Meghalaya High Court
Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited vs The State Of Meghalaya Represented By … on 8 May, 2025
Author: H. S. Thangkhiew
Bench: H. S. Thangkhiew
2025:MLHC:366
Serial No. 01-03
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 478 of 2024 with
WP(C) No. 480 of 2024
WP(C) No. 37 of 2025 Date of Decision: 08.05.2025
WP(C) No. 478 of 2024
Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited
Represented by Mr. Anand Kumar Chaudhary,
8/1, Lal Bazar Street, Bikaner Building, Third
Floor, Kolkata - 700001 :::Petitioner
-Vs-
1.The State of Meghalaya represented by the
Chief Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong - 793001
2.The Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Housing Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong - 793001
3.The Director, Directorate of Housing, Housing
Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong - 793001
4.M/s Meghalaya Roofing, Industrial Area, Umiam,
Meghalaya - 793103
5.Power Roofing, Umtru Road Village Amjok,
Byrnihat, Ri Bhoi - 793122
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6.Mariem Commerce Limited, Umbir,
Ri-Bhoi - 793101 :::Respondents
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No. 480 of 2024
M/s Mariem Commerce,
Umbir, Ri-Bhoi District Meghalaya :::Petitioner
-Vs-
1.The State of Meghalaya represented by the
Chief Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
2.The Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Housing Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
3.The Director, Directorate of Housing, Housing
Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
4.M/s Meghalaya Roofing, Industrial Area, Umiam,
Meghalaya – 793103
5.M/s Power Roofing, EPIP Byrnihat,
Ri Bhoi District
Meghalaya – 793101
6.Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited,
8/1, Lal Bazar Street.
Bikaner Building, Third Floor
Kolkata – 700001 :::Respondents
——————————————————————————————-
WP(C) No. 37 of 2025
M/s Meghalaya Roofing represented
by duly authorised Partner Shri. Manish
Agarwal, S/o Shri. Sushil Kumar Agarwal
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of Age 36, R/o Assam Rifle Bazar,
Happy Valley, Shillong :::Writ Petitioner
-Vs-
1.The State of Meghalaya represented by the
Chief Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
2.The Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Housing Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
3.The Director, Directorate of Housing, Housing
Department, Government of Meghalaya,
Shillong – 793001
4.Power Roofing, Umtru Road Village Amjok,
Byrnihat, Ri Bhoi – 793122 :::Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
In WP(C) No. 478 of 2024
For the Petitioner/Applicant(s): Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih,GA(For R 1-3)
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. M. Hajong, Adv. (For R 4)
Dr. N. Mozika, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, Adv. (For R 5)
Mr. J. Shylla, Adv. (For R 6).
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In WP(C) No. 480 of 2024
For the Petitioner/Applicant(s): Mr. J. Shylla, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Ms. N.G. Shylla, Sr. GA
Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih,GA(For R 1-3)
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. M. Hajong, Adv. (For R 4)
Dr. N. Mozika, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, Adv. (For R 5)
Mr. Philemon Nongbri,Adv.(ForR 6).
In WP(C) No. 37 of 2025
For the Petitioner/Applicant(s): Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. M. Hajong, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih,GA(For R 1-3)
Dr. N. Mozika, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, Adv. (For R 4).
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1. Before embarking upon the exercise of examining the challenge put to
the main subject matter in issue, that is the tender process adopted for supply
of aluminium sheets pursuant to NIQ dated 10.09.2024, through the initial
contender in WP(C) No. 478 of 2024, this Court, in view of the subsequent
writ applications involving the same tender process, which have been
4
2025:MLHC:366preferred by the respondent No. 4 by way of WP(C) No. 37 of 2025, and the
respondent No. 6 by way of WP(C) No. 480 of 2024, while recording
individual submissions and arguments advanced in each of the respective
writ petitions, shall collate the facts and render a collective finding on the
entire matter. This approach is necessitated in the opinion of this Court, in
view of the intertwined facts and circumstances which surround the dispute.
WP(C) No. 478 of 2024
Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited vs. State of Meghalaya & 5 Ors.
2. By this second round of litigation the writ petitioner is praying for
quashing of impugned letters dated 04.12.2024 and 12.12.2024, whereby its
bids have been rejected and for cancellation of the work orders issued in
favour of the respondents No. 4 and 5, and for directions for acceptance of
the Technical Bid of the petitioner and for opening of its Financial Bid.
3. The brief facts are that the respondent No. 3, had issued a Notice
Inviting Quotation (NIQ) dated 10.09.2024, inviting bids, sealed quotations
in a two-bid system, technical and financial for supply of aluminum roofing
sheets. The petitioner at an earlier point of time being aggrieved with some
ambiguous terms contained in the NIQ, had requested for the amendment of
certain clauses contained in Clause A(13), Clause B(7) and (8), and
Annexure-III(1). As the same was not fully acceded to by the respondent No.
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3, a writ petition being WP(C) No. 344 of 2024 was filed, praying for
quashing of the NIQ dated 10.09.2024, and for other directions. The matter
was then finally heard and decided on 14.10.2024, wherein this Court while
dismissing the writ petition, had observed that the contentions raised as to the
product not being under the list of items reserved for purchase from micro
and small enterprises, were not significant enough to vitiate the tender
process and that further the contention with regard to the trading license was
not relevant, as the same was consequential on the bidder being eligible or
awarded the contract. The petitioner thereafter, submitted its bid in a two-bid
system and had also attended the bid meeting in Shillong.
4. The petitioner then after a lapse of 1 month and 25 days, on not getting
any information as to the bid status had enquired and was informed that its
bid had been rejected and the said details thereof, was furnished to the
petitioner vide the impugned letter dated 12.12.2024, wherein it was indicated
that the petitioner had not submitted a call deposit/bank draft/demand draft
as stipulated in the NIQ, and that the trading license submitted, was from the
State of West Bengal, and not from the concerned district, as required under
Clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions of the NIQ. Being aggrieved
thereby the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition.
5. Mr. Philemon Nongbri, learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that the tender quotation of the petitioner has been arbitrarily
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rejected, inasmuch as, with regard to the first ground of rejection, it is not a
case that no deposit had been made in favour of the respondent No. 3. Learned
counsel has referred to Annexure – 13 of the writ petition to show that a fixed
deposit in favour of the respondent No. 3 of Rs.1,39,30,000/-, had been
created which could be prematurely withdrawn, and that this also had been
clarified by the Bank vide its letter dated 21.10.2024, that once a deposit is
pledged in the name of a 3rd party, then the same becomes a call deposit,
which can be matured at any time upon the request of the beneficiary i.e. the
respondent No. 3. Thus, he submits the rejection on this ground was
completely unfounded and illegal. On the second ground for rejection i.e. the
non-possession of trading license, the learned counsel has relied upon the
judgment of this Court dated 14.10.2024, passed in WP(C) No. 344 of 2024,
and a letter dated 24.06.2015, issued by the State Government on the
requirement of trading license before allotment of works to Non-Tribal
Traders/Contractors/Suppliers, wherein he submits, it has been clarified that
submission of tender paper does not fall under trade as per the Act, but the
same was to be furnished, if the non-tribal is a successful bidder before any
work involving trade is issued to him. As such, he submits these two grounds
of rejection being without any basis or cogent reasoning, the rejection of the
bid of the writ petitioner is arbitrary and illegal.
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6. The learned counsel then submits that the tender committee had totally
misdirected itself, and the same is evident from the affidavit filed by the State,
where, the essential condition of Invest Meghalaya at Clause 6 of the General
Terms and Conditions was brushed aside, without any discussion in the
minutes of the meetings dated 14.11.2024 and 20.11.2024, inspite of the fact
that none of the parties possessed a registration certificate, which was an
essential condition as per Clause 6. This it is submitted, was in total
derogation of the fact that this Court in the earlier round of litigation, had
extensively observed and recorded submissions of the parties on this point, at
Paragraphs 5 to14 of the judgment dated 14.10.2024. This action of the
official respondents, he contends, was made to safeguard the interest of the
respondents No. 4 and 5, who did not possess the requisite Invest Meghalaya
registration certificate, which would have otherwise rendered them
technically unqualified.
7. The learned counsel has then submitted that the minutes of the
meetings dated 14.11.2024 and 20.11.2024, which are enclosed in the
affidavit filed by the State show that the respondent had allotted 75% of the
work to the respondent No. 5, and 25% of the work to respondent No. 4, a
decision which as per the financial bid condition could only have been made
by the tender committee, if the rates quoted are of the same stage. It is also
seen from the affidavit, he submits, that the work has been approved by the
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Minister-in-Charge, whereas, nowhere in the terms and conditions of the
NIQ, Minister-in-Charge has been mentioned. The entire exercise he submits,
smacks of collusion between the department and the respondent No. 5, who
has secured 75% of the work order, even though there is no existing clause
of relaxation of the terms and conditions in the NIQ.
8. Public interest it is also contended, has been adversely affected,
inasmuch as, cartelization is writ large in the proceedings with the two
technically qualified bidders quoting the same price at double the market
rates, whereas, as per the Aluminum Sheet specifications, the going rate is
Rs.9000/- per bundle while the work order has been allotted at Rs.17,500/-
per bundle. The respondents it is alleged, by rejecting the technical bid of the
petitioner and not opening the financial bid, has caused a huge financial loss
or wastage of public money since the quotation of the petitioner is much
lower than Rs.17,500/-. The learned counsel submits that there being a
serious flaw in the decision-making process, with the essential terms and
conditions having been relaxed without a relaxation clause, coupled with the
irrationality, arbitrariness and unreasonableness, the actions of the official
respondents, has seriously breached Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
9. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance
on the following case law:
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(i) (2023) 3 SCC 1, Vivek Narayan Sharma (Demonetisation
Case) v. Union of India
(ii) (1994) 6 SCC 651, Tata Cellular v. Union of India
(iii) (2006) 11 SCC 548, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal
Services Ltd.
(iv) (2016) 16 SCC 233, Shobikaa Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Central
Medical Services Society
(v) (2024) 10 SCC 273, Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
10. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG with Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih, learned
GA for the State respondents No. 1-3, has opened his arguments by
submitting that the petitioner herein, had full knowledge of the terms and
conditions of the NIQ, before submitting his bid, and therefore, a bidder who
participates in a tender process and is later unsuccessful, cannot challenge the
same process retrospectively. It is further submitted that the dispute sought to
be made out, arises from a contractual tender process within the meaning of
commercial transactions, which would be more effectively adjudicated under
civil jurisdiction, rather than proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. This commercial transaction it is contended does not
involve the infringement of any fundamental rights, and the writ petition does
not disclose any cause of action for interference, as prima facie, there is no
illegality or arbitrariness in the rejection of the petitioner’s bid, as all bidders
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were treated equally as per the terms and conditions of the NIQ. In this
context, the learned AAG has referred to the case of Jagdish Mandal vs. State
of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517.
11. It is then submitted that the writ petitioner was well aware of the
requirement of a local trading license, and also the call deposit which was
never submitted, as mandated by the NIQ. The Government, the learned AAG
submits, as a tendering authority has the right to prescribe qualifications and
other criteria which are deemed necessary, and unless these conditions are
arbitrary or violate the petitioner’s fundamental rights, no interference is
called for, moreso, in view of the fact that the petitioner failed to meet the
technical qualifications prescribed, which had rightfully resulted in the
rejection of the bid. The demand for cancellation of the work order, it is
argued, is unsustainable, as the said work order has already been issued and
setting aside the same would cause serious prejudice to the awardees and also
delay a public project. The balance convenience it is submitted, is against the
petitioner and in support of this submission, reliance has been placed in the
case of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corp. Ltd. (2016)
16 SCC 818.
12. It is further submitted by the learned AAG that to ensure a transparent
process, the respondent No. 3, had issued two corrigenda, one on 23.09.2024
and the other on 30.09.2024, and the tender had also been extended till the
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15.10.2024. Pre-bid meetings it is submitted, had also been called on
23.09.2024, wherein, representatives from 6 different firms had attended and
raised queries, but there was no representation from the side of the petitioner.
The petitioner it is submitted, was not in possession of a valid trading license
from the concerned District Council, which was necessary requirement,
inasmuch as, the petitioner being a Company would be governed by the
Trading by Non-Tribals Regulation, 1954. On the other ground of rejection,
it has been submitted that a fixed deposit is a financial product, where one
deposits money in the bank, for a fixed tenure and cannot withdraw the same
before its maturity, as it is an investment tool and not a payment instrument,
as compared to call deposit, which can be withdrawn on demand, or on a very
short notice. The clarification issued by the bank on 21.10.2024, it is
submitted, had also been received by the office of the respondent No. 3, after
the closure of the NIQ on 15.10.2024, and as such, could not be entertained.
13. The tender committee, it is submitted, was duly constituted by the
Government to examine and recommend the technical bids held on
14.11.2024 and 20.11.2024, and approval by the Government was obtained
and intimated on 27.11.2024. He finally submits that there has been no
illegality, arbitrariness or discrimination in the decision to reject the technical
bid of the petitioner, and the petitioner’s exclusion from the financial bid
stage, is but a consequence of non-compliance with the terms and conditions
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of the NIQ, and as such, he prays that the writ petition being without merit be
dismissed.
14. On behalf of the respondent No. 4, the simple submission made by Mr.
H.L. Shangreiso, learned Senior counsel is that the rejection of the bid of the
writ petitioner by the tender committee is purely on the clear grounds of
failing to meet the technical requirements enumerated in the NIQ, and as
such, the process does not suffer from any legal infirmity. It is further
submitted that in view of the subsequent corrigendum, registration with
MSME 2020, was not required, the respondent No. 4, nevertheless had
submitted a certificate showing an application under Invest Meghalaya at that
time of submission of bid. The learned Senior counsel then submits that the
respondent has since accepted the work order under protest dated 10.12.2024,
and has also executed an agreement in furtherance thereof, though under
compelling circumstances.
15. The respondent No. 5 represented by Dr. N. Mozika, learned Senior
counsel assisted by Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, learned counsel has submitted that
the terms and conditions of the NIQ are sacrosanct and it is the duty of every
bidder to submit all documents, as per the requirements given therein. The
petitioner he contends, was found ineligible, not only on account of not
possessing a valid trading license, but also on the count of not submitting a
Call Deposit/Bank Draft/Demand Draft, as stipulated by the NIQ. As such,
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he submits the clarification sought to be submitted by the petitioner issued by
the Bank, is of no significance, as a clarification from a Bank cannot change
a Deposit Confirmation Advice into a Call Deposit or a Demand Draft, which
was a mandatory requirement, as per the NIQ. It is also submitted that the
clarification dated 21.10.2024, issued by the Bank has not cited any rules of
the Bank of Baroda or Reserve Bank of India, to substantiate that once a
deposit is pledged in the name of a 3rd party, then the same becomes a Call
Deposit, which can be matured at any time upon the requirement of the
beneficiaries.
16. Learned Senior counsel has then concluded his arguments by
submitting that being one of the L1 bidders, the answering respondent has
since been awarded the contract, and on receiving the work order, orders have
already been placed for supply of the materials, for which advance payment
has already been made. He therefore submits that no interference is called for
and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
17. Mr. J. Shylla, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 6, has
not tendered any alternate arguments, but has supported the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and submits that the tender
process being flawed, the same is liable to be interfered with.
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WP(C) No. 480 of 2024
M/s Mariem Commerce vs. State of Meghalaya & 5 Ors.
18. In this writ petition, the petitioner is a partnership firm under the name
and style of M/s Mariem Commerce. The firm, originally constituted under a
partnership deed dated 30.06.2020, underwent a change in partnership on
01.08.2024, wherein one Shri. Vijay Kumar Goel, retired and one Mrs.
Threebok Kurbah, was inducted as a partner, who then executed a General
Power of Attorney, in favour of one Gilbert Diengdoh, who has sworn the
affidavit and verified the writ petition on behalf of the partnership firm. On
its bid being rejected by the respondent No. 3, vide letter dated 04.12.2024,
on the grounds that the partnership agreement was not submitted, detailed
technical specifications not mentioned and trading license not submitted, the
instant writ petition has been filed. All the respondents in the instant writ
petition are common to WP(C) No. 478 of 2024, and the writ petitioner
therein, has been arrayed as respondent No. 6 (Manaksia Aluminium
Company Limited) along with the successful bidders who have been arrayed
as respondents No. 4 and 5, in the instant writ petition.
19. It has been submitted by Mr. J. Shylla, learned counsel for the
petitioner that the rejection of the petitioner’s bid is arbitrary and contrary to
the tender conditions. The learned counsel asserts that a partnership deed and
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trading license are not mandatory for eligibility and that the bids submitted
by the petitioner contained detailed product specifications which met all the
requirements of the NIQ. Submission is also made that the evaluation process
lacks transparency and contracts were awarded at higher rates to the
respondents No. 4 and 5, which violated Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. It is therefore prayed by the learned counsel that
directions be issued for acceptance of the petitioner’s technical bid and for
opening of the financial bid of the petitioner, which will reveal the arbitrary
and illegal manner, in which the respondents No. 4 and 5 have been favoured
with the allotment of work and issue work orders. The learned counsel has
placed reliance on the judgment of Odimar Syiemsad vs. State of Meghalaya,
2024 SCC OnLine Megh 510, in support of his case.
20. On behalf of the respondents except for the respondent No. 6, who has
relied upon the statements and averments made in WP(C) No. 478 of 2024,
similar arguments as advanced earlier, were reiterated in support of the tender
process, though the respondent No. 4, voiced its grievance with regard to the
allocation of only 25% of the supply order, when both the successful bidders
i.e. the respondents No. 4 and 5 were technically and financially equal.
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WP(C) No. 37 of 2025
M/s Meghalaya Roofing vs. State of Meghalaya & 3 Ors.
21. In this writ petition, challenge has been made to the impugned work
order No. DH/Tech/11/2024/99 dated 04.12.2024, awarding 75% of the
supply work in favour of the private respondent No. 4(Power Roofing), and
the work order No. DH/Tech/11/2024/100 dated 04.12.2024, awarding only
25% of the supply of work in favour of the writ petitioner.
22. Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. M.
Hajong, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the
petitioner and the respondent No. 4, were both found technically and
financially equal, and on all counts if there was to be an apportionment of the
supply order between the two successful parties, the same should have been
done on a 50-50 basis, and not in the manner that has been resorted to by the
official respondents. It is submitted that the petitioner though accepting the
work order had done so on the protest, and that the action of the respondents
violates Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The learned
Senior counsel prays that directions be issued for equal distribution of the
work or in the alternative to award the entire contract to the petitioner and for
cancellation of the work orders, issued in favour of the writ petitioner and the
respondent No. 4. In support of his arguments, learned Senior counsel has
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placed reliance on the case of Manohar Lal vs. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557,
and the case of Amar Nath Chand Prakash vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals
Limited, AIR (1972) Allahabad, 176.
23. In reply thereto, Mr. N. D. Chullai, learned AAG for the State
respondents submits that the writ petition is barred by the principles of
estoppel, acquiescence and waiver, inasmuch as, the petitioner having
participated in the tender process cannot at this stage challenge the same on
the ground of being aggrieved with the allotment order. It is further submitted
that the writ petitioner has suppressed the fact that an agreement has already
been executed with the Government for supply of the roofing sheets as
allotted and on this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. The
learned AAG submits that it is a settled principle of law, that a contract is a
commercial transaction and in the evaluation of tenders, principles of equity
and natural justice stay at a distance, and that the power of judicial review
cannot be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or
for that matter, to decide contractual disputes.
24. It is then submitted that though the petitioner and the respondent No.
4, were both found to be technically qualified and also quoted the same
financial bid, and thus recommended and approved as suppliers, the allotment
of supply order is subject to approval by the competent authority and that the
function of the tender committee is only to approve the bidders. The decision
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with regard to allotment, it is asserted, lies with the head of the department
and since the head of department is the Minister, approval has to be sought
before the supply order is issued. The allocation of work it is contended was
made in public interest and based on administrative discretion, which is the
prerogative of the Government, to ensure successful completion of the supply
of the roofing sheets to beneficiaries. It is then reiterated that the writ
petitioner having entered into a contract, after having voluntarily accepted the
same, cannot now challenge the process or decision, and that the petitioner
has no right to demand a 50-50% allocation. In support of his arguments, the
learned AAG has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court dated
05.11.2024 passed in WP(C) No. 362 of 2023 and WP(C) No. 18 of 2024 in
the case of SM Energenco Limited vs. State of Meghalaya, and the case of
Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651.
25. Heard learned counsel for all the parties in these three writ petitions.
The NIQ in question as noted in the submissions of the parties, is a subject of
much controversy with the conditions of the initial NIQ being challenged in
WP(C) No. 344 of 2024, and inspite of corrigenda being issued amending the
clauses of the tender, is being questioned again as to the fairness in the
process adopted by the tender committee in allotting the work to respondents
No. 4 and 5, though in unequal quantities. Even the work orders which have
since been issued, have also been assailed before this Court, on the ground
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that the unequal allotment of the supply order, has been made in a biased and
arbitrary manner.
26. To shorten the discourse, this Court will attempt to condense the
questions involved, and to examine the issues at hand as to whether judicial
interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, is warranted at all, keeping in mind the limited scope of judicial review
in such commercial matters. What firstly strikes this Court is the ambiguity
of the initial NIQ itself, which when put under challenge in WP(C) No. 344
of 2024, had resulted in the issuance of the corrigenda as aforementioned, but
this exercise it appears, was not efficacious enough according to the
petitioners in the instant writ petitions, to ensure a free and fair bidding and
tendering process. Without dwelling again into the details, only the decision-
making process adopted by the tender committee will be scrutinized, on the
question of legality in line with the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in the celebrated case of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (1994) 6
SCC 651, on the parameters as to whether the tender committee had exceeded
its powers, committed an error of law, breached the rules of natural justice,
abused its powers, or reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would
have reached.
27. In the case of the petitioner in WP(C) No. 478 of 2024, the rejection of
the bid was firstly on the ground that instead of a Call Deposit, a Fixed
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Deposit in favour of the concerned State respondents had been created, which
the petitioner contended was unfair, as Fixed Deposits are callable, and
secondly, for supply of a West Bengal trading license, which was not
accepted. In WP(C) No. 480 of 2024, the petitioner’s bid was rejected for
non-submission of a partnership agreement, incomplete supply of technical
specifications, which was held to be contrary to clause 10 of the technical bid
requirements and the absence of a valid trading license, which the petitioner
contends is arbitrary, as a partnership deed and trading license are not
mandatory for eligibility and that the bid submitted included detailed product
specifications. In WP(C) No. 37 of 2025, the petitioner has contended that
the challenge to the work orders awarded to it and the respondent No. 4
therein, is due to the fact that though the petitioner and the respondent No. 4
were technically and financially equal, the award of only 25% of the tender
value to the petitioner and 75% to the respondent No. 4, violates Article 14,
16, 19 and 21of the Constitution of India. Thus, in the backdrop of these
challenges, the decision-making process of the tender committee, as per the
stipulations and corrigenda given in the NIQ will be examined.
28. In the NIQ dated 10.09.2024, it had been stipulated at clause 3, 6 and
13 under the General Terms and Conditions as follows:
“3. Every quotationer should furnish the company/firm’s
name, registered no. on MIIPP, full postal address along with21
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Department to the address mentioned by the quotationer shall
be deemed to have been received by the quotationer. Any
change of details provided shall be duly informed to the
Department in time.
6.All Quotationer should furnish a valid registration
certificate registered under “Invest Meghalaya” (as per
Meghalaya Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy 2024)
13.The Non-Tribal quotationer should furnish the Trading
license from concerned District Council/Income Tax
Clearance certificate for the past 3 (Three) years along with
the tender papers documents mentioned herein.”
And under the Technical Bid conditions, clause 2 and 8 were as
follows:
“2. Earnest Money deposit, in the form of Call Deposit /Bank
Draft/Demand Draft drawn on any nationalized banks payable
at Shillong pledged in favour of Director of Housing,
Meghalaya, Shillong.
8.Non-Tribal Quatotioner(s) should furnish Trading License
from concerned District Council and Income Tax clearance
certificate from the past 3 (three) years.”
22
2025:MLHC:366
29. Thereafter, consequent to a pre-bid meeting, a corrigendum dated
23.09.2024, was issued, whereby amendments were made to the NIQ in
clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions, and clause 8 of the Technical
Bid conditions, which was with regard to the furnishing of a trading license
from the concerned District Council. Subsequently, on writ petition WP(C)
No. 344 of 2024, being filed; on 03.10.2024, a corrigendum dated
30.09.2024, was produced before the Court, amending clause A of the
General Terms and Conditions, as to the requirement of having a
manufacturing unit or industry in the State of Meghalaya, which was
amended to preferably having their manufacturing unit or industries in the
State of Meghalaya. An amendment was also inserted to clause A of the
Financial Bid Stipulation, where it has been given as follows:
Clauses. NO ORIGINAL CLAUSE AMMENDED CLAUSE
Clause A. If the rate quoted by the If the rate quoted by the
FINANCIAL quotationers is in the quotationers is in the
BID same stage the provision same stage, the decision
of clause 8 (i) of the of the Tender Committee
Meghalaya Procurement will be final and binding
Preference Policy for
Micro and Small
Enterprises 2020 shall
applied and the decision
of the Tender Committee
will be final and binding
23
2025:MLHC:366
30. The clauses as it stood after the corrigenda therefore, was that as per
clause 3 and 6 of the General Terms and Conditions, every quotationer was
to furnish the company or firms name registered under Invest Meghalaya, as
per the Meghalaya Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2024.
Further, provision had by way of amendment to meet the contingency of bids
being submitted at par, by leaving it to the decision of the tender committee.
The status of the NIQ, after the amendments, for the sake of easy reference
is illustrated in the chart below:
STATUS OF NIT DATED 10TH SEPTEMBER 2024
Supply of Aluminium Roofing SheetsSl. Clause Original Clause Amended Remarks
Clause
1 NIQ “bonafide resident “Bonafide Changed
of Meghalaya” Citizen of
India”
2 NIQ Last date of Last date of Changed
submission of NIQ submission of
2:00 PM on 30th NIQ 2:00 PM
September, 2024. on 15th October,
2024
3 Clause A “having their “Preferably Changed
(1) manufacturer having their to
Units/Industries in manufacturer Preferably
the state of Units/Industries
Meghalaya” in the state of
Meghalaya”
4 Clause A “registered no. on No Amendment No
(3) MIIPP” change
24
2025:MLHC:366
5 “registration
Clause A No Amendment No
(6)certificate registered change
under “Invest
Meghalaya” (as per
Meghalaya
Industrial and
Investment
Promotion Policy
2024″
6 Clause A "should furnish No Amendment No
(13) Trading license change
from concerned
District Council"
7 Clause A "should not have No
(23) (2) any pending Clarification
litigation/subjudice
on the subject
matter"
8 Clause B "should furnish No Amendment No
(8) Trading License Change
from concerned
District Council"
9 Clause B "Within the state of Removed Changed
(12) Meghalaya"
10 Financial "the Meghalaya Removed Changed
Bid Clause Procurement
A (3) Preference Policy
for Micro and Small
Enterprises 2020
shall be applied"
31. From the chart above it can be seen that the requirement of registration
under ‘Invest Meghalaya’ had not been subjected to any amendment, as also,
25
2025:MLHC:366
the requirement of a valid trading license. To recapitulate, the bid of the
petitioner in WP(C) No. 478 of 2024 (Manaksia Aluminium Company
Limited), was rejected on two counts, that is the non-furnishing of a Call
Deposit and a valid trading license from the concerned District Council. The
petitioner in WP(C) No. 480 of 2024 (M/s Mariem Commerce), was rejected
on the ground that a partnership agreement and valid trading license was not
submitted and detailed technical specifications not mentioned. Both the
rejected bidders however, were not rejected for non-fulfillment of the
requirement of registration under ‘Invest Meghalaya’. At this point it would
be useful to recall herein, that this Court in the judgment dated 14.10.2024,
passed in WP(C) No. 344 of 2024, with regard to the Meghalaya Industrial
and Investment Promotion Policy, 2024, had at Paragraphs – 11, 12 and 13
thereof, taken cognizance of the importance of this policy, which had been
framed for the economic development of the State and had observed as
follows:-
“11. First in the considered view of this Court, it is important
to note that the State of Meghalaya launched the MIIPP, a
policy document in the year 2024 itself, which was made with
the stated objective to foster economic and human capital
growth and to harness the State’s optimum potential. The
policy document contains the policy roadmap, framework,26
2025:MLHC:366policy enablers, implementation, apart from covering other
areas under different heads. A holistic perusal of the MIIPP
2024 document, reflects that the policy was designed to provide
advantages to investors, to streamline administrative processes
and to consolidate multifaceted initiatives under a single
platform to promote economic development and employment
opportunities in the State. The policy itself at clause 2.5.3
provides for the manner of registration of units which would
make them eligible to avail of incentives/subsidies/
reimbursements and has classified the manufacturing and
service enterprises therein. As such, it is noted that this policy
was framed with the deemed objective for the economic
development of the State.
12. Coming to the impugned general terms and conditions
given in the NIQ, as quoted above, initially the bidding was
restricted to local entrepreneurs representing Industries/Units
who are reputed manufacturers of aluminum roofing sheets
limited to bonafide residents of Meghalaya. This was
subsequently changed to include entrepreneurs who are
bonafide citizens of India representing Industries/Units under
the provision of the Company/Partnership Act, the MIIPP,
2024, preferably having their manufacturing Units/Industries
in the State of Meghalaya duly registered under the Factories
Act. After these amendments, the petitioner however still
harboured grave reservations with regard to the necessity of
registration under the MIIPP, and it was argued that27
2025:MLHC:366registration was not possible without a bidder having
manufacturing facilities in the State of Meghalaya, which
effectively made the petitioner an ineligible bidder.
13. Though on the first blush, the contention of the writ
petitioner seemed valid, as the stipulated conditions in the NIQ
appeared to have restricted the field of bidding to only the
registered manufacturers under the MIIPP, however this
Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the same had been
occasioned, in furtherance of and in pursuance to the adoption
of the policy by the State Government, in a matter concerning
tender specifications and award of contracts, which is in the
realm of commercial transactions. It is settled law that the
scope of judicial review in such matters is very limited, and as
held by the Supreme Court of India in Airport Authorities of
India vs. Centre for Aviation Policy (supra) which followed the
decision rendered in Michigan Rubber (India Limited) at para
30 thereof, which is extracted herein below, certain principles
have been enunciated.
“30. In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd.
(Supra), after considering the law on the judicial
scrutiny with respect to tender conditions, ultimately it
is concluded in paragraph 23 as under:
23. From the above decisions, the following
principles emerge:
(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in
action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and
substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are28
2025:MLHC:366amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that
the State must act validly for a discernible reason and
not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State
acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be
legitimate to take into consideration the national
priorities;
(b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within
the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have
any role to play in this process except for striking down
such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary
or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity
with certain healthy standards and norms such as
awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those
circumstances, the interference by courts is very limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a
tender document and awarding a contract, greater
latitude is required to be conceded to the State
authorities unless the action of the tendering authority
is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory
powers, interference by courts is not warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for
tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the
contractor has the capacity and the resource to
successfully execute the work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably,
fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here
again, interference by court is very restrictive since no
person can claim a fundamental right to carry on
business with the Government.”
32. The above noted requirement after the corrigenda, stood unamended
except the relaxation allowed that the manufacturers or industries preferably
were to have units in the State of Meghalaya. This Court in the judgment
29
2025:MLHC:366
quoted above was also aware as to the limitations of judicial review in such
commercial matters, as such, had quoted the conditions or principles that
were to be taken into consideration before interference in such matters.
However, as it is reflected from the materials on record, all the tenderers who
are in contention and parties in these writ petitions, did not fulfil this
requirement, and the respondent No. 4, on this requirement had only
furnished an application for registration. This to the mind of the Court is
strange, inasmuch as, this aspect as can be made out had been examined by
the respondent tendering authority, which saw no reason to amend or do away
with the condition of registration under the MIIPP. On this count, the tender
committee seemed to have overstepped its mandate in considering the bidders
technically qualified by not insisting on this compliance when the same was
an important eligibility criteria in the NIQ, that to, in the absence of any
clause of relaxation of the terms and conditions thereof. From the part of the
successful bidders and also the State respondents, what has been addressed is
only the deficiency in the bid of the writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 478 of 2024,
and no mention has been made about the non-submission of the registration
under MIIPP by the successful bidders.
33. The minutes of the proceedings of the tender committee held on
20.11.2024, which has been produced by the State respondents annexed at
Annexure -7 to the affidavit also is silent on this aspect and records that the
30
2025:MLHC:366
respondents have satisfied all the conditions. The only material findings
recorded in these minutes, are the grounds for rejection of the bids of the writ
petitioner and the respondent No. 6(M/s Mariem Commerce), and that both
the respondents No. 4 and 5, had quoted exactly the same rate at Rs.17,500/-
per bundle of aluminium sheets and as such, were both declared qualified as
approved suppliers and duly recommended by the tender committee to supply
the materials.
34. Reverting back to the amendments made, it is noted that in the
corrigendum dated 30.09.2024, an amendment had been inserted in the
Financial Bid clause A, whereby instead of the condition, if the rate quoted
by the quotationers should be at the same stage, the provision of clause 8 (i)
of the Meghalaya Procurement Preference Policy for Micro and Small
Enterprises 2020, would be applied, and the decision of the tender committee
final and binding, the same had been amended that in such situations, if the
rate of the quotationers is in the same stage, the decision of the tender
committee would be final and binding. In WP(C) No. 37 of 2025, a pointed
challenge has been made by respondent No. 4 (M/s Meghalaya Roofing) as
petitioner, that the allocation of work order was not on the decision of the
tender committee, but had been made on a decision of the Minister In-charge,
as is revealed in Para – 10 of the affidavit filed by the State respondents. In
the said affidavit, the State respondents inspite of the stipulation of the
31
2025:MLHC:366
amended NIQ as regard this requirement, have stated that “The function of
the Tender Committee is to approve the bidders. The decision with regard to
the allotment of the supply order lies with the head of the department and
since the head of department is the Minister, approval has to be sought from
such Minister before the supply order is to be issued.” This averment
therefore, in the view of this Court flies in the face of clause A of the Financial
Bid, whereby the tender Committee was to be the final authority, in case of
two bidders being equal. As such, the decision to allot 75% of the supply
order to the respondent No. 5 (Power Roofing) and 25% to the respondent
No. 4 (M/s Meghalaya Roofing), does not appear to have been made on any
rational basis, considering the fact that both the bids were at par. This also in
opinion of the Court, is a decision taken without jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the fact that the respondent No. 4, has already accepted the supply order
initially under protest, though has now preferred a writ petition against the
unequal allocation.
35. This Court has also noted the contention raised by the unsuccessful
tenderers on the accepted identical bid amount of Rs.17,500/- per bundle of
roofing sheets by the tender committee, which is far above the market rate,
thus adversely affecting public revenue and interest. Pointed averments has
been made in this regard, that had the Financial Bids of the unsuccessful
bidders been opened, this fact would have been clearly exposed. Categorical
32
2025:MLHC:366
statements have also been made in this regard by the petitioners in WP(C)
No. 478 and 480 of 2024 that the prevailing rate for such aluminium sheets
was Rs.9000/- per bundle, which was the rate quoted by them. This Court
though noting these submissions, however, will limit the scrutiny only to the
decision-making process on the set parameters.
36. In the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma & Ors. (Demonetisation Case-
5 J.) vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2023) 3 SCC 1, the scope of
judicial review has been exhaustively discussed. It has been held, following
the case of Tata Cellular(supra), that the duty of the Court is to confine itself
to the question of legality, as to whether a decision-making authority
exceeded its powers, committed an error of law, committed a breach of the
rules of natural justice, reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal
would have reached or abused its powers. The Court thus, is only concerned
with the manner in which those decisions had been taken, keeping in mind
the principles that have been laid down in the Tata Cellular case, wherein at
Para – 94 thereof, it has been given as follows:
“94. The principles deducible from the above are :
(1) The modem trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely
reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
33
2025:MLHC:366
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision,
without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm
of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award
the contract is reached by process of negotiations through
several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made
qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for
an administrative body functioning in an administrative
sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision
must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury
principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed
out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by
bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative
burden on the administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure.
Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case
since they commend to us as the correct principles.”
37. On the aspect of the relaxation that has been afforded to the successful
tenderers, a judgment, which is relevant for the instant case is B.S.N. Joshi
34
2025:MLHC:366
and Sons Limited vs. Nair Coal Services Limited reported in (2006) 11 SCC
548, at Para – 66 thereof, it has been held as follows:
“66.We are also not shutting our eyes towards the new
principles of judicial review which are being developed; but the
law as it stands now having regard to the principles laid down
in the aforementioned decisions may be summarized as under:
i) if there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered
to;
ii) if there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the
same shall not be exercised and the principle of strict
compliance would be applied where it is possible for all the
parties to comply with all such conditions fully;
iii) if, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the
parties in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again
a power of relaxation may be held to be existing;
iv) the parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation
should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in
relation to compliance of another part of tender contract,
particularly when he was also not in a position to comply
with all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court
otherwise finds relaxation of a condition which being
essential in nature could not be relaxed and thus the same
was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction;
v) when a decision is taken by the appropriate authority
upon due consideration of the tender document submitted
by all the tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately
found that successful bidders had in fact substantially35
2025:MLHC:366complied with the purport and object for which essential
conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be
interfered with;
(vi) the contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same,
their bids are considered and they are given an offer to
match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public
interest would be given priority;
(vii) where a decision has been taken purely on public
interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial
restraint.”
The above quoted judgment has also been followed in the case of
Shobikaa Impex Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Central Medical Services Society &
Ors. reported in (2016) 16 SCC 233.
38. In the recent case of Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 273, the Supreme Court
while examining the decision-making process and finding the same to be
flawed, due to deviation from an essential term of a contract, while
summarizing the law with regard to principles of judicial review of
administrative action in general and of Government contracts in particular, at
Para – 32 and 33 thereof, on the question of an agreement having already
been entered into in Para – 37 had held as follows:
“37. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the project in question being infrastructure36
2025:MLHC:366project and also one of the mega projects, this Court may not
interfere more particularly in view of the fact that agreement
has already been entered into between the respondent BCCL
and the Special Purpose Vehicle of Respondent 8, cannot be
accepted, when we have found that the impugned decision of
the respondent BCCL was grossly arbitrary, illegal,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. As held earlier, the Government bodies/
instrumentalities are expected to act in absolutely fair,
reasonable and transparent manner, particularly in the award
of contracts for mega projects. Any element of arbitrariness or
discrimination may lead to hampering of the entire project
which would not be in the public interest.”
39. In the light of the above noted judgments, reverting back to the case at
hand, what is clearly discernable or rather apparent, is that the tender
committee, firstly ignored Clause 6 of the General Terms and Conditions
regarding ‘Invest Meghalaya’ registration, inasmuch as, the respondents No.
4 and 5 though lacking the required registration, were still awarded the
contract. This requirement it is noted, was never amended in the NIQ by the
corrigenda that had been issued amending other clauses, which implies and
underlines the importance of this clause. Another glaring irregularity is on
the apportionment of the quantity of supply between respondents No. 4 and
5 at 25% and 75% respectively of the contract worth Rs.69 Crores. As
observed earlier, Clause A of the Financial Bid had been amended to meet
37
2025:MLHC:366
the situation, wherein if the same rate is quoted by the tenderers, the decision
of the tender committee would be final and binding, but however, the
respondents have stated on affidavit, that this apportionment had been done
at the instance of the Minister In-charge, which clearly shows that the tender
committee itself had violated a crucial clause of the NIQ by abdicating its
authority.
40. As such, in view of the patent flaws in the decision-making process by
the tender committee, which has resulted in procedural impropriety,
compromised fairness and transparency, which is reflected in the minutes of
the proceedings of the tender committee held on 20.11.2024, this Court
though not sitting in appeal over the decision of the tender committee is
constrained to hold that the tender process adopted by the respondents suffers
from arbitrariness, procedural impropriety and also in violation of Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
41. In view of the findings arrived at, it is also necessary to put on record
that the writ petitioner (Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited) in WP(C)
No. 478 of 2024, and M/s Mariem Commerce (petitioner) in WP(C) No. 480
of 2024, also are on the same boat, as they are also lacking in the eligibility
criteria. Thus, as all the tenderers for the contract did not meet the eligibility
criteria, the tender committee in all fairness should have cancelled the entire
process, instead of going beyond its mandate in relaxing the eligibility when
38
2025:MLHC:366
there existed no relaxation clause, and also abdicating its authority with
regard to the allocation of the supply order in unequal amounts between the
successful bidders.
42. The judgments placed by the State respondents, in view of the
discussions made hereinabove, are of no assistance to their case. For instance,
in the case of Afcons Infrastructure Ltd.(supra), at Paras – 11-13 thereof,
the Supreme Court made it clear that Courts should not interfere with how a
project owner or employer accepts or rejects a tender or bid, unless there is
clear evidence of bad faith, favouritism or extreme unfairness. Similarly, in
the case of Jagdish Mandal(supra), at Para – 22 thereof, it has been held that
Courts should not interfere in Government contract or tender decisions,
unless there is clear evidence of dishonesty, bias or extreme unfairness. In the
instant matter, however, the State respondents having failed to demonstrate
that the tender process was fair and transparent, and the tender or decision-
making process, showing clear signs of arbitrariness and irrationality, this
Court is constrained to interfere with the same.
43. As a footnote, in the considered view of this Court, it is also necessary
to record an observation with regard to the requirement of a trading license
before allotment of works to non-tribal traders/contractors and suppliers.
Though, undoubtedly a Trading Licence is a mandatory requirement for non-
tribal traders/contractors and suppliers under the ‘Trading by Non-Tribals
39
2025:MLHC:366
Regulation’, which has been enacted by all the three Autonomous District
Councils, however, in its implementation, it would be gainful to refer to a
circular being No. DCA.36/91/323 dated 24.06.2015, issued by the District
Council Affairs Department of the Government of Meghalaya, which is
reproduced in its entirety below and should serve as a guide in framing this
condition or requirement in future NIT’s or NIQ’s.
GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA
DISTRICT COUNCIL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
No. DCA.36/91/323 Dated Shillong, the 24th June, 2015.
From:- Smti. E.M. Lyngdoh,
Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya.
To
1) All Administrative Department.
2) All Heads of Department.
Subject:- Requirement of Trading License before allotment of works to
the Non-Tribal Traders/Contractors/Suppliers
Sir,
In suppression of this Department’s letters No.DCA.36/91/56
dated 26th May, 1994 and No.DCA.36/91/82 dated 26th August, 1994, I am
directed to say that under the “Trading by Non-Tribals Regulations” enacted
by all the 3(three) District Councils in the State under Paragraph 10 of the
40
2025:MLHC:366
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, Non-Tribals are banned from
carrying out any trade or business or rendering any service of profit within
the territorial jurisdiction of the respective Autonomous District Councils
without a valid trading license issued by the District Council concerned. This
also includes all trading or businesses or rendering of any service for profit
by the Non Tribals with the State Government of Meghalaya, Central
Government Offices and Organizations, and offices and organizations of
other State Government and Union Territories located within the Sixth
Schedule areas of the respective District Councils.
In view of the above, you are requested not to allot any work to
the Non-Tribal Contractors/firms/Companies/Suppliers/Stockist/Bonded
Warehouse/Private Carriage Contractors/Co-operative Societies etc. except
under a valid Trading License issued by the respective District Council.
Submission of tender paper does not fall under trade as per the
Act. However, if a Non-tribal becomes a successful bidder he has to furnish
trading license from the concerned District Council before any work
involving trade is issued to him.
It is also clarified that if the execution of work or supply is
within the Schedule areas of the State, trading License from the concerned
District Council is to be insisted upon irrespective of the location of the
registered office/establishment of the parties to the contract.
The above may kindly be brought to the notice of all the
subordinate officers under your control with the direction that they should
strictly adhere to the instructions.
Yours faithfully,
Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya
District Council Affairs Department
41
2025:MLHC:366
Memo No. DCA.36/91/323(A) Dated Shillong, the 24th June, 2015.
Copy forwarded to:
1. The P.S. to Chief Minister for information of the Chief Minister.
2. The P.S. to Minister, District Council Affairs Department for
information.
3. Director, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, ICAR Research
Complex for NEH Region, Umroi Road, Meghalaya-793103 with
reference to his letter No.RC/EC/237-NAIP/Agril Engg/2013-14
dated 25th March, 2014.
4. The Secretary, Executive Committee, Khasi Hills Autonomous
District Council, Shillong.
5. The Secretary, Executive Committee, Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council, Tura.
6. The Secretary, Executive Committee, Jaintia Hills Autonomous
District Council, Jowai.
By order etc.,
Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya,
District Council Affairs Department.
(Emphasis supplied)
42
2025:MLHC:366
44. As per the above noted circular, submission of a tender paper does not
fall under trade as per the Act, but if a non-tribal becomes a successful bidder,
a trading license issued from the concerned District Council before any work
involving trade is issued is necessary.
45. Though it is settled law that a writ court should refrain or restrain itself
from interfering in tender matters, and the principles of equity should not be
brought into play, however, taking into consideration the entire facts and
circumstances of the case at hand, judicial review of the decision-making
process is warranted to interfere with the arbitrary and illegal manner of
award of the contract.
46. Accordingly, for the reasons aforementioned, the entire tender process
pursuant to the NIQ dated 10.09.2024, is hereby set aside. The consequential
work orders issued to the respondents No. 4 and 5 therefore, shall accordingly
also stand cancelled. However, keeping in mind that the matter concerns the
providing of free roofing sheets to Below Poverty Line families, which is
vital to their shelter and well-being and in the greater public interest, the State
respondents are directed to immediately float a fresh NIQ, citing clear and
unambiguous requirements in the terms and conditions thereof, and further
endeavor to complete the entire process preferably within a period of 3(three)
months from the date of this order.
43
2025:MLHC:366
47. This batch of writ petitions as ordered above, accordingly stand closed
and disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
08.05.2025
“D.Thabah-PS”
Signature Not Verified 44
Digitally signed by DARIHUN
THABAH
Date: 2025.05.08 03:17:53 IST
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