Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
M/S S.A.S. R.K. Marble Udhyog vs Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya … on 3 January, 2025
Author: Rekha Borana
Bench: Rekha Borana
[2025:RJ-JD:239]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 122/2023
M/s S.A.S. R.K. Marble Udhyog, Nizarna, Proprietor Smt. Usha
Kanwar W/o Shivdan Singh Chouhan Aged About 62 Yrs., R/o
Fort Kothariya, Tehsil Nathdwara, District Rajsamand.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya Peeth-Pranyas, Shri
Dwarkadhees Mandir, Shri Dwarkadhees Mandir, Kankroli,
Through Executive Officer Bhagwatilal S/o Kajjulal Ji
Paliwal, Aged 85 Yrs., R/o Kamal Talai Road Kankroli,
Tehsil and District Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
2. State of Rajasthan through District Rajsamand,
Rajsamand.
3. Department of Mines and Geology through Mining
Engineer, Department of Mines and Geology, Block II,
Rajsamand.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 123/2023
Rishi Raj Singh S/o Shri Dan Singh Chouhan, Aged About 42
Years, R/o Kotharia, Tehsil Nathdwara, District Rajsamand,
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya Peeth-Pranyas, Shri
Dwarkadhees Mandir, Kankroli, Through Executive
Officer Bhagwatilal S/o Kajjulal Ji Paliwal, Aged 85 Yrs.,
R/o Kamal Talai Road Kankroli, Tehsil and District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
2. State of Rajasthan through District Collector, District
Rajsamand.
3. Department of Mines and Geology, Through Mining
Engineer Department Of Mines And Geology, Block II,
Rajasthan.
----Respondents
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S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 124/2023
Rishi Raj Singh S/o Shri Dan Singh Chouhan, Aged About 42
Years, Resident of Kotharia, Tehsil Nathdwara, District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya Peeth-Pranyas, Shri
Dwarkadhees Mandir, Kankroli, through Executive
Officer Bhagwatilal S/o Kajjulal Ji Paliwal, Age 85 Yrs.,
R/o Kamal Talai Road Kankroli, Tehsil and District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
2. State of Rajasthan through District Collector, District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
3. Department of Mines and Geology, Through Mining
Engineer, Department of Mines and Geology, Block II,
Rajsamand.
----Respondents
&
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 125/2023
Rishi Raj Singh S/o Shri Dan Singh Chouhan, Aged About 42
Years, Resident Of Kotharia, Tehsil Nathdwara, District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya Peeth-Pranyas, Shri
Dwarkadhees Mandir, Kankroli, Through Executive
Officer Bhagwatilal S/o Kajjulal Ji Paliwal, Age 85 Yrs.,
R/o Kamal Talai Road Kankroli, Tehsil and District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
2. State of Rajasthan through District Collector, District
Rajsamand, Rajasthan.
3. Department of Mines and Geology, Through Mining
Engineer, Department of Mines and Geology, Block II,
Rajsamand.
----Respondents
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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Himanshu Choudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr. O.P. Mehta
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA
Order
03/01/2025
1. The present four revision petitions arise out of the same
cause of action and hence, were heard together and are being
decided by this common order.
2. The revision petitions have been preferred against the order
dated 06.07.2023 passed by the Civil Judge, Rajsamand in Civil
Original Suit Nos.42/2023, 43/2023, 44/2023 & 45/2023
respectively whereby the applications under Order VII Rule 11 r.w.
Section 9, CPC r.w. Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) as filed on behalf of defendant
No.1 have been rejected and the suits in question have been held
to be maintainable before a Civil Court.
3. The facts are that four suits for permanent injunction were
filed by the plaintiff Shree Pustimargiya Tritiya Peeth-Pranyas, Shri
Dwarkadhees Mandir, Shri Dwarkadhees Mandir, Kankroli with a
prayer to restrain defendant No.1 from conducting mining
operation on the respective lands in question without the consent
of the plaintiff and further to restrain defendants No.2 & 3 from
issuing any permission/sanction or rawanna to defendant No.1 for
mining on the said lands.
4. Applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC read with Section
207 of the Act of 1955 were filed on behalf of defendant No.1 and
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also by defendants No.2 & 3 in each suit with a submission that
the land in question was evidently an agricultural land and hence,
the suit for permanent injunction qua an agricultural land could
not have been maintained before a Civil Court.
5. Learned Trial Court proceeded on to reject the applications
while recording a finding to the effect that as per the Jamabandi
and even as averred by the plaintiff in the plaint, nature of the
land in question was recorded as ‘mining area’ ( [kuu {ks=) and
therefore, the same could not be termed to be ‘agricultural’ and
hence, the suit was maintainable before a Civil Court.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that merely
because sanction for mining operation had been granted qua the
land in question, the nature of the same did not change and the
land definitely remained to be agricultural only. He submitted that
Rule 32(6) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017
(for short ‘the Rules of 2017’) pre-supposes a khatedari land and
it is qua a khatedari land only that the licence/lease for mining is
granted. The grant of lease/licence is only for a particular purpose
but the nature of the land effectually does not change and it
remains agricultural.
7. Counsel further submitted that admittedly, the land in
question was never converted and in absence of any conversion it
definitely remained agricultural and hence, the Civil Court did not
have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for relief of permanent
injunction qua an agricultural land.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon
judgments rendered in the cases of Hastimal & Ors. Vs. Pushpa
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Devi & Ors., S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.84/2017
(decided on 20.11.2020), 2020/RJJD/018646; Karan Singh
Chouhan & Ors. Vs. Manu Bal Sikshan Sansthan, Soorsagar
Jodhpur and Ors.; 2018(3) RLW 1988(Raj.) and Smt. Premi
Devi Vs. Deva Ram & Ors., 2009 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 401.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the land in question was evidently not an agricultural land
firstly, because the jamabandi itself reflected/recorded the same
as ‘fdLe [kuu {ks=’. Secondly, mining is a civil right and once mining
lease/licence had been granted qua the land in question, the
nature of the land definitely changed as it was no more used for
agricultural purposes. Relying upon the definition of “land” as
defined under Section 5(24) of the Act of 1955, learned counsel
submitted that the land in question was neither let or held for
agricultural purposes and hence, could not have been termed to
be an “agricultural land”. As it is settled position of law, nature of
user of land becomes relevant to decide the jurisdiction of a Court
and herein the land in question being used for mining purposes is
not denied, rather admitted.
10. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon
the following judgments:
(i) Harpal Singh Vs. Ashok Kumar; AIR 2017 SC
5852.
(ii) Shyam Singh Vs. Bhanu Prakash Saxena; AIR
2015 Raj. 40.
(iii) Tota Ram & Ors. Vs. Deep Chand & Ors.; 2014 (1)
WLN 105 (Raj.).
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(iv) Ravindra Kumar Vs. Swapan Choudhary & Ors.;
2012(2) DNJ (Raj.) 822.
(v) Banshidhar & Anr. Vs. Ram Narain; 1997 WLC
(Raj.) UC 676.
(vi) Anandi J. Datwani Vs. Ms Geeti Bhagat Datwani;
2013 AIR CC 2223.
(vii) Adhunik Grah Nirman Sahaklari Samiti LTD. Vs.
State of Rajasthan; AIR 1989 SC 867.
(viii) Bhanwar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.;
2022 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 322.
11. So far as the judgment in the case of Hastimal (supra) is
concerned, counsel for the respondents submitted that the same
is not a good law as ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Harpal‘s case (supra) had not been considered in the said
judgment. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the findings
as recorded by the learned Trial Court are perfectly in consonance
with law and does not deserve any interference.
12. In rejoinder arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the nature of user of land would make no
difference so far as jurisdiction of the Court is concerned. He
submitted that the land being used for mining purposes is totally
different from the same being used for
abadi/residential/commercial purposes. In all the latter cases, the
land requires a mandatory conversion but for mining purposes, no
conversion is required rather the mining lease is granted on the
agricultural land only. Therefore, the judgments as relied upon by
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learned counsel for the respondents would not apply to the
present matter.
13. Heard learned counsels and perused the record.
14. For adjudication of the dispute in question, the consideration
of the terms “land” and “agriculture” as defined under the Act of
1955 is essential. Section 5(24) of the Act defines “land” as
under :
“(24) “land” shall mean land which is let or held
for agricultural purposes or for purposes
subservient thereto or as grove land or for pasturage,
including land occupied by houses or enclosures
situated on a holding, or land covered with water
which may be used for the purpose of irrigation or
growing singhara or other similar produce but
excluding abadi land; it shall include benefits to arise
out of land and things attached to the earth or
permanently fastened to anything attached to earth.”
Section 5(2) defines agriculture as under :
“(2) “Agriculture” shall include horticulture, 3[Cattle
4
breeding, dairy farming, [Poultry farming and
forestry development].”
15. What can be concluded by a conjoint reading of the above
definitions is that the land in terms of the Act of 1955 is the one
which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes
subsevient thereto; and agriculture includes horticulture, Cattle
breeding, dairy farming, Poultry farming and forestry
development. Meaning thereby, as per the above definitions,
neither can mining be termed to be an agricultural activity nor can
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the mining operation be termed to be an agricultural purpose. In
the specific opinion of this Court, the land used for mining
operations cannot, by a bare reading of the above definitions, be
concluded to be a land used for agricultural purposes.
16. So far as the matters in hand are concerned, the land in
question is admittedly entered in the revenue records as ” ca>M [kuu
{ks=”. Evidently, the land is neither a cultivated one nor is being
used for any agricultural purposes therefore, even going by the
position of law that the nature of land would not change by mere
change in user, evidently, the nature of the land in question is
recorded in the revenue records for ‘mining purposes’. By all
means, the said entry in the revenue record cannot be read to be
for ‘agricultural purposes’ and hence, the land in question
definitely would not be covered by the definition as provided under
Section 5(24) of the Act of 1955.
17. Once this Court has held that the land in question is not
governed by definition of “land” in terms of Section 5(24) of the
Act of 1955, the Court is not required even to analyse the
judgments as relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Even otherwise, the judgments as relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner are of no help to him as therein the land in
question evidently was an agricultural land. Premi Devi (supra)
was a case wherein the Court held that just because the land was
not cultivated, it could not be held that it was not an agricultural
land. In Hastimal‘s case (supra), the land in question was used
for residential purposes but without any conversion for the said
purposes in terms of Section 90A of the Land Revenue Act. The
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Court therefore opined that without the conversion of the land in
terms of law, its nature would not change and the land would
remain to be an agricultural land. In Karan Singh Chouhan’s
case (supra), the Court specifically concluded the nature of the
land to be agricultural and hence, held the suit in question to be
barred under the provision of Section 207 of the Act of 1955.
18. The issue in question therefore would definitely be governed
by the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Harpal Singh (supra). Therein, the Hon’ble Apex Court while
dealing with the definition of “land” under the Delhi Land Reforms
Act, 1954 (akin to the definition of “land” under the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955) observed that where the land has not been
used for any purpose contemplated under the Land Reforms Act, it
would cease to be an agricultural land.
19. Further more, the reliefs as prayed for in the present suits
evidently do not fall under Schedule 3(2) of the Act of 1955 and
hence, Section 207 of the Act of 1955 would not even apply.
20. In view of the above analysis/discussion, this Court does not
find any ground to interfere with the orders impugned and hence,
the present revision petitions are dismissed.
21. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(REKHA BORANA),J
Vij/-1to4
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