Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
M/S. Zydus Health Care Ltd vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 19 August, 2025
2025:CHC-AS:1582
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
WPA 7792 of 2025
M/s. Zydus Health Care Ltd.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Anurag Lakhotia,
Mr. Asish Kumar Das,
Mr. Sunny Nandy,
Md. Baharuzzaman.
For the Respondent no. 2 : Mr. Soumya Majumdar,
Mr. Suvodip Bhattacharjee,
Mr. Balaram Patra.
For the State : Mr. Susanta Pal,
Ms. Ananya Neogi.
Hearing concluded on : 22.07.2025
Judgment on : 19.08.2025
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an award
passed by the learned 7th Industrial Tribunal, in Case No. 15 of
2020, under Section 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
2. The petitioner‟s case is that it is a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 and is running a Pharmaceutical Business.
2
2025:CHC-AS:1582
3. The petitioner states that the respondent no. 2 Subir Kumar
Bandyopadhyay, the private respondent herein was a Medical
Representative of the petitioner, at whose instance an industrial
dispute was espoused regarding dismissal of his service on
04.06.2020 before the Conciliation officer and the same having not
ended in a settlement, the Respondent No. 2 invoked the provision
of section 10(1B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and on the
basis of the pendency certificate issued by the conciliation officer,
he made an application before the Learned Seventh Industrial
Tribunal.
4. The petitioner further states that the learned tribunal passed an
erroneous award on 17.01.2025 by acting in an arbitrary manner.
5. It is the case of the petitioner that during the pandemic Covid-19
lockdown, the Management of the petitioner through its HR and
business, had come up with the tasks, which the complete pan-
India based sales team including the respondent No. 2 were directed
to do. These tasks were to be done from home only, which included
taking up training modules on Frontline 2.0. chemist mapping.
6. It is stated that each and every sales team, which is pan-India
based had performed these tasks except the respondent no. 2 and
few employees employed in West Bengal Region, who were led by the
respondent No. 2 as their leader.
7. The petitioner issued a show cause notice to the respondent no. 2
for such alleged misconduct and considering the Covid-19 situation
and the conduct of the respondent no. 2 which was in defiance of
3
2025:CHC-AS:1582
the direction of the management and the documents in support,
which allegedly showed that the respondent no. 2 was the misguider
and instigator of other employees, the management was constrained
to terminate the services of the respondent no. 2 and sent the order
of termination vide email dated 04.06.2020.
8. The respondent no. 2 was dismissed from service vide
Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal dated 04.06.2020 as it was
the Covid-19 pandemic.
9. Vide the award under challenge, the learned 7th Industrial Tribunal,
Kolkata passed an award and on a contested hearing decided the
application under Section 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Dispute Act, on
the following findings:-
“……….The OP/Company has also failed to
demonstrate its stand of preliminary enquiry. The
OP/Company has failed to bring any iota of evidence in
support of its version as to preliminary enquiry. No
preliminary enquiry report has been placed before this
Tribunal. The OP/Company also failed to aver and/or
depose that it supplied any copy of such alleged
preliminary enquiry to the applicant/workman. In view
of the settled law as to preliminary enquiry, such
alleged preliminary enquiry as alleged by OP/Company
is violative of the principles of natural justice and holds
no water in the eye of law and is in teeth of the settled
law on this aspect.
Thus, this Tribunal has no hesitation to conclude from
the evidence adduced on behalf of OP/Company that
the OP/Company has failed to prove any of the charges
42025:CHC-AS:1582
leveled by the OP/Company in Exhibit-23 being styled
as “Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal”.
The applicant/workman has averred and deposed
that the applicant/workman has not been in any gainful
employment elsewhere since his said illegal
retrenchment and is entitled to full back wages with
reinstatement with consequential benefits and prayed
for continuity of service.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
the settled position of the law, this Tribunal finds that
the applicant/ workman has been able to prove his case
by cogent and consistent evidence that his alleged
termination vide letter dated 04.06.2020 is bad, illegal
and unjustified and is liable to be set aside and that the
applicant/Workman is entitled to reinstatement with full
back wages alongwith consequential reliefs and the
services of the applicant/workman be deemed to be
continuous service without any break.
………………………………
Hence, it is
ORDERED
that the instant case being No. 15/2020 u/s. 10(1B)(d)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 be and the same is
allowed on contest with costs of Rs. 5,00,000 (Rupees
Five Lacs only) against the OP/Company. The letter of
chargesheet cum Order of dismissal dated 04.06.2020
(Exhibit-23) is set aside being bad, illegal and
unjustified.
The applicant/ workman is entitled to be reinstated
in service with effect from 04.06.2020 with full back
wages alogwith all other consequential benefits thereto
arising out of such reinstatement and continuity of
5
2025:CHC-AS:1582
service and the service of the applicant/ workman shall
be deemed to be continuous service without any break.
Since the date of superannuation of the applicant/
workman is 31.03.2024 which has crossed during the
pendency of the instant case, the applicant/ workman is
deemed to have been reinstated in service with effect
from 04.06.2020 with full back wages alogwith all other
consequential benefits thereto arising out of such
reinstatement and continuity of service and the service
of the applicant/ workman shall be deemed to be
continuous service without any break. The
applicant/workman stands superannuated/retired on
31.03.2024.
The OP/Company is directed to pay full back wages
alogwith all other consequential benefits thereto arising
out of such reinstatement till the date of superannuation
of the applicant/ workman i.e. till 31.03.2024 and also
other benefits being paid to other workman/ workmen
on their retirement including benefits paid under various
beneficial, welfare and/or benevolent schemes of the
OP/company. The OP/Company is further directed to
ensure that the applicant/ workman is not deprived of
the annual increments which fell due from time to time
since 04.06.2020. The OP/Company is also directed to
ensure payment of all other retiral benefits to the
applicant/workman including Provident Fund, Gratuity,
Pension etc as applicable in the OP/Company.
The OP/Company is also directed to further pay a
sum of Rs. 4 Lac (Rupees Four Lacs) as
compensation to the applicant/ workman for the
applicant’s mental agony and unnecessary harassment
due to illegal, unlawful and unjust termination of his
service by the OP/Company.
6
2025:CHC-AS:1582
The OP/Company is also directed to pay all the dues
and outstanding as directed by this Tribunal with
interest @ 10% per annum within thirty days from the
date of this order…………….
Sd/-
7th Industrial Tribunal
Kolkata”
10. Written notes has been filed by the petitioner reiterating their case
as made out in the writ application and it has been further argued:-
“……..In cases where the misconduct is held to be
proved, and reinstatement is itself a consequential
benefit arising from imposition of a lesser punishment,
award of back wages for the period when the employee
has not worked, may amount to rewarding the
delinquent employee and punishing the employer for
taking action for the misconduct committed by the
employee……….”
11. The petitioner has relied upon the following judgments:-
i. The workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of
India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Management and Ors., (1973) 1
SCC 813.
ii. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. vs Sureshwati, (2021) 3 SCC
108.
iii. TATA Oil Mills Co. Ltd. vs Workman & Anr., 1962 SCC
OnLine SC 5.
7
2025:CHC-AS:1582
iv. Kurukshetra University vs Prithvi Singh, (2018) 4 SCC
483.
v. Anand Cinema, Jabalpur vs Mohan Tiwari and Anr.,
1992-II L.L.N.301, Madhya Pradesh High Court.
vi. J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs K.P.Agrawal & Anr., (2007) 2 SCC
433.
vii. OM Pal Singh vs Disciplinary Authority & Ors., (2020) 3
SCC 103.
viii. U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. vs Subhash Chandra
Sharma & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 324.
ix. State Bank of India vs Chandra Govindji (KM.), (2000) 8
SCC 532.
12. On hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record,
the relevant extract of the Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal is
reproduced herein:-
“………….The world was hit by pandemic of Covid-19 and
our country is also not an exception to the same. On
24/03/2020 the national lock down was declared by the
Central Government as a result of which entire activity
within the country was at standstill. While issuing the
guidelines the manufacturing of medicines and other allied
essential services were allowed and ‘work from home’ was
encouraged.
8
2025:CHC-AS:1582
Looking at the prevailing conditions and considering thesafety and security of employees, the Zydus management
issued a circular dated 20/03/2020 for working from home
which was received by you. Management issued similar
circulars from time to time. You were in receipt of all those
circulars of work from home. In spite of receipt of circulars
on work from home, since you were not working from home,
your Area Business Manager during the course of routine
telephonic conversation explained to you the
necessities/requirements of ‘work from home’ as per
circulars but you continued with your defiant attitude.
……………………….
It is a matter of regret that, in spite of clear cut instructions
to participate in said activities while at home, as a part of
work from home, you deliberately did not participate in the
same. Not only this but you instigated and advised your
colleagues/ co-employees for not participating or not
adhering to the management’s instructions as per above
referred circulars. As a result of which many employees did
not participate.
It is also observed that and management has reason to
believe that you had instructed, advised and instigated
your colleagues to write derogatory emails to the
management. As a result of which management received
more than 100 emails having Identical/similar contents.
9
2025:CHC-AS:1582
It is also observed that, in the recent past i.e. fromDecember 2019 to March 2020 at your instructions,
instigation and advice the obstructions and hindrance was
caused in normal field working in West Bengal.
It is also noticed that, based on the Government orders
when management tried to restore the field work in green &
orange zones by adhering to the guidelines issued by
Government authorities, you instigated and advised your
colleagues not to resume field work by alleging that the
conditions are not conducive. Whereas, other employees of
Zydus in other divisions had resumed their field work.
The aforesaid acts on your part amounts to serious acts of
misconduct as under:-
a) Willful insubordination of lawful and reasonable
work instructions of management;
b) Instigation to other employees for mass
disobedience;
c) Act subversive of discipline and/or good behavior;
d) Tarnish the image of organization, Human
Resource Department and senior officials of the
company.
In the normal course, management would have conducted
an enquiry in respect of the above charges, but in view of
current scenario of Covid-19 it is not possible to conduct a
formal enquiry. Besides, your continuation in the
10
2025:CHC-AS:1582
employment is also detrimental to the interest and discipline
of the organization and hence management has decided to
dispense with the enquiry.
Accordingly your services stand terminated by way of
dismissal with immediate effect for your above stated acts
of gross misconduct. In the event you decide to challenge
your termination, management reserves its right to prove the
aforesaid charges on merits before the appropriate Court
and/or Authority along with your unsatisfactory past
service record.
You are advised to hand over all company’s property in your
possession to your reporting manager so as to enable the
management to settle your full and final account.
For Zydus Healthcare Ltd
Sd/-
Deputy General Manager – HR Department”
13. It appears from the materials on record that:-
i. Admittedly the dismissal of the respondent no. 2 was done
during the Covid-19 pandemic period.
ii. The respondent no. 2 joined the petitioner company on
01.08.1985 and was confirmed in service on and from
01.01.1986, when he was designated as Senior Field Officer.
iii. The respondent no. 2‟s case is that he being an active member
of the trade union having raised his voice against illegal
11
2025:CHC-AS:1582
activities and unfair labour practice was subjected to
harassment by the management which subsequently led to
his illegal dismissal/termination.
iv. The respondent no. 2 was transferred to various places during
his service period, which he joined and performed his duties
and he superannuated on 31.03.2024.
v. At the time of his termination, the petitioner had put in
about 35 years of service.
vi. From the Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal, it appears
that as the respondent no. 2 allegedly did not participate in
the online training programme conducted during the Covid-19
pandemic as part of work from home and having allegedly
instigated other colleagues and co-employees to also not co-
operate with the company, he was dismissed from service on
and from 4th June, 2020, on the following grounds which as
per the management amounts to serious acts of
misconduct:-
a) Willful insubordination of lawful and reasonable
work instructions of management;
b) Instigation to other employees for mass disobedience;
c) Act subversive of discipline and/or good behavior;
d) Tarnish the image of organization, Human Resource
Department and senior officials of the company.
14. The learned tribunal considering the argument of the parties and
the evidence adduced and the various documents produced as
12
2025:CHC-AS:1582
Exhibits by the company and the judgments relied upon held that
the tribunal had territorial jurisdiction as the letter of termination
was received by the respondent no. 2 in Kolkata (Exhibit 23) and by
passing a well reasoned order, relying upon several judgments
rightly held that the tribunal had territorial jurisdiction to
consider the application filed under Section 10(1B)(d) of the
Industrial Dispute Act.
15. Regarding maintainability, the tribunal rightly decided that the
respondent no. 2 was covered under the definition of Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Dispute Act.
16. The learned Tribunal was also of the view that a Chargesheet-cum-
Order of Dismissal on the face of it is not part of labour
jurisprudence. It is the view of the tribunal that in order to
travel from the stage of Chargesheet to order of dismissal the
company was bound to provide opportunity to the workman to
meet the charges leveled against the applicant/workman.
17. Admittedly, no domestic enquiry or disciplinary proceeding was
held. It was countered by the Opposite Party/Company, pleading
the Covid-19 pandemic, but the company went ahead to inflict
“major punishment” of “dismissal from service” of a workman who
had put in 35 years of service, without conducting a formal enquiry
or even providing an opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself,
in view of the fact that the chargesheet included the order of
dismissal.
13
2025:CHC-AS:1582
18. Such an order is usually invalid because it denies the employee a
reasonable opportunity to be heard.
It breaches the principles of natural justice, especially
audi alteram partem (“hear the other side”).
A chargesheet is meant to initiate disciplinary
proceedings, not conclude them.
The procedure as per law flows like this:-
Chargesheet Employee‟s reply Domestic Enquiry
Enquiry Report Show cause notice on proposed penalty Final
order imposing punishment.
19. In the present case, the workman served the company for 35 years
being also involved in trade union activities. Being dismissed in this
manner is clearly an unfair labour practice, thus coming within
the fifth schedule to the Industrial Dispute Act, more specifically
under clause 5 to the fifth schedule.
20. In Sur Enamel and Stampingworks (P) Ltd vs Their Workmen,
1963 AIR 1914, the Supreme Court held:-
“………..In our opinion, it would be a misuse of the words
to say that this amounted to holding of proper enquiry it
has been laid down by this Courtin a series of decisions
that if an industrial employee’s services are terminated
after a proper domestic enquiry held in accordance with
the rules of natural justice and the conclusions reached at
the enquiry are not perverse the industrial tribunal is not
entitled to consider the propriety or the correctness of the
said conclusions. In a number of cases which have come to
this Court in recent months, we find that some employers
have misunderstood the decisions of this Court to mean
that the mere form of an enquiry would satisfy the
requirements of industrial law and would protect the
disciplinary action taken by them from challenge. This
142025:CHC-AS:1582
attitude is wholly misconceived. An enquiry cannot be
said to have been properly held unless,
(i) the employee proceeded against has been informed
clearly of the charges levelled against him, (ii) the
witnesses are examined–ordinarily in the presence of the
employee-in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is
given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he
is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including
himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant
matter, and (v) the enquiry officer records his findings with
reasons for the same in his report………”
21. It appears that a domestic enquiry was not only dispensed with but
a short cut method of a Chargesheet-cum-Dismissal letter which
is totally against the principle of natural Justice, was issued to the
workman.
22. In spite of the fact that the world was passing through the severe
effects of Covid-19 pandemic, the petitioner hurriedly dismissed the
employee without a proper dismissal procedure. This only goes to
show that the defence of Covid-19 pandemic and the said
situation was used as an opportunity to dismiss the employee
without affording an opportunity of facing a domestic enquiry.
23. An employee who had put in 35 long years of service and holding a
senior position, was subjected to such prejudice and abuse of the
process of law during a period, when he could not defend himself.
This conduct on the part of the petitioner company, which appears
to be a multinational, prima facie shows that the company was in
a hurry to dismiss the employee, he prima facie being an active
member of the trade union.
15
2025:CHC-AS:1582
24. The documents placed before the Court and the tribunal to
substantiate the petitioner‟s argument that the respondent no. 2
employee instigated the other workers not to participate, has not
satisfied this Court, as the same also appears to be part of their
defence regarding the Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal of the
employee.
25. It appears from the Chargesheet-cum-Order of Dismissal that online
training was being conducted which the respondent no. 2 and other
employees were required to participate but having not done so, the
company allegedly has faced obstruction and hindrance in normal
field working in West Bengal.
26. Even if, this is considered to be insubordination, indiscipline, it is
not sufficient or act of such aggravated nature so as to lead to
dismissal of an employee who had put in 35 years of service,
without any formal enquiry during the Covid-19 pandemic period.
27. There was no such hurry to dismiss the employee during the
severe pandemic Covid-19 lockdown.
28. Accordingly, the major punishment of dismissal without following
the normal procedure/norms is totally disproportionate to the prima
facie alleged misconduct of the employee.
29. From the evidence before the tribunal the petitioner/company could
not prove any instigation on the part of the employee/respondent
no. 2, nor does this Court find any materials on record to
substantiate the charge no. D, which is that the respondent no. 2
has tarnished the image of the organization etc.
16
2025:CHC-AS:1582
30. In Airports Authority of India vs Pradip Kumar Banerjee, in
Civil Appeal No(s). 8414 of 2017, decided on February 04,
2025, the Supreme Court held:-
“32. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is
not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal
with each and every ground raised by the delinquent
officer in the representation against the proposed
penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be
recorded in the order imposing punishment if he
accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer.
Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court
in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank,
(2021) 3 SCC 806, wherein it was held:-
“11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the
disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by
the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed
reasons are required to be recorded in the order
imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed
based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report,
as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to
be given by the disciplinary authority. . . .”
33. All that is required on the part of the
Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine
the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and
arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the
material placed on record during the course of
enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent
employee on the principle of preponderance of
probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority
while dealing with the case of the respondent.
39. In the wake of the above discussion, we hold that
the Division Bench, while exercising the intra-court
writ appellate jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering
with the concurrent findings recorded by the
Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority
as affirmed by the learned Single Judge.”
17
2025:CHC-AS:1582
31. The Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan and others – vs –
Heem Singh, in Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020 decided on 29th
October, 2020 held :-
“33. In exercising judicial review in
disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the
spectrum. The first embodies a rule of
restraint. The second defines when
interference is permissible. The rule of
restraint constricts the ambit of judicial
review. This is for a valid reason. The
determination of whether a misconduct has
been committed lies primarily within the
domain of the disciplinary authority. The
judge does not assume the mantle of the
disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear
the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding
of fact by the disciplinary authority is a
recognition of the idea that it is the employer
who is responsible for the efficient conduct of
their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to
abide by the rules of natural justice. But they
are not governed by strict rules of evidence which
apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of
proof is hence not the strict standard which
governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, but a civil standard governed by a
preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of
preponderance, there are varying approaches based
on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum
is founded on deference and autonomy – deference
to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact
finding authority and autonomy of the employer in
maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service.
At the other end of the spectrum is the
principle that the court has the jurisdiction to
interfere when the findings in the enquiry are
based on no evidence or when they suffer from
perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence
is an incident of what the law regards as a
perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is
an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service
jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in
allowing for the authority of the court to
interfere when the finding or the penalty are
disproportionate to the weight of the evidence
or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in
182025:CHC-AS:1582
maintaining a steady sail between the banks
of these two shores which have been termed as
the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest
with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when
they exercise judicial review. To determine
whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry
is based on some evidence an initial or
threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That
is to satisfy the conscience of the court that
there is some evidence to support the charge of
misconduct and to guard against perversity.
But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate
evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to
substitute a view which appears to the judge to be
more appropriate. To do so would offend the first
principle which has been outlined above. The
ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common
sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
32. Thus, a writ Court has the jurisdiction in such proceedings to only
ensure that the person aggrieved has had a fair trial and that
principle of natural justice was followed while deciding the case and
as to whether the punishment given is proportionate to the offence
committed. A writ Court cannot go into the details of evidence
recorded and as to the discrepancies of the said finding and
proceedings conducted by a disciplinary authority.
33. In Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali,
(2017) 4 SCC 507, the Supreme Court held:-
“13. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary
Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the
Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a
local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was
held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had
better medical facilities which could have been
availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering
from illness. It was further held that the delinquent
did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local
doctor. The High Court should not have entered into
the arena of facts which tantamount to re-
19
2025:CHC-AS:1582
appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-
appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
14. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi
Chand Nalwaiya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584,
this Court held as follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If
the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts
will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings
are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [(1995) 6 SCC 749: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80:
(1996) 32 ATC 44], Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463: 1997 SCC (L&S)
1806], Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana [(1999) 5 SCC 762: 1999 SCC
(L&S) 1036] and High Court of Judicature
at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.”
15. In Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran
reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, this Court held as
follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as
202025:CHC-AS:1582
an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as
a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-
appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
(a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the inquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
21
2025:CHC-AS:1582
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance
with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
16. We are in agreement with the findings and
conclusion of the disciplinary authority as confirmed
by the appellate authority and revisional authority on
Charge 1. Indiscipline on the part of a member of an
Armed Force has to be viewed seriously. It is clear
that the respondent had intentionally disobeyed the
orders of his superiors and deserted the Force for a
period of 5 days. Such desertion is an act of gross
misconduct and the respondent deserves to be
punished suitably.
19. Though we are of the view that the High
Court ought not to have interfered with the
order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the
penalty of dismissal from service is not
commensurate with delinquency. The
Respondent was found guilty of desertion of the
Force for a period of five days and not
improving his conduct in spite of imposition of
penalties on three occasions earlier. For the
above delinquencies, the penalty of dismissal
from service is excessive and harsh. In our view,
the penalty of compulsory retirement would
meet the ends of justice. We are informed by the
counsel for the Appellants that the Respondent
is entitled for pension as he has completed 10
years of service. In order to avoid any
22
2025:CHC-AS:1582
controversy, we direct that the Respondent shall
be entitled for notional continuity of service till
the date of completion of minimum service
required to make him eligible for pension. He
will not be entitled for payment of salary and
allowances for that period.”
34. The employee herein, who had put in 35 years of service, in the
petitioner company was terminated from service by a charge sheet
cum dismissal letter, during the Covid pandemic (04.06.2020),
without there being a scope of placing the employees case/defence.
35. Date of dismissal (04.06.2020) was during the period of the 1st
wave of the pandemic which was very severe causing
innumerable deaths and immense trauma to the members of
the public.
36. The pandemic created havoc in the lives of all, causing loss of near
and dear ones, with no known treatment.
37. It was at this stage, the company in the most insensitive manner,
dismissed the employee from service by not following the norms of
dismissal, using the excuse of Covid pandemic.
38. The case of the petitioner/company that the respondent/employee
was instigating other employee, causing inconvenience to the
petitioner/company has not been substantiated by any
materials/evidences, thus has no merit.
39. As per Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution, any termination without
providing a chance to be heard is arbitrary and unjust.
Under Section 25-F, retrenchment without notice, notice pay, or
enquiry is illegal.
23
2025:CHC-AS:1582
MHA Guidelines (March-April 2020) directed/advised all
employers (especially private establishments) not to terminate
or reduce wages during lockdown.
Thus termination contrary to these directions is illegal and
in violation of public policy.
40. An employee who had put in almost 35 years of service, deserved a
more sympathetic approach from his company, while being inflicted
with major punishment of dismissal from service, during a very
difficult period the world was passing through.
41. Thus in view of the guidelines laid down in Central Industrial
Security Force and Ors. (Supra) and Union of India & Ors. vs P.
Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610, Para 12:-
i. The enquiry in this case has not been held according to the
procedure laid down under the law.
ii. There has been clear violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings.
iii. The authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case.
iv. The authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
v. The conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion.
24
2025:CHC-AS:1582
vi. The disciplinary authority had erroneously admittedinadmissible evidence which influenced the finding.
vii. The finding of fact as stated is based on no evidence
and thus suffers from perversity.
42. A chargesheet cum dismissal notice is a document which puts
questions regarding the allegations (charge) and if clubbed with a
dismissal (order) then if can be presumed that the decision to
terminate was already taken prior to the charge sheet. A case
where questions (charge) directly end in dismissal (result) with no
scope to answer (chargesheet cum dismissal letter), is clearly an
abuse of the process of law.
43. The workman in this case was dismissed on 04.06.2000, that is
during the 1st Covid pandemic period, when there was mass
panic around the world for this unforeseen fatal disease and being
dismissed during this period and in the manner done is basically
„cruelty‟ beyond imagination.
44. A workman, who had put in 35 years of service, with no past
grievances or allegations against him, was treated in the most
inhuman manner. As such the compensation granted by the
tribunal is also justified, the whole process being under a
beneficial legislation.
45. Thus, the order passed by the tribunal on 17.01.2025 in Case No.
15 of 2020, being in accordance with law is modified to the extent
that the direction to pay cost of Rs. 5,00,000 (five lacs) is hereby set
25
2025:CHC-AS:1582
aside. Rest of the order under challenge requires no interference
and be complied with by the petitioner within 30 days from the date
of this order.
46. The respondent/workman‟s prayer to withdraw the amount
deposited by the petitioner with the learned Registrar General, High
Court, Calcutta, may be entertained after the period of appeal.
47. WPA 7792 of 2025 is disposed of.
48. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
49. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
50. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties, expeditiously after complying with all
necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)