M/S Tpc Techno Power Corporation (Llp) vs Bunty K Mehta on 16 July, 2025

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Bangalore District Court

M/S Tpc Techno Power Corporation (Llp) vs Bunty K Mehta on 16 July, 2025

                               1           Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023



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  IN THE COURT OF LXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
          AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH 70)

                         Present:
     Smt. Shirin Javeed Ansari, B.A.,LL.B (Hon`s) LL.M.,
     LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
                      Bengaluru.
         Dated this the 16th day of July, 2025

                  Crl.A.No.1276/2023


Appellants:      1. M/s. TCP TECHNO POWER
                    CORPORATION (LLP),
                    Unit No. 2, No. 25-A, 2nd Phase,
                    Peenya Industrial Area,
                    BENGALURU - 560 058,
                    Rep. by its Managing partner.

                 2. Sri. K.S. Ashwathnarayana,
                    Managing Partner,
                    M/s TCP Techno power,
                    Corporation (LLP),
                    Unit No. 2, No. 25-A, 2nd Phase,
                    Peenya Industrial Area,
                    Bengaluru - 560 058.
                    (Accused No.1 and 2)
                    (Sri Ravi Shankar C.S. Advocate for
                    Appellants)

                            Vs.
                                    2               Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023



Respondent:       1. Sri. Bunty K. Mehta,
                     S/o. Kirti Mehta,
                     Aged about 39 years,
                     Proprietor,
                     F.S. Enterprises,
                     Sy.No. 58, Andrahalli Main Road,
                     Yeshwanthapura Hobli,
                     Bengaluru - 560 091

                     (Complainant before trial court)
                     (Sri M.R.Balakrishna, Advocate for R1)

                  2. Sri. Arun Kumar,
                     Partner,
                     M/S TCP Techno power
                     Corporation (LLP),
                     Unit No. 2, No. 25-A, 2nd Phase,
                     Peenya Inustrial Area,
                     Bengaluru 5600 058.

                     (Accused No.3 before trial court)

                         JUDGMENT

This is an appeal filed under Section 374(3) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the

legality, correctness, and propriety of the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 17/08/2023

passed by the learned XXVII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Bengaluru City in C.C. No.1643/2015,

convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and
3 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

sentencing them to pay fine of Rs.4,65,50,000/-, directing

payment of Rs.4,65,00,000/- to the complainant by way of

compensation and Rs.50,000/- to the State, and further

directing that in default of payment of fine, accused No.2

shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two

years.

2. The accused No.1 and 2 in C.C.No.1643/2015

before the trial court having preferred the instant appeal

against the complainant. The appellant and the

respondent are hereby assigned with their original ranks

before the trial court i.e., the appellant as accused and

respondent as original complainant and

C.C.No.1643/2015 in the instant discussion for the

purpose of brevity and convenience to avoid the confusion

and perplexity.

3. It is the case of the complainant before the trial

court that since 2001 he had been supplying transformer

laminations to the accused firm. That by 16.4.2014 a sum

of Rs.4,49,72,829/- stood outstanding; that towards
4 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

payment the accused issued cheque bearing No.072834

dt.4.8.2014 for Rs.2,46,00,000/- drawn on Punjab

National Bank, Peenya Industrial Branch, Bengaluru.

That the cheque when presented returned unpaid with

endorsement, “stop payment”. The statutory notice

dt.26.11.2014 was served, but not replied and unpaid,

culminating in the complaint.

4. The accused admitted signatures but

contended inter-alia that the cheque was issued for the

security purpose. That all liabilities till 19.12.2012 stood

settled. That requisite statutory documents were withheld

by the complainant, that the complaint was defective of

non-joinder of necessary parties under Sec.141 of N.I.Act.

5. Upon evidence of PW1 – complainant with

Ex.P.1 to P.13, DW1 – accused No.2, DW2 – the bank

Manager and DW3 – representative of Skill Tech Pvt Ltd.,

the trial court convicted accused No.1 and 2, but

dismissed the complaint against accused No.3 / nominee

of Skill Tech, holding the prosecution defective vis-a-vis
5 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

him.

6. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment

passed by the trial court, the appellant No.1 and 2 being

accused No.1 and 2 before the trial court have preferred

the instant appeal against the respondent who was the

complainant before the trial court on the following:

7. GROUNDS OF APPLEAL

a) The Appellant No.1 herein has running
account with the Respondent No.1 and the
Respondent No.1 has claimed in the complaint
that, he has supplied the materials from 2001
to 16/04/2014, however the Appellant No.1
has been incorporated during the year 2011,
the glaring inconsistency in the Complaint, the
Trial Court has failed to consider the same and
passed the impugned order and the same is
liable to be set-aside.

b) The Trial Court has failed to appreciate
the facts in the cross-examination of PW-1, he
has categorically admitted that, the subject
cheque relates to the materials supplied
between 19/12/2012 and 16/04/2014, prior
6 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

to the same the entire amount has been paid
by the Appellant No.1 and also produced the
invoices pertaining to the said period, however
the Trial Court has failed to give evidentiary
value to the admission of the PW-1 and passed
the impugned order and the same is liable to
be set-aside.

c) The Trial Court has failed to appreciate
the admission of PW-1 that, the subject cheque
is issued for the bills pertaining to the 2012 to
2014 transactions and also the amount due
has been reflected in the balance sheet and the
ledger and also admitted he has no problem to
produce the same before the Court, however,
the Trial Court has failed to draw the
inferences that, the Respondent No.1 has failed
to produce the documents even though the
same are in his possession as admitted by the
PW-1, despite the same passed the impugned
order and the same is liable to be set-aside.

d) The Trial Court has failed to take note of
the fact that, the PW-1 has categorically
admitted the fact that, the transactions
reflected in VAT and he was paying the Sales
Tax to the Government and he has no problem
to produce the document, however no
7 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

documents have produced and marked as
Exhibits on behalf of the Respondent No.1 and
the Trial Court has failed to draw the proper
presumption in respect of the admissions
made by PW-1 and passed the impugned order
and the same is liable to be set-aside.

e) The Trial Court has failed to note that,
Ex.P1 not related to one invoice and it relates
to the transaction between 2012 to 2014, the
said admission clearly evidenced that, the
transaction prior to 2012, the First Appellant
is not liable to discharge any dues, the Trial
Court has erred in holding the said admission
of the PW-1 and passed the impugned order
and the same is liable to be set-aside.

f) The PW-1 has categorically admitted that,
Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2, one
Veeresh and Shivashankar all are partners of
the Appellant No.1 Firm, that the Respondent
No.1 was aware of the same, however they are
not arraigned as Accused, the Complaint ought
to have been dismissed on this ground alone.

g) The Trial Court has erred in not
considering the fact that dar the outstanding
bills details, ledger extract, opening and
8 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

closing balance has glaring differences and the
repayment made by the Accused No.1 is not
accounted properly, hence there is no
dischargeable debt or liability in respect of the
subject cheque and passed the Impugned
order which is liable to be set-aside.

i) The Appellant No.1 being the registered
Partnership LLP, the Respondent No.1 has
failed to invoke the provision of under Section
141
of Negotiable Instruments Act and also
failed to comply with the statutory
requirements. The Trial Court ought to have
dismissed the complaint on this ground alone.

j) The Trial Court has failed to consider ratio
laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Basalingappa Vs Munibasappa and
Eshwardas Jain Vs Sohan Lan and passed
the Impugned order and the same is liable to
be set-aside.

k) The Trial Court has wrongly came to the
conclusion that, Skill Tech Company has not
been arraigned as party to the proceedings,
Respondent No.2 shall not be made as
Accused, however the Respondent No.2 is the
designated. partner of Appellant No.1 and
9 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

signatory to the subject cheque, there is no
need to arraign the Skill Tech Company as
Accused, based on wrongful notion, the Trial
Court passed the impugned order and the
same is liable to be set-aside.

l) The Trial Court has failed to appreciate
the fact that, if the Skill Tech Company has
not made as Party by the Respondent No.1, the
complaint filed by the Respondent No.1 ought
to have been dismissed and not the acquittal
and dismissal of the complaint against the
Respondent No.2. The Trial Court misapplied
the proposition of Law and passed the
Impugned order and the same is liable to be
set-aside.

m) The Trial Court has failed to appreciate
the fact that, the Respondent No.2 being the
representative of Skill Tech Company has
made as Partner of Appellant No.1 and also
signatory to the cheque and he is on the same
footing of the Appellant No.2 as partner,
without considering the said fact dismissed the
complaint against the Respondent No.2, the
same is ended with miscarriage of justice and
opposed to the well established principles of
Law, hence the impugned order is liable to be
10 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

set-aside.

n) The Trial Court has erred in dismissing
the complaint against the Respondent No.2
and acquitted from the charges on technical
ground, however considered the oral and
documentary evidence of the Respondent No.2,
against the Appellants is improper and
unknown to the well settled principles of law.
Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set-
aside.

o) The Trail Court has completely erred and
failed to consider that, Respondent No.2 never
stepped into the witness box and adduced
evidence on his behalf, however one
Shivashankar who is the Director of Skill Tech
Company has adduced the evidence on behalf
of the Respondent No.2, the Trail Court
without considering the said facts has
dismissed the complaint and acquitted the
Respondent No.2 and passed the impugned
order and the same is liable to be set-aside.

p) The complaint filed by the First
Respondent ought to have been dismissed on
the ground that, improper arraigning of
parties, the Trial Court chose to convict
11 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

Appellants and dismissed the complaint and
acquit Respondent No.2, has done grave
injustice and the Trial Court cannot approbate
and reprobate on the same set of facts, the
impugned order/Judgment is liable to be set-
aside on this ground alone.

q) The Trial Court has failed to appreciate
the evidence adduced by the Second Appellant
and the documents relied and passed the
Impugned order without proper application of
mind and acquitted the Respondent No.2,
which rises suspicion on the mind of the
Court, hence the impugned order is liable to be
set-aside.

r) The Trial Court has misinterpretated the
proviso of Section 7 of Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP) Act wherein it has enshrined
that, all the partners are equally liable to the
day-to-day affairs of the firm. However, without
considering the said provision has acquitted
Respondent No.2 in a casual manner, hence
the impugned order is liable to be set-aside.

s) The Trial Court has erred and failed to
give evidentiary value to the categorical
admission made by PW-1 (Respondent No.1) in
12 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

the cross-examination and passed the
impugned order against the probabilities of the
case and the same is liable to be set-aside.

t) The Trial Court has failed to apply the
ratio laid down in (2019) 5 Supreme Court
Cases 418, “Drawing of presumption under
and how said presumption can be rebutted-
standard of proof while prosecution must
establish its case beyond reasonable doubt,
accused to prove a defense must only meet
standard of preponderance of probabilities-
principles summarized”. The Trial Court has
passed the impugned order and the same is
liable to be set-aside.

u) The Trial Court has failed to apply the
ratio laid down in (2019) 4 Supreme Court
Cases 197: “right of presumption of innocence
of accused which prosecution is required to
dislodge by proving its case against accused
beyond reasonable doubt”. The Trial Court has
passed the impugned order and the same is
liable to be set-aside.

v) The Trial Court has falled to apply the
ratio laid down in 2020 (3) KCCR 2373
Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench):
13 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

“Issue of cheque Denied borrowal No evidence
existing legally enforceable debt or liability.
However, such a presumption is rebutted by
the accused, the onus shifts on the
complainant to prove his case”. The Trial Court
has passed the impugned order and the same
is liable to be set-aside.

8. Hence, the Appellant prays before this Court to

Call for the records of the case in C.C. No. 1643/2015

and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated

17.08.2023 by allowing this Criminal Appeal in the

interest of justice and equity.

9. Heard arguments. I have perused the

materials on record.

10. Out of the above factual circumstances of the

case the following points arise for my consideration for

determination in this appeal:

       1)    Whether      the      complainant               has
            established     the         existence       of     a

legally enforceable debt or liability
within the meaning of Section 138
14 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

of the Negotiable Instruments Act
against the appellants as on the
date of issuance of the subject
cheque?

2) Whether the trial court has erred in
appreciating the evidence on
record, particularly the material
admissions of PW1, the
documentary inconsistencies, and
statutory lapses?

3) Whether the statutory presumption
under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act has been
successfully rebutted by the
accused, and whether the
complainant has failed to discharge
the reverse burden?

4)   Whether      the     conviction        of    the
     appellants,        while   simultaneously
     dismissing the complaint against
     the   co-signatory/accused                  No.3,
     amounts to legal inconsistency and
     violation     of     the    provisions         of
     Section     141      of    the    Negotiable
     Instruments Act?
                                15           Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023


       5) Whether the judgment of the trial
            court suffers from grave legal and
            factual     infirmities      warranting
            interference            in    appellate
            jurisdiction?

       6) What order?

11. This court upon re-appreciation of available

materials on record with reference to prevailing law of the

land, proceeds to give findings to the above points as

follows:

Point No. 1 :- In the Negative
Point No. 2 :- In the Affirmative
Point No. 3 :- In the Affirmative
Point No. 4 :- In the Affirmative
Point No. 5 :- In the Affirmative
Point No. 6 :- As per final order
for the following;

REASONS

12. POINT NO.1 to 5:- It is the case of the

complainant before the trial court that since 2001 he had

been supplying transformer laminations to the accused

firm. That by 16.4.2014 a sum of Rs.4,49,72,829/- stood

outstanding; that towards payment the accused issued

cheque bearing No.072834 dt.4.8.2014 for
16 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

Rs.2,46,00,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank, Peenya

Industrial Branch, Bengaluru. That the cheque when

presented returned unpaid with endorsement, “stop

payment”. The statutory notice dt.26.11.2014 was served,

but not replied and unpaid, culminating in the complaint.

13. The complainant, while presenting the case

before the trial court, claimed that the accused-firm had

business transactions with him from the year 2001 till

16/04/2014, and that there was an outstanding liability

of Rs.4,49,72,829/- as on the said date. However, it is an

undisputed fact emerging from the documentary evidence

placed on record (particularly Ex.D10 – Certificate of

Incorporation) that appellant No.1, TPC Techno Power

Corporation LLP, came into legal existence only in

January 2011. Hence, the complainant’s allegation of

transactions with the LLP from 2001 is factually

impossible and patently false. The trial court has

committed a fundamental error in not appreciating this

glaring factual inconsistency, which vitiates the very

substratum of the prosecution.

17 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

14. Further, in the course of cross-examination,

PW1 – the complainant – has candidly admitted that the

subject cheque does not relate to the entire alleged

outstanding amount of Rs.4.49 Crores, but only pertains

to supplies made between 19/12/2012 and 16/04/2014,

and that the dues for all transactions prior to this period

had been fully settled by the accused. This admission is

crucial and directly undercuts the complainant’s principal

case. The trial court, unfortunately, has failed to give due

evidentiary value to this categorical admission, thereby

leading to an erroneous conclusion.

15. Not only has PW1 admitted that the cheque

pertains to the period between December 2012 and April

2014, but he has also admitted that the alleged

outstanding amounts are reflected in his business balance

sheet and ledger, and he has no objection to producing

the same. However, no such documents were ever

produced before the court. The non-production of primary

documents, despite admission of their existence, invites a

serious adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the
18 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The trial court has

committed a grave error in not drawing the said inference.

16. Similarly, PW1 admitted that the transaction

details were recorded in the VAT returns and sales tax

filings submitted to the Government, and that he had no

objection to produce the same. Yet again, no tax

document or return was brought on record. The deliberate

withholding of statutory documents which are directly

relevant to the question of liability constitutes a material

omission, and the failure of the trial court to evaluate this

aspect undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s

case.

17. The subject cheque (Ex.P1), as admitted by

PW1, is not issued in respect of a single invoice, nor has it

been tied to any specific supply order or delivery challan.

The complainant himself admitted that it relates to a

group of invoices from 2012 to 2014. Therefore, the

accused-firm cannot be saddled with liability for any

period prior to December 2012. The trial court has failed
19 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

to appreciate this factual demarcation while holding that

the entire outstanding from 2001 is relevant.

18. Moreover, PW1 has also admitted that along

with appellant No.2, other persons such as Veeresh and

Shivashankar were also partners and designated

representatives of the LLP, and that he was aware of their

involvement. Despite this knowledge, the complainant

chose not to array them as accused in the present

complaint. The complaint therefore suffers from material

non-joinder of necessary parties, contrary to the

mandatory requirement under Section 141 of the NI Act.

19. The complainant has placed on record Ex.P10

(alleged confirmation letter) and Ex.P11 (ledger extract),

but a comparative reading of these documents reveals

glaring inconsistencies, including mismatched figures,

unexplained debits, and discrepancies in opening and

closing balances. Further, payments made by accused

No.1 during the period have not been duly reflected or

accounted for. The trial court has glossed over these
20 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

discrepancies without due evaluation.

20. The complaint is also defective in law.

Appellant No.1 being a Limited Liability Partnership is

governed by the LLP Act, 2008. As such, Section 141 of

the NI Act read with Section 7 of the LLP Act mandates

that the LLP and all designated partners be properly

arraigned and their role specifically pleaded in the

complaint. The complainant has neither pleaded the

specific role of each partner nor arrayed Skill Tech Pvt.

Ltd., the designated partner, as an accused. This renders

the complaint legally unsustainable.

21. The trial court has further failed to apply

binding precedents including Basalingappa v.

Mudibasappa [(2019) 5 SCC 418], wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that once the presumption under

Section 139 of the NI Act is rebutted through a probable

defence, the burden shifts back to the complainant to

prove the legally enforceable liability. The trial court

erroneously assumed that the presumption alone is
21 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

sufficient for conviction.

22. The trial court has wrongly held that Skill Tech

Pvt. Ltd. need not be arraigned as an accused, while

simultaneously dismissing the complaint against accused

No.3 (its nominee) on the ground of non-joinder. This

contradiction exposes the inconsistent legal approach

adopted in the impugned judgment.

23. In fact, if the trial court was of the view that

non-joinder of Skill Tech Pvt. Ltd. rendered the complaint

defective vis-à-vis accused No.3, it ought to have

dismissed the complaint in toto, and not just qua one

accused. The selective dismissal violates the settled

principle that a complaint must stand or fall as a whole

when the allegation is collective and arises from a single

transaction.

24. Accused No.3, who stood on the same legal

footing as appellant No.2, being a co-signatory to the

cheque and representative of Skill Tech Pvt. Ltd., was

acquitted without assigning reasons differentiating him
22 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

from appellant No.2. This unequal treatment, despite

identical roles, is opposed to law and justice.

25. Despite having acquitted accused No.3, the

trial court has relied on the oral and documentary

evidence pertaining to him to convict the appellants. This

is wholly impermissible. Once the complaint was

dismissed against a co-accused on a technical ground, his

evidence and documents cannot be selectively applied to

fasten liability on others.

26. Accused No.3 never entered the witness box.

One Shivashankar, Director of Skill Tech Pvt. Ltd., was

examined as DW3 on behalf of accused No.3. The trial

court failed to note that DW3’s evidence cannot be

construed as direct testimony of accused No.3. It was

improper for the trial court to rely on such derivative

testimony.

27. The complaint should have been dismissed in

its entirety for defective arraignment of parties and

procedural irregularities. Instead, the trial court chose to
23 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

convict some and acquit others on the same set of facts.

This double standard amounts to judicial inconsistency.

28. The trial court has failed to properly appreciate

the defence evidence led by the appellants, including the

cheque status reports, correspondence, ledger objections,

and repayment proofs. The documentary and oral

evidence adduced by appellant No.2 was not given due

consideration.

29. The trial court misinterpreted the provisions of

the LLP Act, especially Section 7 and the implication of

equal liability among partners. The acquittal of accused

No.3 on a casual interpretation of the LLP framework is

untenable in law.

30. The trial court has also failed to appreciate the

admissions made by PW1 in his cross-examination. These

admissions go to the root of the alleged debt and the

complainant’s own knowledge of the partnership

structure. The failure to assign evidentiary weight to such

critical admissions renders the impugned judgment legally
24 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

infirm.

31. The trial court has failed to apply the

principles laid down in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa

[(2019) 5 SCC 418], particularly in regard to the standard

of rebuttal, which is one of preponderance of probability,

and not beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment ignores

this foundational principle.

32. Likewise, the trial court has not considered the

ratio of Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat

[(2019) 4 SCC 197], which reiterates that the presumption

of innocence is a constitutional right and must be

displaced by credible, cogent evidence, which is absent in

the present case.

33. The trial court has failed to apply the judgment

of Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka reported in KCCR

2020 (3) 2373, which holds that when the execution of the

cheque is admitted but the existence of debt is disputed

and the complainant fails to prove the same, the

complaint must fail. The same principle applies squarely
25 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

here.

34. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is

abundantly clear that the prosecution has failed to prove

the existence of a legally enforceable debt. The

presumption under Section 139 NI Act has been duly

rebutted by the accused through consistent and probable

defence. The complainant has failed to discharge the

reverse burden. The trial court has failed to appreciate

material admissions, has misapplied settled legal

principles, and has rendered a judgment that is legally

unsustainable. Hence I answer point No. 1 in the Negative

and Point No.2 to 5 in the Affirmative.

21. Point No.6: In the light of my findings on

point No.1 to 5, I proceed to pass the following

ORDER

Appeal u/s. 374(2) of Cr.P.C filed by the
appellant is hereby allowed.

The judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 17/08/2023 passed by the
learned XXVII Addl. Chief Metropolitan
26 Crl.Apl.No.1276/2023

Magistrate, Bengaluru City, in C.C.
No.1643/2015, is hereby set aside.

Consequently, the appellants/accused
Nos.1 and 2 are acquitted of the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The bail bonds executed by the
appellants/accused No.1 and 2 shall stand
cancelled.

If any amount has been deposited by the
appellants in pursuance of the judgment of
the trial court, the same shall be refunded to
them forthwith.

Send back the trial court records with
a copy of this judgment forthwith.

(Dictated to the Stenographer Grade-1 directly on the computer,
corrected, signed and then pronounced by me in open court on this
the 16th day of July, 2025)

(Shirin Javeed Ansari)
LXIX Addl.C.C. & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.



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