Delhi District Court
M/S Sangar Overseas vs Sanjay Jindal on 5 April, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-017187-2023
Criminal Revision No.: 635/2023
1. M/s. SANGAR OVERSEAS,
L-6/5, 1st Floor, DLF Phase-2,
Gurugram-122002, Haryana,
Through its partner, Rajiv Sangar.
2. RAJIV SANGAR,
Partner, M/s. Sangar Overseas,
L-6/5, 1st Floor, DLF Phase-2,
Gurugram-122002, Haryana.
3. SMT. GLORIA SANGAR,
Partner, M/s. Sangar Overseas,
L-6/5, 1st Floor, DLF Phase-2,
Gurugram-122002, Haryana. ... REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
SANJAY JINDAL,
Proprietor of Jindal Fashion,
S-34, Okhla Industrial Area,
Phase-II, New Delhi-110020. ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 07.12.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 04.03.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 05.04.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter, referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’), seeking setting aside
of the order dated 10.10.2023 (hereinafter referred to as
‘impugned order’), passed by learned Metropolitan
Magistrate-01 (NI Act)/Ld. MM-01 (NI Act), Central Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ld. Trial Court/Ld.
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Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
16:40:48 +0530
MM’) in case bearing, ‘Sanjay Jindal v. Sangar Overseas, Ct.
Case No. 884,2018’, in a complaint proceeding under Section
200 Cr.P.C. read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NI Act‘). Pertinently, by
virtue of the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court directed the
petitioners/accused to bring the account statement and ledger of
revisionist no. 1/accused firm along with the taxation details
relating to the transaction in dispute, with an advance copy
thereof to the opposite side.
2. Tersely put, the genesis of the present proceedings is
the complaint, filed by the respondent/complainant before the Ld.
Trial Court in terms of the provisions under Section 138/141/142
of the NI Act. Under the said complaint, the respondent inter alia
contended that revisionist no. 1 is a partnership firm, with
revisionist nos. 2 and 3 as partners and persons in charge, thereof.
As per the respondent revisionists nos. 2 and 3 approached the
revisionist in person and made representation that they were
interested in doing business with the respondent and introduced
themselves as the partners of revisionist no. 1. Correspondingly,
the complaint records that revisionist nos. 2 and 3 portrayed
themselves as engaged in manufacturing and export of
readymade garments, as well as in need to purchase fabric for
their business requirement. As per the complainant, revisionist
nos. 2 and 3 assured that the payment against said proposed
purchase would be made by them within a period of seven days
from the receipt of material, failing which, it was guaranteed to
the respondent that the revisionists shall be liable to pay interest
at the rate of 21% (twenty one percent) per annum on the delayed
payments. Consequently, based on the said assurances,
declarations and assertions, the respondent was induced to supply
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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goods to revisionist no. 1 since 2012, in the terms of statement of
account of the respondent, which delivery was
accepted/acknowledged by the revisionists/revisionist no. 1. It is
further the case of the respondent that against their debt/liability
towards the respondent, the revisionists issued three cheques, i.e.,
cheque bearing no. 374828, dated 10.07.2017, for a sum of Rs.
3,28,535/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Twenty Eight Thousand Five
Hundred and Thirty Five only); cheque bearing no. 374829,
dated 11.07.2017, for sum of Rs. 5,72,704/- (Rupees Five Lakhs
Seventy Two Thousand Seven Hundred and Four only); and
cheque bearing no. 374830, dated 12.07.2017, for a sum of Rs.
5,46,608/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Forty Six Thousand Six Hundred
and Eight only), all drawn on, Punjab National Bank, Udyog
Vihar, Phase-I, Gurgaon-122016 (hereinafter collectively referred
to as the ‘cheques in question/dishonoured cheques’). Notably,
when the respondent is asserted to have deposited the cheques in
question with his banker, i.e., Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd.,
Chandani Chowk, Delhi, however, the same were returned
unpaid with the remarks, ‘Payment Stopped by Drawer’ vide
memo dated 18.08.2017. Subsequently, the complainant is
avowed to have issued a notice/legal notice dated 16.09.2017
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘legal notice/legal demand notice’)
to the revisionists in terms of the provisions under Section
138/141 NI Act. However, despite the receipt of said notice by
the revisionists, the revisionists are proclaimed to have neither
made payment against the dishonoured cheque, nor issued reply
thereto. Ergo, under such facts and circumstances, the instant
complaint came to be filed before the Ld. Trial Court.
2.1. Markedly, upon such complaint being filed and upon
the respondent tendering pre-summoning evidence, the Ld. Trial
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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Court vide its order dated 05.12.2017, took cognizance of the
offence under Section 138 NI Act and issued summons against all
the accused persons, i.e., the revisionists herein. Subsequently,
upon the revisionists’ entering appearance before the Ld. Trial
Court and arguments having been addressed on notice by the Ld.
Counsel for the respondent and that of the revisionists, Ld. Trial
Court, vide order dated 02.05.2022 directed framing of notice
against the revisionists in terms of the provisions under Section
251 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, the respondent was examined and
party cross examined on behalf of the revisionists. Markedly,
during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court on
10.10.2023, the Ld. Trial Court vide its order of the said
date/impugned order, directed the revisionists to inter alia bring
on record, its account statement and ledger along with taxation
details. Relevant extracts of the said order dated
10.10.2023/impugned order are reproduced as under;
“…CW-1 (complainant) is examined in chief,
partly cross examined & his further cross
examination is deferred till the next date of hearing.
Since the transactions between the parties spread
over a number of years the court exercising its power
u/s 165 of Indian Evidence Act, directs the accused to
bring the account statement and ledger of accused
firm along with the taxation details relating to the
transaction in dispute with an advance copy to the
opposite side within 10 days.
Ld. Counsel for accused submits that since the
transaction is old it is difficult to obtain the records.
However, the court opines that to determine the real
question in controversy and to ascertain which
entries are disputed in the ledger of the complainant
and accused the above said documents are essential
in the interest of justice.
Ld. Counsel for accused submits that at this stage,
it would disclose his defence. However, since the
business between the complainant and accused was
stretched over several years and in multiple
transaction, it is essential to crystalize the
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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controversy and to focus on the entries which are
disputed in the records of each party. Thus, the
accused is directed to file above said documents.
Be put up for further cross examination of
CW-1…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist outrightly
contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court without properly appreciating the facts of the present case
as well as wrongly applying the law. Further, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the impugned order is wrong and contrary to settled law
and has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, mechanically,
without due application of mind to the factual and legal position.
As per the Ld. Counsel, the procedure adopted by the Ld. Trial
Court, militates against the rudimentary principle and procedure
of trial in a criminal case, whereby the accused has a right to
remain silent. However, it was asserted that the Ld. Trial Court
passed the impugned order in violation of Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of Indian (hereinafter referred to as they
‘Constitution’). Ld. Counsel further asserted that the right
guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution acts as a
‘protective umbrella’ against testimonial compulsion in respect of
persons accused of an offence or to be witness against
themselves. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the directions
issued by the Ld. Trial Court violates the spirit of the said
provision, whereby the Ld. Trial Court erroneously directed the
revisionist to produce documents while the complainant was
being examined as witness before the Ld. Trial Court. It was
further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the
impugned order, failed to appreciate the provisions under Chapter
X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( hereinafter referred to as the
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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‘Evidence Act‘), as the revisionist was not in the witness box at
the relevant point in time, when the Ld. Trial Court directed the
revisionist to produce self-incriminating material. Ergo, it was
asserted that the provisions under Section 165 of the Evidence
Act was wrongly interpreted by the Ld. Trial Court. In this
regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in
not appreciating that it could have asked the respondent to
produce the documents to prove his case/complaint, however,
could not have directed/coerced the revisionists to produce the
documents as directed under the impugned order.
3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionists further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the
complaint under trial is a criminal complaint and there is a
specific procedure, as prescribed under Cr.P.C. for trial of the
complaint cases read with relevant provisions under NI Act. As
per the Ld. Counsel, the respondent could have produced the
documents in his evidence and have chosen not to produce the
same, however, the revisionists who were cross-examining the
witness, could not and ought not to have been directed to produce
the documents, by seeking recourse to the provisions under the
Evidence Act. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld.
Trial Court could not have directed the revisionists to produce the
documents, which were not in their custody and could
subsequently be exploited to take an adverse opinion. However,
despite the revisionists’ specific requests that after huge losses all
the assets of the revisionists were taken over by the Bank under
the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002/SARFASI Act and
that no documents were in the possession of the revisionists, the
Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order to the prejudice of the
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signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
16:41:08
+0530
revisionists. Further, as per the Ld. Trial Court, the Ld. Trial
Court could not have directed the revisionists to prove the case of
the complainant/respondent by producing the documents, which
relate to business transactions, concluded five years prior to the
dispute in question. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the
impugned order is arbitrary, biased and against the facts and law,
resulting in causing grave miscarriage of justice as well as
prejudice to the case of the revisionists. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel
fervently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned
order, oblivious of the settled judicial precedents as well as legal
provisions, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset.
4. Per contra Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted
that there is no irregularity in the impugned order, which has
been passed by the Ld. Trial Court after duly appreciating the
facts of the present case and the judicial precedents. In this
regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that during the course of cross-
examination of the respondent by/on behalf of the revisionists,
when revisionists started agitating unnecessary and frivolous
questions on the statement of account filed by the respondent,
raising confusion and doubt, the Ld. Trial Court directed the
revisionists to place on record its statement of account/ledger for
the purpose of lucidity and exactness. As per the Ld. Counsel, the
endeavor of the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned
order was to pint-point and recognize the disputed entries in
question, deserving no interference from this Court. It was
further submitted that the provisions under Section 165 Evidence
Act are quite expansive, and the Ld. Trial Court has absolute
right to regulate the cross examine the truth which can be
extracted by seeking recourse to the said provision. Even
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the defence now raised by the
revisionists of destruction of records or taking over of the assets
of the revisionists by Banks under SARFAESI Act could have
been taken by/on behalf of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial
Court. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists, instead
of agitating the said issue before the Ld. Trial Court, agitated the
same before this Court by filing the instant revision petition.
Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the instant revision petition has
been filed by the revisionists with the sole endeavor to delay the
proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court and cause
prejudice/harassment to the respondent. Ld. Counsel further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court was well within its right to
regulate the proceedings conducted before itself, including
directing the revisionists to produce the documents as sought for.
Consequently, Ld. Counsel for the respondent entreated that the
present petition may be dismissed at the outset, as no irregularity
can be attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the
Ld. Trial Court as per the provisions of law.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and
that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent have been heard as well as
the record(s), including the Trial Court record(s), thoroughly
perused.
6. Before proceeding further with the determination of
the rival contentions of parties, i.e., Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist and Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this deems it apposite
to outrightly refer and reproduce the provisions under Section
397 Cr.P.C.1, as under;
1
Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or
passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-
section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Appositely, from a perusal of the aforesaid
provision, it is quite manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of
this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of the
parties only in the instances where there is a palpable error, non-
compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being
completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised
arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander,
(2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while explicating
the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C.,
observed as under;
record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement
that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation–All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate
jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of
Section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding….”
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise
of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with
the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in
the proceedings under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Manifestly, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. Further, as aforenoted,
the object of the provisions under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. Needless to
further iterate that law is settled 2 that there has to be, “well-
founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
2
Malkeet Singh Gill v. The State of Chhattisgarh, MANU/SC/0814/2022.
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individual case. It is also well settled that while considering the
same, the revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts
and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.” Quite
evidently, the revisional jurisdiction of court(s) is confirmed only
to the extent to correct the wrong exercise of jurisdiction if the
finding is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong
that if allowed to stand, would result in grave injustice to a party,
whereas the appellate jurisdiction permits a court to
re-examine/reevaluate/re-appreciate the material placed on
record. Needless to mention, the main distinction between
appellate and revisional jurisdiction is that exercise of revisional
jurisdiction is confined to the questions of jurisdiction, whilst, in
first appeal, court is free to decide all questions of law and fact
which arises in the case. Reference in this regard is made to the
decision in State of Kerala v. Putthumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri, AIR 1999 SC 981: MANU/SC/0100/1999 , wherein
the Apex Court in unambiguous terms noted as under;
“5. Having examined the impugned Judgment of
the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions
raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, we have
no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the
case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its
revisional jurisdiction. In Its revisional jurisdiction,
the High Court can call for and examine the record of
any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as
to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power
cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate
Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate
Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the
evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same
when the evidence has already been appreciated by
the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the
notice of the High Court which would otherwise
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinizing the impugned Judgment of the High
Court from the aforesaid stand point, we have no
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the
oral evidence. The High Court also committed
further error in not examining several items of
evidence relied upon by the Additional Sessions
Judge, while confirming the conviction of the
respondent. In this view of the matter the impugned
Judgment of the High Court is wholly unsustainable
in law and we, accordingly, set aside the same. The
conviction and sentence of the respondent as passed
by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional
Sessions Judge in appeal is confirmed. This appeal is
allowed. Bail bonds furnished stand cancelled. The
respondent must surrender to serve the sentence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Significantly, at this stage, this Court deems it
pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under
law/Constitution, for the purpose of present adjudication on
merits, as under;
“20. Protection in respect of conviction for
offences-(1) No person shall be convicted of any
offence except for violation of a law in force at the
time of the commission of the act charged as an
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than
that which might have been inflicted under the law in
force at the time of the commission of the offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished
for the same offence more than once.
(3) No person accused of any offence shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Noticeably, from a perusal of the above provision, in
particular, from a conscientious appreciation of provision under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution, it is observed that the same
provides that no person accused of any offence shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Clearly, law
encompasses a right of silence with an accused, which has been
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GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
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persistently recognized by superior courts 3 to be an extension of
the rule of civil liberty enjoined by our Constitution. Markedly,
the protection guaranteed to a person accused of an offence to
maintain ‘silence’ or to be not compelled to a witness against
himself is of quite far-reaching and extensive in its scope and
ambit. Such a protection extends even to the stage of
investigation as much as it is applicable at the stage of trial, as
has been settled by the superior courts under their tenacious
declarations. Reference in this regard is made to decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in M.P. Sharma & Ors. v. Satish Chandra &
Ors., MANU/SC/0018/1954, wherein the Hon’ble Court in
unambiguous terms, explicated the law in the following terms;
“11. Broadly stated the guarantee in article 20(3)
is against “testimonial compulsion”. It is suggested
that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person
standing his trial for an offence when called to the
witness-stand. We can see no reason to confine the
content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely
literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the
guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the
substance for the sound as stated in certain American
decisions. The phrase used in article 20(3) is “to be a
witness.” A person can “be a witness” not merely by
giving oral evidence but also by producing
documents or making intelligible gestures as in the
case of a dumb witness (see section 119 of the
Evidence Act) or the like. “To be a witness” is
nothing more than “to furnish evidence”, and such
evidence can be furnished through the lips or by
production of a thing or of a document or in other
modes.
So far as production of documents is concerned,
no doubt section 139 of the Evidence Act says that a
person producing a document on summons is not a
witness. But that section is meant to regulate the right
of cross-examination. It is not a guide to the
connotation of the word “witness”, which must be
understood in its natural sense, i.e., as referring to a
person who furnishes evidence.
3
Aloke Nath Dutta and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, MANU/SC/8774/2006.
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Indeed, every positive volitional act which
furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial
compulsion connotes coercion which procures the
positive volitional evidential acts of the person, as
opposed to the negative attitude of silence or
submission on his part. Nor is there any reason to
think that the protection in respect of the evidence so
procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in
the court room.
The phrase used in article 20(3) is “to be a
witness” and not to “appear as a witness”; It follows
that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as
it is related to the phrase “to be a witness” is not
merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the
court room but may well extend to compelled
testimony previously obtained from him. It is
available therefore to a person against whom a
formal accusation relating to the commission of an
offence has been leveled which in the normal course
may result in prosecution…”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Quite intelligibly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
aforenoted dictate gave an expansive meaning to the provision
under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. However, it is equally
worthy to note here that the superior courts 4 have also time and
again explicated that for a testimony by an accused to fall under
the purview of the protective umbrella of the said provision,
testimony of an accused person must be of such a character that
by itself, it should have a tendency of incriminating such an
accused or make the case against such an accused at least
probable, considered by itself. In this regard, reference is made to
the decision in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani,
MANU/SC/0139/1978, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in akin
terms, remarked as under;
“…In this sense, answers that would in
themselves support a conviction are confessions but
answers which have a reasonable tendency strongly
to point out to the guilt of the accused are4
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Ors., MANU/SC/0134/1961.
C.R No. 635/2023 M/s Sangar Overseas & Ors. v. Sanjay Jindal Page 14 of 24 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05 16:41:35 +0530
incriminatory. Relevant replies which furnish a real
and clear link in the chain of evidence indeed to bind
down the accused with the crime become
incriminatory and offend Article 20(3) if elicited by
pressure from the mouth of the accused… An answer
acquires confessional status only if, in terms or
substantially, all the facts which constitute the
offence are admitted by the offender. If his statement
also contains self-exculpatory matter it ceases to be a
confession. Article 20(3) strikes at confessions and
self- incriminations but leaves untouched other
relevant facts…”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. However, it is pertinent to observe here that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in State of
Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Ors., MANU/SC/0134/1961
inter alia delved into the issue, whether the expression ‘to be a
witness’ was the same as ‘to furnish evidence’. Relevantly, upon
exhaustively reviewing the judicial precedents and legal
provision governing the field, the majority opinion of Hon’ble
Apex Court in the said decision voiced that the ambit of the
expression ‘to be a witness’ was narrower than that of ‘furnishing
evidence’. In particular, it the majority view in the said decision,
inter alia, unequivocally held that ‘self-incrimination’ under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution means, conveying information
based upon the personal knowledge of an accused/person
accused of an offence/giver and that it does not include, mere
mechanical process of producing documents in court, which do
not contain any statement of such an accused/giver, based on his
personal knowledge. Apposite in this regard to reproduce the
relevant extracts from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
Kathi Kalu Oghad Case (Supra.), as under;
“…To be a witness’ may be equivalent to
`furnishing evidence’ in the sense of making oral or
written statements, but not in the larger sense of the
expression so as to include giving of thumb
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
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impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers
or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body by
an accused person for purpose of identification.
`Furnishing evidence’ in the latter sense could not
have been within the contemplation of the
Constitution-makers for the simple reason that –
though they may have intended to protect an accused
person from the hazards of self- incrimination, in the
light of the English Law on the subject – they could
not have intended to put obstacles in the way of
efficient and effective investigation into crime and of
bringing criminals to justice. The taking of
impressions or parts of the body of an accused person
very often becomes necessary to help the
investigation of a crime. It is as much necessary to
protect an accused person against being compelled to
incriminate himself, as to arm the agents of law and
the law courts with legitimate powers to bring
offenders to justice. Furthermore it must be assumed
that the Constitution- makers were aware of the
existing law, for example, Section 73 of the Evidence
Act or Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of
Prisoners Act (XXXIII of 1920).
…The giving of finger impression or of specimen
signature or of handwriting, strictly speaking, is not
`to be a witness’. `To be a witness’ means imparting
knowledge in respect of relevant fact, by means of
oral statements or statements in writing, by a person
who has personal knowledge of the facts to be
communicated to a court or to a person holding an
enquiry or investigation. A person is said `to be a
witness’ to a certain state of facts which has to be
determined by a court or authority authorised to
come to a decision, by testifying to what he has seen,
or something he has heard which is capable of being
heard and is not hit by the rule excluding hearsay or
giving his opinion, as an expert, in respect of matters
in controversy. Evidence has been classified by text
writers into three categories, namely, (1) oral
testimony; (2) evidence furnished by documents; and
(3) material evidence. We have already indicated that
we are in agreement with the Full Court decision in
Sharma‘s case MANU/SC/0018/1954 : [1954] SCR
1077, that the prohibition in Clause (3) of Article 20
covers not only oral testimony given by a person
accused of an offence but also his written statements
which may have a bearing on the controversy with
reference to the charge against him….
…Self-incrimination must mean conveying
information based upon the personal knowledge of
the person giving the information and cannot include
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GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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merely the mechanical process of producing
documents in court which may throw a light on any
of the points in controversy, but which do not contain
any statement of the accused based on his personal
knowledge. For example, the accused person may be
in possession of a document which is in his writing
or which contains his signature or his thumb
impression. The production of such a document, with
a view to comparison of the writing or the signature
or the impression, is not the statement of an accused
person, which can be said to be of the nature of a
personal testimony. When an accused person is
called upon by the Court or any other authority
holding an investigation to give his finger impression
or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is
not giving any testimony of the nature of a `personal
testimony’. The giving of a `personal testimony’ must
depend on his volition. He can make any kind of
statement or may refuse to make any statement. But
his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of
efforts at concealing the true nature of it by
dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character.
Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of specimen
writing or of signatures by an accused person, though
it may amount to `furnishing evidence’ in the larger
sense, is not included within the expression `to be a
witness’…”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Apropos the present discourse, this Court deems it
fit to make a reference to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court
of Kerala in M/s. Kuriland (P.) Ltd. & Anr. v. P.J. Thomas & Anr.,
Crl. MC. No. 2403/2007, dated 05.09.2008, wherein the Hon’ble
Court, whilst being confronted with the issue of akin kind as that
before this Court, observed as under;
“13. The first and foremost issue to be considered
in the context of the contentions raised by the parties
is whether, even if a direction issued by the court is
construed as a direction to the accused to produce the
document, whether the same by itself will amount to
testimonial compulsion prohibited under Article
20(3) of the Constitution. The concept of testimonial
compulsion is relatable to the protection given to an
accused from being a witness against himself. The
larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Kathi Kalu
considered this aspect elaborately. One of the aspects
considered by the larger bench was the correctness of
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
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the reasoning given by the Supreme Court in an
earlier judgment in M.P. Sharma V. Sathish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi {AIR 1954 SC 300}. The
scope and ambit of Article 20(3) of the Constitution
was considered by the Supreme Court in M.P.
Sharma, AIR 1954 SC 300 and the same merits
reproduction:
*** *** ***
14. The court then went on to find that the
guarantee against testimonial compulsion is also
extended to a statement in writing which
incriminated a witness when figuring as an accused
person. In the words of the court “put a witness”
means “to furnish evidence”. After referring to the
said view taken by the Supreme Court in M.P.
Sharma {AIR 1954 SC 300}, the larger bench said
that the substantial view taken by the court earlier
seems to be correct, but went on to find in paragraph
11 of the judgment as follows:
*** *** ***
15. In effect, therefore, the larger bench of the
Supreme Court specifically referred to the Section to
hold that a person summoned to court does not
become a witness by the mere fact that he produces a
document and cannot be examined or cross-examined
unless and until he is called as a witness. Therefore,
if the accused is called upon to produce a document,
he does not become a witness by reason of the same.
Obviously, the accused cannot be compelled to
testify against himself, and therefore, the order
passed by the court directing the accused to produce
a document does not by reason of the said order
impute the status of a witness and consequently, mere
production of the document will not amount to
testimonial compulsion within the meaning of Article
20(3) of the Constitution. The conclusions of the
larger bench in paragraph 16 of the judgment is
relevant and with respect, merits reproduction:
“‘To be a witness’ is not equivalent to
‘furnishing evidence’ in its widest significance,
that is to say, as including not merely making of
oral or written statements, but also production
of documents or giving materials which may be
relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.”
16. Once this position is accepted, mere
production of a document without compelling the
accused to be a witness as such, will not amount to
testimonial compulsion within the meaning of Article
20(3) of the Constitution, even if it is assumed that
the direction to the Accountant of the 1st accused
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by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2025.04.05
16:41:49
+0530
company to attend and produce the documents would
amount to a direction to the accused to produce the
documents because they are actually, in law, deemed
to be in custody of the documents. The direction to
the Accountant to produce the documents by itself
cannot be considered as illegal.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Ergo, in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates and
being cognizant of the legal provisions as well as the facts and
circumstances brought forth on record, this Court would now
proceed with the determination of the rival contentions of Ld.
Counsel for the parties. As aforenoted, one of the primary
objections of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists to the impugned
order is that by virtue of the said order, Ld. Trial Court has
directed the accused/revisionists to produce self-incriminating
material. In particular, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned
order violates article 20(3) of the Constitution. However, as
aforenoted, mere direction of Ld. Trial Court under the impugned
order to the revisionists/accused to produce its account statement
and ledger along with the taxation details relating to the
transaction in dispute, would not, in the considered opinion of
this Court, be violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution in the
instant case, in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates, in
particular that under Kathi Kalu Oghad Case (Supra.). Needless
to reiterate that the law is settled that self-incrimination, under
the said provision, denotes, conveying of an information based
upon the personal knowledge of such a giver and that mere
mechanical production of documents in Court, which may throw
a light on any of the points in controversy, but which do not
contain any statement of the accused based on his personal
knowledge, cannot fall within the proscription of Article 20(3) of
the Constitution. Needless to reiterate and accentuate that the
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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revisionists’ account statement, ledger and taxation details
relating to the transaction in dispute, in the considered opinion of
this Court are not information based on personal knowledge of
the revisionists herein and is per se nor self-incriminatory or
sufficient to bringforth the conviction of an accused, so as to be
barred under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. In fact, the facts of
the present case, clearly align and are covered under the decision
of the Hon’ble High Court in M/s. Kuriland (P.) Ltd. & Anr. v.
P.J. Thomas & Anr., (Supra.), wherein the Hon’ble Court
unmistakably observed that mere production of a document
without compelling the accused to be a witness as such, will not
amount to testimonial compulsion within the meaning of Article
20(3) of the Constitution, even if such directions are made
towards an accused (or to accused’s accountant as in the said
case, though the documents were in fact under the custody of
such an accused). Ergo, it is reiterated that the said contention
falls flat before this Court in view of the persistent and
unambiguous avowal of superior courts as well as in light of the
correct interpretation of words, ‘self-incrimination’ under Article
20(3) of the Constitution.
15. In so far as the contention of Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists pertaining to wrongful exercise of discretion under
Section 165 of the Evidence Act is concerned, same too fails to
impress this Court in view of explicit terms of the said provision.
In this regard, it is reiterated that Ld. Counsel for the revisionists
has vehemently asserted that since the revisionists were not being
examined by the Ld. Trial Court at the time when the impugned
order came to be passed, such an order/discretion was violative
of the explicit terms under Section 165 Evidence Act. However,
in this regard, this Court reiterates that a conscientious perusal of
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.04.05
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Section 165 Evidence Act demonstrates that the said provision
grants the court, wide discretion/broad power to ask any
question, at any time, of any person, whether a witness or not and
order the production of documents or things, to discover or
obtain proof of relevant facts. Clearly, the only limitation under
Section 165 Evidence Act5 is that envisaged under the said
provision, however, as aforenoted, does not relate to the stage at
which such discretion is exercised or the person to whom, such
directions are made. Undoubtedly, the objective behind the said
provision is to facilitate Judge in reaching at the ultimate truth. In
other words, Section 165 of the Evidence Act, confers ample
power on courts to interfere and control conduct of trial properly,
effectively and in a manner as prescribed by law, whereby, court
does not sit as a mute spectator or an umpire, rather, takes an
active part within the boundaries of law, for reaching at the
eventual truth. Quite remarkably, it is with this understanding
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court as early as in Ram Chander v.
State of Haryana, 1981 (3) SCC 191, remarked in this context as
under;
” …What is the true role of a judge trying a
criminal case? Is he to assume the true role of a
referee in a football match or an umpire in a cricket
match, occasionally answering, as Pollock and
Maitland (Pollock and Maitland: The History of
English Law) point out, the question ‘How is that’, or,
is he to, in the words of Lord Kenning ‘drop the
mantle of a judge and assume the role of an5
165. Judge’s power to put questions or order production-“The judge may, in order to discover or to obtain
proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of
the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing;
and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order,
nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any
question:*** Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant and
duly proved:*** Provided also that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to
answer any question or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer
or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked or documents were called
for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other
person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document ,
except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.” (Emphasis supplied)
C.R No. 635/2023 M/s Sangar Overseas & Ors. v. Sanjay Jindal Page 21 of 24Digitally signed
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
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advocate?(2) Is he to be a spectator or a participant at
the trial? Is passivity or activity to mark his attitude?
If he desires to question any of the witnesses, how far
can he go? Can he put on the gloves and ‘have a go’
at the witness who he suspects is lying or is he to be
soft and suave? These are some of the questions
which we are compelled to ask ourselves in this
appeal on account of the manner in which the judge
who tried the case put questions to some of the
witnesses.
The adversary system of trial being what it is,
there is an unfortunate tendency for a judge presiding
over a trial to assume the role of a referee or an
umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest
between the prosecution and the defence with the
inevitable distortions flowing from combative and
competitive element entering the trial procedure. If a
criminal court is to be an effective instrument in
dispensing justice, the presiding judge must cease to
be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He
must become a participant in the trial by evincing
intelligent active interest by putting questions to
witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. As one of us
had occasion to say in the past.
*** *** ***
We may go further than Lord Denning and say
that it is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and
for that purpose he may “ask any question, in any
form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties,
about any fact, relevant or irrelevant” (Sec.
165Evidence Act). But this he must do, without
unduly trespassing upon the functions of the public
prosecutor and the defence counsel, without any hint
of partisanship and without appearing to frighten or
bully witnesses. He must take the prosecution and the
defence with him. The Court, the prosecution and the
defence must work as a team whose goal is justice, a
team whose captain is the judge. The judge, ‘like the
conductor of a choir, must, by force of personality,
induce his team to work in harmony; subdue the
raucous, encourage the timid, conspire with the
young, flatter and old’…”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Lastly, the contention of Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists that impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court oblivious to the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists that after huge losses all the assets of the revisionists
C.R No. 635/2023 M/s Sangar Overseas & Ors. v. Sanjay Jindal Page 22 of 24
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
16:42:02
+0530
were taken over by the Bank under the Securitization and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002/SARFASI Act and that no documents were in
the possession of the revisionists. Correspondingly, it is averred
by the Ld. Counsel that Ld. Trial Court could not have directed
the revisionists to prove the case of the complainant/respondent
by producing the documents, which relate to business
transactions, concluded five years prior to the dispute in question.
However, it is noted in respect of the same that the said
contentions appear to have been raised for the first time before
this Court in the instant revision, which can only be considered
by the Ld. Trial Court at appropriate stage of the proceedings and
in the considered opinion of this Court, no sufficient for this
Court to reach a conclusion of any irregularity, impropriety or
palpable error under the impugned order.
17. Consequently, in conspectus of the above as well as
from a meticulous review of the impugned order, it is observed
that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the same has duly
considered all the relevant facts and circumstances, besides
passed a reasoned and speaking dictate, in terms of settled law
and judicial precedents as aforenoted. Clearly, Ld. Counsel for
the revisionists/revisionists has/have not been able to show any
reasonable ground(s) for interfering with the impugned order by
this Court, at this stage. Needless to reiterate, revisional
jurisdiction can be exercised only when there is glaring defect in
procedure or there is manifest error of law and consequently
there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. However, when
the impugned order is scrupulously perused, in light of the scope
of the provisions under Section 397 Cr.P.C., this Court reiterated
that no illegality, impropriety, palpable error/defect and/or
C.R No. 635/2023 M/s Sangar Overseas & Ors. v. Sanjay Jindal Page 23 of 24
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
16:42:05 +0530
irregularity is forthcoming/demonstrable by the revisionists
under the said order/impugned order.
18. Consequently, in light of the foregoing discussion
and keeping in view the aforenoted judicial precedents, law as
well as the submissions addressed before this Court, it is
reiterated that no illegality, impropriety and/or irregularity is
demonstrable by the revisionists in the order dated
10.10.2023/impugned order, passed by Ld. MM-01 (NI Act),
Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, ‘Sanjay Jindal
v. Sangar Overseas, Ct. Case No. 884,2018’, directing the
petitioners/accused/revisionists to bring the account statement
and ledger of revisionist no. 1 along with the taxation details
relating to the transaction in dispute, with an advance copy
thereof to the opposite side.
19. Conclusively, in light of the above, this Court
unambiguously observes that present revision petition deserves to
be dismissed as devoid of merits and is hereby, accordingly,
dismissed.
20. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of
this order.
21. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance. Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
GOYAL Date:
2025.04.05
16:42:10
+0530Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 05.04.2025. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, DelhiC.R No. 635/2023 M/s Sangar Overseas & Ors. v. Sanjay Jindal Page 24 of 24
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