Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Manchala Mouleswara Reddy vs Dabbali Samanna on 23 January, 2025
APHC010540172012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3397]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY ,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA
KRISHNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 959/2012
Between:
Manchala Mouleswara Reddy and another ...APPELLANTS
AND
Dabbali Samanna and 13 others ...RESPONDENTS
Counsel for the Appellants:
1. P. VEERA REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL, REP. KARRI MURALI
KRISHNACounsel for the Respondent(S):
1. O. MANOHER REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL, REP. B S REDDY
The Court made the following:
Judgment:
This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree
dated 30-7-2012 in A.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the III Additional District
Judge, Nandyal, Kurnool District, in setting aside the Judgment and decree
dated 19-01-2012 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Senior
Civil Judge, Nandyal.
2. The appellants herein are plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the respondents 1 to
11 are defendants 1 to 11 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of II Additional
Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal. Respondents 12 to 14 herein are added
as legal representatives of deceased 5th respondent vide order dated
26-6-2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2023.
3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of
II Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal, with a prayer for declaration
of plaintiffs’ title in respect of the plaint schedule properties and for
consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men,
legal heirs, assignees, representatives etc., from interfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs with regard to the plaint schedule
properties and for costs of the suit.
4. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal, decreed the
suit with costs by declaring the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the plaint
schedule property as owners of the plaint schedule property and also granted
permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, legal heirs,
assignees, representatives etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the plaintiffs with regard to the plaint schedule properties.
Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendants in the above said
suit filed the aforesaid appeal before the first appellate Court. The learned
III Additional District Judge, Nandyal, allowed the first appeal by setting aside
the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the
unsuccessful plaintiffs/appellants approached this Court by way of second
appeal.
5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will
be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit.
6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in
O.S.No.69 of 2008, is as follows:
(a) It is pleaded that the plaintiffs purchased the plaint schedule
properties from one K. David and others under a registered sale deed dated
24-7-1987 and since then they are in possession and enjoyment of the said
properties and the Government also issued pattadar pass books and title
deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs also availed crop loan from
Andhra Pragati Grameena Bank, Gadivemula Branch, by executing
a registered mortgage deed in favour of the bank on 28-11-2007 and the
plaintiffs are paying cist to the Government authorities for the plaint schedule
lands.
(b) It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs filed a caveat petition on
11-02-2008 before Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal and having received
the said caveat petition, the defendants gave reply on 04-3-2008 stating that
the plaintiffs are the tenants of plaint schedule properties and the defendants
are aware that they are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property.
(c) It is further pleaded that in temporary absence of the plaintiffs, the
defendants tried to trespass into the plaint schedule properties and due to
intervention of the elders, the matter was pacified and as the defendants are
proclaiming that they will interfere with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties, the plaintiffs are constrained to
file the suit.
7. The defendants 1, 2 and 6 filed a written statement, which was
adopted by the defendants 3 to 5, denying the contents of plaint averments
and they further contended as follows:
(a) It is contended that the plaintiffs are not the owners of plaint
schedule properties. The plaint schedule properties are the properties of
American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village, represented by
the 2nd defendant as President, the 6th defendant as Secretary and the
1st defendant as Treasurer. The American Baptist Foreign Mission Church is
a necessary party to the suit. Even after filing caveat petition by the plaintiffs,
the defendants gave reply to them stating that the properties belong to the
American Baptist Foreign Mission Church and the said properties are in
possession and enjoyment of the Church committee. Knowing fully well about
the facts, the plaintiffs filed the suit against wrong persons in their individual
capacity, so the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary party
and proper parties.
(b) It is further contended that the plaintiffs never purchased the plaint
schedule properties from K. David and others under the alleged sale deed
dated 24-7-1987. The said document was created by the plaintiffs with
an intention to grab the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission
Church of Pesaravai village. The said K. David and his family members have
no right, title and enjoyment over the plaint schedule properties to sell the
same to the plaintiffs. The plaint schedule properties are situated within the
limits of Nandyal Sub-Registration District, at present within the limits of Bandi
Atmakur Registration District. The plaintiffs in collusion with K. David with
an intention to grab the church property, created false documents and as per
the recitals of the alleged registered sale deed dated 24-7-1987, it was
registered at Kurnool. The plaint schedule properties belong to American
Baptist Foreign Mission Church and they are not transferable. It is further
contended that the said property stands in the name of Reverend Stanton
Dora in the records of Registration and Revenue authorities. Further, the
plaintiffs or K. David or his family members were never in possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties as owners. The documents filed
by the plaintiffs are only created and fabricated documents.
(c) It is further contended that the plaintiffs have no right to mortgage
the church properties. It is further contended that the plaint schedule
agricultural landed properties are the properties of American Baptist Foreign
Mission Church of Pesaravai village and the same were shown in the Record
of Holdings at page-4 and in Re-Survey and Re-Settlement Register and in
No.3 Village Adangal Extract, it is shown that the properties shown in the
name of Reverend Stanton Dora, agent of American Baptist Foreign Mission
Society.
(d) It is further contended that as per Field Measurement Book, Survey
No.246 is an extent of Ac.0-35 cents, Survey No.247 is full extent of Ac.2-10
cents, Survey No.251 is full extent of Ac.2-60 cents, Survey No.252 is full
extent of Ac.1-89 cents and Survey No.280 is full extent of Ac.3-00. In Survey
Nos.246, 247, 252 and 280 full extent of land belongs to the church and to
an extent of Ac.1-10 cents in Survey No.251, which is made sub-division as
Survey No.251/1 belongs to the church. But, in the alleged registered sale
deed filed by the plaintiffs, the said Survey number is mentioned as Pyki and
the said registered sale deed was registered at Kurnool. It is further
contended that the properties of church cannot be alienable. Hence, the suit
filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and prayed for dismissal of the same.
8. The defendants 7 to 10 remained ex parte.
9. On the basis of the above pleadings, the learned II Additional Senior
Civil Judge, Nandyal, framed the following issues for trial:
(1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the plaint schedule
mentioned properties ?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of their title over
the plaint schedule mentioned property ?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent
injunction as prayed for ?
(4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? and
(5) To what relief ?
10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs,
P.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-65 were marked. On behalf of
the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Ex.B-1 to B-27 were marked.
Exs.X-1 to X-10 were also marked.
11. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal, after
conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on
consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit
with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendants filed the
appeal suit in A.S.No.10 of 2012 before III Additional District Court, Nandyal,
wherein the following points came up for consideration.
(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration as prayed for ?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as
prayed ? and
(3) To what relief the appellants/defendants are entitled ?
12. The learned III Additional District Judge, Nandyal, i.e., the first
appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above,
against the respondents/plaintiffs and in favour of the appellants/defendants
and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and set aside the judgment
and decree of the trial Court. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful
plaintiffs 1 and 2 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 filed the present second appeal before
this Court.
13. The following substantial questions of law are framed on 12-9-2012
at the time of admission of second appeal by the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad:
(1) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in not accepting the
title set up by the plaintiffs and reversing the judgment of the trial Court ? and
(2) Whether the lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated
the evidence on record ?
14. Heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the
appellants/plaintiffs and Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the respondents/defendants.
15. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would
contend that the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Judge is
contrary to law. He would further contend that the defendants have not
claimed any title and possession over the plaint schedule properties, but the
learned first appellate Judge came to wrong conclusion that Ex.A-1 registered
sale deed, Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books and title deeds issued by the
Revenue authorities, Ex.A-5 No.3 adangal and Exs.A-15 to A-52 land revenue
receipts issued by the Tahsildar do not confer title in favour of plaintiffs.
He would further contend that the second appeal may be allowed by setting
aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge.
16. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents would
contend that on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned
first appellate Judge rightly held that the plaintiffs are not having any right and
title in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to
declaratory relief and the said finding given by the learned first appellate
Judge is sustainable under law and the second appeal may be dismissed by
confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate
Judge.
17. Normally in a second appeal, the second appellate Court cannot
substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the first appellate Court are
manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. If the findings are
based on inadmissible evidence or failure to consider the relevant evidence,
then only the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. If the conclusions drawn by the first appellate Court were
erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its
settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court or
was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring the material
evidence, then also the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of Civil
Procedure Code. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra, the
same has been well settled that if the judgment of the first appellate Court is
based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of
inadmissible evidence or ignoring the material evidence, then only in a second
appellate stage the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived by the
first appellate Judge.
18. The title document of the plaintiffs is Ex.A-1 registered sale deed
dated 24-7-1987 said to have been executed by one K. Daveedu and others.
Admittedly, the defendants severely pleaded in the written statement itself that
the plaintiffs’ vendor has no right in the property under Ex.A-1 sale deed.
The suit schedule properties to the extents of Ac.0-35 cents, Ac.2-10 cents,
Ac.1-10 cents, Ac.1-89 cents and Ac.3-00 in Survey Nos.246 Pyki, 247 Pyki,
251/1 Pyki, 252 Pyki and 280 Pyki, respectively, to a total extent of Ac.8-44
cents situated in Pesaravai village of Kurnool district, which were situated
within the common boundaries. In the written statement itself, the defendants
1, 2 and 6 severely pleaded that they are not the owners of plaint schedule
properties and the plaint schedule properties are the properties of American
Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village, represented by the
2nd defendant as President, the 6th defendant as Secretary and the
1st defendant as Treasurer and the American Baptist Foreign Mission Church
is a necessary party to the suit. Admittedly, the title of the plaintiffs’ vendor is
strongly disputed by the defendants, therefore, the burden is heavily casts on
the appellants/plaintiffs to prove the right and title of their vendors over the
plaint schedule properties.
19. It is trite law that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden
always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for
granting such a declaration and the weaknesses, if any, of the case set
up by the defendant would not be a ground to grant the relief of
declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. The onus to prove title to the
schedule property in question was on the plaintiff. It was incumbent on
the part of the Court to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit
property, the Court is also bound to enquire or investigate that question
on first before going into any other question that may arise in a suit.
20. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-1 registration extract of sale deed dated
24-7-1987 said to have been executed by K. Daveedu and others in favour of
the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the title of the vendor is not found in Ex.A-1. One of
the plaintiffs’ vendors was examined as P.W.3. He admits in his evidence in
chief-examination that the suit schedule properties were their ancestral
properties. As stated supra, there is no whisper in Ex.A-1 registered sale
deed said to have been executed by P.W.3 and others that property covered
under Ex.A-1 is their ancestral property. In cross-examination, P.W.3, the
plaintiffs’ vendor, admits that in total, the church is having property of
an extent of Ac.8-44 cents in Survey Nos.280, 246, 252, 251 and 247 and the
said property belongs to the church and the suit schedule properties and the
property belongs to the church are one and the same. Another crucial
admission made by him is that he was President and Secretary of the church
for a long period and he was continued as President of the church up to the
year 2001. Another crucial admission made by him is that as President of the
church, he cultivated the suit schedule property. Another admission made by
him is that they have no right to sell the church property to the plaintiffs and
the suit schedule property stands in the name of Reverend Stanton Dora.
The own admissions of the plaintiffs’ vendor clearly goes to show that himself
and other executants in Ex.A-1 are not having any right and title in Ex.A-1
property and Ex.A-1 property belongs to the church property, therefore, the
title of the plaintiffs’ vendor is not at all proved. Furthermore, the own
admissions of the plaintiffs’ vendor go to show that himself and other vendors
are not having any right to alienate the suit schedule property under Ex.A-1.
21. As seen from the recitals of Ex.B-9 i.e. Rights of Holdings issued by
the Sub Registrar, Nandyal, Reverend Stanton Dora is in possession and
enjoyment of the property. The plaintiffs pleaded that they purchased the
property under Ex.A-1 from one K. Daveedu and others, who are lawful
owners. As noticed supra, the said K. Daveedu, plaintiffs’ vendor, was
examined as P.W.3. As per the own admissions of P.W.3, himself and other
executants in Ex.A-1 sale deed are not having any right and title in
Ex.A-1 property and Ex.A-1 property belongs to the church property.
Furthermore, Ex.B-10 re-survey settlement register shows that Reverend
Stanton Dora is in possession and enjoyment of the properties. Admittedly,
the plaintiffs pleaded their title based on Ex.A-1 registered sale deed said to
have been executed by K. Daveedu and others. The plaintiffs did not file any
link documents to prove the ownership of their vendors. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs’ vendor i.e. P.W.3 himself admits that himself and other executants
are not having right and title in Ex.A-1 property i.e. plaint schedule property.
22. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-55 true copy of No.2 adangal, Ex.A-56
true copy of adangal for fasli 1411 and Exs.A-57 to A-59 true copies of
adangals. The law is well settled that entries in revenue records cannot form
basis for declaration of title. In Exs.A-15 to A-52 land revenue receipts relied
on by the plaintiffs, survey numbers are not at all mentioned in Exs.A-15 to
A-52. It is well settled that payment of land revenue does not confer any right
and title in the suit schedule property. Since the plaintiffs are seeking the
relief of declaration of title, they must have established their title de hors
mutation entries. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramanna v. Samba
Murthy 1 held that the entries in revenue records though may be relevant
under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and those are not evidence of title.
23. The plaintiffs relied on Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books said to
have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Gadivemula Mandal of
Kurnool District. Ex.B-1 shows that on hearing both sides, the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Nandyal, through his proceedings dated 23-8-2008,
cancelled Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books.
24. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants placed
a reliance on Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector2.
In that judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:
“19. It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima
facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the
party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable,
is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the
contesting party has no title.
1
AIR 1961 A.P. 361
2
AIR 2003 SC 1805
20. This Court in Nair Service Society Limited v. K. C. Alexander and
Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 1165) observed,
“the possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one
can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known.
When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.””
The aforesaid case law relates to a writ petition. Both parties in the said
writ petition are Chief Conservator of Forests, Collector and other
respondents. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs are claiming the relief of
declaration of title in the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the facts and
circumstances in the cited judgment are different to the instant case.
25. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants placed
a reliance on High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Ramkrishna Sharma v.
State of M.P3. In the case on hand, the title of the plaintiffs’ vendors is denied
by the defendants. Admittedly, one of the plaintiffs’ vendor i.e. P.W.3
categorically admitted in his evidence that himself and other executants in
Ex.A-1 registered sale deed are not having any right and title in the schedule
property and the suit property belongs to the church property. Therefore, the
facts and circumstances in the case law are different to the instant case.
26. In the case of Smriti Debbarma (Dead) thr. LRs. v. Prabha
Ranjan Debbarma4, the Apex Court held as follows:
“31. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies upon the
plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of
a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief. This is
mandated in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that
burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the
affirmative and not on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be
universal and has exceptions, but in the factual background of the present
case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the
Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail. Onus
of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the3
2022 Law Suit (MP) 447
4
2023(2) ALD 28 (SC)
evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and
possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability
to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the
burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is
able to prove title. … … … .”
Admittedly, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs failed to prove their title
over the suit schedule property. Since the defendants are disputing the title of
the plaintiffs, it is for the plaintiffs to prove the title of the plaintiffs’ vendor.
As stated supra, the evidence of plaintiffs’ vendor clearly goes to show that
himself and other executants in Ex.A-1 are not having any right in the
schedule property and the suit schedule property belongs to the church
property and the suit schedule property is not belong to them.
27. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first
appellate Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove
their title and possession in the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiffs
are not entitled to the main relief of declaration of title, the question of granting
consequential relief of permanent injunction does not arise. For the aforesaid
reasons, I do not find any illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the
learned first appellate Judge. The learned first appellate Judge on
re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, rightly set aside the judgment
and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and allowed the first appeal.
Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate
Judge is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference.
28. Resultantly, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the
judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge in setting
aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. Pending
applications, if any, shall stand closed. Each party do bear their own costs in
the second appeal.
VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO,J
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