Himachal Pradesh High Court
Maan Singh vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 23 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:23795 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1083 of 2025
.
Reserved on: 16.07.2025
Date of Decision: 23.07.2025
Maan Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Virender Katoch, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 190 of 2023, dated 10.12.2023, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short
‘the NDPS Act‘) at Police Station Damtal, District Kangra, H.P.
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01C-1826
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2( 2025:HHC:23795 )
on 10.12.2023. The driver identified himself as Kewal, and the
person sitting beside him identified himself as Maan Singh (the
.
present petitioner). The police checked the vehicle and found a
carry bag containing 2.5 Kgs of charas. The police seized the
charas and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The petitioner is
innocent, and was falsely implicated. The charge-sheet has been
filed before the Court, and no recovery is to be effected from the
petitioner. The petitioner has spent more than 01 year 06 months
in custody. The petitioner’s further detention is not justified. The
petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the
Court may impose. Hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on traffic checking duty on
10.12.2023. The police were talking to Kamal Kishore and Ajay
Pathania when a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01C-1826
reached the spot. The police signalled the driver to stop the vehicle
and asked him to show the documents; however, he got
frightened. The driver identified himself as Kewal, and the person
sitting beside Kewal identified himself as Maan Singh (the present
petitioner). The police checked the vehicle and recovered a carry
bag containing 2.5 kgs of charas. The police seized the charas and
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3( 2025:HHC:23795 )
arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to SFSL,
Junga and as per the result of the analysis, it was found to be an
.
extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The police filed the
charge sheet before the Court. 04 witnesses have been examined
out of 20 witnesses cited by the prosecution. The matter was listed
for the recording of statements of prosecution witnesses on
31.05.2025. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Virender Katoch, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Virender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely
implicated. There is no material to connect him with the
commission of the crime. The petitioner has been in custody for
more than 01 year and 06 months. There is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because his right
to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Pawan Kumar v. State
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4( 2025:HHC:23795 )
of Himachal Pradesh [2025:HHC:21380] in support of his
submission.
.
6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,
submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a
commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of Section 37 of the
ND&PS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not
satisfied the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The
prosecution has already examined 04 witnesses, and there is no
delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the
Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
5( 2025:HHC:23795 )released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of.
justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused
on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [KalyanChandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. AshisChatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under: –
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related
to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
6( 2025:HHC:23795 )interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any.
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accusedand ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct
the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which canlegitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Courtto impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed
in the following terms: —
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power ona court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable
condition acceptable in the facts permissible in thecircumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of theview that the present facts and circumstances of the case
do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant
or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The
factors to be taken into consideration while considering an::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
7( 2025:HHC:23795 )application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the
severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the
nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
.
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or
apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses;
the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the
accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of hisabscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the
accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the
accused and larger interest of the public or the State and
similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercisingjurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not
expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of
the complainant, and that too, without any trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. A perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner
was travelling in the vehicle from which 2.5 Kgs of charas was
recovered. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003
SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was
recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of
the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It
was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
8( 2025:HHC:23795 )facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle,
and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each.
other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how
they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit,
there must be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of thenature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
which assumes different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definitionof “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the
context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was
observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother’s flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
9( 2025:HHC:23795 )considered to be in possession of the same.
(See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB
966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .).
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutoryrecognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
13. Therefore, the petitioner was prima facie found in
possession of 2.5 kilograms of charas.
14. The police had recovered 2.5 Kgs of charas, which is a
commercial quantity; therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act apply to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act
provides that in an offence involving commercial quantity, the
Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the
commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as under:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
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10( 2025:HHC:23795 )
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
.
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A,
and also for offences involving commercial quantity,
shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
r bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time beingin force, on granting of bail.”
15. This Section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an
offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are :
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
11( 2025:HHC:23795 )(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as
it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied
in addition to the normal requirements under the
provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the personis not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
16. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bailmoved by the accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors.,(1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits the murder
of one or two persons, while those persons who
are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
12( 2025:HHC:23795 )to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would
continue their nefarious activities of trafficking.
and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The
reason may be the large stake and illegal profit
involved. This Court, dealing with the contention
with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act,has succinctly observed about the adverse effect
of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy.,
Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out
that the organised activities of the
underworld and the clandestine smuggling
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances into this country and illegaltrafficking in such drugs and substances
have led to drug addiction among a
sizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious andalarming proportions in the recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control
and eradicate this proliferating andbooming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and deadly impact onsociety as a whole, Parliament, in its
wisdom, has made effective provisions byintroducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying
mandatory minimum imprisonment and
fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section
37, namely,::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
13( 2025:HHC:23795 )
(i) there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of
such offence; and.
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail are satisfied. The
High Court has not given any justifiable
reason for not abiding by the aforesaidmandate while ordering the release of the
respondent accused on bail. Instead of
attempting to take a holistic view of the
harmful socio-economic consequencesand health hazards which would
accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit withwhich Parliament, after due deliberation,
has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the
limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC
but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section
37, which commences with the non-obstante clause.
The operative part of the said section is in the negative
form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person
accused of the commission of an offence under the Act
unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first
condition is that the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application, and the second
is that the Court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is
not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision
requires the existence of such facts and circumstances
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14( 2025:HHC:23795 )
as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In
the case on hand, the High Court seems to have
.
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section
37 that in addition to the limitations provided under
the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force,
regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the
matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled
for.”
17. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A
and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity
to oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of suchan offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person
is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard
of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge
Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of
India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 &
10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
connotes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged,
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15( 2025:HHC:23795 )
and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn
points to the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
.
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to
act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
Reason varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The
reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic
sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok
Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4
SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors
(Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P)
Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
particular act is reasonable or not, depends on
the circumstances in a given situation.
(See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is
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16( 2025:HHC:23795 )
not called upon to record a finding of not guilty.
It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined
to the question of releasing the accused on bail,
.
that the court is called upon to see if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction
about the existence of such grounds. But the
court has not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has not committed an
offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence
while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences
punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb
the menace of drug trafficking in the country,
stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the
NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
18. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control Bureau
v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was
observed:
“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante
clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions
imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are
certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when
granting bail to a person accused of having committed an
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations
imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973, to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed under
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be
factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of
Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
17( 2025:HHC:23795 )given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an
accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is
opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are.
reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is
not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must
be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit
any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for
discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of
Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC 549,
a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, ithas been held thus:–
“7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when
the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart fromthe grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the
other twin conditions which have relevance so far as thepresent accused-respondent is concerned, are the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of thealleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and
not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regardingthe accused being not guilty has to be based on
reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds”
means something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added]
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for
discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122,
and this Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:29 :::CIS
18( 2025:HHC:23795 )that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in.
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to thelimitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for
the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its
liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act
is indeed uncalled for.”[emphasis added]
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in
clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible,
plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused
person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For arriving at any
such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a
case that can persuade the Court to believe that the accused
person would not have committed such an offence. Dovetailed
with the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional consideration that
the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on
bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an application
for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not
required to record a finding that the accused person is not guilty.
The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving
at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence
under the NDPS Act or not. The entire exercise that the Court is
expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of
releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
the offences that he has been charged with and that he is unlikely
to commit an offence under the Act while on bail.
19. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of
the trial, and the right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being
violated. This submission is not acceptable. A perusal of the record
shows that the applications for exemption were filed on behalf of
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19( 2025:HHC:23795 )
the co-accused on 30.07.2024 and 06.09.2024. Adjournment was
prayed for the consideration of the charge on 05.11.2024.
.
Consequently, the charge was framed on 16.01.2025. The order
sheets show that the charge could not be framed for more than 08
months due to the lapses of the accused/co-accused. Therefore, he
is not entitled to bail on the ground of violation of the right to a
speedy trial.
21. The status report shows that 03 witnesses were
examined on 19.03.2025 and 24.04.2025, and one witness was
given up. The matter was listed on 31.05.2025, but the copy of the
order sheet of that day was not filed. The examination of 03
witnesses and giving up 01 witness within 04 months of the
framing of the charge cannot lead to an inference that there is a
delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, the judgment in Pawan
Kumar‘s Case (supra) does not apply to the present case.
22. No other point was urged.
23. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the
same is dismissed.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
23rd July, 2025
(Shamsh Tabrez)
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