[ad_1]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Munak Chem.Etc vs State Of Pb on 22 April, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
101 CRA-S-437-SB-2004
HARDAMAN SINGH .....APPELLANT
Vs.
STATE OF PUNJAB .....RESPONDENT
2. CRA-S-424-SB-2004
M/s MUNAK CHEMICAL LIMITED AND ANOTHER .....APPELLANTS
Vs.
STATE OF PUNJAB .....RESPONDENT
Date of Decision: 22.04.2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Present: Mr. Vishal Gupta, Advocate
for the appellant in CRA-S-437-SB-2004.
Mr. Dinesh Goyal, Advocate and
Mr. Jugansh Goyal, Advocate
for the appellant in CRA-424-SB-2004.
Mr. R.K. Takkar, DAG, Punjab.
*******
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
In complaint case No. 7 of 1997 filed by Chief Agricultural
Officer, Kapurthala before learned Special Judge, Kapurthala, accused-
Hardaman Singh, sole proprietor of M/s Chadha Khad Store, Nadala, District
Kapurthala; and accused Nirbhai Singh, Chief Produc9on Officer of M/s
Munak Chemicals Limited, Bathinda were convicted by the Court of learned
Special Judge, Kapurthala under Sec9on 7 of the Essen9al Commodi9es Act,
1955 vide judgment dated 12.02.2004, on the allega9ons that fer9lizer kept
for sale by M/s Chadha Khad Store, Nadala, in the brand name of ‘Pooja
Brand Singal Super Phosphate’, manufactured by M/s Munak Chemicals
Limited, on analysis was found to be ‘non-standard’. Vide a separate order
dated 12.02.2004, both these accused i.e. Hardaman Singh and Nirbhai Singh
were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 02 years
1 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
each and to pay a fine of ₹5000/- each with default sentence of one month
rigorous imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.
2. Against the aforesaid convic9on and sentence, the two convicts
namely Hardaman Singh and Nirbhai Singh have filed the present two
separate appeals.
3. At the outset, learned counsel for both the appellants submit
that offence in ques9on was commiCed way back in 1996; that convic9on
was recorded in 2004 aEer trial of approximately 08 years; that the
appellants are facing agony of trial and further proceedings for the last
almost 30 years; that both the appellants are now quite aged and so,
considering all these circumstances, they be released on proba9on, as none
of the appellants want to press their appeal against convic9on.
4. Specific statement is made by learned counsel for both the
appellants withdrawing the appeal against convic9on and confining their
prayer only against the order of sentence so as to release the appellants on
proba9on.
5. It is contended by learned counsel that in the similar facts and
circumstances as in the present case, in a case pertaining to Essen9al
Commodi9es Act, 1955, Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to release the
appellant on proba9on in case 9tled Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West
Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605, which was also relied by this Court in CRR-
43-2010 tled Aditya Kumar Vs. State of Haryana decided on 03.04.2025.
6. Learned State counsel has opposed the prayer.
7. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides and
have appraised the record.
8. Considering the statement as made by learned counsel for the
appellants, both the appeals against the impugned judgment of convic9on
Page 2 of 10
2 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
dated 12.02.2004 are hereby dismissed as withdrawn, inasmuch as
convic9on is otherwise also found to be based upon proper apprecia9on of
evidence on record.
9. As far as the impugned order of sentence is concerned, it is
no9ced that at the 9me of commission of offence, appellant-Hardaman Singh
was 61 years of age, which means that as of now, he is approximately 89
years of age. Similarly, appellant-Nirbhai Singh was aged 47 years at the 9me
of commission of offence, which means that as of now, he is 75 years of age.
The offence in ques9on was commiCed in 1996. Convic9on was recorded in
February, 2004. Both these appeals were filed and admiCed in 2004. The
same could not be listed earlier due to huge pendency and have ul9mately
been listed for final hearing in 2025. Meaning thereby, from the date of
commission of the offence, the two appellants have already faced agony of
approximately 30 years including the trial proceedings and then the appeal
proceedings.
10. The ques9on is that whether in the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, par9cularly considering the advanced age of the two
appellants, it will be jus9fiable to send the appellants behind bars to carry
out the sentence as imposed by the trial Court.
11. A similar ques9on was considered by this Court in Aditya Kumar
Vs. State of Haryana (supra). It is relevant to reproduce the observa9ons as
made by this Court, which are as under:-
“19. As far as the impugned order of sentence is concerned, the accused-
pe99oner has been sentenced to undergo the minimum sentence as
provided under the Statute i.e. rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
months and fine of ₹500/- with default sentence of one month.
20. As per the custody cer9ficate, pe99oner has already undergone the
actual custody period of seven days and he is not involved in any other
offence. It is also no9ced by this Court that offence in ques9on was
commiCed in September, 1999 and aEer a protracted trial of more than 8Page 3 of 10
3 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004years, he was ul9mately convicted in October 2007 and then his appeal was
dismissed by the Appellate Court in January 2010. The sentence of the
pe99oner was suspended by this Court in January 2010 and this way, he is
out on bail for the last more than 15 years.
21. In the above circumstances, whether it will be jus9fiable to send him
behind bars to carry out the remaining sentence; or can he be released on
proba9on; or whether sentence can be reduced for the period already
undergone by him?
22. As per Sec9on 20AA of the PFA Act , the provisions of Proba9on of
Offenders Act 1958, or Sec9on 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are
not applicable to a person convicted of an offence under the provision of
the PFA Act, unless that person is under the 18 years of age.
23. In this case, at the 9me of recording convic9on in 2007, the age of
the pe99oner is men9oned to be 36 years as per the custody cer9ficate,
which means that at the 9me of commiLng the offence, he was 27 years of
age and not less than 18 years of age. As such, he cannot be granted benefit
of proba9on in view of Sec9on 20AA of the PFA Act.
24. Although, in Ishar Dass Vs. State of Punjab, 1972 PLR 475, it was held
by Hon’ble Supreme court that provisions of Proba9on of Offenders Act,
1958 are not excluded in the case of person found guilty of offence under
the PFA Act, but it is important to no9ce that Sec9on 20AA was inserted in
PFA Act, 1958 by way of an amendment in 1976 and therefore, the case of
Ishar Dass (supra) is not applicable in the present case.
25.1 In yet another case 9tled State of Punjab Vs. Mithu Singh, 1988 (3)
SCC 607, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Sec9on 20AA of the PFA
Act applies also to the offences commiCed prior to its enactment.
25.2 In the present case, since the offence was commiCed in 1999;
whereas, the amendment by inser9ng Sec9on 20AA was brought in 1976, as
such this authority is also of no help to the case of the pe99oner so as to
give him the benefit of proba9on.
Page 4 of 10
4 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
26. In Joginder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1980 PLR 585, a Full bench of
this Court held that benefit of provisions of the Proba9on of Offenders Act,
1958 can be extended even in a case, where minimum sentence is provided.
However, in that case before this Court, the accused had been convicted for
the offence under Sec9on 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. That was not a
case commiCed under the provisions of the PFA Act and so, not applicable
to the facts of present case.
27. In Lakhvir Singh etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and another, 2021 AIR
(Supreme Court) 555, benefit of proba9on was extended in a case, where
minimum sentence was provided. However, that was the case under the
provisions of Indian Penal Code. Similarly in Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of
West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605, the benefit of proba9on was granted
despite the fact that minimum sentence of imprisonment was provided, but
that was the case under the provisions of Essen9al Commodi9es Act, 1955.
Thus, in none of these cases, the provisions of the PFA Act were applicable.
28. In State of Haryana Vs. Yad Ram 1987(1) RCR (Criminal) 264, a Full
Bench of this Court has held that when convic9on is recorded under the
Preven9on of Food Adultera9on Act, then the minimum sentence provided
in the provision cannot be further scaled down.
29. Thus, from the legal posi9on as above, it emerges that when a
convic9on is recorded under the provisions of PFA Act, neither the accused
can be granted the benefit of Proba9on of Offenders Act, 1958 nor he can
be sentenced to the period of imprisonment lesser than as provided in the
Act.
30. However, in the case of Yad Ram (Supra), the effect of Ar9cle 21 of
the Cons9tu9on of India was not discussed, providing for speedy trial.
31. It cannot be disputed that right to speedy and expedi9ous trial is one
of the most valuable and cherished right guaranteed under the Cons9tu9on.
Ar9cle 21 of the Cons9tu9on of India takes in its sweep the right to
expedi9ous and fair trial. Even Ar9cle 39A of the Cons9tu9on of India
recognizes the right of ci9zens to equal jus9ce and free legal aid. To put itPage 5 of 10
5 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004simply, it is the cons9tu9onal duty of the Government to provide the
ci9zens of the country with such judicial infrastructure and means of access
of jus9ce so that every person is able to receive an expedi9ous, inexpensive
and fair trial.
32. Though our Cons9tu9on does not expressly declare the right to
speedy trial as a fundamental right, but the said right was recognized in
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC
81, wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that speedy trial is
implicit in the broad sweep and content of Ar9cle 21 of the Cons9tu9on of
India. Subsequently, in the serious of judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that a reasonably expedi9ous trial is an integral and essen9al part
of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Ar9cle 21. Hon’ble
Supreme Court has gone to the extent that speedy trial is of the essence of
criminal jus9ce and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself
cons9tute denial of jus9ce.
33. Speaking about the need of speedy trial, the Cons9tu9onal Bench of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC
569 has observed as under: –
“The concept of speedy trial is read into Ar$cle 21 as an essen$al part
of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved
under our Cons$tu$on. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarcera$on and
con$nues at all stages, namely, the stage of inves$ga$on, inquiry,
trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the $me of the
commission of the offence $ll it consummates into a finality, can be
averted. In this context, it may be noted that the cons$tu$onal
guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Sec$on 309 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.”
34. As has been observed in the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors
(supra), no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Ar9cle 21.
Page 6 of 10
6 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
35. It has been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal
Dass Vs. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 149 that right to speedy trial
encompasses all the stages, namely, stages of inves9ga9on, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and re-trial. Each case has to be decided on its own merits.
As has been held in P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4
SCC 578, it must be leE to the judicious discre9on of the Court seized of an
individual case to find out from the totality of the circumstances of the case,
if the 9me consumed up to a given point of 9me amounted to viola9on of
Ar9cle 21. In State vs. Narayan Waman Nerukar (2002) 7 SCC 6, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that while considering the ques9on of delay, the Court
has a duty to see whether the prolonga9on was on account of any delay in
tac9cs adopted by the accused and other relevant aspects, which
contributed to the delay. There cannot be any empirical formula of
universal applica9on in such maCers.
36. In Chander Bhan Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 1 RCR (Crl) 125, it has
been observed by a Coordinate bench of this Court as under: –
“8. Now it cannot be disputed that the right to speedy and
expedi$ous trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights
guaranteed under the Cons$tu$on. Fundamental rights were not a
teasing illusions to be mocked at. These were meant to be enforced
and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in
Ar$cle 21 of the Cons$tu$on creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that
a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social
interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused.
Right to speedy trial flowing from Ar$cle 21 encompasses all the
stages, namely the stage of inves$ga$on, inquiry, trial, appeal,
revision and retrial. This is how the Court shall understand this right
and have gone to the extent of quashing the prosecu$on a9er such
inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view
the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in
suspended anima$on for 10 years or more without any case at all
cannot be within the spirit of the procedure established by law. It isPage 7 of 10
7 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a
convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions
of Ar$cle 21 of the Cons$tu$on of India and the interpreta$on thereof
qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can
play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony,
which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of
the prosecu$on by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdic$on.
9. An iden9cal ques9on had arisen before the apex Court in
Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1988) 2 FAC 13; wherein
their Lordships were pleased to observe as under:-
“Coming to the ques$on of sentence, we find that the
appellant had been acqui<ed by the trial Court and High Court
while reversing the judgment of acqui<al made by the
appellate judge has not made clear reference to Clause (f). The
occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records
show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the
imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be
served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of $me for
undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though
ordinarily in an an$-social offence punishable under the
Preven$on of Food Adultera$on Act, the Court should take
strict view of such ma<er.”
10. This view was followed by this Court in Nand Lal v. State of
Haryana (1992) 1 Rec. Cri R. 82 and Ishwar Singh v. State of Haryana
1994(1) RCR 160. The present case is fully covered by the view
expressed by the Apex Court and by this Court in the judgments cited
above and I have no reason to differ therewith.
11. For the reasons men9oned above, the convic9on of the pe9-
9oner for an offence under Sec9on 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sec9on 7 of
the Act is hereby maintained. However, keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of the case and the fact that the pe99oner has already
Page 8 of 10
8 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
faced the agony of the protracted prosecu9on and suffered mental
harassment for a long period of ten years, his sentence is reduced to
the period of sentence already undergone. Sentence of fine is, how-
ever maintained along with its default clause.”
37. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken the similar view in
Vikas Mehta Vs. State of Haryana, Law Finder doc ID #2041916 by placing
reliance upon Des Raj Vs. State of Haryana, 1996(1) RCR (Criminal) 689.
38. Keeping in mind the abovesaid legal principles, when facts and
circumstance of the present case are examined, it is noted that pe99oner
faced protracted trial from 1999 9ll 2007, when he was ul9mately convicted
by the trial Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that there was any
aCempt on the part of the accused-pe99oner to delay the trial. His appeal
was dismissed in 2010. AEer the present Criminal Revision was admiCed by
this Court in 2010, because of the huge pendency, the file could not be
listed for final hearing and when it has now been listed for final hearing in
2025, it is almost more than 15 years from the date of its admission.
39. Thus, the sword of convic9on kept on hanging on the head of the
pe99oner for the last 26 years. It is easy to say that for almost all the 9me,
the pe99oner was on bail, but one cannot imagine the agony & trauma,
which is faced by such a person, whose convic9on has been recorded by the
Court. The Court also cannot ignore the age factor, inasmuch as at the 9me
when the offence was commiCed in 1999, pe99oner was hardly 27 years of
age. Now, aEer passing of the 26 years, he is 53 years of age and so, sending
him behind bars at this stage to undergo the remainder of the sentence, will
not be in the interest of jus9ce.”
12. It is to be noted that in Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West
Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605, which has also been referred by this Court
in Aditya Kumar‘s case (Supra), the benefit of proba9on was granted by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case under Essen9al Commodi9es Act, despite
the fact that minimum sentence of imprisonment was provided. The present
case is also under the Essen9al Commodi9es Act.
Page 9 of 10
9 of 10
::: Downloaded on – 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:051829
CRA-S-437-SB-2004
CRA-S-424-SB-2004
13. Having no9ced the legal posi9on as has been discussed by this
Court in detail in Aditya Kumar‘s case (supra), which is squarely applicable to
the facts and circumstances of this case, the prayer of both the appellants to
release them on proba9on, is hereby accepted.
14. As such, the impugned order of sentence as passed by the trial
Court is hereby set aside. It is directed that both the appellants be released
on proba9on for a period of 02 years on furnishing requisite proba9on bonds
in a sum of ₹50,000/- each with a surety of like amount to the sa9sfac9on of
CJM concerned, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of
cer9fied copy of this order. At the same 9me, both of them are directed to
pay prosecu9on costs to the tune of ₹50,000/- each. The fine of ₹5,000/-
each, as imposed by the trial Court, shall be converted into prosecu9on cost,
which will be adjusted in above amount; and in case the same has not been
paid, the appellants are required to pay the en9re amount along with the
furnishing of the bonds. It is further made clear that in case the appellants
failed to make compliance of this order within s9pulate 9me, the present
order direc9ng the appellants to release on proba9on, shall automa9cally
stand vacated and in that eventuality, they will have to undergo the actual
sentence as imposed by the trial Court.
15. Both these appeals stands disposed of accordingly.
16. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected
case.
22.04.2025 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Pry JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes
Whether reportable? Yes
Page 10 of 10
10 of 10
::: Downloaded on - 24-04-2025 04:25:49 :::
[ad_2]
Source link