Delhi High Court
M/S Masihi Sahitya Sanstha vs Mr. Nikhil Sen. (Claimed Trustee Of … on 16 July, 2025
Author: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Bench: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
$-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
+ CS(OS) 230/2025, I.A. 9252/2025, I.A. 9253/2025 and I.A.
11703/2025
Between: -
M/S MASIHI SAHITYA SANSTHA
REGISTERED SOCIETY UNDER THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION
ACT
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
70 JANPATH, FIRST FLOOR, NEW DELHI -110001,
THROUGH ITS GENERAL MANAGER AND AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE MR. SUNIL KUMAR
....PLAINTIFF
(Through: Mr. Sanjay Dewan, Sr. Advocate with Mr. M. Qayamuddin, Ms.
Kashish Jain and Ms. U. Fatima, Advocates.)
AND
1. MR. NIKHIL SEN
(CLAIMED TRUSTEE OF VIDYAWATI
KHANNA TRUST)
A4, ZAVER MEHAL 66 MARINE DRIVE, MYMBAI 400026
AND ALSO HAVING ADDRESS AT
73 JOR BAGH NEW DELHI
AND ALSO
HAVING ADDRESS AT
S-101, PANCHSHEEL PARK, NEW DELHI-110017
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Signed By:PRIYA Signed
Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 1 KUMAR KAURAV
AND ALSO
HAVING ADDRESS AT
70 JANPATH, NEW DELHI-110001
2. MR. VIKRAM KHANNA, CLAIMED TRUSTEE VIDYAWATI
KHANNA TRUST
S/O LATE SHRI RAMESH CHANDRA KHANNA,
73 JOR BAGH, NEW DELHI-110003
AND ALSO
HAVING ADDRESS AT
S-101, PANCHSHEEL PARK, NEW DELHI-110017
3. SMT. USHA PURI, CLAIMED TRUSTEE VIDYAWATI KHANNA
TRUST
(D/O G.C. KHANNA & VIDYAWATI KHANNA
HAVING ADDRESS AT ZAVER MAHAL A4, FIRST FLOOR, 66
MARINE DRIVE
MUMBAI- 400020.
4. M/S ABSTERGE REAL ESTATE PVT. LTD. REGISTERED
OFFICE AT PLOT NO. 152,
BASEMENT, TRANSPORT CENTRE, ROHTAK ROAD, PUNJABI
BAGH, NEW
DELHI-110026
AND ALSO
HAVING ADDRESS AT
70 JANPATH, NEW DELHI-110001 (BACK SIDE)
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR SH. JAI DEEP BHANDARI
....DEFENDANTS
(Through: Mr. Suresh Chaudhary, Mr. Gagan Kumar Singhal and
Ms.Prerna, Advocates for D-1.
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Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 2 KUMAR KAURAV
Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Akshat Chandra, Mr. Aditya
Chandra, Mr. Utkarsh Bhanu and Mr. Vikas Sharma, Advocates for D-4.)
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% Reserved on: 09.07.2025
Pronounced on: 16.07.2025
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JUDGMENT
I.A. 9252/2025 (By Plaintiff – Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 r/w
Section 151 of CPC)
1. The plaintiff, vide the instant application has made the following
prayers:-
“(a) Pass an ex-parte ad interim-injunction restraining the Defendants
from dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit property being the entire
first floor 70 Janpath, New Delhi-110001 in view of the pendency of the
declaration of above sale deed dated 21.03.2018 registered vide
Registration No. 3270, Book No. 1, Volume No. 6659 at pages No. 137 to
150 on 16.3.2018 with the Sub Registrar VII, New Delhi and above order
dated 24.12.2024 in false and fabricated eviction petition RC ARC 14/23,
which was allowed by the Hon‟ble Addl. Rent Controller New Delhi
District, Delhi as a nullity and not binding on the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs
possession of the suit property as tenant under Defendant No 1 subsists
and continues to be valid and in accordance with law; and
(b) Restrain the Defendant from creating any third-party interest of any
kind whatsoever qua the suit property being the entire first floor 70
Janpath, New Delhi-110001 during the pendency of the present case.”
2. Mr. Sanjay Dewan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff has made the following broad submissions:-
I. The plaintiff is in occupation of a portion of the property bearing
no. 70 Janpath, New Delhi, amounting to approximately 3000 sq.
ft., first floor out of its total area of 7249 sq. ft. (hereinafter
referred to as the suit property) as a tenant from 1956. Delineating
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the history of the suit property, he submitted that one late Mr. Rai
Bahadur Gyan Chand Khanna had become perpetual lessee of the
suit property on 02.07.1938. He submitted that a trust named
Vidyawati Khanna Trust (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) was
created by late Mr. Rai Bahadur Gyan Chand Khanna vide Deed of
Indenture dated 11.04.1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Trust
Deed), and the suit property came to be part of the said Trust.
II. That the suit property was transferred to defendant No.4
fraudulently by defendant No. 1, Mr. Nikhil Sen, allegedly being a
trustee, purportedly acting on behalf of the Trust vide Sale Deed
dated 15.03.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the Sale Deed).
III. Referring to Clause 13 of the Trust Deed as substituted vide the
Deed of Variation dated 08.10.1956, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that the Trust Deed and the subsequent documents have
clearly defined the scope of the powers of the trustees with respect
to the properties of the Trust, and a perusal of the said provisions
would indicate that the properties, in no circumstance, can be
alienated for purposes other than as provided under the Trust
Deed. For the sake of clarity, the substituted Clause 13 in the Trust
Deed is reproduced hereunder:-
“13. The trustee may, at any time at her discretion sell the said
land hereditaments and the premises or any part or parts thereof
and invest the sale proceeds in her hands in any of the securities
and investments authorised by the Indian Trusts Act or in the
purchase of immovable property in Delhi, Bombay or elsewhere of
any tenure including leasehold or in shares of joint stock
companies incorporated in India and may at the discretion of the
trustees or trustee from time to time vary or transpose such
securities or investments into or for others of the same or of likeSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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nature and such investments shall be subject to the trusts hereby
created or declared.”
IV. Learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of the Court to the
provision in the aforesaid clause of the Trust Deed to the effect
that any investment out of funds received from the Trust shall be
subject to the Trust. He thus, emphasised the limited scope of
alienation of the Trust property.
V. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the Sale Deed is illegal and
improper, inasmuch as defendant No. 1 was not authorized to
execute the same.
VI. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the Sale Deed records that
vide a letter dated 06.02.2018, defendant No. 1 was authorized by
the trustees to execute the Sale Deed dated 19.03.2018. However,
according to him, there is no such validly executed authorisation. It
is also contended that the purported authorisation letter placed on
record is false and fabricated.
VII. According to learned Senior Counsel, a careful perusal of the Sale
Deed would indicate that part of the advance consideration for the
suit property had been received on 18.02.2016 and subsequently
on 26.02.2016. Therefore, he submits without prejudice to his
other contentions, even if there was any authority, the same was
conferred on Mr. Nikhil Sen only on 06.02.2018, indicating that
the aforesaid sale was not bona fide.
VIII. It was further submitted that the aforesaid conclusion is supported
by the fact that details of the person or entity who received the
aforesaid consideration are not specified in the Sale Deed.
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Furthermore, the details regarding the purpose for which the
consideration was utilized by the Trust were also not disclosed.
IX. He also pointed out that although the purported Deed of
Appointment dated 29.04.2016, whereby Mr. Nikhil Sen was
appointed as a trustee of the Trust, has been placed on record, the
said document is forged and fabricated.
X. It was further urged that the signatures of Mrs. Mohini Tandon,
one of the trustees, appearing in the authorisation letter dated
15.05.2015, are also forged and fabricated. In support thereof,
learned Senior Counsel compared the aforenoted signatures of
Mrs. Mohini Tandon with those appearing in two other documents,
namely, the authority letter dated 06.02.2018, vide which Mr.
Nikhil Sen was purportedly authorized to sign all documents
relating to the sale, conversion, etc., of the suit property, and the
Deed of Appointment dated 15.05.2015.
XI. He further contended that in terms of the provisions of Section
50(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to
as the DRC Act), Civil Courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate
questions of title with respect to tenanted properties. However, it
was pointed out that the plaintiff had filed an application on
03.06.2023, seeking leave to defend in an eviction petition
instituted by defendant No. 4, the subsequent purchaser, before the
Rent Controller, which was rejected vide order dated 24.12.2024.
XII. Thereafter, the plaintiff preferred a revision petition bearing
RC.REV No. 83/2025 challenging the aforesaid order, which
remains pending consideration before this Court. It was submitted
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that notwithstanding the pendency of the challenge to the said
order, and in view of the likelihood of dispossession from the suit
premises in execution of the order of the Rent Controller, the
instant civil suit was filed on 02.04.2025.
XIII. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the
Supreme Court judgment in M.V. Ramasubbaier and Others v.
Manicka Narasimhachari and Others1 to contend that, where a
sale of trust property is challenged, it is incumbent upon the Court
to examine whether the trustee who alienated the property acted
reasonably and in good faith, or whether a breach of trust was
committed.
XIV. Further reliance was placed on another decision of the Supreme
Court in Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif and Others2 to
urge that the claims of an alleged subsequent purchaser regarding
the derivation of good title from the original landlord may be duly
considered by the Court in such challenges. Additionally, drawing
upon the decisions of this Court in Nagender Kumar v. Malik
Tejram Anand3 and Niranjan Lal Vohra v. Ram Lal Mahajan4, it
was contended that if the authorisation letter authorising defendant
No.1 to execute the sale deed is itself false and fabricated, the
resultant sale deed stands rendered null and void.
XV. Learned Senior Counsel concluded his submissions, stating that
pending proper adjudication of the aforementioned issues, the
1
1979 (2) SCC 65
2
1990 AIR 636
3
29 1986 DLT 167
4
1983 (1) RLR
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possession of the suit property must be protected, and in case the
plaintiff is dispossessed as a tenant, it would result in irreparable
loss that cannot be remedied monetarily. It was further urged that,
in light of the facts presented, a prima facie case has been
established, and the balance of convenience lies in favour of
granting the injunction sought, given that the plaintiff has been in
occupation of the suit property since 1956.
3. Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
defendant No.4, and Mr. Suresh Chaudhary, learned counsel for defendant
No.1, respectively, opposed the prayers made by the plaintiff.
4. Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned Senior Counsel, made the following broad
submissions:-
I. Drawing the attention of the Court to the prayers made in the civil suit
and the instant application, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
granting the relief sought in the present application tantamounts to
decreeing the civil suit itself, and that the Court cannot grant interim
relief which effectively disposes of the main suit. He further
submitted that the order passed by the Rent Controller is already
under challenge in separate proceedings, namely RC.REV. 83/2025,
wherein the plaintiff had sought interim injunction against
dispossession by defendant No. 4, but despite approximately nine
hearings, no such relief has been granted. Additionally, he referred to
various orders passed by this Court in the said revision petition on
07.09.2025, 11.03.2025, 09.04.2025, 30.04.2025, and 07.05.2025, toSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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indicate that despite the numerous hearings undertaken, the plaintiff
has not been granted any interim relief therein.
II. He submitted that the instant suit is expressly barred under Section
50(1) of the DRC Act, rendering it not maintainable. He further
contended that any challenge to the order of the Rent Controller must
be pursued exclusively through Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, and
since the plaintiff has already invoked this provision, maintaining the
present civil suit constitutes an impermissible parallel proceeding.
Additionally, learned Senior Counsel asserted that the challenge to the
Sale Deed is belated, as they were aware of the sale through a letter
dated 25.04.2018, sent by the purported trustees, in the name of the
Trust, to the tenants, informing them of the sale to defendant No. 4,
and through a reply dated to a legal notice dated 12.10.2018 issued by
defendant No. 4 to the plaintiff, wherein the plaintiff acknowledged
the sale by defendant No. 1. Despite this knowledge, the suit was only
instituted on 02.04.2025, failing to challenge the Sale Deed at the
earliest opportunity.
III. According to him, under the provisions of Articles 58 and 59 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Limitation Act“),
a strict limitation period of three years is prescribed for initiating legal
proceedings to challenge a sale deed. He submitted that this three-year
period had already elapsed prior to the filing of the civil suit on
02.04.2025.
IV. Elaborating further, learned senior counsel submitted that Article 58
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of the Limitation Act pertains to suits instituted for the purpose of
obtaining a declaration, with the limitation period commencing from
the date on which the right to sue first accrues, and that, Article 59
governs suits filed to cancel or set aside an instrument, such as a sale
deed, on grounds including fraud or misrepresentation, with the
limitation period beginning when the plaintiff becomes aware of the
facts justifying such cancellation or setting aside of the document.
V. According to learned Senior Counsel, under the facts of the instant
case, the limitation period began prior to 02.04.2022. Consequently,
by the time the civil suit was instituted on 02.04.2025, the claim was
no longer tenable, as it was barred by the provisions of the Limitation
Act.
VI. He further submitted that, in terms of Section 41 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, the injunction sought in the present proceedings is barred
by law. He contended that, in the absence of the Trust being arrayed
as a party, the Court cannot examine allegations regarding whether
the sale consideration was utilized for the benefit of the Trust or
otherwise. Additionally, it was urged that allegations concerning the
veracity of the purported signatures of Mrs. Mohini Tandon cannot be
adjudicated in the absence of the Trust as a party.
VII. Furthermore, he submitted that defendant No.1 was lawfully inducted
as a trustee vide a resolution dated 15.05.2015 and, on the same date,
was duly authorized to sign and execute all documents pertaining to
the property in question. Consequently, the payment of any
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consideration prior to the execution of the Sale Deed, i.e., on
26.02.2016 and 18.02.2016, cannot, by itself, cast doubt on the legal
authority of defendant No.1to execute the Sale Deed in question.
VIII. To substantiate his submissions, Mr. Rajesh Yadav placed reliance on
the Supreme Court decisions in Prem Singh v. Birbal5 and Md.
Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa and Others6 to contend that the
limitation period for seeking a declaration that a sale deed is illegal
and void commences from the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud,
and that such cases are governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963. He further relied on the decision in Anuradha Sharma v. North
Delhi Municipal Corporation and Anr7 to support his submission
that, should the plaintiff succeed, he would be entitled to seek
repossession of the suit premises, thereby negating any claim of
irreparable injury. Additionally, he argued that the plaintiff has failed
to establish that the sale deed in question was executed on account of
fraud or misrepresentation. Consequently, he contended that granting
interim relief to allow the plaintiff to continue possession of the suit
property would be impermissible in law and tantamount to restraining
the execution of a validly passed eviction order.
IX. Learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance on the decision in
Vipin Wadhwa v. M/s Prashant Enterprises8 to contend that once the
statutory period of limitation has lapsed, the cause of action is
5
(2006) 5 SCC 353
6
(1996) 7 SCC 767
7
2017 SCC OnLine Del 9104
8
2025 DHC 5229
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extinguished in the eyes of law and the same cannot be resuscitated.
Furthermore, he highlighted that the principle of acknowledgement of
debt in that case, which extends the limitation period, applies only
during the continuation of the prescribed period and ceases to have
effect once the period has expired.
5. Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel for defendant No. 1, adopted the
submissions advanced by Mr. Yadav and contended that the plaintiff is not
entitled to any interim relief.
6. In his rejoinder submissions, Mr. Sanjay Dewan, learned Senior
Counsel drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 23 of the plaint,
wherein it was averred that the limitation period for the present suit first
arose on 24.12.2024, being the date of the order of the Rent Controller in the
eviction proceedings instituted by defendant No. 4, and on various
subsequent dates thereafter. He submitted that neither defendant No. 1 nor
defendant No. 4 has specifically denied the averments made in paragraph 23
of the plaint in their respective written statements. To substantiate this
contention, he extensively referred to the averments contained in paragraph
23 and subsequent paragraphs of the plaint, as well as the corresponding
responses of the defendants in their written statements.
7. Further, Mr. Dewan submitted that the non-impleadment of the Trust
as a party constitutes a curable defect, and the plaintiff undertakes to take
appropriate steps to implead the Trust as a defendant. He also placed
reliance on the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Pravin
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Jethalal Kamdar (Dead) by LRs9 to contend that, for the recovery of
possession of trust property, the limitation period is 12 years, as prescribed
under Article 92 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, he urged that the
present suit is not time-barred and that the plaintiff has established the three
essential ingredients for the grant of an injunction, namely, a prima facie
case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. He, therefore, prayed
that the injunction sought be granted pending the adjudication of the suit.
8. In rebuttal to the rejoinder submissions, Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned
Senior Counsel, contended that the decision relied upon by the plaintiff in
Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (Dead) by LRs is inapplicable to the facts of the
instant case. He submitted that Article 92 of the Limitation Act pertains to
suits “to recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed
in trust and afterwards transferred by the trustee for valuable
consideration,” and the same does not apply to the plaintiff, who is merely a
tenant of the Trust and not a beneficiary or party entitled to invoke the said
provision.
9. I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and
also have perused the record.
10. The facts of the case disclose that the plaintiff-society was inducted as
a tenant in the suit premises in the year 1956. One Mr. Rai Bahadur Gyan
Chand Khanna, having acquired the said property as a perpetual lessee vide
a lease deed dated 02.07.1938, created the Trust through the Trust Deed for
the benefit of his wife, Mrs. Vidyawati Khanna, their sons, daughters,
9
AIR 2000 SC 1099
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sisters, and, subsequent to his demise, their further siblings, all designated as
beneficiaries. The Trust income was to be distributed amongst the
beneficiaries in specified proportions, with the suit property designated to be
held in perpetuity for the benefit of the trustees and beneficiaries. By a Deed
of Variation dated 08.10.1956, the original Trust Deed was modified,
substituting Clause 13 to provide that the Trust would operate in perpetuity,
vesting the sole discretion to sell the Trust property in the surviving trustee,
Mrs. Vidyawati Khanna. While further modifications to the Deed of
Variation appear to have been made, such aspects, at this stage, may not
bear significant relevance to the present proceedings.
11. The case of the plaintiff is that defendant No. 4, in collusion with the
other defendants, executed a Sale Deed dated 15.03.2018, which is void ab
initio, as the Trust was established to operate in perpetuity, and the trustees,
in breach of their fiduciary duties, could not convert the Trust property into
private property or appropriate its proceeds, rendering such alienation
fraudulent, null, and illegal. It is, further, the case of the plaintiff, who has
been in possession of the suit property as a tenant, that permanent injunction
is sought to restrain the defendants from evicting the plaintiff based on the
said illegal Sale Deed.
12. Additionally, it is averred that, relying on this fraudulent and
fabricated Sale Deed, defendant No. 4 filed an eviction petition bearing No.
14/2023, concealing the existence of the Deed of Variation dated
08.10.1956, which was erroneously allowed by the Additional Rent
Controller, New Delhi, vide order dated 24.12.2024. The said order is
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presently under challenge in RC.REV.83/2025, though no stay has been
granted by the concerned Court.
13. The submissions of defendant No. 4, as detailed in the preceding
paragraphs, include the contention that the instant civil suit is not
maintainable, being barred by limitation. In adjudicating an application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to, as the CPC), the Court must be satisfied that the
three essential ingredients for granting temporary injunction, namely, a
prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, and the
likelihood of irreparable injury, are established in favour of the applicant.
14. In view of the aforesaid, the Court deals with the aforesaid aspects as
under:-
(i) Prima-facie case:-
15. The question of limitation, as raised by the defendants, is fundamental
to the maintainability of the instant suit and lies at the core of the present
dispute. They have challenged both the suit and the instant application on
the ground that they are barred by limitation. Consequently, this issue pivots
the determination as to whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case sufficient to warrant the granting of injunction.
16. In the plaint, the plaintiff has averred that the cause of action first
arose on 24.12.2024, being the date of the eviction order passed by the Rent
Controller. It is further stated that subsequent to this order, the plaintiff
undertook steps to obtain relevant documents, through which it acquired
knowledge of the alleged illegality in the impugned transaction. For clarity,
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the relevant excerpts from paragraphs 23 and 24 of the plaint are reproduced
below:-
“23. That the cause of action for filing the present suit has arisen on
24.12.2024 as the Defendants are threatening to evict the Plaintiff from
the suit premises on the basis of false and fabricated said sale deed dated
15.03.2018 registered vide Registration No. 3270, Book No. 1, Volume
No. 6659 at pages No. 137 to 150 on 16.3.2018 with the Sub Registrar
VII, New Delhi and on the basis of fraudulent sale deed above
fraudulently obtained order/ judgement/ decree dated 24.12.2024 by
concealment of trust deed and variation deed in false and fabricated of
eviction petition RC ARC 14/23, titled as Absterge Real Estate Pvt
Limited -Vs- Masihi Sahitya Sanstha, which was allowed by the Hon‟ble
Addl. Rent Controller New Delhi District, Delhi and the cause of action
is continuing cause of action as threat of eviction continues from day to
day . The cause of Action further arose in January when the plaintiff has
come to know about the contents of the settlement and variation deed in
January 2025. It further arose on 08.3.2025 when the Hon‟ble High
Court of Delhi orally declined to hear and decide the question of title in
revision petition under revisional jurisdiction of the DELHI RENT
CONTROL ACT in view of section 50(4) of the DELHI RENT CONTROL
ACT as only the civil court can decide the question of title and voidability
or validity of the sale deed dated 15.03.2018 and not the rent controller
or the high court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction , hence present
suit.
24. That the present suit is within limitation as there is no period of
limitation to avoid a void ab initio document and void ab -initio order
based on void ab initio document as a plea about its invalidity can be
raised .in any proceedings and it is not necessary to claim any
declaration about its invalidity.”
17. To address the issue of limitation, Mr. Dewan, learned Senior
Counsel, contended that the limitation period for the instant suit is governed
by Article 92 of the Limitation Act, which pertains to suits for the recovery
of possession of trust property. However, the Court, upon a perusal of the
said provision, is of the opinion that the aforenoted article is inapplicable to
the facts of the instant case, as the relief sought in the present suit is for the
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protection of the plaintiff’s subsisting possession of the suit property, rather
than its recovery. The plaintiff, being currently in possession, has instituted
the instant suit and application to safeguard that possession. Consequently,
Article 92 of the Limitation Act has no bearing on the present proceedings.
Instead, the limitation period for a civil suit seeking a declaration that an
instrument is invalid, or for its cancellation, falls within the ambit of Articles
58 and 59 of the Limitation Act. A plain reading of these provisions
confirms that Article 59 governs suits for the cancellation of an instrument,
which aligns with the relief sought by the plaintiff in this case, while Article
58 applies to suits for declarations, not otherwise provided for under the
Limitation Act.
18. This interpretation is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd.10, where the Court dismissed a suit
seeking a declaration that a transfer deed was void and its cancellation as
time-barred, holding that under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, a
suit for declaration must be instituted within three years from the accrual of
the right to sue, and a suit for cancellation of an instrument must be filed
within three years from the date the plaintiff became aware of the facts
warranting such relief. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as
under:-
“Suit barred by limitation
36. As discussed, the suit was filed for declaration that the mortgage
deed dated 21-11-1967 as well as sale deed dated 21-12-1970 executed
by Wali Mohd. were not executed by him out of his free will and are
void. In Para (14) of the plaint, it is averred that the cause of action of
the suit arose on 21-11-1967 and 21-12-1970. Under Articles 58 and10
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59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 in a suit filed for any
declaration is to be filed within three years when the right to sue
accrues. Under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, suit filed to cancel or
set aside the instrument or decree, the suit has to be filed within three
years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to set aside or
cancel the instrument or decree became first known to him. Plaintiff
Shami Mohd. has admitted in his evidence that he got knowledge about
the execution of the sale deed dated 21-12-1970 on the third day of
death of his father on 17-5-1971. The suit must have been filed within
three years of the date of knowledge or the date of the sale deed but the
suit was filed on 12-7-1978. In the case in hand, the suit filed
challenging the validity of the mortgage deed dated 21-11-1967 and
sale deed dated 21-12-1970 is beyond the period of limitation of three
years as prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act and barred by limitation.”
19. Applying this principle, the Court must ascertain whether the
plaintiff’s claim, filed on 02.04.2025, falls within the prescribed three-year
period from the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud or fabrication
concerning the Sale Deed.
20. In the present case, it remains undisputed that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the execution of the Sale Deed as early as 12.08.2018. Even
prior to this date, the vendor had issued a letter dated 25.04.2018, intimating
the plaintiff of the impugned sale to defendant No. 4, the receipt of which
has not been denied by the plaintiff. Furthermore, on 12.11.2018, the
plaintiff responded to a legal notice issued by defendant No. 4, thereby
acknowledging the factum of the sale, and even disputing defendant No. 4’s
title over the suit property. Consequently, the knowledge of the plaintiff with
respect to the Sale Deed can be reasonably traced back to 2018.
21. Given that the plaintiff was aware of the impugned sale of the suit
property in 2018, it has failed, at this interlocutory stage, to satisfy the Court
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that it lacked knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action for the
instant suit at that time. It is reasonable to presume that a tenant, such as the
plaintiff, would have undertaken necessary due diligence concerning its
tenancy in the suit property upon being informed of the sale, especially in
light of the plaintiff’s aforenoted reply to defendant No. 4’s legal notice. The
inaction of the plaintiff in this regard undermines their claim of delayed
knowledge of the cause of action.
22. Moreover, the plaintiff cannot claim ignorance of the provisions of
Section 50(4) of the DRC Act, which precludes challenges to the title of a
landlord over tenanted property before the Rent Controller. Given this
statutory bar, the plaintiff could have instituted a civil suit to challenge the
title or the validity of the Sale Deed as soon as the eviction proceedings
commenced before the Rent Controller. The failure to do so promptly
further weakens the position of the plaintiff at this stage.
23. The Court also takes note of various orders passed by the Revisional
Court in RC.REV. 83/2025. On 07.03.2025, arguments were heard, and the
Revisional Court passed the following order:-
“RC.REV. 83/2025 & CM APPL. 13998/2025 [Stay]
3. The present Petition has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner/tenant
impugning the order dated 24.12.2024 [hereinafter referred to as
“Impugned Order” passed by the learned ACJ/CCJ/ARC, New Delhi
District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. By the Impugned Order, the
leave to defend Application filed by the Petitioner/tenant has been
dismissed and the order granting recovery of possession has been passed
by the learned Trial Court with respect to premises i.e., commercial
flat/floor on front portion of first floor (facing Janpath), constructed at
Plot No. 33, Block No. 134, also known as 70, First Floor, Janpath, New
Delhi-110001[hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”].
4. The challenge in the present Petition as raised by the Petitioner/tenant
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is to the aspect of landlord-tenant relationship or ownership of the
subject premises. It is the case of the Petitioner/tenant that the
Respondent/landlord has not derived title in a manner as is set out under
the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 [hereinafter referred to as the “Act”].
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/landlord, who appears on
advance service, submits that the subject property was purchased in
accordance with law under the provisions of Section 37 of the Act and no
permission as is suggested by the Petitioner/tenant was required in law.
5.1 Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/landlord further submits
that on the aspect of bonafide need, there was no challenge set out by the
Petitioner/tenant before the learned Trial Court in his leave to defend
Application.
6. The issue raised before this Court was also raised by the
Petitioner/tenant before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court
examined this contention of the Petitioner/tenant and found that the
Respondent/landlord had purchased the subject premises from the
erstwhile owner which is a trust by virtue of a registered sale deed dated
15.03.2018. The learned Trial Court also relied upon the fact that the
Petitioner/tenant has admitted to being a tenant in the subject premises
and given its finding in this behalf.
7. On the aspect of bonafide need and availability of alternate suitable
accommodation, the learned Trial Court has given a finding that no
documents in support of available alternate accommodations has been
made available.
8. After some arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
requests for some time to take instructions in the matter.
9. At his request, list on 11.03.2025 in the Supplementary list.
10. The parties shall remain present on the next date of hearing through
their authorized representatives.
11. The parties shall act based on the digitally signed copy of the order.”
24. Thereafter, on 11.03.2025, the matter got adjourned, and the Court
made the following observations:-
“1. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner requests for an adjournment. This
request is opposed by learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent.
2. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that on the last date of
hearing, after hearing arguments in the matter, the Court was inclined toSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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dismiss the Petition. However, at the request of learned Counsel for the
Petitioner, an adjournment was sought for additional time to vacate the
premises.
2.1 Once again, an adjournment is sought on behalf of the learned
Counsel for the Petitioner.
3. The parties are present in Court.
4. The date given today was given at the instance of the learned Counsel
for the Petitioner. Accordingly, the adjournment is granted subject to
payment of costs in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- payable directly to “Bar
Council of Delhi-Indigent and Disabled Lawyers Account”. Proof of
costs shall be filed before the next date of hearing.
5. In the meantime, the parties shall file their short note of contentions
not exceeding two pages each, in the matter at least one week before the
next date of hearing, along with the compilation of judgments, if any,
they wish to rely upon. All judgments sought to be relied upon shall be
filed with an index which also sets out the relevant paragraph numbers
and the proposition of law that it sets forth.
6. Registry is directed to place on record the digital copy of the Trial
Court Record duly paginated and book-marked in accordance with the
rules of the High Court.
7. In the interest of justice, list on 03.04.2025 in the Supplementary list.
8. It is also made clear that no further adjournment will be granted to the
Petitioner.
9. The parties shall remain present in Court on the next date of hearing.”
25. Subsequently, the plaintiff appears to have filed an application in
RC.REV.83/2025, and the matter was heard on 09.04.2025, 30.04.2025, and
thereafter on 07.07.2025. The relevant orders passed on these dates are
extracted below for reference:-
“09.04.2025
CM APPL. 19395/2025 [Modification]
1. This Application has been filed inter alia seeking the following prayers:
“It is therefore prayed that in the interest of justice and keeping
the facts and circumstances of the matter in view the order dated
11.03.2025 to be modified to the effect that para 2 be kindlySignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 21 KUMAR KAURAV
expunged from the order dated 11.03.2025 and amended order be
directed to be reloaded accordingly.”
2. At the outset, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that on
07.03.2025 after the hearing, the Petitioner had sought time to take
instructions in the matter and the Court had directed that the parties remain
present on next date of hearing. However, on the next date of hearing, the
parties did appear but once again an adjournment was sought by the
Petitioner.
2.1 Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that in view thereof
the adjournment was granted subject to payment of costs. Learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent further submits that the Application was filed
belatedly and once the roster was changed.
3. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
Application as filed is contemptuous. He seeks to rely upon Paragraph 2 of
the Application which is extracted below:
“2. That the when the matter was listed on 11.003.2025 [sic:
11.03.2025] the instructing counsel was not present as he was
not available in Delhi and the petitioner sought adjournment
through PROXY COUNSEL DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ADJOURNMENT Slip was circulated in advance to the Ld.
counsel for the respondent so as to Sr. counsel be informed in
advance but AS NO OBJECTION REQUEST WAS DECLINED
BY THE COUNSEL for the reasons known to the respondent
and in the absence of the instructing counsel certain non-
factual statement got recorded by the counsel for the respondent
as under:
“Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that on
the last date of hearing, after hearing arguments in the
matter, the Court was inclined to dismiss the Petition.
However, at the request of learned Counsel for the
Petitioner, an adjournment was sought for additional
time to vacate the premises.”
whereas no such event had taken place on that day. Neither the
senior counsel nor the instructing counsel nor the AR of the
petitioner had submitted that an adjournment was sought for
additional time or any time to vacate the premises and these
words have been got/ recorded falsely with an attempt to misled
or prejudice the Hon‟ble court. Even this Hon‟ble court did not
used the words that the Hon‟ble court is dismissing the petition
whereas the Hon‟ble court proposed and suggested that the
Hon‟ble court may consider granting liberty to file suit to
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16:12:51 22 KUMAR KAURAV
challenge the title of the buyer respondent who according to the
petitioner is claiming the title on the basis of void abinition sale
deed which had been got registered by playing fraud and
contrary to the provisions of Indian trust act applicable to
private trust and the respondent is not having a valid title and
the impugned sale deed has been got executed inter alia without
seeking permission of the district judge concerned was
submission was though opposed by the ld. Senior counsel of the
respondent citing the provision of section 37 of the Indian Trust
Act and at this stage the hobble [sic: hon‟ble] court was of an
opinion that the issue of validity of title can not be gone into
revision by this court and suggested the grant of liberty for filing
the separate suit challenging the validity of title or transfer and
at this stage adjournment was sought to for seeking instruction
from the client which is a body corporate and works under
collective wisdom instead of individual wisdom. Hence this
application for recalling and modification of the order thereby
removing or expunging the submission as recorded in para 2 of
the order as the same is false submission contrary to the
submissions & events in the Hon‟ble court.”
[Emphasis supplied]
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that admittedly
intemperate language has been used in the Application for which he renders
an unconditional apology on behalf of the Petitioner.
4.1 Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, on instructions, further
submits that the instructing counsel was not available in Delhi when the
matter was listed on 11.03.2025, and thus, an adjournment was sought. It is
submitted that since an adjournment request was declined in the absence of
the instructing counsel, certain non-factual statements got recorded by the
learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent.
4.2 Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that in fact
what transpired was that the instructions were to be taken to challenge the
title of the Respondent by way of a separate suit.
5. Quite clearly and given the fact that even as per the Petitioner, the liberty
was being sought to file a fresh petition would mean that the Petitioners
intended to withdraw the present Revision Petition with that liberty.
6. After some arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, on
instructions, seeks and is granted liberty to withdraw the present Application.
7. The Application is dismissed as withdrawn.
RC.REV. 83/2025
8. List before the Roster bench on 30.04.2025 subject to the orders of
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Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 23 KUMAR KAURAV
Hon‟ble the Chief Justice.”
“30.04.2025
The court has briefly heard Mr. C. Mohan Rao, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondent.
Mr. Rao‟s primary ground of challenge to the impugned eviction
order dated 24.12.2024 is that the sale deed executed by the previous lessor
in favour of the respondent is invalid in light of the provisions of the Indian
Trusts Act, 1882; and that the petitioner has never attorned to the respondent.
On the other hand, Mr. Yadav argues, that in view of section 109 of
the Transfer of Property Act 1882 it has been clearly laid-down that upon
transfer of the property, the transferee acquires all the rights of the transferor
and it is not necessary that a lessee must attorn to the transferee. In this
behalf, learned senior counsel has drawn the court‟s attention to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Ambica Prasad vs. Mohd. Alam & Anr.
Furthermore, it transpires that the present petitioner has already fixed
a suit bearing CS(OS) No. 230/2025 titled M/s. Masihi Sahitya Sanstha vs.
Mr. Nikhil Sen (Claimed Trustee of Vidyawati Khanna Trust) & Ors.
challenging the aforementioned sale deed, which suit is pending before a Co-
ordinate Bench of this court. Mr. Yadav accordingly submits, that until the
petitioner succeeds in challenging the sale deed by way of the civil suit, the
sale deed must be taken to be valid; and therefore, the impugned eviction
order does not suffer from any error suffers within the scope of section 25-
B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 („DRC Act‟).
In view of what has been transpired during the course of today‟s
hearing, Mr. Rao seeks time to take instructions as to which of the 02
proceedings namely the present revision petition or the said civil suit, the
petitioner would wish to pursue.
For the above limited purpose, re-notify on 07th May 2025 in the
„Supplementary List‟.”
“07.07.2025.
RC.REV. 83/2025
10. The court is informed that the petitioner has moved an application
before the learned Rent Controller for setting-aside the eviction order, on the
ground that the order has been obtained „fraudulently‟. That application is
pending consideration before the learned Rent Controller.
11. To allay the apprehension expressed on behalf of the petitioner, it is
clarified that the said application would be considered and decided by the
learned Rent Controller without being influenced by any observation made inSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 24 KUMAR KAURAV
the present proceedings.
12. Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
submits, that all their rights and contentions in relation to the application
pending before the learned Rent Controller, be also kept open.
13. Accordingly, it is further clarified that the respondent shall also be
entitled to raise all their rights and contentions before the learned Rent
Controller.
14. Re-notify on 01st September 2025, the date already fixed”
26. A perusal of the crucial dates involved would indicate that the instant
civil suit was instituted on 02.04.2025, at a time when the initial hearing in
the revision petition (RC.REV. 83/2025) had already taken place, and no
interim protection had been granted by the Revisional Court. Nothing
precluded the plaintiff from obtaining copies of the relevant documents to
verify the genuineness of the Sale Deed dated 15.03.2018 as soon as it was
informed of its execution, particularly in light of the letter of the vendor
dated 25.04.2018 and the reply of the plaintiff to the legal notice dated
12.11.2018. However, according to the plaintiff, such documents were
applied for only in the year 2025, indicating a significant delay in taking
steps to ascertain the validity of the transaction.
27. This Court, being a Civil Court, possesses the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the title of defendant No. 4. Any delay on the part
of the plaintiff in approaching the Court must be accorded due weight when
adjudicating an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC,
especially when the suit is opposed on the ground of being barred by
limitation.
28. This Court is of the considered opinion that, prima facie, the plaintiff
appears to have approached this Court belatedly. In Rashmi Saluja v.
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Religare Enterprises Ltd11, this Court examined the impact of delay by a
plaintiff in instituting a suit on an application for temporary injunction and
held that such delay constitutes a significant factor in adjudicating
applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The relevant
paragraph from the said judgment is extracted below for reference:-
“42. For the sake of argument, assuming that the contentions advanced
by the plaintiff are correct and that the entire process of subjecting her to
retirement by rotation is de hors the statutory scheme of the Companies
Act, the plaintiff, being fully aware of such an alleged irregularity, ought
to have pursued the appropriate legal recourse at the earliest possible
opportunity. At the very least, the final opportunity for the plaintiff to
challenge the applicability of Section 152 of the Companies Act would
have been prior to the AGM dated 28.05.2020. Even with respect to the
impugned Proposed Resolution to be placed before the 40th AGM, the
notification for the same was issued on 15.01.2025. However, the instant
suit and the accompanying application were filed only on 28.01.2025,
nearly thirteen days after the plaintiff admittedly became aware of the
resolution. When the matter was first placed before the Court on
29.01.2025, the Court, in the interest of procedural expedition, issued
summons in the suit and scheduled the instant application for
consideration. Furthermore, the AGM is not a mere discretionary
exercise undertaken at the behest of the company but a statutory
obligation, deriving its existence, powers, and duties from the Companies
Act. Given its inherent significance, any judicial interference with such a
statutory exercise carries far-reaching and unforeseen repercussions.
The plaintiff, if genuinely aggrieved by the notice dated 15.01.2025,
ought to have acted with due diligence and expedition rather than
waiting until the eve of the AGM scheduled on 07.02.2025 before
approaching this Court. Thus, at this belated stage, any interference by
this Court would result in unnecessary inconvenience to all parties
concerned. It is trite law that any party applying for an injunction should
approach the Court as early as possible and any laches would render the
application fatal. Moreover, the Court can refuse its discretion to a
person who has been sleeping over his rights. [Reference can be made to
the decisions in the cases of Associated Cement Companies v. State of
Rajasthan17; Baldeo Das Bajoria v. Governor of the United
Provinces18; Adiram Sarma v. DeokinandanAgarwalla19].”
11 2025 SCC OnLine Del 692 Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 16:12:51 26 KUMAR KAURAV
29. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a prima facie case, particularly as the issue of limitation, being a
vehemently contested matter involving mixed questions of law and fact,
remains unresolved at this interlocutory stage. The plaintiff has not
satisfactorily demonstrated to the Court that the instant suit, filed on
02.04.2025, falls within the limitation period prescribed under Articles 58
and 59 of the Limitation Act, especially given its admitted knowledge of the
Sale Deed as early as 12.08.2018, reinforced by the vendor’s letter dated
25.04.2018 and the plaintiff’s response to the legal notice dated 12.11.2018.
Even if the question of limitation were to tilt in the plaintiff’s favour, the
significant prima facie delay in approaching this Court constitutes a
substantial factor weighing against the grant of interim relief.
30. The law on granting of temporary injunction requires the applicant to
establish all the three ingredients, being a prima facie case, irreparable
injury, and balance of convenience lies in his favour. In the absence of even
one of the aforesaid ingredients, the Court cannot grant the injunction
sought. This proposition finds support in various judgments of the Supreme
Court, including in Hazrat Surat Shah Urdu Education Society v. Abdul
Saheb.12
31. Having concluded that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie
case, the existence of the other two necessary ingredients has not been
adjudicated by the Court.
32. Consequently, for the reasons aforesaid, the instant application under
12
JT 1988 (4) SC 232
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Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 27 KUMAR KAURAV
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC stands dismissed.
I.A. 11703/2025 (By Defendant No. 4 – For Rejection of Plaint under Order
VII Rule 11 & For judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 r/w
Section 151 of CPC)
33. The instant application has been preferred by defendant No. 4,
seeking the following relief:-
“To reject the plaint as filed by the plaintiff being under Order 7 Rule
11 (a) & (d) r/w Order 12 Rule 6 CPC in view of the admitted facts and
circumstances as pleaded by the plaintiff itself.
Costs be also awarded in favor of the applicant/defendant No. 4 and
against the plaintiff for filing the false and frivolous suit.”
34. A perusal of the instant application reveals that defendant No. 4 has
primarily premised its opposition to the plaint on the ground of limitation,
relying on the purported acknowledgement of the plaintiff regarding the sale
in the year 2018, as evidenced by the reply of the plaintiff dated 12.11.2018
to the legal notice issued by defendant No. 4. Their contention is that the
present suit ought to have been filed, latest by 2021, when the limitation
period ended as per Article 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act.
35. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, 1908, can
be ordered if the Court is satisfied that on a plain reading of the plaint and
perusal of the documents adduced along with it, the suit appears to be barred
by law. A perusal of the plaint and the plaint documents does not reveal that
the instant suit is barred by limitation. Defendant No. 4 herein, has sought
rejection of the plaint on the ground that the plaintiff had knowledge about
the cause of action for the present suit in 2018, based on certain documents
that do not form a part of the plaint or the plaint documents.
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Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 16:12:51 28 KUMAR KAURAV
36. Further, the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts
in the present case, and requires evidence to be led by both sides in order to
be adjudicated.
37. The law governing Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is well-settled, as
elucidated in decisions of this Court, such as in Naveen Kumar v.
Meenakshi Goel13, wherein it was held that limitation, being a mixed
question of law and fact, cannot warrant rejection of the plaint without
recording evidence. It is trite law that a plaint cannot be rejected if the issue
of limitation is not apparent from the averments in the plaint alone.
Although the contents of the plaint may indicate a date of knowledge
regarding the execution of the Sale Deed, they do not unequivocally
establish when the plaintiff became aware of the alleged fraud underlying
the transaction. Accordingly, this contested issue cannot be adjudicated at
the threshold stage and must be resolved upon trial after leading evidence.
38. With respect to the aspect of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC invoked in
this application, the same rationale applicable to Order VII Rule 11 extends
here, to the effect that an admission regarding knowledge of the execution of
the Sale Deed does not ipso facto translate to knowledge of its fraudulent
nature; such a determination necessitates examination of evidence to be led
by the parties, which cannot be undertaken at this preliminary stage. This
position is supported by the decisions in India Tourism Development
Corporation Ltd. v. Chander Pal Sood & Son14, where this Court held that
the power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and should be exercised
13
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1956
14
2000 SCC OnLine Del 43
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Signed By:PRIYA Signed
Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 29 KUMAR KAURAV
only when admissions are clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal, and in
Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal15, wherein the Supreme Court
reiterated that judgments on admission must be based on specific,
categorical, and intentional admissions, and the provision is enabling rather
than mandatory, allowing the court to insist on proof where necessary. Thus,
in the absence of unambiguous admissions warranting a judgment at this
juncture, the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC cannot succeed.
39. In view of the aforesaid, the instant application stands dismissed.
40. In view of the foregoing discussion, the application for interim
injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, as well as the
application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
for rejection of the plaint and judgment on admission, stand dismissed.
CS(OS) 230/2025 and I.A. 9253/2025 (under Order XI Rule 12 r/w Section
151 of CPC)
41. By way of caveat, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that the
findings recorded in the present order are based solely on a prima facie
appreciation of the material on record and are, in no manner, conclusive or
binding determinations on the merits of the case, which can only be
adjudicated upon trial.
42. Accordingly, the observations made herein shall not be construed as
an expression of opinion on the final merits and shall have no bearing on the
trial or the ultimate outcome of the suit.
15 2025 INSC 467 Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 16:12:51 30 KUMAR KAURAV
43. Let the matter be listed before the concerned Joint Registrar for
completion of further necessary steps in accordance with extant rules on
15.09.2025, the date already fixed.
44. Thereafter, the date of listing before the Court shall be given by the
concerned Joint Registrar.
(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE
JULY 16, 2025
nc
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRIYA Signed
Signing Date:17.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
16:12:51 31 KUMAR KAURAV
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