Delhi High Court
M/S Tamta Construction Co. Pvt Ltd vs M/S Allied Energy System Pvt. Ltd on 31 July, 2025
Author: Jyoti Singh
Bench: Jyoti Singh
$~87
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 31st July, 2025
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025
M/S TAMTA CONSTRUCTION CO. PVT LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinod Zutshi and Mr. R.P.
Tamta, Advocates.
versus
M/S ALLIED ENERGY SYSTEM PVT. LTD. .....Respondent
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH
JUDGEMENT
JYOTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
I.A. 18215/2025 (u/S 5 of Limitation Act, 1963)
1. This application is filed on behalf of the Petitioner seeking
condonation of delay of 325 days in filing the accompanying petition under
Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘1996 Act’)
challenging the impugned arbitral award dated 13.02.2024 passed by the
learned Sole Arbitrator in Case No. DIAC/2434/04-19 titled Allied Energy
System Pvt. Ltd. v. Tamta Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd.
2. It is averred in the application that the arbitral award was received on
25.05.2024, however, due to the bank account of the Petitioner company
being frozen in respect of certain other matters, Petitioner was under a
financial crunch and could not file the petition within the prescribed period
of limitation. With a lot of efforts, Petitioner arranged some finances and
decided to challenge the award. Delay is also attributed to the fact that the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 Page 1 of 5
Signing Date:03.08.2025
16:02:05
case file and certain documents were missing in the office of the Petitioner.
Relevant paragraphs of the application are as follows:-
“3. That the Applicant has filed an application for getting certified copies
before the copy agency and the same was received on 25.05.2024.
4. That due to financial problems with the petitioner company the bank
account of Tamta Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. maintained by petitioner
company were freeze in other matters, due to which the petitioner
company could not be able to withdraw any amount from their banks. The
delay in filing the accompanying petition was due to financial problem.
5. The applicant after a lot of efforts was able to arrange some finances
from other source and able to file the application for setting aside the
Impugned Award dated 13.02.2024.
6. That the case file and certain documents were missing in the office of
the petitioner company. Hence the counsel did not file the petition within
the time. Hence the applicant filed this petition before this Hon’ble Court.”
3. Based on the averments in the application, learned counsel for the
Petitioner submits that the delay is neither intentional nor mala fide and for
reasons beyond the control of the Petitioner and thus the delay be condoned
in the interest of justice. Emphasis is laid on the financial condition of the
Petitioner company as also the fact that some documents went missing in the
office of the Petitioner.
4. The impugned award was pronounced by the learned Sole Arbitrator
on 13.02.2024 and going by Petitioner’s averment in the application, the
award was received on 25.05.2024. This petition is filed on 03.04.2025,
which is evident from the filing log sheet and thus there is a delay of 325
days in filing the petition. Section 34(3) of 1996 Act provides a limitation
period of three months for filing objections against an arbitral award and
Proviso thereto provides a period of thirty days within which the Court can
in its discretion condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown by the
objector, which prevented the objector in filing the objections within the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 Page 2 of 5
Signing Date:03.08.2025
16:02:05
prescribed period of limitation. However, post 120 days period, Court has no
power to condone the delay, which is palpably clear from reading of the
Proviso to Section 34(3) where the Legislature has used the phrase ‘but not
thereafter’.
5. The Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 and Simplex Infrastructure Limited v.
Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455, held that the use of the words ‘but not
thereafter’ in Proviso to Section 34(3) makes it clear that no extension can
be given beyond the period of 30 days and an objection petition filed
thereafter cannot be entertained. Relevant passage from the judgment in
Simplex Infrastructure (supra) is as follows:-
“18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section
34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award
on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made
within three months and the period can only be extended for a further
period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The
use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the
extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of
131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines
prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the
High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate.”
6. Following the aforesaid judgments, this Court in SKS Power
Generation (Chhattisgarh) Ltd. v. ISC Projects Private Limited, 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 8006; Akash Gupta v. Praveen Kumar Gupta and Others,
2020 SCC OnLine Del 229; Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. RKMT Buildcon Pvt.
Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8330; and Container Corporation of India
Limited v. Shivhare Road Lines, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5490, to refer a
few, has dismissed petitions filed under Section 34 after a period of 120
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 Page 3 of 5
Signing Date:03.08.2025
16:02:05
days. In this context, I may also allude to a recent judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of West Bengal Represented Through the Secretary and
Others v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Limited, (2024) 7 SCC 257,
wherein it was held that a petition filed even one day after the expiry of 30
days condonable period cannot be entertained. In the said case, Arbitral
Tribunal passed the award on 30.06.2022, which was served on the
Appellants on the same day but the petition under Section 34 of 1996 Act
was filed on 31.10.2022. Submission of the Appellants was that period of
limitation ended on 01.10.2022, when calculated from 01.07.2022, since the
Pooja vacation ended on 01.10.2022. Respondent, on the other hand,
contended that benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act was available only
if the proceedings are filed within the prescribed period of limitation, which
under Section 34(3) is three months and reliance was placed on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Popular Construction (supra). The
Supreme Court held that period of limitation will have to be reckoned from
30.06.2022 when the Appellants received the award and excluding the said
day in view of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation
will start running on 01.07.2022 and three months would thus expire on
30.09.2022. Since the three months expired a day before commencement of
the Pooja vacation on 01.10.2022, Appellants were not entitled to the benefit
of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and the maximum period of 30 days
having expired on 30.10.2022, petition filed under Section 34 on
31.10.2022 was rightly dismissed by the High Court on the ground of bar of
limitation.
7. Coming to the instant case, the petition is filed beyond three months
prescribed period of limitation as also beyond the 30 days period within
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 Page 4 of 5
Signing Date:03.08.2025
16:02:05
which the Court has the discretion to condone the delay, on sufficient cause
being shown. In fact, the delay is 325 days. In light of the judgments
aforementioned, this Court does not have the discretion to condone the delay
after 120 days and therefore, the reasoning given by the Petitioner that the
delay was on account of financial crunch or missing documents has no
relevance.
8. Application is dismissed, being devoid of merit.
O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 & I.As. 18214/2025, 18216/2025, 18217/2025
9. In view of the dismissal of the application seeking condonation of
delay in filing the objections, the present petition cannot be entertained
being barred by limitation and the same is accordingly dismissed.
10. Pending applications also stand dismissed.
JYOTI SINGH, J
JULY 31, 2025
S.Sharma
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR O.M.P. (COMM) 293/2025 Page 5 of 5
Signing Date:03.08.2025
16:02:05