Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Magapu Satyanarayana vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 18 August, 2025
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
****
WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
Between:
Magapu Satyanaratyana
.....PETITIONER
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
General Administratin (SC-I) Department,
Secretariat Buildings,
Amkaravati, Guntur and 2 others
.....RESPONDENTS
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 18.08.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the Yes/No
fair copy of the Judgment?
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
____________________________
MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J
RNT, J & MRK, J
2 WP No.13785 of 2025
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
+ WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
% 18.08.2025
Between:
Magapu Satyanarayana
.....PETITIONER
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
General Administratin (SC-I) Department,
Secretariat Buildings,
Amkaravati, Guntur and 2 others
.....RESPONDENTS
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar,
Representing Sri Venkat
Challa
Counsel for the Respondents : Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti
Govt. Pleader,
Attached to the Office of the
Addl.Advocate General
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1. 2020 (5) ALT 160
2. WP.No.5469/2022, APHC, decided
On 11.07.2022
3. (2025) 4 SCC 476
4. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 576
5. (1975) 3 SCC 198
6. AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 61
7. AIR 1975 SC 623
8. AIR 1966 SC 740
9. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322
10. (1969) 1 SCC 10
RNT, J & MRK, J
3 WP No.13785 of 2025
11. (1982) 2 SCC 403
12. (2013) 5 SCC 470
13. (2009) 14 SCC 302
14. (2010) 13 SCC 336
15. (2018) 12 SCC 150
16. (2023) 14 SCC 641
17. (1992) 2 SCC 177
18. (1975) 2 SCC 81
19. (2023) 9 SCC 587
RNT, J & MRK, J
4 WP No.13785 of 2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BL SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar, learned counsel, representing Sri Venkat
Challa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri Kirthi Teja
Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, attached to the Office of the
Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents.
2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed for writ of Habeas Corpus to set aside the Order of detention dated
03.05.2025 baring Ref.No.M1/521904/2025 passed by the 2nd respondent-The
Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District with respect to the
petitioner’s wife Smt. Polisetti Laxmi (in short ‘the detenue’) and to set her free.
During the pendency of the writ petition, the detention Order was confirmed by
the State/1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.1206 dated 20.06.2025, served to the
petitioner on 28.06.2025. By way of amendment, the petitioner has challenged
the G.O.Rt.No.1206 dated 20.06.2025 as well.
I Facts:
3. By the detention Order, the detenue was detained on the ground that
she is ‘bootlegger’ as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short ‘the
Act 1986’), as she was repeatedly indulging in committing offenses of
RNT, J & MRK, J
5 WP No.13785 of 2025possession, supply and sale of illicitly distilled liquor in contravention of Section
7(B) read with Section 8 (B) of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act,
2020 (in short ‘the Act 2020’) to prevent her from acting in any manner
prejudicial to maintenance of public health and public order.
Detention Order by District Collector:
4. The detention Order passed by the 2nd respondent-the Collector &
District Magistrate, East Godavari District, dated 03.05.2025, is reproduced as
under:
“File No.REVEG-MAGL0M1(PRED)/7/2025-JA(MAGL-1)-COL-RJY-EG
Ref.No.M1/521904/2025 Collector’s office
Date: 03/05/2025 East Godavari
District
RajamahendravaramProceedings of the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari
District, Rajamahendravaram
Present:- Smt. P. Prasanthi, I.A.S.,
***
ORDERS OF DETENTIONUNDER SECTION 3(1) & (2) R/W SECTION 2(b) OF THE ANDHRA
PRADESH PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES OF
BOOTLEGGERS, DACOITS, DRUG OFFENDERS, GOONDAS,
IMMORAL
TRAFFIC OFFENDERS AND LAND GRABBERS ACT, 1986 (ACT No.1
OF 1986)Read: 1. Govt. Circular Memo.No.106/Law & Order/A3/2014-1
(General Administration (Law & Order) Department), Dated:
29.10.2014.
2. G.O.Ms.No.18, General Administration (Law & Order)
Department, Dated: 02.03.2015.
3. G.O.Rt.No.486, General Administration (SC.I) Department,
Dated: 07.03.2025.
4. R.C.No.L/101/DPEORJVM/2025, Dt. 02.05.2025, of the
District Prohibition and Excise Officer, East Godavari District,
Rajamahendravaram.
-o0o-
RNT, J & MRK, J
6 WP No.13785 of 2025
Whereas, as per the information laid before me by the District Prohibition &
Excise Officer, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram, which reveals that,
one individual Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija,
R/o. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District is
repeatedly indulging herself in clandestine possession, supply & sale of illicitly
distilled liquor in contravention of Section 7(B) read with 8 (B) of A.P.
Prohibition (Amendment) Act 2020. She indulged in bootlegging activities in the
manner prejudicial to the public health and public order and she has involved in
05 cases.
Whereas, the following 05 cases are considered as grounds for her detention
under the above act.
Sl. Cr. No. & Date I.D.Liquor
No. seized
1. Cr.No.220/2024, dated 22.03.2024, under 55 liters of ID
Section 34 (a) of A. P. Excise Liquor and 8
(Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and 7-B bottles of
r/w. 8-B of A. P. Proh.(Amendment) Act IMFL
of 2020 of SEB Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
2. Cr.No.389/2024, Dated 12.07.2024, 52 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of A.P. Prohibition Liquor
(Amendment) Act of 2020 of SEB
Station, Rajamahendravaram South
3. Cr.No.16/2025, Dated 16.01.2025, 30 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act No.18 of
2020 of Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
4. Cr.No.117/2025, Dated 21.02.2025, 20 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 2020 of
Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
5. Cr.No.145/2025, Dated 12.03.2024, 20 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 2020 of
Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
RNT, J & MRK, J
7 WP No.13785 of 2025
Against Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija,
R/o.Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District who
is repeatedly indulging herself in committing the offences of possession, supply &
sale of I.D. Liquor in contravention of section 7(B) r/w 8(B) of AP Prohibition
(Amendment) Act 2020 which comes under the category of “BOOTLEGGER”
as defined U/Sections 2 (b) of “The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
activities of Bootleggers, Decoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 and it is necessary to make an order
invoking powers conferred under Sec.3 (2) of the Act (Act No.1 of 1986)
directing that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija,
R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District be
detained in Special Prison for Women, Rajamahendravaram, with immediate
effect, with a view to preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to
maintenance of public health and public order.
The District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari,
Rajamahendravaram further submitted that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram
Urban, East Godavari District is spoiling the health of people by manufacturing
and selling ID Liquor to the local persons and making them addicted to ID Liquor.
Thus the above individual has been spoiling/disturbing the society/Community at
length leading to health related issues and law and order problems not only in
Hukumpeta Village but also in surrounding areas of Rajamahendravaram Urban
and Rural Mandals. Hence her activities are dangerous to the society and needs to
be curtailed and in the above cases after analysis the contraband seized is found to
be illicitly distilled liquor containing fusel oil as such unfit for human
consumption and injurious to health.
Therefore I Smt. P. Prasanthi, I.A.S, Collector & District Magistrate, East
Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram in exercise of the powers conferred upon
me under Sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoran Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 vide G.O. Rt. No. 486, General
Administration (SC.I) Department, Dated: 07.03.2025 do hereby direct under
Sub Section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram
Urban, East Godavari District shall be detained in Special Prison for Women,
Rajamahendravaram, Andhra Pradesh State as per G.O.Ms.No.18, General
Administration (Law and Order) Department, Dated: 02.03.2015 until further
orders to be received from the Government in order to prevent the detenue from
indulging “Bootlegger” activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public health
and public order and as per the provisions laid down under the Andhra Pradesh
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.
The District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari,
Rajamahendravaram, is directed to take necessary action in serving the “Detention
RNT, J & MRK, J
8 WP No.13785 of 2025
Order” and “Grounds of Detention” in English and Telugu Languages to Smt.
Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar,
Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District and explain to her in
known language and send due acknowledgment immediately to the under signed.
It is also directed to take the detenue into the custody and handover her to the
Superintendent, Special Prison for women, Rajamahendravaram, Andhra Pradesh
soon after serving the Detention Order.
This case will be referred to the Advisory Board for review and opinion under
section 10 of A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-letters, Dacoits,
Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act,
1986 (Act 1/1986) and Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs,
C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East
Godavari District has right to make representation (i) to authority who passed the
order i.e., to the under signed before this order is approved by the Government or
(ii) to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of A.P. Amaravathi or (iii) to the Advisory Board
or to all of them.
Given under my hand and seal on this day 03/05/2025.
P. Prasanthi, I.A.S
Collector & District Magistrate,
East Godavari District,
Rajamahendravaram”
5. The grounds of detention as per the detention Order are as under:
“File No.REVEG-MAGL0M1(PRED)/7/2025-JA(MAGL-1)-COL-RJY-EG
Ref.No.M1/521904/2025 Collector’s office
Date: 04/05/2025 East Godavari District
RajamahendravaramGROUNDS OF DETENTION
Sub: Grounds for Detention Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53
yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram
Urban, East Godavari District U/Section 3 (2) of “The Andhra
Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits,
Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land
Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No.1 of 1986) – Communicated.
-o0o-
Whereas, as per the Information laid before me by the District
Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram,
which reveals that, Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs,
RNT, J & MRK, J
9 WP No.13785 of 2025C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East
Godavari District is repeatedly indulging herself in committing the offences of
possession, supply & sale of I.D. Liquor in contravention of Section 7 (B) read
with 8 (B) of A.P. A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act 2020.
You, Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kiondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija,
R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District is
not a licensee or holder of any permit to deal in any kind of intoxicants under the
provisions of A.P. Excise Act, 1968. Further, there is a “Prohibition” on
procurement supply, sale and possession of illicitly distilled liquor, only
allowing the sale of Indian made liquor (I.M.L) and Indian made foreign liquor
(IMFL) from licensed premises by the licence holders only in the state of
Andhra Pradesh from 1st April 1997. As such sale of illicitly distilled liquor is
an offence. The I.M.L is being supplied through the I.M.L depots under the
control of Government of Andhra Pradesh and those who intend to trade the
I.M.L were issued licenses as per the procedure laid down by the State
Government through the Prohibition & Excise Department as per the provisions
of Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 after collection of prescribed fees. But the
material placed before me reveals that you have been indulging in clandestine
manufacturing, possession, transport and sale of illicitly distilled liquor.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
1. Cr.No.220/2024, Dated: 22.03.2024, U/Sec 34 (a) of A.P. Excise
(Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment)
Act of 2020 of SEB Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On 22.03.2024 at about 12.30 PM, on reliable information, the ESI, DTF,
Rajamahendravaram along with staff reached the Grama Sachivalayam,
Veerabhadra Nagar and requested the VRO to act as mediator regarding illegal
sales of ID Liquor and duty paid bottles in Veerabhadranagar, then he agreed
and proceeded with the raid party and reached the scene of offence i.e., beside
bridge at 100 feet road near wambay houses in Veerabhadra Nagar of
Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal, we found one female person standing with
a gunny bag kept in front of her. On seeing the raid party the female person
tried to escape from the place, but the raid party stopped her with the assistance
RNT, J & MRK, J
10 WP No.13785 of 2025
of staff and questioned about the contents in the hand bag and gunny bag. Then
she stated that hand bag contain IML bottles and gunny bag contain ID liquor.
When verified the gunny bag in the presence of mediator and found 55 Ltrs of
ID Liquor in 11 polythene covers each cover contains 05 Ltrs of ID Liquor
(11×05=55 Ltrs). Then the raid party verified the hand bag in the presence of
mediator and found i) Amber Horse Superior whisky – 180 ML – 04 bottles,
B.No.230, dt.13.03.2024. ii) Mansion House French brandy – 180 ML – 01
bottle, B.No.249, dt.01.03.2024. iii) old Tavern Deluxe whisky – 180 ML – 01
bottle, B.No.91/44, dt.13.03.2024. iv) Silver Strips Reserve Whisky – 180 ML –
01 bottle B.No.72/L11, dt.08.01.2024. v) Sterling Reserve Whisky – 90ml loose
in 180ml bottle – 1 bottle, B.No.175, dt.12.12.2023 Total 8 (180 ML – 7, 90 ML
– 01) bottles of Duty paid liquor without HEALS and also found “For sale in
Andhra Pradesh only” printed on the bottle label. On questioning in the
presence of mediator she revealed her identities noted as A2) Polisetti Laxmi,
W/o Kondayya, Age:52 years, C/o. Kapu, R/o Ayyappanagar,
Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. When questioned about the said ID
Liquor in the presence of mediator she revealed that she purchased the above ID
Liquor for Rs.150/- per 1 Ltr from A1) Magapu Satyanarayana, S/o. Tatarao,
Age: 47 years, C/o. Kapu, R/o. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban
Mandal and she sells the ID Liquor for Rs.200/- per 1 Ltr for her livelihood. In
the presence of mediator the ESI, DTF arrested her duly informing the reasons
for arrest, drawn 5 sample bottles (each brand one bottle) and also drawn 300 ml
of ID Liquor in a bottle as sample for analysis, seized the remaining duty paid
liquor bottles and ID Liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample
bottles and seized property under the cover of mediator report drafted at the
scene of offence. Further the ESI, Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R
in Cr.No.220/2024, U/s 34(a) of A.P. Excise (Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and
7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act of 2020 and A-2 was produced
before the Hon’ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody,
during enquires the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South arrested A-1 on
27.03.2024 and produced before the Hon’ble VII AJFCM Coiurt,
RNT, J & MRK, J
11 WP No.13785 of 2025
Rajamahendravaram for judicial custody. Subsequently they were released on
bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the samples S.No.22207
to 22211 is Indian Made Liquor and S.No.22212 is illicitly distilled liquor, unfit
for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report
vide C.E.No.1482/2024, Dt: 12.04.2024. Charge sheet filed. C.C. No awaited.
2. Cr.No.389/2024, Dated: 12.07.2024, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh
(Amendment) Act of 2020 of SEB Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On reliable information, on 12.07.2024 at about 01.45 PM 1 (B.
Srinivasa Rao) ESI, DTF, Rajamahendravaram South along with his staff
contacted the VRO, Hukumpeta through phone and requested the VRO to act as
mediator regarding illegal sales of ID Liquor in the village, then he agreed,
proceeded with the raid party and reached the scene of offence i.e., near bushes
in front of canal right side of AVA Road in Hukumpeta village of
Rajamahendravaram Rural Mandal. We found one female person sitting on the
stone and kept one bag in front of her and also found 2 persons standing near
her. On seeing the raid party the 2 persons ran away and female person tried to
escape from the place, on suspicion the raid party stopped her with the assistance
of staff and questioning she stated that she is selling ID liquor and ran away
persons they came to drink ID Liquor. When verified the bag in the presence of
mediator and found 02 Ltrs of ID Liquor in 4 plastic bottles each bottle contains
500ml Ltrs of ID Liquor (04x500ml=02 Ltrs) and also found 20 Ltrs of ID
Liquor in a water can and also found 30 Ltrs of ID Liquor in a black plastic can
(Total 02+20+30=52 Ltrs) with strong ID liquor smell. On questioning she
revealed that her identities noted as Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age-52
years, Caste-Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban,
Mandal. When questioned her about the said ID Liquor, then she revealed that
ID liquor purchased from unknown person at Peravaram Lankalu to sell the
same at the scene of offence. Then the ESI arrested her duly informing the
reasons for arrest at about 01.45 PM, drawn 300 ML of ID liquor as sample for
analysis, seized the remaining ID liquor in the presence of mediator. Sealed and
affixed identity slips on the sample bottles and seized ID liquor under the cover
RNT, J & MRK, J
12 WP No.13785 of 2025
of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the ESI, Rajamahendravaram South
register the F.I.R in Cr.No.389/2024, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh
(Amendment) Act of 2020 and produced before the Hon’ble VII AJFCM Court,
Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently she was released on
bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly
distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued
an analysis report vide C.E.No.3190/2024, Dt: 21.08.2024 in S.No.41296.
Charge sheet filed, C.C. No awaited.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
3. Cr.No.16/2025, Dated: 06.01.2025, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh
Prohibition (Amendment) Act. No.18 of 2020 of Prohibition & Excise
Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
As per the instructions of Proh. & Excise Inspector, Rajamahendravaram
South, on 06.01.2025 at about 05.00 PM, the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South
along with her staff conducting Raids for Prohibition & Excise offences, we
reached the scene of offence i.e., At the bridge at 100 feet road near wambay
houses in Veerabhadra Nagar of Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. We found
one female person standing with a mica bag kept beside her legs. On seeing the
raid party the person tried to escape from the place, but the P&ESI stopped her
with the assistance of staff, ascertained her full name and address Smt. Polisetti
Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o D.No:87-1-19/13 a,
Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, Mandal, East Godavari
District and also questioned her about the contents in the mica bag, then she
stated that it contain ID liquor. Then the P&ESI deputed one of the staff
constable named A. Venkatalakshmi tried to secure mediators, she came back
after 15 minutes and told that nobody came forward to act as mediators. The
raid party verified the mica bag found 30 Ltrs of ID Liquor packed in 06
polythene covers each cover containing about 05 Ltrs of ID Liquor (06×05=30
Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. On questioning she stated that she purchased
said ID liquor from unknown person at Veerabhadra Nagar near Ava Road and
sells high price and she will get profit. The P&ESI arrested her duly informing
RNT, J & MRK, J
13 WP No.13785 of 2025
the reasons for arrest at about 05.00 PM, drawn one bottle with 300 ML of ID
liquor as a sample for analysis, seized the remaining ID liquor. Sealed and
affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and seized property under the cover of
occurrence report drafted on the spot. Later, the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram
South register the F.I.R in Cr.No.16/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, 2020 and produced before the Hon’ble VII AJFCM Court,
Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently they were released on
bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly
distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued
an analysis report vide C.E.No.362/2025 in S.No.3293. Charge sheet filed. C.C.
No awaited.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
4. Cr.No.117/2025, Dated: 21.02.2025, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh
Prohibion (Amendment) Act.No.18 of 2020 of Prohibition & Escise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
As per the instructions of Proh. & Excise Superintendent, Rajamahendravaram,
on 21.02.2025 at 04.00 PM, on reliable information, the P&EI, ESTF,
Rajamahendravaram along with her staff conducting raids for Proh.& Escise
offences they reached the scene of offence i.e. left side of 4 roads junction in
front of the road leads to Wambay houses to Morampudi in Hukumpeta village
of Rajamahendravaram Rural Mandal. Then the raid party requeted the
pedestrian person named Kammirilli Raju, S/o. Apparao to act as mediator
regarding illegal sales of ID Liquor, then he agreed and proceeded with the raid
party. In the presence of mediator the raid party found one person kept the mica
bag beside his legs near the road left side bushes. On seeing the raid party the
person tried to escape from the place, but the P&EI stopped him with the
assistance of staff and questioned him about the contents in the mica bag, for
which he stated that the bag contained IA Liquor. On questioning in the presence
of mediator he revealed his name and address noted as A1) Mohammad Gouse
Mohiddin @ Rafi, S/o. Amear, Age: 34 Yrs C/o. Muslim, R/o. Danavayipeta,
Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal and A1 also stated that he was working as
RNT, J & MRK, J
14 WP No.13785 of 2025
daily wages coolie for 500/- per day and the above ID Liquor given to him for
sale purpose by A2) Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age about 56 years,
Caste-Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram, Urban Mandal
and A1 also stated that the above ID Liquor bringing by A3) Magapu
Satyanarayana @ Sathibabu, S/o. Manyalu, Age about – 45 years, Caste Kapu,
R/o. Mangalavarapupeta, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. In the presence
of mediator the A1 stated that the A2 and A3 are selling the ID Liquor through
A1. In the presence of mediator then raid party verified the mica bag found 20
Ltrs of ID Liquor packed in 4 polythene covers each cover containing about 05
Ltrs of ID liquor (04×05=20 Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. In the presence
of mediator the P&EI arrested the A1 duly informing the reasons for arrest at
about 04.00 PM, drawn one sample bottle with 300 ML of ID Liquor. Sealed
and affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and seized property under the
cover of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the P&ESI,
Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No.117/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8-
B of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and A-1 was produced before the
Hon’ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody.
Subsequently he was released on bail. During the course of investigation the
accused A2) Polisetti Laxmi was produced before the Hon’ble V AJFCM Court
Rajamahendravaram through P.T. Warrant on 19.03.2025. Subsequently she
was released on bail. The accused A3) Magapu Satyanarayana @ Sathibabu got
anticipatory bail from the Hon’ble High Court of AP, Amaravati vide
CRLP.No.2703 of 2025, Dt.28-03-2025.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly
distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued
an analysis report vide C.E.No.767/2025, Dt: 11.03.2025 in S.No.5838. The
case is Under investigation.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
5. Cr.No.145/2025, Dated: 12.03.2025, 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh
Prohibitino (Amendment) Act.No.18 of 2020 of Prohibition & Excise
Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On 12.03.2025 at about 08.15 AM, on reliable information the P&EI,
Rajamahendravaram South along with staff reached the Sachivalayam – 39, 16th
RNT, J & MRK, J
15 WP No.13785 of 2025
ward, Veerabhadra Nagar and met the VRO and requested him to act as
mediator regarding illegal possession of ID Liquor, then he agreed and
proceeded with the raid party in their jeep No.AP02 TV 0297 and reached the
scene of offence i.e., At the bridge at 100 feet road near wambay houses in
Veerabhadra Nagar of Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. In the presence of
meditor the raid party found one female person standing with mica bag holding
in her right hand. On seeing the raid party the person tried to escape from the
place by leaving her mica hand bag, but the P&EI stopped her with the
assistance of staff and questioned about the contents in the mica hand bag, for
which she stated that the bag contains ID Liquor. In the presence of mediator
the raid party verified the mica hand bag and found 20 Ltrs of ID Liquor
(04×05=20 Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. On questioning in the presence of
mediator she revealed that her identities noted as A1) Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, Age: 53 years, Caste: Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar,
Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal and also stated that she purchased the
the above ID Liquor from A2) Palivela Veera Venkata Ramana @ Bujji, S/o.
Nageswara Rao, Age about 36 Yrs, Caste: Yadava, R/o. Raghunadhapuram
village, Rajanagaram Mandal for lower price and according to sell for higher
price at wambay house. In the presence of mediator the P&EI arrested the A1
duly informing the reasons for arrest at about 08.30 AM, drawn one sample
bottle with 300 ML of ID Liquor as sample for chemical analysis, seized the
remaining ID Liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and
seized property under the cover of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the
P&ESI, Prohibition & Excise – Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in
Cr.No.145/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020
and A-1 was produced before the Hon’ble VII AJFCM Court,
Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently she was released on
bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly
distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued
an analysis report vide C.E.No.1063/2025, Dt: 09.04.2025 in S.No.7836. Case is
UI for arrest of the accused A2 Palivela Veera Venkata Ramana @ Bujji.
RNT, J & MRK, J
16 WP No.13785 of 2025
Thus, you are “Boot-legger” defined under section 2(b) of the A.P.
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1/1986)
and your activities are causing injury to the public health.
In the above cases after analysis the contraband seized is found to be illicitly
distilled liquor containing fusel oil as such unfit for human consumption and
injurious to health. It is evident from the above facts that you are actively
indulging in bottlegging activities of supply, possession and sale of illicitly
distilled liquor within the limits of Hukumpeta Village and the surrounding
vicinities of Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals and deliberately
violating the provisions of A.P.Prohibition Act in spite of ban on arrack.
Further, it is clear that in spite of booking number of cases by the Prohibition &
Excise Station, Rajamahendravaram South against you. You are continuing
activities in violation of the provisions of A.P. Prohibition Amendment Act,
2020. The illicitly distilled liquor sold by you is injurious to health, thereby
affecting Public Order. The said illicitly distilled liquor was being manufactured
by adopting crude and unscientific methods. Because of all these crude and
unscientific methods, the illicitly distilled liquor contains all types of impurities,
fusel oil and also it is found acetic.
The consumption of illicit distilled liquor causes Liver diseases, CNS
depression, Metabolic Acidosis, Visual Symptoms like decreased visual acuity,
Hemorrhagic Pancreatitis, Convulsions. Basal Ganglion problems like
Parkinson’s due to methyl alcohol (wood alcohol), Ethylene Glycol can cause
metabolic Acidosis, Acute Renal Failure, Come / Seizures / Arrythmias, ARDS,
Hypertension. Ethyl Alcohol can cause Cerebella Disorders, Depression,
Psychosis, Convulsions, Cardiomyopathy. Benzodiazepines can cause
Depression, Respiratory failure and Hypotension. Chloral Hydrate can cause
Hypoglycemia. Seizures and Excessive sedation.
Process of prosecution of cases against you in the above-mentioned cases
under the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 also takes long time to have
any desired impact to your clandestine, boot-legging activities since prosecution
proceedings take sufficiently long period of time. You are causing wide spread
RNT, J & MRK, J
17 WP No.13785 of 2025
danger to public health and creating a feeling of insecurity amiong the general
public of that locality. If your activities are allowed unhindered and unchecked,
there is every danger of leading to liquor tragedies costing many lives of poor
people within the limits of Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals and
its surrounding villages and there by affecting the public order. While the
Government is implementing various schemes for the benefit and welfare of the
downtrodden, the sales of illicitly distilled liquor is badly affecting consumer’s
health, the financial status, social status of public and ultimately the public order.
As this trade is found to be most convenient to get easy and fast money and
huge profits with small investments, offenders are again and again resorting to
the same offences without caring the ordinary cases booked under the
A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020. It is difficult for the department to
catch at every occasion of commission of the offence. To detect an offence
while violating the law of land is a laborious process involving meticulous
planning and hundreds of man-hours. Further, an execution of criminal
prosecution launched against her under normal process of law will take a long
time. Hence, it is not possible to immediately prevent you from indulging in
similar prejudicial activities to public health and order. Your activities are
adversely affecting community, creating a feeling of insecurity, danger to life
and public health in that locality. Thus, your activities are affecting the life of
community in that locality and having impact on public health and public order.
Action taken against her under normal provisions of law by registering the cases,
sending for remand and putting her up for trial had no effect in curbing her
unlawful activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
Therefore there is no other option except to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction conferred on the District Collector and District Magistrate under
section 3 (1) of Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Boot
Leggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land
Grabbers Act, 1986 as an extreme measure in order to prevent bootlegging
activities of this person and save public from grave threat to their health and
requested that the said individual be detained under A.P. Prevention of
RNT, J & MRK, J
18 WP No.13785 of 2025
Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas,
Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.
Thus, I am satisfied after thorough verification of the material placed before
me that you are fall under the category of “BOOTLEGGER” as defined in Sec 2
(b) of “The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land
Grabbers Act, 1986” and you are a fit person to be detained U/Sec.3 (2) of the
said Act and accordingly I will issue orders with a view to preventing you from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
The District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari,
Rajamahendravaram further submitted that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram
Urban, East Godavari District, is spoiling the health of people by possession,
supply & sale of illicitly distilled liquor to the local persons and making them
addicted to ID Liquor. Thus the above individual has been spoiling/disturbing
the society/Community at length leading to health related issues and law and
order problems not only in Hukumpeta Village but also in surrounding areas of
Rajamahendravaram urban and rural Mandals. Hence her activities are
dangerous to the society and needs to be curtailed and in the above cases after
analysis the contraband seized is found to be illicitly distilled liquor containing
fusel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health.
The request made by the District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari
District, Rajamahendravaram is hereby considered and after thorough
verification of the material evidences placed before me, I am satisfied that this is
a fit case to initiate the powers conferred on me U/Sec 3 (1) & (2) of A.P.
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 agaunst Smt.
Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar,
Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District.
Therefore, I, Smt. P. Prasanthi, I.A.S. Collector & District Magistrate, East
Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram in exercise of the powers conferred upon
me under Sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous
RNT, J & MRK, J
19 WP No.13785 of 2025
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 vide G.O. Rt. No.486, General
Administration (SC.I) Department, Dated: 07.03.2025 do hereby direct under
Sub Section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar,
Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District shall be detained in
Special Prison for women, Rajahmundry, Andhra Pradesh State as per
G.O.Ms.No.18, General Administration (Law and Order) Department, Dated:
02.03.2015 until further orders to be received from the Government in order to
prevent the detenue from indulging Bootlegging activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of public health and public order and as per the provisions laid
down under the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land
Grabbers Act, 1986.
And that this case shall be referred to the Advisory Board for review and
report under Section 10 of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activies of
Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Land Grabbers Act, 1986. Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs,
C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari
District has right to make representation (i) to authority who passed the order
i.e., to the under signed before this order is approved by the Government or (ii)
to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of A.P, Amaravathi or (iii) to the Advisory Board
or to all of them.
The Government on the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Board may
confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person under
Section 12 & 13 of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land
Grabbers Act, 1986.
Given under my hand and seal, on this day 04/05/2025.
P Prasanthi, I A S
Collector & District Magistrate,
East Godavari District,
Rajamahendravaram”
RNT, J & MRK, J
20 WP No.13785 of 2025
6. On reference to the Advisory Board, the Advisory Board submitted its
report to the Government that there was sufficient cause for the detention and
vide G.O.Rt.No.1206, dated 20.06.2025, on consideration of the report of the
Advisory Board and the material available on record, the State confirmed the
Order of detention under Section 12 (1) read with Section 13 of the Act 1986.
Order of Confirmation by State:
7. The detention Order dated 03.05.2025 was confirmed by the State/1st
respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.1206, dated 20.06.2025, which reads as under:
“GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
ABSTRACT
PREVENTIVE DETENTION – Detention order passed against Smt. Polisetti Laxmi,
W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East
Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, by the Collector & District Magistrate, East
Godavari District and approved by the Government, under the A.P. Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral
Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No: 1 of 1986) – Confirmed –
Orders – Issued.
============================================================
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (SC-I) DEPARTMENT
G.O.RT.No. 1206 Dated: 20-06-2025
Read the following: –
1. From the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Letter
No.M1/521904/2025, Dated: 07-05-2025, together with Proceedings
No.M1/521904/2025, Dated:03-05-2025.
2. Radio Message Lr.No.SPWR/JR./859/2025, Dated: 05-05-2025, From the
Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, along with
Acknowledgement received from Superintendent, Special Prison for Women,
Rajamahendravaram.
3. G.O.RT.No.892, General Administration (SC-I) Department, Dated: 09-05-
2025.
4. W.M.No:2821442 /SC-I/A3/2025-1, Dated: 09-05-2025.
5. Letter No. 2821442/SC-I/A3/2025-2, General Administration (SC-I)
Department, Dated: 15-05-2025.
6. Letter No. 2821442/SC-I/A3/2025-3, General Administration (SC-I)
Department, Dated: 27-05-2025.
7. From the Chairman, Advisory Board Report on Preventive detentions Opinion
& Minutes of the meeting Dated: 28-05- 2025.
*****
RNT, J & MRK, J
21 WP No.13785 of 2025
ORDER:
WHEREAS, the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, has
made an order of detention, vide reference 1st read above under Section- (2) r/w
Section 2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No.1 of 1986), against Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East
Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, She is repeatedly indulging herself in
clandestine possession, supply & sale of illicitly distilled liquor in contravention of
Section 7(B) read with 8 (B) of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act 2020. She
indulged in bootlegging activities in the manner prejudicial to the public health and
public order and she has involved in 05 cases. She is spoiling the health of people
by manufacturing and selling ID Liquor to the local persons and making them
addicted to ID Liquor. Thus the above individual has been spoiling/disturbing the
society/Community at length leading to health related issues and law and order
problems not only in Hukumpeta Village but also in surrounding areas of
Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals. Hence, her activities are
dangerous to the society and needs to be curtailed and in the above cases after
analysis the contraband seized is found to be illicitly distilled liquor containing
fuel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. She is
repeatedly indulging herself in committing the offences of possession, supply &
sale of I.D. Liquor in contravention of section 7(B) r/w 8(B) of AP Prohibition
(Amendment) Act 2020 which comes under the category of “BOOTLEGGER” as
defined U/Sections 2 (b) of “The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 and it is necessary to make an order
invoking powers conferred under Sec 3 (2) of the Act (Act No.1 of 1986) directing
that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o
Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District be detained in
Special Prison for Women, Rajamahendravaram, with immediate effect, with a
view to preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of
public health and public order.
2. AND WHEREAS, the Government have accorded approval of the said
detention order under sub-section (3) Section 3 of the Act, vide Government
Orders 3rd read above.
3. AND WHEREAS, under Section 10 of the Act, Government within three
weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order shall place the case
before the Advisory Board on Preventive Detentions and the Advisory Board shall
submit its report to Govt., within seven weeks from the date of detention under
Section 11(1) of the said Act. The above said case was placed before the Advisory
Board constituted under Section 9 of the said Act, comprising of Justice Sri
Neelam Sanjiva Reddy (Retired), Chairman and two Members for its consideration
and to submit its report to Government, under Section 11 (1) of the said Act, vide
reference 5th read above. The case was reviewed by the Advisory Board on 28-05-
2025 through video conference. After having heard the detenue and the
RNT, J & MRK, J
22 WP No.13785 of 2025
Investigating Officer, who have attended the Video Conference and also upon
perusing the grounds of detention and the connected records, the Advisory board
has unanimously opined and reported that “there is sufficient cause for the
detention of the detenue.
4. AND WHEREAS, the Government after careful examination of the entire
record, observed that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o
Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District, Andhra
Pradesh State, is found to be involved in as many as in Five (05) cases mentioned
in the grounds of detention. All the instances mentioned above clearly establish
that he is an habitual offender and his activities are habitual in nature and which
are registered under various Sections, i.e. U/Sec 34 (a) of A.P. Excise
(Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B Andhra Pradesh Prohibition
(Amendment) Act. No. 18 of 2020. As such, the activities of the individual falls
under and within the meaning of “Bootlegger” as defined under section 2(b) of Act
1 of 1986. The detaining authority having taken into account and consideration of
indulgence of the detenue in the above said activities repeatedly at regular intervals
and having satisfied that the penal laws have failed to curb her illegal activities,
has passed the detention order against the detenue by invoking the provisions
under the Act 1 of 1986, in order to prevent her from indulging further in such
activities, which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The Advisory
Board after review of the case, has opined that there is sufficient cause for the
detention of the detenue. As such, the detenue deserves the maximum period of
detention, as provided under Section 13 of the Act.
5. Now, therefore, after due consideration of the report of the Advisory Board
and the material available on record, and in exercise of the powers conferred under
sub-section (1) of Section 12 read with Section 13 of the said Act, the Order of
Detention made by the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, in
the reference 1st read above, as approved in the G.O.3rd read above are hereby
confirmed by the Government. The detention of Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East
Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, shall be for a period of 12 (Twelve)
months from the date of his detention, i.e., 05- 05-2025 under Section 13 r/w
Section 12(1) of the said Act 1/1986.
(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA
PRADESH)
K. VIJAYANAND
CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT ”
8. The respondents filed counter affidavit justifying the Order of
detention.
RNT, J & MRK, J
23 WP No.13785 of 2025
9. The petitioner submitted that there was no need to file rejoinder
affidavit.
II. Submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner:
10. Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the Order of detention and confirmation does not mention about
the bail conditions. He submitted that there are 5 criminal cases, as mentioned
in the detention Order, but in all those cases, the detenue was granted bail. He
submitted that there was no violation of the bail conditions. He submitted that
the conditions in the bail were sufficient safeguard and there was no
justification for passing the detention Order. The authority, the 2nd respondent,
as also the 1st respondent did not satisfy about the pre-requisites for passing
the detention order, i.e., with a view to prevent the detenue from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. He
submitted that the detenue was on conditional bail and had been visiting the
police stations in compliance with the bail orders and hence, there was no
necessity to issue detention order. He submitted that the detention order was
served on the detenue while she was enlarged on bail in connection with Crime
No.145 of 2025, dated 12.03.2025 on the file of the Prohibition and Excise
Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
detention Order was passed mechanically and without arriving at a subjective
satisfaction. The normal penal laws were adequate enough to deal with the
RNT, J & MRK, J
24 WP No.13785 of 2025offences and mere apprehension to commit a crime in near future could not be
a valid ground to detain the detenue.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the cases of (1)
Md. Maruf v. State of Telangana1, (2) Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu v.
State of A.P.2, (3) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India3 and (4)
Omprakash v. Commissioner of Police4 in support of his contentions.
III. Submissions of the learned Government Pleader:
13. Sri Keerthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, submitted
that the detenue was repeatedly engaging herself in committing the offences of
possession, supply and sale of illicitly distilled liquor (ID liquor) in contravention
of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020. The detenue after
being released on bail, though subject to condition, was again and again
indulging in the same offence. He submitted that those cases were registered
in one year. He submitted that there was material before the District Collector
to pass the Order of Detention, as also for the Order of Confirmation by the
State. The report of the analyst clearly revealed adversely affecting the
maintenance of public health thereby effecting the public order. The detenue
was not holding licence or permit to deal any kind of intoxicants under the
provisions of the A. P. Excise Act, 1968. He submitted that the sale of illicitly
distilled liquor was an offence. The detenue was indulging in clandestine
1
2020 (5) ALT 160
2
WP.No.5469/2022, APHC, decided
On 11.07.2022
3
(2025) 4 SCC 476
4
1989 Supp (2) SCC 576
RNT, J & MRK, J
25 WP No.13785 of 2025manufacture, publish, transport and sale of illicit distilled liquor. She was a
bootlegger and her activities were causing injury to the public health, effecting
public order. If the activities of the detenue were allowed to continue, that was
prejudicial to giving effect to the various schemes of the Government for the
benefit and welfare of the downtrodden, badly affecting the consumers health,
financial status, social status of public and ultimately the public order. The
activities of the detenue were creating a feeling of insecurity, danger to the life
and public health in the locality having an impact on public order. The normal
provisions of law of legislature, sent her for remand, for trial, had no effect in
curbing her unlawful activities and there was no other option except to invoke
the provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Act 1986 to prevent the bootlegging
activities of the detenue for maintenance of the public order.
14. Sri Keerthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, further
submitted that the detention order was informed, the grounds of detention
were also informed, the right of the detenue to make representation, as also
the right to approach personally to the Advisory Board, if she desired and thus,
the statutory provisions in passing the detention order were duly complied. The
matter was placed before the Advisory Board which reviewed the case of the
detenue and submitted the report that there was sufficient cause for her
detention and considering the report and also the material, the Government
confirmed the detention Order for a period of 12 months from the date of
detention i.e., 05.05.2025. The Approval Order and Confirmation Order were
also served to the detenue under acknowledgment. He submitted that the
RNT, J & MRK, J
26 WP No.13785 of 2025Order of Detention as a precautionary measure was necessary. There was
sufficient cause for such detention. The chemical examiner in each of the cases
opined that the illicit distilled liquor was unfit for human consumption and
injurious to health. The detenue’s illegal activities were assessed not only in
terms of gravity but also by its potential to cause widespread breach of
tranquility affecting persons forming a sizable part of a community or a locality.
He submitted that the detention order was passed with application of mind
based on subjective satisfaction of the necessity for such order and was not
mechanical order. The detenue in spite of the conditional bail orders in criminal
cases, continued to commit offences one after the other, so the order was
necessary for preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, and this aspect of grant of bail and the bail
conditions was also considered in the detention order.
15. Learned Government Pleader placed reliance in the cases of (1)
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal5, (2) Subramanian v. State of
Tamil Nadu6 and (3) Ram Bali v. State of W.B7 in support of his
contentions.
IV. Point for consideration:
16. The point for consideration and determination is the validity of the
detention Order of the 2nd respondent and the confirmation Order by the 1st
respondent.
5
(1975) 3 SCC 198
6
AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 61
7
AIR 1975 SC 623
RNT, J & MRK, J
27 WP No.13785 of 2025
V. Consideration/Analysis:
17. We have considered the aforesaid submissions advanced by the
learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
18. A citizen has fundamental right to live freely, move from one place to
another, live with dignity and decency. Apart from that right to life has got
many other facets and unless due procedure under law is followed, the citizen’s
right to life and personal liberty cannot be deprived. The personal liberty of the
citizen is the most precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. However, a person can be deprived of his life and personal liberty by
authority of law. The personal liberty of the citizens, as such can be taken
away only by the procedure established and when it is used to jeopardize in the
context of the preventive detention on the grounds permitted by Statute. In a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court has to be satisfied that the detention of the
petitioner or the detenue, is as per the prescribed procedure and is not
unwarranted by law. The Court has to see that the detaining authority while
passing the detention order has ensured the strict compliance of law, more
particularly, when fundamental rights of the detenue are involved.
19. In Ram Bali (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under in
para-14:
“14. Every petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution has to establish an
infringement of a fundamental right. Hence, this Court cannot order a release
from detention, upon a habeas corpus petition, until it is satisfied that a
petitioner’s detention is really unwarranted by law. This means that, in a case of
detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the petitioner
has to show a violation of either Article 21 or Article 22 of the Constitution.
RNT, J & MRK, J
28 WP No.13785 of 2025That personal liberty of the citizen which the law so sedulously and carefully
protects can also be taken away by the procedure established by law when it is
used to jeopardize public good and not merely private interests.”
20. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from
punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power
exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It
is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies
on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been
launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during
prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without
prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The
pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order
of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.
21. Section 3 of the Act 1986 provides for the ‘power to make order
detaining certain persons’. It reads as under:
“3. Power to make orders detaining certain reasons
(1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any boot-legger, dacoit,
drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing
that such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in
any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a
Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to
do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be
specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may
RNT, J & MRK, J
29 WP No.13785 of 2025also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred
by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in the order made be the Government
under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but
the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do,
amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not
exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in
sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together
with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars
as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain
in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the
meantime, it has been approved by the Government.”
22. Section 3 of Act 1986 thus provides that the Government may if
satisfied inter alia with respect to any bootlegger with a view to preventing him
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is
necessary so to do make an order directing that such person be detained. So,
the detention may be on satisfaction of the competent authority that it is
necessary for preventing the bootlegger from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of the public order.
23. The expression ‘Bootlegger’ and ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order’ have been defined under Section 2 (b) and (a)
respectively, of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-
Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 as under:
“2(b) “boot-legger” means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores,
transports, imports, exports sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or
RNT, J & MRK, J
30 WP No.13785 of 2025other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh
Excise Act, 1968 and the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, or in
contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly
expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other
conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or
support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things himself or through
any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such
thing;”
“2(a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order” means when a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug offender, a goonda, an
immoral traffic offender or a land-grabber is engaged or is making preparations
for engaging in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are
likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order:”
“Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order shall be deemed to
have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely
inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause
directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof
or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health.”
Public Order:
24. Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 defines what is meant ‘acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. It means when a
bootlegger, a dacoit, a drug offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or
a land grabber is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his
activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the
maintenance of public order. The Explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986
for the purpose of that clause explained that ‘public order’ shall be deemed to
have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely
RNT, J & MRK, J
31 WP No.13785 of 2025
inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in clause 2(a)
directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof
or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health. So, from the
explanation, it is evident that if any of the activities, inter alia, of the
bootlegger, if directly or even indirectly either cause or calculated to cause any
harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or
any section of the general public or grave or widespread danger even to public
health that would be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the
public order.
25. The ‘public order’ was explained in Ram Monohar Lohia v. State
of Bihar8 in the context of Rule 30 of the Defense of India Rules which permits
detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order, in which the Hon’ble Apex Court held that every breach of peace
does not lead to public disorder. There is distinction between ‘Public Order’ and
‘Law and Order’. Public Order if breached must lead to public disorder. If there
is disorder but not public disorder, that can be dealt with under the powers to
maintain law and order. The person cannot be detained on the ground of
disorder, which is not public disorder. It was held that the contravention of law
always affects order but before it can be said to effect public order, it must
effect the community or the public at large. It was further observed that law
and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle
8
AIR 1966 SC 740
RNT, J & MRK, J
32 WP No.13785 of 2025
representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of
State. Paragraphs-54 and 55 of Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) are as under:
“54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India
Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a
person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no
doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a
broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other
the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression “public
order” take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this
serves to distinguish “public order” from “law and order” because the latter
undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public
disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two
drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can
be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained
on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two
fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal
passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the
apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The
contravention of law always affects order but before if can be said to affect
public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere
disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily
sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which
subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action
under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of
maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.
55. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this Court
(earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those
affecting “security of State”, “law and order” also comprehends disorders of
less gravity than those affecting “public order”. One has to imagine three
concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is
RNT, J & MRK, J
33 WP No.13785 of 2025the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents
security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but
not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the
State. By using the expression “maintenance of law and order” the District
Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the
Defence of India Rules.”
26. In Omprakash (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to its
decision in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad City9 in which the previous judgment in Pushkar Mukherjee v.
State of West Bengal10 was referred wherein the distinction between ‘law
and order’ and ‘public order’ was clearly laid down. Paras 6 to 10 of
Omprakash (supra) are reproduced as under:
“6. ……….. One of us (Dutt, J.) speaking for the bench in the said Piyush
Mehta case [1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 438] referred to a
decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal [(1969) 1
SCC 10 : (1969) 2 SCR 635 : 1970 Cri LJ 852] wherein the distinction between
“law and order” and “public order” has been clearly laid down and stated as
follows:
“In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to
substantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner adversely
affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true
some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the
witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the
maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged
offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences
cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community.
It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of Section9
1989 Supp (1) SCC 322
10
(1969) 1 SCC 10
RNT, J & MRK, J
34 WP No.13785 of 20252(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be
preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down
in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect
adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
We have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the
order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our
opinion, these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any
feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the
area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The
order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld.”
7. There is a series of decisions explaining what the expression “public
order” means. We feel that it is not necessary to refer to all those decisions but
suffice to make reference to the following decision in addition to Piyush Mehta
case [1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 438] .
8. This Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration [(1982) 2 SCC 403 :
1982 SCC (Cri) 451] has observed: (SCC p. 410, para 13)
“It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”
9. See also Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [AIR 1966 SC 740 :
(1966) 1 SCR 709 : 1966 Cri LJ 608] , Arun Ghosh v. State of West
Bengal [(1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67 : AIR 1970 SC 1228] and Ajay
Dixit v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 400 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 625]
10. The view expressed in Piyush Mehta case [1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 438] has been adopted by this Court in Rashidmiya @ Chhava
Ahmedmiya Shaik v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad [(1989) 3 SCC 321 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 559] and Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan v. Police
Commissioner, Ahmedabad [(1989) 4 SCC 43] .”
27. In Omprakash (supra), thus referring the case inter alia of Ashok
Kumar v. Delhi Administration11 the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that it is
11
(1982) 2 SCC 403
RNT, J & MRK, J
35 WP No.13785 of 2025the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
28. With respect to ‘public order’, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Bali
(supra) observed that ‘public order’ is necessarily an elastic concept which is, in
any case, wider than the “security of the State”.
Deeming Provision / Public health:
29. The Explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 creates a legal
fiction that inter alia, where there is grave or widespread danger to the public
health, then such acts shall also be deemed to effect adversely to the
maintenance of the public order. The expression “deemed to be” creates legal
fiction. So, the public order shall be deemed to have been affected aversely,
also, when there is grave or widespread danger to public health, by legal
fiction.
30. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment
Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited12
the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that when a person is ‘deemed to be’
something, the only meaning possible is that while in reality he is not that
something, but for the purposes of the Act of legislature he is required to be
treated that something and not otherwise. The Hon’ble Apex Court further
observed that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and
even necessary to assume all those facts on the basis of which alone such
fiction can operate.
12
(2013) 5 SCC 470
RNT, J & MRK, J
36 WP No.13785 of 2025
31. Paragraphs – 26 to 29 of Rajasthan State Industrial
Development and Investment Corporation (supra) read as under:
“VI. “As if”–Meaning of
26. The expression “as if” is used to make one applicable in respect of the
other. The words “as if” create a legal fiction. By it, when a person is “deemed
to be” something, the only meaning possible is that, while in reality he is
not that something, but for the purposes of the Act of legislature he is
required to be treated that something, and not otherwise. It is a well-settled
rule of interpretation that, in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it
would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on the basis
of which alone such fiction can operate. The words “as if” in fact show the
distinction between two things and, such words must be used only for a limited
purpose. They further show that a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose
for which it was created. [Vide Radhakissen Chamria v. Durga Prosad
Chamria [(1939-40) 67 IA 360 : (1940) 52 LW 647 : AIR 1940 PC 167]
, CIT v. S. Teja Singh [AIR 1959 SC 352] , Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of
India [AIR 1966 SC 644] , Sher Singh v. Union of India [(1984) 1 SCC 107 :
AIR 1984 SC 200] , State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah [(2000) 2 SCC
699 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 2000 SC 937] , Paramjeet Singh
Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. [(2006) 13 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 168] (SCC p. 341,
para 28) and CIT v. Willamson Financial Services [(2008) 2 SCC 202] .]
27. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952 AC
109 : (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL)] this Court approved the approach which stood
adopted and followed persistently. It set out as under : (AC p. 133)
“… The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does
not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to
boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”
28. In Industrial Supplies (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 341 :
AIR 1980 SC 1858] this Court observed as follows : (SCC p. 351, para 25)
“25. It is now axiomatic that when a legal fiction is incorporated in a statute,
the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created. After
RNT, J & MRK, J
37 WP No.13785 of 2025ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it
should be carried to its logical conclusion. The court has to assume all the
facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to
giving effect to the fiction. The legal effect of the words ‘as if he were’ in the
definition of ‘owner’ in Section 3(n) of the Nationalisation Act read with
Section 2(1) of the Mines Act is that although the petitioners were not the
owners, they being the contractors for the working of the mine in question,
were to be treated as such though, in fact, they were not so.”
(emphasis added)
29. The instant case is required to be decided in the light of the aforesaid
settled legal propositions.”
32. In Hindustan Cooperative Housing Building Society Limited
v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies13 on legal fiction and deeming
provision, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in para-17 as under:
“17. “13. … It is, as noted above, a deeming provision. Such a provision
creates a legal fiction. As was stated by James, L.J. in Levy, Re, ex p
Walton [(1881) 17 Ch D 746 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548 (CA)] : (Ch D p. 756)
‘… When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been
done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled and bound to
ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to
be resorted to.’
After ascertaining the purpose full effect must be given to the statutory fiction
and it should be carried to its logical conclusion and to that end it would be
proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction
can operate. [Ed. : This latter sentence does not form part of what was observed
by James, L.J. in ex p Walton, (1881) 17 Ch D 746 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548
(CA) but is a paraphrase of what was observed by the Supreme Court in State of
Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, (1953) 1 SCC 425 : 1953 SCR 773 at p. 778.
13
(2009) 14 SCC 302
RNT, J & MRK, J
38 WP No.13785 of 2025See also Ali M.K. v. State of Kerala, (2003) 11 SCC 632 : 2004 SCC (L&S)
136, SCC at p. 639, para 13.]
[See Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. [(1884) 9 AC 448 (HL)] , State of
Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory [(1953) 1 SCC
826 : AIR 1953 SC 333] , American Home Products Corpn. v. Mac
Laboratories (P) Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 465] and Parayankandiyal Eravath
Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi [(1996) 4 SCC 76] .] In an oft quoted
passage, Lord Asquith stated:
‘If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must
surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences
and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact, existed, must
inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. … The statute [states] that you
must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you
must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the
inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.’
(See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952 AC 109 :
(1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL)] at AC pp. 132-33.)
‘… The word “deemed” is used a great deal in modern legislation.
Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial
construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it
is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be
uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that
includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense,
impossible.’
[Per Lord Radcliffe in St. Aubyn v. Attorney General (No. 2) [1952 AC 15 :
(1951) 2 All ER 473 (HL)] , AC p. 53.]
14. ‘Deemed’, as used in statutory definitions [is meant]
‘to extend the denotation of the defined term to things it would not in ordinary
parlance denote, is often a convenient devise for reducing the verbiage of an
enactment, but that does not mean that wherever it is used it has that effect; to
deem means simply to judge or reach a conclusion about something, and the
words “deem” and “deemed” when used in a statute thus simply state the effect
RNT, J & MRK, J
39 WP No.13785 of 2025or meaning which some matter or thing has — the way in which it is to be
adjudged; this need not import artificiality or fiction; it may simply be the
statement of an undisputable conclusion.’ (Per Windener, J. in Hunter Douglas
Australia Pty. v. Perma Blinds [(1970) 44 Aust LJ R 257] .)
15. When a thing is to be ‘deemed’ something else, it is to be treated as that
something else with the attendant consequences, but it is not that something
else (per Cave, J., in R. v. Norfolk County Court [(1891) 60 LJ QB 379] ).
‘When a statute gives a definition and then adds that certain things shall be
“deemed” to be covered by the definition, it matters not whether without that
addition the definition would have covered them or not.’
(Per Lord President Cooper in Ferguson v. McMillan [1954 SLT 109] .)
16. Whether the word ‘deemed’ when used in a statute established a
conclusive or a rebuttable presumption depended upon the context (see St. Leon
Village Consolidated School Distt. v. Ronceray [(1960) 23 DLR (2d) 32] ).
‘…. I … regard its primary function as to bring in something which would
otherwise be excluded.’
(Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. IRC [1961 AC 509 : (1960) 3 WLR
280 : (1960) 2 All ER 817 (HL)] at AC p. 523.)
‘Deems’ means ‘is of opinion’ or ‘considers’ or ‘decides’ and there is no
implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is
taken.
[See R. v. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex p Soblen [(1963) 2 QB 243 : (1962) 3
WLR 1154 : (1962) 3 All ER 641 (CA)] at QB p. 315.]” [Ed. : As observed
in Ali M.K. v. State of Kerala, (2003) 11 SCC 632 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 136, SCC
at pp. 639-40, paras 13-16.]”
33. In Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing
Society Limited14 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that it is the exclusive
prerogative of the legislature to create a legal fiction meaning thereby to enact
14
(2010) 13 SCC 336
RNT, J & MRK, J
40 WP No.13785 of 2025a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which
does not really exist. Paragraph – 14 of Sant Lal Gupta reads as under:
“14. The legislature in its wisdom has not enacted any deeming provision
providing that in case the resolution is not considered and finally decided by the
Registrar within a period of six months, the resolution shall become effective
and operative. It is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature to create a
legal fiction meaning thereby to enact a deeming provision for the purpose
of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Even if a
legal fiction is created by the legislature, the court has to ascertain for what
purpose the fiction is created, and it must be limited to the purpose indicated
by the context and cannot be given a larger effect. More so, what can be
deemed to exist under a legal fiction are merely facts and no legal consequences
which do not flow from the law as it stands. It is a settled legal proposition that
in absence of any statutory provision, the provision cannot be construed as to
provide for a fiction in such an eventuality. More so, creating a fiction by
judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the
domain of the legislature. (Vide Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd. [(1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054] )”
34. In Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana15 the expression ‘acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order’ as
under Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 was considered and it was observed that
the power to detain, under the 1986 Act can be exercised only for preventing a
person from engaging in, or pursuing or taking some action which adversely
affects or is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, or for
preventing him from making preparations for engaging in such activities. It was
observed that the conduct or activities of the detenue in the past must be taken
15
(2018) 12 SCC 150
RNT, J & MRK, J
41 WP No.13785 of 2025
into account, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities. But,
the incidents which are said to have taken place, if are in stale, it could not
have been considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that
the detenue must be detained. The detention order must be based on a
reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his past
conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The detention order which is
founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order of punishment for a
crime, passed without a trial though purporting to be an order of preventive
detention, whereas the essential concept of preventive detention is that the
detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to
prevent him from doing it.
35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sama Aruna (supra) found that the
detention order was vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the
past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a
trial. The satisfaction of the authority was not in respect of the thing in regard
to which it was required to be satisfied. It was observed that the incidents
which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry
and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.
36. In Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu (supra), a Coordinate Bench of
this Court held that the existence of the element of disturbance to the public
order is a sine qua non for invoking the provisions of Section 3 of the Act 1986,
the power conferred on the authorities by Section 3 of the Act 1986, is required
to be exercised with lot of care, caution and circumspection and the same
RNT, J & MRK, J
42 WP No.13785 of 2025
cannot be exercised in a routine and mechanical manner and absolutely not on
the foundation of assumptions, presumptions and surmises. The power
conferred under Section 3 of the Act 1986 is an exception to the normal
procedure under the criminal laws and as the authorities ultimately deal with
the fundamental right of personal liberty of the citizens as enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India strict adherence to the mandatory
provisions of the Statute is indispensible. The satisfaction as stipulated under
Section 3 of the Act 1986 should necessarily be a subjective satisfaction and is
required to be on the basis of cogent and convincing material and not on the
foundation of stale and sterile reasons. It was further held that so long as
ordinary criminal law is adequate to deal with the offences, preventive
detention without subjecting an individual to the procedure of free and fair trial
would infringe the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Part-
III of the Constitution of India.
37. On facts, in Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu (supra), it was found
that there was no material to show that there was a feeling of insecurity
amongst the general public which was a condition precedent for meddling with
the liberty of an individual under the Act 1986. This Court opined that in the
case of the detenue therein the order of detention was not justified in the light
of the explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986, observing that simply
because an individual is a bootlegger, the same would not be sufficient to press
into service the provisions of the Act 1986.
RNT, J & MRK, J
43 WP No.13785 of 2025
38. In Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh16
which was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities
of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, the detention order was passed, the detenue
being habitual offender and committing offences against A.P.Prohition
(Amendment) Act, 2020 was arrested in 4 cases from January 2021 to March
2022, and was indulging in committing the offences of distributing, storing,
transporting and selling ID liquor which caused huge damage to the public
health as well as public peace and tranquility.
39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pesala Nookaraju (supra), on
examination of the provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Articles 21 and
22 of the Constitution of India, while drawing distinction between the
expressions ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’, observed that there is very thin
line between the question of, law and order situation and a public order
situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law and order
situation can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for
determining is the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of
public order. The object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but
rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of
detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an
objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide.
The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding
16
(2023) 14 SCC 641
RNT, J & MRK, J
44 WP No.13785 of 2025
circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Prohibition Act.
It was further observed that just because four cases have been registered
against the detenue as in that case under the Prohibition Act, by itself, might
not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenue might
be punished for the offences which have been registered against him. In other
words, if the detention is on the ground that the detenue is indulging in
manufacture or transport or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become
an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same can
be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, but if the
liquor sold by the detenue is dangerous to public health then under the 1986
Act, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order,
therefore, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on
material available to it that the liquor dealt with by the detenue is liquor which
is dangerous to public health to attract the provisions of the 1986 Act.
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court referred to Section 2 (a) and its explanation,
and observed that it also incorporates a legal fiction as to the adverse effect on
public order. It also referred to the case in Harpreet Kaur v. State of
Maharashtra17 to observe that it is the fall out of the activity of the
bootlegger which determines whether ‘public order’ has been affected within
the meaning of this deeming provision or not. This legislative intent has to be
kept in view while dealing with detentions under the Act.
17
(1992) 2 SCC 177
RNT, J & MRK, J
45 WP No.13785 of 2025
41. In Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra), the detenue was granted bail
imposing stringent conditions as the detenue was engaging in smuggling
activities in various offences. However, the detaining authority said nothing in
the detention order as to why those conditions were not sufficient to prevent
the detenue from engaging in further activities of smuggling. The Hon’ble Apex
Court observed that it was for the detaining authority to look into it and enter
into a subjective satisfaction as to whether the same was sufficient to avoid
preventive detention or otherwise, insufficient to restrain him from further
involvement in similar smuggling activities. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed
that if there was consideration, then the reasonableness of the consideration
could not have been scrutinized in judicial review. But, as there was no such
consideration, the Court had to interfere. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed
that it was not concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by the
Magistrate would have taken care of the apprehension expressed by the
detaining authority; of the detenue indulging in further smuggling activities.
But, it was more concerned with the aspect that the detaining authority did not
consider the efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction, however,
subjective it was, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the
detenue from indulging in such activities. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed
that the preventive detention is hard law and therefore, it should be strictly
construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardized
unless his case falls squarely within, and it should not be used merely to clip
the wings of an accused who was involved in a criminal prosecution. The
RNT, J & MRK, J
46 WP No.13785 of 2025
preventive detention law is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man
under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available was such as
would satisfy the requirement of the legal provisions authorizing such
detention.
42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra) observed that
when a person is enlarged on bail by a competent court, great caution should
be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention
which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal
Court. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional Court, that too on conditions,
the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to
curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities, which is the very basis
of the preventive detention ordered.
43. Paragraphs 27 to 35 of Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra) are as under:
“27. However, nothing is stated by the detaining authority as to why the
conditions are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from engaging in further
activities of smuggling; which was the specific ground on which the conditions
were imposed while granting bail.
28. We are not examining the conditions imposed by the Magistrate since it
was for the detaining authority to look into it and enter into a subjective
satisfaction as to whether the same was sufficient to avoid a preventive
detention or otherwise, insufficient to restrain him from further involvement in
similar smuggling activities. As has been held in Rameshwar Lal
Patwari v. State of Bihar [Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 142 : AIR 1968 SC 1303] : (SCC OnLine SC para 7)
“7. … The formation of the opinion about detention rests with the
Government or the officer authorised. Their satisfaction is all that the law
RNT, J & MRK, J
47 WP No.13785 of 2025speaks of and the courts are not constituted an appellate authority. Thus
the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the court.
However, the detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective
satisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter. It must require the
closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving no
room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the courts do
not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the
material on which it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection
on the part of those who wield this power over others.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. “If there is a consideration, then the reasonableness of the
consideration could not have been scrutinised by us in judicial review,
since we are not sitting in appeal and the provision for preventive detention
provide for such a subjective satisfaction to be left untouched by the
Courts. However, when there is no such consideration then we have to
interfere.”
30.Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana [Ameena Begum v. State of
Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] held that the
observations in Rekha v. State of T.N. [Rekha v. State of T.N., (2011) 5 SCC
244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] ; that preventive detention is impermissible when
the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with the situation was per
incuriam to the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of
W.B. [Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri)
816] , in the limited judicial review available to constitutional courts in
preventive detention matters. The courts would be incapable of interference by
substituting their own reasoning to upset the subjective satisfaction arrived at
by the detaining authority, especially since preventive detention law is not
punitive but preventive and precautionary.
31. In Ameena Begum [Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC
587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] , this Court was concerned with the true
distinction between a threat to “law and order” and acts “prejudicial to public
order”, which was not to be determined merely by the nature or quality of the
RNT, J & MRK, J
48 WP No.13785 of 2025
act complained of, but was held to lie, in the proper degree and extent of its
impact on the society. It was held that there could be instances where
“disturbance of public order” would not be attracted but still, would fall within
the scope of maintenance of “law and order”. It was held that : (SCC p. 621)
“47. … preventive detention laws–an exceptional measure reserved for
tackling emergent situations–ought not to have been invoked in this case as a
tool for enforcement of “law and order”. (sic para 47)”
especially when the existing legal framework to maintain law and order is
sufficient to address the offences under consideration.
32. Likewise, in the present case, we are not concerned as to whether the
conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the
apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenu indulging in
further smuggling activities. We are more concerned with the aspect that the
detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions and
enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions not
being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such activities.
33.Ameena Begum [Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC
587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] , noticed with approval Vijay Narain
Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 :
1984 SCC (Cri) 361] and extracted para 32 from the same (Vijay Narain
Singh [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri)
361] ) : (SCC pp. 35-36)
“32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law
and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the
liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within … not
be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal
prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention
when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of
orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the
requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person
is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be
RNT, J & MRK, J
49 WP No.13785 of 2025exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which
is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered
are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a
network set-up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations, on
specific information received, leading to recovery of huge cache of contraband.
When bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on conditions, the
detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb
the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of
the preventive detention ordered.
35. The detention order being silent on that aspect, we interfere with the
detention order only on the ground of the detaining authority having not looked
into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while granting bail for the very
same offence; the allegations in which also have led to the preventive detention,
assailed herein, to enter a satisfaction as to whether those conditions are
sufficient or not to restrain the detenu from indulging in further like activities of
smuggling.”
44. In Ram Bali (supra) it was further observed that the required
satisfaction must have reference to a need to prevent what is anticipated from
the detenue. The past conduct or activity is only relevant in so far as it
furnishes reasonable grounds for an apprehension. Prevention and punishment
have some common ultimate aims but their immediate objectives and modes of
action are distinguishable.
Order of Detention:
45. Now coming to the Order of Detention passed by the District
Collector.
RNT, J & MRK, J
50 WP No.13785 of 2025
46. A perusal of the Order of Detention along with the Grounds of
Detention passed by the District Collector shows that with respect to every case
i.e., 5 criminal cases, in which the detenue was granted bail subject to
condition, the District Collector has considered that aspect. So, the contention
of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the detention order the bail
conditions were not considered is unacceptable. The District Collector has
recorded specifically that the detenue in spite of her release in those criminal
cases on bail, was involving repeatedly in the same activities causing injury to
the public health. The District Collector also recorded its satisfaction that the
detenue was causing widespread danger to the public health and creating a
feeling of insecurity among the general public of that locality and if the activities
of the detenue were allowed unhindered and unchecked, there was every
danger of leading to liquor tragedies causing many lives of poor persons within
the limits of Rajamahendravaram urban and rural mandals and its surrounding
villages and thereby affecting the public order. In that regard, with respect to
each case, it also referred to the report of the chemical examiner, REL,
Kakinada in all cases to which the illicitly distilled liquor was sent for
examination and which reports opined that the sample was illicitly distilled
liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health.
47. The District Collector clearly recorded in the Detention Order that the
action taken under the normal provisions of law by registering the cases,
sending for remand and putting her up for trial had no effect in curbing the
unlawful activities of the detenue which were prejudicial to the maintenance of
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51 WP No.13785 of 2025
public order and therefore there was no other option but to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 3 (1) of the Act 1986.
48. Consequently, we are of the view that the grant of bail was taken
care of. The detenue was repeatedly acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, the detention was considered necessary and the
normal criminal laws were not acting as deterent, as the detenue was
repeatedly involving herself in same kind of offences after getting bail.
49. We are of the view that those 5 criminal cases which are the basis of
the detention Order were in a span of one year. So, it cannot be said that the
criminal activities of the detenue were stale or not relevant for consideration to
pass preventive detention Order.
50. We are of the view that the District Collector has recorded its
satisfaction and such satisfaction is based on consideration of the material
before it.
Judicial Review / Scope:
51. We shall consider the scope of judicial review against the Order of
Detention.
52. The scope of judicial review with the preventive orders of detention
was explained in Khudiram Das v. State of W.B.18 in para-9 as under:
“9. … There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for saying
that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required under the
statute. The simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at
all; in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as regards the18
(1975) 2 SCC 81
RNT, J & MRK, J
52 WP No.13785 of 2025fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. King Emperor v. Sibnath
Banerjee [King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 1943 SCC OnLine FC 15] is a
case in point. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised
dishonestly or for an improper purpose : such a case would also negative the
existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of “improper
purpose”, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been
recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The
satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and
therefore, if in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation
of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commr. of Police,
Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas
Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16] and the officer of the Ministry of
Labour and National Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of
Labour and National Service [Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour
and National Service, (1946) 2 All ER 201 (DC)] , the exercise of the power
would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the
authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each
individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner. The
satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad
where it is based on the application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a
statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in
respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then again
the satisfaction must be grounded “on materials which are of rationally
probative value”. Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. R. [Machindar Shivaji
Mahar v. R., 1950 SCC OnLine FC 4 : AIR 1950 FC 129] . The grounds on
which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can
consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be
reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not
be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken
into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor
something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or
RNT, J & MRK, J
53 WP No.13785 of 2025not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be
exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad.”
53. With respect to the scope of judicial review in Sama Aruna (supra),
the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that while reviewing the detention order, a
court does not substitute its judgment for the decision of the executive.
Nonetheless, the court has a duty to enquire that the decision of the executive
is made upon matters laid down by the statute as relevant for reaching such a
decision. For what is at stake, is the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed to
him by the Constitution and of which he cannot be deprived, except for reasons
laid down by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law.
54. In Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana19 on the scope of
judicial review by a constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of
orders of preventive detention, it was laid down as under in para-28, which is
reproduced hereunder, as to what the Court would be entitled to examine.
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court when called
upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to
examine whether:
28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the
detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a
matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is
predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being
satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has
applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on
material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;
19
(2023) 9 SCC 587
RNT, J & MRK, J
54 WP No.13785 of 2025
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has
been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the
statute, and is therefore ultra vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation
of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in
any other manner not authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself
from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case;
28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are
of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard
to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live
and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative
need to detain him or is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which
an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as
connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in
respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not
vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity,
inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity
to make a suitable representation; and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered
to.”
55. In Subramanian (supra), upon which the learned Government
Pleader placed reliance, it was held that if the detaining authority on the
material before it satisfied that the preventive detention was required and once
the order was passed on the subjective satisfaction on the material before the
authority and confirmed, such satisfaction, could not be open for interference in
RNT, J & MRK, J
55 WP No.13785 of 2025
the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Para-18 on which emphasis was laid reads as
under:
“18. The incidents have been highlighted in the grounds of detention
coupled with the definite indication as to the impact thereof which have been
precisely stated in the grounds of detention mentioned above. All the incidents
mentioned in the grounds of detention clearly substantiate the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as to how the acts of the detenu
were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. All these aspects have been
considered by the High Court which rightly affirmed the detention order.”
56. In Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra) placing reliance upon which learned
counsel argued that in the present case the detenue was granted conditional
bail and so the detaining authority could not pass the order of detention as the
detaining authority did not consider the aspect of grant of bail conditions in all
those 5 cases. However, we are not able to convince ourselves with the
argument. In Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra), the detention Order was silent on
that aspect. The Hon’ble Apex Court interfered with the detention Order,
observing clearly, only on the ground of the detaining authority having not
looked into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while granting bail, the
allegations which also have led to the preventive detention, assailed, to enter a
satisfaction as to whether those conditions were sufficient or not to restrain the
detenue from indulging in further like activities of smuggling. We find from the
detention order that it is not silent on that aspect, but considers grant of bail
and records that in spite thereof the detenue was repeatedly indulging in the
same offences.
RNT, J & MRK, J
56 WP No.13785 of 2025
57. In Md. Maruf (supra) upon which learned counsel for the petitioner
placed reliance, there was no discussion in the detention order that the detenue
has violated any bail conditions. It was observed that an accused has got every
right to apply for bail. The grant of bail depends upon several circumstances
and the Court while granting bail takes into consideration several factors, like
past crime history, the nature of the crime, stage of investigation etc.
Opportunity is given to the prosecution (State) to oppose the bail application.
In all the three crimes referred to in that case, bail was granted with certain
conditions. It was observed that when certain conditions are imposed, while
granting bail, there is some check on the conduct and movement of the detenu.
In the event of violation of such bail conditions, the prosecution has full
opportunity to apply for cancellation of bail. In spite of having such remedy
under the provisions of Cr.P.C. the detention order can be passed only as a last
resort and not in a routine manner. The detaining authority has to satisfy itself
that all other legal avenues have been exhausted either of arrest, prosecution
etc. under ordinary law and in spite of the same, if it has become difficult for
the authority to control the criminal activities of the detenue, only in such case,
the detention order needs to be passed. We are of the view that in the present
case the District Collector has given due consideration to the grant of bail and
has recorded his satisfaction for passing the detention order.
58. In Pesala Nookaraju (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court found that
the detaining authority specifically stated in the grounds of detention that
selling liquor by the detenue therein and the consumption by the people of that
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57 WP No.13785 of 2025
locality was harmful to their health. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that such
statement is an expression of subjective satisfaction that the activities of the
detenue appellant are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The
detaining authority has also recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to
prevent the detenue from indulging further in such activities and such
satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. The
Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that it is well settled that whether the
material was sufficient or not is not for the courts to decide by applying the
objective basis as it is matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority.
Period of Detention:
59. One more aspect which requires consideration is that the
Confirmation Order has been passed for a period of 12 months. The Statute
prescribes that period of detention of 12 months which is the maximum period.
We, however, find in that order of confirmation, that no such reason has been
assigned for the period of detention to be for the maximum statutory period.
60. In Ameena Begum (supra) with respect to maximum period of
detention in the confirmation Order of the State, the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed that the period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform in all cases.
The objective sought to be fulfilled in each case, whether is subserved by
continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some reflection in
the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of
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58 WP No.13785 of 2025
unreasonableness and unfairness. It was further observed that the detention
being a restriction on the invaluable right to personal liberty of an individual
and if the same were to be continued for the maximum period, it would be
eminently just and desirable that such restriction on personal liberty, in the
least, reflects an approach that meets the test of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court, thus, in Ameena Begum (supra), held that
if the period of detention is for the maximum period, then at least the order of
detention/confirmation must reflect in consideration of that aspect so as to
evidence of reasonableness and fairness for such maximum period of detention.
61. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ameena Begum (supra) refrained from
pronouncing that an order of detention otherwise held legal and valid, could be
invalidated only on the ground of absence of any indication therein as to why
the detention has been continued for the maximum period, inasmuch as
observing that situation did not arise in that case and was left for decision in an
appropriate case.
62. Paragraphs – 72, 75 and 79 of Ameena Begum (supra) are
reproduced as under:
“72. Whenever an accused is tried for an offence under a penal law
which carries a maximum sentence, the Court is obliged while imposing
sentence to apply its mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case
and to either impose maximum sentence or a lesser sentence. It has, therefore, a
discretion regarding imposition of sentence. We are inclined to the view that
there could be no warrant for the proposition that when it boils down to
confirming an order of detention under a preventive detention law, which is not
punitive, the Government can seek immunity and enjoy an unfettered, unguided
and unlimited discretion in continuing detention for the maximum period
RNT, J & MRK, J
59 WP No.13785 of 2025without even very briefly indicating its mind as to the “imponderables” that
were taken into account for fixing the maximum period. The very term
“maximum period” in Section 13 vests the Government with discretion,
allowing it to be exercised while considering whether the detention is to be
continued for the maximum period of 12 (twelve) months or any lesser period.
In our opinion, the relevant provisions of the Act have to be so read as to inhere
a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power.
75. True it is, Deepak [Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC
707 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 99] was not a case arising out of preventive
detention laws. However, in situations where discretion is available with
authorities to decide the period of detention, as articulated by Lord Halsbury
in Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield [Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield, 1891 AC 173 at
p. 179 (HL)] , this discretion should be exercised in accordance with “the rules
of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and
not humour; it is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular”.
79. Viewed reasonably, the period of detention ought to necessarily vary
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform
in all cases. The objective sought to be fulfilled in each case, whether is
subserved by continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some
reflection in the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of
unreasonableness and unfairness. Detention being a restriction on the invaluable
right to personal liberty of an individual and if the same were to be continued
for the maximum period, it would be eminently just and desirable that such
restriction on personal liberty, in the least, reflects an approach that meets the
test of Article 14. We, however, refrain from pronouncing here that an order of
detention, otherwise held legal and valid, could be invalidated only on the
ground of absence of any indication therein as to why the detention has been
continued for the maximum period. That situation does not arise here and is left
for a decision in an appropriate case.”
63. In view of the aforesaid on the point of maximum period of
detention, in the Order of detention/confirmation, we find in the present case,
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60 WP No.13785 of 2025
the Order of Confirmation has not taken into consideration as to why the
maximum period was imposed and also that whether by passing the order of
detention of continuing the detention of the detenue for a period lesser than
the maximum period would or would not serve the objective sought to be
fulfilled by such Detention.
Conclusion:
64. We do not find this case for interference with the Order of Detention
and the Confirmation Order, for the reasons indicated and discussion made
hereinabove. But, on the point of providing the maximum period of 12 months
under the Statute for the detenue to be detained, in the absence of any
discussion on that aspect in the Confirmation Order as to why the maximum
period has been provided, we are of the view that the State
Government/respondent No.1 shall consider this aspect of the matter by
passing fresh order on that aspect, as to whether the Order of Confirmation, is
to be continued for the maximum period of 12 months, as provided thereunder,
or in the facts and circumstances of the case of the detenue, considering the
objective sought to be fulfilled by the Order of preventive detention, the
detention of the detenue should be reduced to such other period, lesser than
12 months or for the period already detained.
Result:
65. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed, but with the observations
made herein above and the direction issued to the State/1st respondent in the
following terms;
RNT, J & MRK, J
61 WP No.13785 of 2025
i) The State / Respondent No.1 shall pass fresh Order only with
respect to the period of detention, indicating the reasons, for
continuing the detention for the maximum period of 12 months
preventive detention of the detenue or reducing it to a lesser
period, i.e, lesser than 12 months, or for the period already
detained.
ii) The aforesaid exercise pursuant to the direction (i) shall be
undertaken within a period of 3 (three) weeks from the date of
receipt of the copy of this judgment.
66. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in
consequence.
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________________
MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J
Date: 18.08.2025
Dsr
Note:
LR copy to be marked
B/o
Dsr