur, Plot No.63 (part), 64(part) and
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2025:JHHC:24811-DB65(part) in the District of Pakur, for a period of 10 years from
07.06.2010 to 05.06.2020. In terms of provisions of JMMC Rules,
2004, the period of said mining lease was extended up to
31.03.2022 by supplementary lease deed for extension of minor
minerals dated 30.12.2020.
(ii) The writ petitioner, prior to expiry of its Mining lease
deed, on several occasions attempted before the respondent-
authorities for filing application for renewal of mining lease but
such application for renewal of mining lease was not being
accepted by the respondent authorities. The respondent-State of
Jharkhand, on the pretext of alleged amendment carried out
under JMMC Rules, 2004 was not granting any renewal of mining
lease.
(iii) The writ petitioner has been further advised to annex
provisions of JMMC (Auction) Rules, 2017 and from bare perusal
of the said Auction Rules also, it would be evident that the said
Auction Rules only contemplates grant of fresh mining
lease/concession through auction and does not deal with the
applications pertaining to renewal of mining lease.
(iv) Despite the fact that such right of renewal has been
stipulated in statutory lease deed itself, respondent-authorities on
the pretext of aforesaid amendment, were not extending benefit
of renewal of mining lease nor were giving extension of renewal
of mining lease. In this context, it is stated that the petitioner is in
possession of a document pertaining to renewal of its mining
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lease, wherein the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, in respect of
the said applicant for renewal of mining lease, clearly stated that
in view of the amendment made in JMMC Rules, 2004, there is
no provision for renewal of mining lease. In fact, said
understanding of Deputy Commissioner, Koderma was the
prevalent understanding of the concerned authorities across the
State of Jharkhand, due to which, no renewal applications were
being accepted by the respondent-authorities.
(v) The writ petitioner was repeatedly approaching
respondent-authorities for acceptance of its applications for
renewal of mining lease and ultimately, petitioner’s application for
renewal of its mining lease was accepted on 10.01.2025.
(vi) The said application for renewal of mining lease has
been rejected by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner cum
District Magistrate, Pakur, vide its order contained in memo
no.276/M dated 04.03.2025 on the sole ground that the said
application for renewal has not been filed within stipulated time in
terms of Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, 2004.
(vii) The said order dated 04.03.2025 is under challenge in the
present writ petition.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
3. Ms. Shruti Shekhar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has
submitted that the authority concerned while passing the
impugned order dated 04.03.2025 has not appreciated the
prevalent rule, i.e., JMMC Rule in the right perspective.
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4. It has been contended that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of
Jharkhand and Ors., vide order dated 06.02.2025 passed in
W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024 wherein, the issue of applicability of
Rule 9 has also been taken into consideration by applying the
implication of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules 2004, and has observed that the notification
issued amending Rule 9 providing for grant of lease through
public auction cannot be extended in the matter pertaining to
renewal of mining lease.
5. It has further been contended that the application for renewal of
mining lease has been rejected by the respondent-Deputy-
Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Pakur, vide order dated
04.03.2025 on the sole ground that the said application for
renewal has not been filed within stipulated time in terms of Rule
23 of Rules, 2004 but the time limit for filing application for
renewal as prescribed under Rule 23(1) of Rule 2004 is not
mandatory and merely directory in nature.
6. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that order impugned require interference by this
Court.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State
7. Per Contra, Mr. Shray Mishra, AC to AG appearing for the
respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of the provision of
Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules,
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amended as 2017 and 2019, wherein, it has been provided that
on or after 31.03.2022, there cannot be renewal of licenses even
by way of extension, rather, the licenses are to be granted only by
virtue of auction.
8. It has been contended that the quasi-judicial authority, on
consideration of legal implication of Rule 23 of Rule 2004, since,
has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any
interference.
9. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by
another Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 10.09.2024 passed
in the case of Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand
and Ors. [In W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024].
10. Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by
this Court in the case of Ghosh Stone Works represented
through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors.,
reported in (2023) SCC OnLine Jhar 3182.
11. Learned State Counsel has further submitted that the order, upon
which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner is not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
since, the said order has been passed without taking into
consideration the view already taken by the Co-ordinate Benches
in the aforesaid two cases.
12. It has further been contended that the order, which has been
passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025
in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the consideration has been
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given with respect to the issue of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules, but
if the provision of Rule 23 will be taken into consideration, the
same will only with respect to the process of making application
for the purpose of renewal.
13. The submission has also been made that the provision of Rule 23
of the JMMC Rules, is to be taken into consideration along with
the provision of Rule 9(च) wherein it has been stipulated that in
any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not
to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 and later on by
virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has
been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022.
14. On the basis of the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the
respondent-State has submitted that since the authority
concerned has passed the order impugned as per the mandate of
the existing Rule 2004, as such, the same requires no
interference.
Analysis
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the
reasons assigned by the authority concerned negating the claim
of the writ petitioner.
16. The issue which requires consideration, i.e.,
(i) Whether the time limit for filing application for renewal
as prescribed under Rule 23(1) of Rule 2004 is not
mandatory and merely directory in nature.
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(ii) Whether the application filed after the cut-off date,
i.e., 31.03.2022 can be fit to be entertained by the
authority for the purpose of renewal of the lease.
(iii) Whether acceding to the prayer made on behalf of
the writ petitioner, will it not amount to violation of the
provision of Rule 9(च), wherein, the embargo has
been put under the statute for no renewal of the lease
license on or after 31.03.2022 and even, if the license
has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2022,
the same will lost its force on 31.03.2022.
(iv) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench
of this Court dated 06.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No.6812 of
2024 in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The
State of Jharkhand and Ors., is to be considered on
the principle of judicial discipline if there is no
consideration of the earlier two judgments passed by
the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the aforesaid
case.
(v) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench
in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State
of Jharkhand and Ors., is held to be per incuriam.
17. Issue no.(i) to (iii) are interlinked and as such, the same are to be
taken up together. However, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being dealt
with separately.
18. This Court, before dealing with the issue no.(i) to (iii), therefore, is
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thought it proper to deal with the issues, i.e., issue no.(iv) and (v),
since, the learned counsel for the petitioner has given much
emphasis upon the applicability of the order dated 06.02.2025
passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6812
of 2024 (Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand
and Ors.).
19. This Court, in order to consider the applicability of the order dated
06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, needs to refer
herein the order passed by the Coordinate Bench, which is being
referred hereinbelow: –
1. In this writ petition, petitioners assail order dated
29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer,
Koderma refusing to grant renewal of the mining
lease granted to the petitioners from 11.02.2015
to 10.02.2025.
2. In the impugned order, it is mentioned that
because the land is Gair Majarua land and there
is no provision for grant of renewal of mining
lease for such a land, the application for renewal
of mining lease is being rejected.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
before us Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2004 which provides for
renewal of mining lease. The said rule nowhere
prohibits grant of renewal in respect of a mining
lease of Gair Majarua land. When there is no
such prohibition for renewal of a mining lease of
such a category of land, the respondents cannot
invent such a prohibition and seek to reject the
renewal application of the petitioners.
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4. Reliance by the respondents on the notification
issued on 22.02.2017 and 08.03.2019 amending
the Rule 9 of the above rules is of no avail, since
the said rule only provides for grant of mining
lease for the first time through a public auction,
and there has been no amendment to Rule 23
which deals with renewal of mining leases at all.
5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. Order
dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining
Officer, Koderma is set-aside and the
respondents are directed to renew the mining
lease granted to the petitioners forthwith subject
to the petitioners complying with all other
formalities.
20. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the Coordinate
Bench has considered the applicability of Rule 23 of the
Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004.
21. The reliance which has been placed on behalf of the respondent
about the applicability of Rule 9 of the above Rules has been held
to be not availed.
22. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision
of Rule 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), Rule 9(छ) and Rule 9(ज) of the JMMC
Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis.
“9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
प्राप्त वैसे आवेदन पत्र धिसमें इस अधिसूचना धनर्गत होने की धतधि से
पूवग झारखण्ड लघु खधनि समनुदान धनयमावली, 2004 के धनयम 11
अंतर्गत Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) धनर्गत हो चुका है, उसे
इस अधिसूचना के धनर्गत होने की धतधि से 180 धदनों के अंदर10
2025:JHHC:24811-DBपयागवरण स्वीकृधत एवं खनन योिन अधनवायग रूप से समधपगत करना
होर्ा, अन्यिा उनका आवेदन स्वतः अस्वीकृत हो िाएर्ा।
9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र परप्राप्त खनन पटे को िो करकामेव व एवं पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत खनन
योिना प्राप्त नही राहत वैसे खर कालधतरोधहत हो र्ये हो, उनके पट्टे
की अवधि पट्टा स्वीकृधत/नवीनीकरण की धतधि से 31 माचग,
2022तक के धलए अवधि धवस्ताररत मानी िाएर्ी, बशते धकअधिसूचना की धतधि के पूवग खनन पट्टा की अस्वीकृधत/रद्द/व्ययर्त
होने का आदे श, नहीं पाररत धकया र्या है, परन्तु वैसे खानन पट्टे पर
कोई खनन तब तक नहीं धकया िा सकेर्ा, िब तक खनन हेतु
आवश्यक पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत/वन एवं पयागवरण धवभार् की
स्वीकृधत/खनन योिना स्वीकृधत प्राप्त नहीं हो िाता है। आवेदक को
सभी वांधित अनापत्ती 180 धदनों के अंदर समधपगत कना होर्ा।
9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
स्वीकृत/नवीकृत खनन पट्टे की अवधि यधद उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण
की अवधि 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाद की धतधि हो, तो उनकी अवधि
उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण की अवधि तक धवधिमान्य रहेर्ी।
9(ज)(12) धनयम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (ि) तिा 9
(10) पूवग से स्वीकृत/आवधदत लघु खधनि के 5.00 हे क्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम
क्षेत्र पर भी लार्ू होंर्ें।”
23. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (ङ) and (च), wherein,
the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt with initially
for the period of 90 days thereafter, it was extended upto the
period of 180 which is to be renewed on the basis of making
proper application by the applicant. The provision of Rule 9(च)
provides that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially,
the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020
by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has
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been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022.
24. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license
has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of
the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.
25. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9 (ि) as
referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity
of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will
remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any
extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of
Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction.
26. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (ज)(12) as quoted
and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(च) will be
applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.
27. The provision of Rule 23 speaks about the procedure for filing an
application for the purpose of renewal of lease. The occasion to
insert the provision as under Rule 23 is to comply with the
procedure by the applicant, which is required at the time of filing
an application for renewal of license, if any applicant is making an
application in view of the provision of Rule 9(ङ).
28. But, the specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (च)
putting complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022,
rather, the allotment is to be made only through auction.
29. The aforesaid issue has been taken into consideration in the
judgment passed by the Coordinate Benches in two cases, i.e., in
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the cases of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its
Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath
Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
30. We have considered the said judgments and found therefrom that
the consideration has been given regarding Rule 9(च) in the
situation, wherein, the issue of renewal of license is to be granted
beyond the period of 31.03.2022 or not.
31. The Coordinate Benches have passed order by taking the
implication of Rule 9(ङ) and Rule 9(च), which is based upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa
Foundation Vrs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2014) 6
SCC 590, holding therein that there cannot be any extension
contrary to the statutory command.
32. The issue of applicability of the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is
being considered by this Court.
33. This Court, on consideration of the judgment passed in the case
of Gopal Kumar and Ors., has found that the date of judgment is
dated 06.02.2025, while, the judgment passed by the Coordinate
Bench in the case of Ghosh Stone Works and Ors., is dated
29.11.2023 and in the case of Rang Nath Singh is dated
10.09.2024, respectively.
34. These two judgments are prior to the order dated 06.02.2025
passed in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. But, there is no
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consideration of the said judgments in the case of Gopal Kumar
and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.6812
of 2024].
35. We are conscious that if two conflicting views are there, then, the
matter is to be referred to the larger Bench on the principle of
judicial discipline.
36. We are further conscious that the judicial discipline warrants the
order passed by the Coordinate Benches are to be given adhered
to.
37. But, we are also conscious that if the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench without taking into consideration of the
judgment passed by the same Corum which is earlier to the
judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench, then, the principle of
judicial discipline is not to be made applicable.
38. The principle of per incuriam has been taken into consideration
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and
Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, for
ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment
are being referred as under: –
“Per incuriam — Doctrine
64. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per
incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have
developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare
decisis. Thus the “quotable in law”, is avoided and ignored if
it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding
authority.
65. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [(1975) 2 SCC
232 :AIR 1975 SC 907] this Court held : (SCC p. 235, para14
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
7)
“7. … where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a
judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision
or obligatory authority running counter to the
reasoning and result reached, it may not have the
sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring
case, an obtrusive omission.”
39. Further, the concept of per incuriam was examined by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Hyder Consulting (UK)
Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 where it was held
that decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the
court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision
of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a
decision of the court of record, for ready reference the relevant
paragraph is being quoted as under:
“46. Before I consider the correctness of the
aforementioned decisions, it would be necessary to
elaborate upon the concept of “per incuriam”. The Latin
expression “per incuriam” literally means “through
inadvertence”. A decision can be said to be given per
incuriam when the court of record has acted in ignorance
of any previous decision of its own, or a subordinate court
has acted in ignorance of a decision of the court of record.
As regards the judgments of this Court rendered per
incuriam, it cannot be said that this Court has “declared
the law” on a given subject-matter, if the relevant law was
not duly considered by this Court in its decision. In this
regard, I refer to State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J. in his
concurring opinion stated as follows : (SCC p. 162, para
40)
“40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In
practice per incuriam appears to mean per
ignoratium. English courts have developed this
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principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis.
The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is
rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other
binding authority’.”
40. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition that the word “per
incuriam” has been interpreted if any order/judgment has been
passed by the Court in complete ignorance of the judgment
already passed on the same issue or ignorance of any statutory
provision, then, such judgment will come under the fold of
principle of per-incuriam, exactly same is the case herein, since,
in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., even though, the views
have been taken by the Co-ordinate Benches in the cases of
Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs.
State of Jharkhand and Ors. [W.P.(C) No.1511 of 2018] and
Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
[W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024], since have not been produced, hence,
there is no consideration thereof.
41. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment passed by
the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is
having no binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline.
42. Accordingly, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being answered.
43. So far as the issue nos.(i) to (iii) are concerned, the admitted
case of the writ petitioner is that after expiry of the existing lease,
i.e., after 31.03.2022, the renewal application for lease has been
filed. The further admitted fact is that the lease has already been
expired in the year, 2022. The application for renewal of lease
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has been made before the authority concerned but the same has
been dismissed on the ground of applicability of provision of Rule
23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules.
44. The factual aspect therefore is not in dispute that the application
for renewal has been made for renewal of license after
31.03.2022.
45. The argument has been advanced by taking aid of Rule 23 of the
JMMC Rules but as has been referred that the Rule 23 of the
JMMC Rules lays down the procedure for making application for
the purpose of renewal in a case where the application is to be
filed under Rule 9(ङ) of the JMMC Rules and once the application
is being filed, then, the lease is to be renewed either by way of
renewal or extension but in no case, it is beyond the period of
31.03.2022 in view of the provision of Rule 9(च).
46. Herein, the petitioner has approached the authority for renewal of
the lease after expiry of lease, beyond the stipulated period as
provided under Rule 23(1) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2004, which is the condition precedent for filing
of such application.
47. Further, the authority concerned has taken into consideration the
aforesaid statutory restrictions as well as the application of Rule
23 of Rule, 2004 and accordingly, rejected the claim of the writ
petitioner.
48. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that
17
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
time limit as has been stipulated in the Rule 23 of Rule 2004 is
not mandatory, rather, it is directory, but the said submission is
not acceptable due to the application of the principle of
harmonious construction of the statutory provision and herein as
per the mandate of Rule 2004, the Rule 9 should be read with the
Rule 23 of rule 2004.
49. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shafi, reported in (2001) 8 SCC
540 while taking into consideration the core of harmonious
consideration has observed that the statute or rules made
thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should
be construed with reference to the other provision to make the
provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. It has
further been observed that the well-known principle of
harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the
provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions
to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction, for ready
reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is
being quoted as under:
“8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an
Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and
phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text,
the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention
of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by
avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The
statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole
and one provision should be construed with reference to the18
2025:JHHC:24811-DBother provision to make the provision consistent with the object
sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious
construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions
and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead
letter” is not harmonious construction. With respect to law
relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of
India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990)
1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16)
“16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is
to discover what the legislature intended. This
intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of
enactment in question. That does not mean the text is
to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without
reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither
a literary text nor a divine revelation. ‘Words are
certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged’ as
Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned.
(Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned
Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said:
‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of
Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes
which lie behind them.’ (Lenigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553] )”
50. Thus, it is settled position of law that the statute is to be taken
into consideration harmoniously and not on the basis of picking
one provision whose suits the litigant and leaving another
provision which is against the interest of the litigant concerned.
Otherwise, the same will be in defiance of the principle of
harmonious construction of the statutory provision and in that
view of the matter, the very object of the statutory command will
be frustrated, which has been mandated in the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa
Foundation (supra).
51. It needs to refer herein, in view of Rule 23(1)
of JMMC Rules, 2004 that applicant has to submit the renewal
application at least 180-90 days prior to the date of expiry of the
19
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
lease period.
52. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that even if
application for renewal of lease would have been filed within the
stipulated time, then, the said application is not fit for
consideration in the light of statutory restriction as provided under
Rule 9(च) as discussed and referred hereinabove.
53. Further, it needs to refer herein that the law is well settled that if
any statutory provision is there, the same is to be complied with
in its strict sense and the action is to be taken based upon the
statutory provision without any deviation. Reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of
Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422, wherein it has been held at
paragraphs-31 & 32 as under:
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the
manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any
statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.
The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor
v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir
Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under:
“[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain
way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.”
32. This rule has since been approved by this Court
in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again
in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were
considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of
U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir
20
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been
applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has
also been recognized as a statutory principle of
administrative law.”
54. Reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v.
Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No.
5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690, wherein it has
been held at paragraph-14 as under:
“14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate
Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When
the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of
exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in
that manner and not in any other manner. In State of
Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that :
26…. it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a
statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it
should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any
other way.”
55. Further, it needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been
filed for issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the
decision taken by the Mines Commissioner, as available in the
order dated 04.03.2025 appended as Annexure-10.
56. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ
of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error
apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice,
21
2025:JHHC:24811-DB
reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs.
Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477,
wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.
226 has been frequently considered by this Court
and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer
in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior
courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of
failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on
it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as
for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the
order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural
justice. There is, however, no doubt that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory
jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled
to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by
the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which
is apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however
grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of
fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can
be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which22
2025:JHHC:24811-DBhas influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected
by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of
cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated
before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art.
226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately
exercised.”
57. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad
Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as
hereunder: –
“21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ
of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be
issued, the following propositions may be taken as
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or
fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3)
The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of
a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review23
2025:JHHC:24811-DBfindings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its
purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear
the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings
in certiorari.”
58. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and
Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while
discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold
at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:
“12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it
will be useful to notice the general principles indicating
the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction
can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of
certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate
jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction
under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed
Yakoob‘s case (supra).
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in
recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on
evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to
admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such
cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ
jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their
jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise24
2025:JHHC:24811-DBjurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or
improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing
grave miscarriage of justice.”
59. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason
assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the
authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error,
hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with.
60. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in view of the restriction
imposed under the statute for leasing out the mining hold area
only on the basis of auction as provided under Rule 9 of Rule
2004, having been considered by this Court in the case of Ghosh
Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs. State of
Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of
Jharkhand and Ors. (Supra), therefore, the instant writ petition
is fit to be dismissed.
61. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.
62. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
25
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