Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Manepalli Ammalu Anr vs Kada Hareesh Kumar 3 Ors on 20 June, 2025
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.No.537 of 2017
JUDGMENT:
1. Claimants in M.V.O.P.No.276 of 2015 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal-cum-II Additional District Judge, Parvatipuram (for short “the learned
MACT”), questioning the dismissal of their claim petition filed the present appeal.
2. The claim was arising out of the death of Manepalli Annaji Rao (hereinafter
referred to as “the deceased”) in a Motor Vehicle accident that occurred at
A.P.S.R.T.C. complex, Salur, due to the involvement of A.P.S.R.T.C. Bus bearing
No.AP 10 Z 6354 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”) driven by
Respondent No.1.
3. Claimants are the wife and the son of the deceased. Respondent Nos.1
and 2 i.e. the driver of the offending vehicle and the Shift Supervisor of the
R.T.C. Depot, Salur remained ex parte.
4. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 / Depot Manager and Managing Director
contested the case.
5. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as
the claimants and the Respondents as and how they are arrayed in the
impugned proceedings.
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Case of the claimants:
6. Deceased worked as driver in A.P.S.R.T.C. became unfit due to medical
reasons and out of service from A.P.S.R.T.C. On 03.12.2013 at about 08:00
p.m., the deceased went to Salur R.T.C. depot to enquire about the retirement
benefits payable to him. When he was proceeding towards office / garage,
Respondent No.1-the driver of the offending vehicle drove the offending vehicle
and dashed the deceased causing severe injuries. Immediately the deceased
was shifted to the Government Hospital. But, while undergoing treatment, the
deceased succumbed to injuries. Deceased was aged about „58‟ years; hale and
healthy; earning Rs.400/- per day on daily wage basis and also Rs.6,000/- as
pension. Due to the death of the deceased, the claimants become orphans.
7. Case in Cr.No.119 of 2013 was registered at Salur Town Police Station
against the driver of the offending vehicle viz. Respondent No.1 and
subsequently charge sheet was laid. Since the accident has occurred due to the
rash and negligent driving of Respondent No.1 and Respondent Nos.2 and 3, the
officials / in charge of the employment of Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.4
owning the offending vehicle, all the Respondents are liable to pay the
compensation.
Case of Respondent Nos.3 and 4:
8. The petitioner(s) allegations are incorrect. There was no negligence on
the part of Respondent No.1. Age, occupation, income of the deceased claimed
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are incorrect and the claimant is put to strict proof of all the allegations.
Negligence of the deceased is the cause for the accident. Garage is a private
place, the movements are restricted and prohibited. There cannot be free
access to others. The entry into garage of the R.T.C. is unauthorized. The
claimant, being a retired employee, should know the rules and also the tune
being dangerous. He is a trespasser. Therefore, not entitled for compensation.
9. Further, Respondent No.1, who was serving as an outsourcing Shramik
(employee) at the time of accident. The bus / offending vehicle was handed over
to the private contractor/ agency (KLFM) for service and maintenance. The
operation of the bus / offending vehicle by Respondent No.1 is without the
instructions of Management. The liability, if any, is that of the Management of
KLFM. The petition is bad for non-joinder.
10. The outsourcing Shramiks are not entitled to drive the buses and they
have to assist the mechanics. Therefore, there is violation of the conditions. The
contractor is fully acquainted with the conditions in terms of the agreement with
A.P.S.R.T.C. As per contract conditions, the workers are not allowed to drive
inside/outside the premises. The contractor is liable to pay compensation for any
damage to the property caused by him or his workers. Therefore, A.P.S.R.T.C.
is not liable.
11. On the strength of pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial by
the learned MACT:
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1.) Whether the 1st respondent drove the offending vehicle (RTC bus)
bearing No.AP 10 Z 6354 in a rash and negligent manner and responsible
for the death of the deceased in the accident?
2) Whether the petitioners are entitled to any compensation and if so, at
what quantum and from whom?
3) To what relief?
12. Evidence before the learned MACT:
Description Remarks
Oral evidence P.W.1: Manepalli Ammulu Claimant No.1.
P.W.2: Rajanala Chandrasekhar Eye witness to the
accident.
R.W.1: Penta Siva Kumar Depot Manager,
Salur Depot.
Documentary Ex.A1: Attested true copy of FIR On behalf of the
evidence in Cr.No.119/2015 of Salur Town petitioner(s).
Police Station.
Ex.A2: Attested true copy of post
mortem certificate.
Ex.A3: Attested true copy of
charge sheet.
Ex.A4: Attested true copy of
M.V.I. report
Ex.A5: Pass book
Ex.B1: copy of agreement On behalf of the
Respondent(s)
Findings of learned MACT:
On negligence and death of the deceased due to accident:
13. In view of evidence of PW.1 and PW.2-another driver of the R.T.C. bus
and the crime record, particularly charge sheet laid against the driver of
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Respondent No.1 and MVI report, the negligence, accident, and death of
deceased due to accident stands proved. Accordingly, the issue regarding
negligence is answered in favour of the claimants.
With regard to compensation:
14. Deceased was aged about „58‟ years, multiplier „9‟ is applicable. His
income can be notionally taken at Rs.4,500/-. After deducting 1/3rd towards the
personal expenditure and upon application of multiplier „9‟, the loss of
dependency to claimants comes to Rs.3,24,000/- and the claimants are entitled
for Rs.5,000/- towards transport expenditure, Rs.25,000/- towards funeral
expenditure, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs.30,000/- towards loss of
consortium. In all, the claimants are entitled for Rs.3,94,000/- as compensation.
With regard to liability:
15. The petitioners did not implead M/s. K.L.F. Management Services, who
provided the services of Respondent No.1 driver. Evidence of RW.1 is that the
Ex.B1 agreement with M/s. K.L.F. Management Services were in force and
Respondent No.1 is not the employee of the R.T.C. but outsourced by Shramic
agency and the agency as to provide only services and maintenance to the
buses. The workers of agency shall not drive the vehicle and as Respondent
No.1 is not the employee of R.T.C and the K.L.F.M. service agency is not
impleaded. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
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Arguments in the appeal:
For the claimants:
16. Dismissal of the claim petition on the ground of not adding the agency,
which provided the services of Respondent No.1 is an incorrect approach.
17. Learned MACT erred in appreciating the evidence particularly Ex.B1 and
its contents.
18. Learned MACT erred in quantifying the compensation also and ought to
have awarded more compensation than what claimed.
On behalf of the Respondent-A.P.S.R.T.C:
19. Dismissal of claim petition is justified and the contents of Ex.B1 and
evidence of RW.1 are properly appreciated. The learned MACT ought to have
appreciated the defense that the premises of the A.P.S.R.T.C depot and garage
is not a public place, in addition to the absence of a proper party. No liability can
be imposed on A.P.S.R.T.C under any circumstances and the quantification of
compensation done is also without any basis. There are no grounds to interfere
in this appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs.
20. Perused the pleadings. Thoughtful consideration given to the arguments
advanced by the both sides.
21. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:
1) Whether the pleaded accident dated 03.12.2013 has occurred due to
rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by Respondent No.1?
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2) Whether the accident place viz. the RTC depot premises and garage, is
not a public place and whether on the ground of deceased presence is not
proper at the time of the accident and no liability can be imposed on the
APSRTC?
3) When outsourcing employees are sponsored by an agency and when
such an outsourced functionary drives a vehicle? Whether the owner of the
offending vehicle like A.P.S.R.T.C, an organization, who has engaged the
services of an outsourcing agency can disown the liability?
4) Whether the petition is bad and liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of
the agency-M/s.K.L.Facility Management Services, which provided the
outsourcing functionaries for maintenance etc. of the vehicles of the
A.P.S.R.T.C. viz. the Respondents?
5) Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation, if so, to what
quantum?
6) What is the liability of the Respondents?
7) What is the result of the appeal?
Point No.1:
Negligence:
22. Accident and death of deceased due to accident are not in dispute.
Registration of FIR and filing of charge sheet against the Respondent No.1 who
drove the offending vehicle at relevant time is also out of dispute.
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23. There is evidence of eye witness-PW.2 in categorical terms indicating the
occurrence of accident and negligence of Respondent No.1. PW.2 is also a
driver, working for A.P.S.R.T.C. The presence of PW.2 at relevant time near
accident spot is natural. Respondent No.1, who drove the offending vehicle and
against whom the FIR and charge sheet were laid remained ex parte and he was
not examined.
24. This material available on record is sufficient to believe the occurrence of
accident and negligence of Respondent No.1, who drove the offending vehicle at
the relevant time.
25. There is no iota of evidence contradicting this material from the end of
Respondents. Therefore, without any hesitation the point touching the negligence
is answered in favor of the claimants and against the Respondents Concluding
that the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is the cause for the
accident. Point No.1 is answered accordingly.
Point No.2:
26. Section 2 (34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines the public place as
follows:
Public place means a road, street, way or other place, whether a
thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and
includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or
set down by a stage carrier;
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27. Access to the public cannot be equated to access to an employee or a
retired employee who approaches an office like RTC depot or garage where
office is also located.
28. It is the case of the claimants that the office is located in the depot/garage.
It is natural for an employee either serving or retire for certain office and
administrative purposes to visit the office. There is no denial that the office is
situated within the depot or garage. Therefore, the contention that the entry of
the deceased into the premises is unauthorized and that he is a trespasser is
found not acceptable ex-facie.
29. In a case between The New India Assurance Company Limited vs.
Devchandbhai Khumansinh Ajanar1, the Hon‟ble High Court of Gujarat found
that if a place is accessible to the public even if privately owned, the claim can be
entertained by the tribunal. Observations in para Nos.8 and 9 of the judgment
with reference to Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act and also another
judgment of the Gujarat High Court in a case between United India Insurance
Company Limited vs. Gujarat Ship Trade Corporation and others 2 found
relevant. They are as follows:
8. At the outset, the definition of „public place‟ given in Section 2 (34)
of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is required to be read, which is as
follows:
1
2024 Supreme (Online)(GUJ)23740 =First Appeal No.1225 of 2020
2
1997 (3) GLR 2560
10“public place means a road, street, way or other place,
whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a
right of access, and includes any place or stand at which
passengers are picked up or set down by a stage
carriage;”
9. The simple reading of Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
1988 would imply that if public have a right of access though on
private land, it could be public place within the meaning of Section 2
(34) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The issue is no more res integra
as this Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited
vs. Gujarat Ship Trade Corporation and others – 1997 (3) GLR
2560, addressed this issue. Relevant paras thereof are as under:
“12. It would be interesting to consider as to whether in
the light of the special circumstances obtainable from the
evidence on record could the accident be said to have
occurred in a ‘public place’ or not. Before factual scenario
put again into focus it would be advisable to refer the
statutory provisions of Section 2(34) of the new Act which
prescribes and provides as to what is a ‘public place’. Its
corresponding section of old Act is Section 2(24), which
reads as under ‘Public place’ means a road, street, way
or other place, whether a thorough-fare or not, to which
the public have a right of access, and includes any place
or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down
by a stage carriage.
13. It would be very well seen from the aforesaid
provisions that even user of the private place where
public have access is also included in the definition of the
‘public place’. It, therefore, need not necessarily be a
public property. Even in case of private place where
public have access without restrictions or even limited
with pass, etc., it could be characterised as a public place
in view of the clear definition supplied in Section 2(34) of
the new Act.
14. ***
15. It would be very well visualised from the aforesaid
provisions that in order to hold the insurer liable for
11compensation one of the requirements and conditions is
vehicular accident must have occurred in a ‘public place’.
Broadly speaking, when bodily injury to any passenger of
public service vehicle or when damage is caused to a
third party arising out of use of the vehicle in the ‘public
place’ governs the field arising out of the use of the
vehicle in a ‘public place’. That means there must be
involvement of the vehicle which is defined under the new
Act.
16. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that there must
be user of the vehicle because of which injury to a person
or damage to the goods has been caused in a ‘public
place’. The expression ‘public place’ provided under
Section 2(34) of the new Act is of vital importance and
wide amplitude. It is an inclusive definition. Therefore,
definition of a ‘public place’ under the new Act would
include any place which members of public use and to
which they have a right of access. The right of access
may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral
or written permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on
payment of fee. This is a settled principle of law. The use
may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or
purposes. What is paramountly significant is the place
ought to have access to take members of public and be
available for their use, enjoyment, avocation or any other
purpose.”
30. The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Devchandbhai
Khumansinh Ajanar (1 supra) was a case of a minor son of the claimants was
sleeping by covering a plastic cover in an open place of the factory and while
reversing a tractor in the premises the accident has occurred and minor son of
the claimants died. The defense was similar to that of the present case that the
place is not a public place and within the four corners of the compound of the
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factory which is the private place. In the said context, the above observations are
made by the Hon‟ble High Court of Gujarat.
31. Similarly in a case between K. Hanumantha Rao vs. National
Aeronautical Laboratory3, the Hon‟ble High Court of Karnataka held that a
tribunal in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
for compensation in respect of accidents, regardless whether they are occurred
in public or private places as long as the tribunals jurisdiction extends to the area
where the accident takes place.
32. It was the case where this accident took place within the private premises
of National Aeronautic Laboratory, Kodihalli, Bangalore and it is not a public
place. Addressing the said situation, Hon‟ble High Court of Karnataka found that
the observations of the learned MACT that it had no jurisdiction as the place of
accident is not a public place cannot be upheld vide para No.3 observed as
under:
(3) THE incident in question happened on 5-8-1968. The accidents
claims Tribunals are constituted by virtue of the provisions of S. 110
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. S. 110 (1) as i,t stood prior to its
amendment by 2-3-1970 reads as follows :
” A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter
referred to as claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in3
1973 0 Supreme (Kar) 4 =1973 0 ACJ 78; 1973 I KarLJ 152
13the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for
compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily
injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. ”
a reading of the above provision makes it plain that it empowers the
State government to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette and
prescribing the area or areas over which the Tribunals would have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of
accidents involving the death of, or bodily injuries to persons arising
out of the use of Motor Vehicles. It is also plain that the said section
by itself does not place any restrictions in regard to places by
characterising places either as public or as private places. Hence it is
necessary to make a reference to the notification issued by the State
Government while constituting the Motor Accidents Claims tribunal at
Bangalore. The First Additional District Judge, Bangalore, was
appointed as Member cf the said Tribunal by such a notification
issued on 24-2-1968. A reference to this notification shows that the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal extended over the whole of Bangalore
District. The notification has not made any distinction between private
places and public places in Bangalore District. A result of reading of
the provisions of this notification and S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, would clearly be that the State Government by exercising
its powers under S. 110 of the act, constituted a Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal and appointed the First additional District Judge as
Member and fixed Bangalore District as the area over which the
Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicte upon for claims of compensation
in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to
persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. We have therefore
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no hesitation in holding that the conclusion of the Tribunal that it had
no jurisdiction in view of the fact that the accident in question had
taken place not in a public place but in the National Aeronautic
Laboratory, kodihalli, Bangalore, cannot be upheld. The learned
Member has nowhere in the order passed by him made it clear as to
why he was under the impression that the Tribunal had jurisdiction
only in regard to claims arising out of accidents in public places.
33. Further, the Hon‟ble High Court of Rajasthan in a case between United
India Insurance Company Limited vs. Smt. Roop Kanwar4, while answering
whether a motor garage is a public place answered the same affirmatively that it
is also a public place. While referring to the definition of public place in terms of
Section 2(24) of the Act of 1939 in para No.15, the High Court of Rajasthan
made the following observations:
15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Admittedly the accident
took place in the workshop of Kasim Khan, PW-3. It was public place
within the meaning of section 2(24) of the Act of 1939 as public had a
right of access in it. Any person could go inside it. His brother Kalu
Khan has categorically stated in his cross-examination that any
person could come in the Workshop for repairs of his vehicle. No
suggestions was put in the cross-examination of Kasim Khan that it
was a private place and not a public place. It has been observed in
Pandarang vs. New India Life Insurance Company Ltd. (supras)
paras 8, 10 and 11 as under:
“Para 8
4
1990 0 Supreme (Raj) 217; 1991 0 ACJ 74; 1991 1 RLW(Raj) 242: 1991 1 TAC 289
15It is in the light of the object of the statute, its aforesaid relevant
provisions and the schema, that we have to appreciate the true
import of the expression “public place” for the purposes of Chapter
VIII of the Act. It has further to be remembered that the expression
“public place” is a term of art, the same having been defined
specifically by sub-cl. (24), of S.2 of the Act. Such definition reads as
follows:
“(24) public place means a road, street, way or other place,
whether a thorough fare or not, to which the public have a right
of access and includes any place or stand at which
passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;”
“The first thing to remember with regard to the definition is that it is
an inclusive one. Secondly it in terms makes it clear that any road,
street way or other place, whether a thorough fare or not, is a public
place for the purposes of the Act, the only condition being that the
public should have a right of access to it. Thirdly, the expression used
in the definition is “a right of access” and not “access as of right”.
Lastly, when it states that any place or stand at which passengers are
picked up or set down by a stage carriage, is a public place, it shows
that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as
with its user. Stage carriage is defined in sub-cl.(29) of S. 2 and it
means a motor vehicle which is used to carry or adapted to carry
more than six persons excluding the driver and which carries
passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for
individual passangers, either for the whole journey or for stages of
the journey. In short, it means a public passenger-carrier. In other
words, by virtue of the last part of the definition, the expression would
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include any place, including private, where public passenger-carrier
picks up or sets down passengers.
The definition of “public place” under the Act is, therefore, wide
enough to include any place which members of public use and to
which they have a right of access. The right of access may be
permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written
permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fee. The
use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes.
What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the
members of public and be available for their use, enjoyment,
avocation other purpose.
Para 10 :
If we further bear in mind the overall object of the provisions of
Chapter VIII which deals with compulsory insurance of the vehicle to
cover risks to third parties and their property, with claims to be filed
for recovering compensation, no fault liabilities and liabilities arising
out of hit and run accidents, etc. the intention of the legislature is
clear. It is to secure compensation to the persons and property which
are exposed to the accidents caused by the vehicles. The very nature
of the motor vehicle and its use, mandate these provisions. The
motor vehicle in this respect can be likened to a wild animal.
Whoever keeps it does so at his risk. As pointed out earlier, some of
the restrictions on the use of the vehicle contained in the Act are
irrespective of the nature of the place where it is used and
irrespective of whether it is plied or kept stationary. The legislature
was concerned not so much with the nature of the place where the
vehicle causes the accident as where it was likely to do so. Hence all
places where the members of public and/or their property are likely to
17come in contact with the vehicles can legitimately be said to be in its
view when the legislature made the relevant provisions for
compulsory insurance. It will have, therefore, to be held that all
places, where the members of public have an access, for whatever
reasons, whether as of right or controlled in any manner whatsoever,
would be covered by the definition of “public place” in S. 2 (24) of the
Act. To hold otherwise would frustrate the very object of the said
Chapter and the Act.
Para 11 :
Although dictionary meaning of the expression is hardly of any use to
us, it will be instructive to refer to it. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary,
Fifth Edition, page 2094,public place has been defined as follows:
“A public place is a place to which the public can and do
have access; it doesnt matter whether they come at the
invitation of the occupier or merely with his permission, or
whether some payment or the performance of some formality
is required before access can be had…”
This definition is taken from the decision in R. V. Kane, (1965) 1 ALL
ER 705, and is a reproduction of only a part of it given there. The
other part reads as follows:-
“but a place such as the club in the present case, would be a
private place, if there was a real restriction of access to
members and their guests and that any other members of the
public who got in was in reality a trespasser.”
In this case what fell for consideration was whether for the purposes
of common law offeace of affray in a public place, the Stage and
Press Club where the offence took place was a public place. The
other definitions of public place given in the dictionary are with
reference to the provisions of the Vagrancy Act of 1824. They are
hardly of any relevance to us.
18
In Blacks Law Dictionary; Fifth Edition, page 1107, public place has
been defined as follows:
“A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not
necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public,
but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private,
a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to
the neighbouring public (e.g. a park or public bench). Also, a
place in which the public has an interest as affecting the
safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community. A place
exposed to the public, and where the public gather together
or pass to and fro.”
Neither the Act of 1923 nor the above-quoted endorsement No. 16 of
the Policy Ex.A-19 requires that the accident should have taken place
in a public place. Thus the said contention of the learned counsel for
the appellant is also devoid of force.
34. It is also relevant to note the observations of the High Court of Orissa in a
case between Nakula Swain vs. Ravi Suresh Ku. Gupta5, wherein it is found
that the public place under Motor Vehicles Act should not be narrowly considered
and it includes the places which is the vehicle have access and it was a case of
deceased working as a coolie under the respondent while sitting on road inside
the factory premises, a vehicle suddenly moved backward and dashed the
deceased. It was a case of accident occurring inside the factory premises.
Relevant observations are made in para No.6 which are as follows:
6. This Court in the case of M.K. Bhaumik (supra) referring to
various decisions of different High Courts has come to hold that the5
2013 0 Supreme (Ori) 450
19definition of ‘public place’ u/s 2(34) of the M.V. Act is very wide and
the private place used with permission or without permission would
amount to a public place. This Court further observed that the term
‘public place’ cannot be given a restricted meaning, inasmuch as, it
is not to be taken as a place where public have uncontrolled access
at all times. ‘public place’ for the purpose of M.V. Act has to be
understood with reference to the places to which a vehicle has
access.
35. In view of the consistent judicial approach of various high courts and in
view of the facts and circumstances of the present case as the deceased was an
ex-employee of the A.P.S.R.T.C and who said to have back to the depot for
enquiring about his retirement benefits etc. His presence at the accident spot
within the RTC premises cannot be considered as unauthorized and the
objection of the A.P.S.R.T.C found not tenable. Hence, the point is answered
against the A.P.S.R.T.C. and in favour of the claimants.
Point No.3:
36. As per the evidence of RW.1, there was agreement between the APSRTC
and M/s.K.L. Facility Management Services, Secunderabad for providing certain
workers. Admittedly, Respondent No.1 was provided by the contracting agency.
RW.1 is not a party to the Ex.B1 agreement. Contracting party M/s. K.L. Facility
Management has nothing to do with the buses is the admission of RW.1.
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37. Rw.1 did not file any counter though arrayed as independent party.
Fictionally, the counter filed by Respondent No.4 would cover the defense of
RW.1, but it is relevant to note that Ex.B1 is binding on all the Respondents.
The deceased and the claimants are third parties to the Ex.B1 agreement.
R.T.C. is relying on the violation of contractual terms of Ex.B1, which are
between the R.T.C. and another agency. It is a private arrangement made by
R.T.C. to have certain outsourcing functionaries provided to the R.T.C. for the
management of its business or services.
38. Entrustment of the vehicle to proper driver is the obligation of any and
every owner of a motor vehicle in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act.
39. It is not the case of the A.P.S.R.T.C./ Respondents. Respondent No.1 was
not driving the offending vehicle at the relevant time. A.P.S.R.T.C is a
monopolized organization, being a statutory establishment. Having special
exemptions in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act issued by the State Government.
Therefore, the defense cannot be very light like the ordinary owner of any
vehicle. A.P.S.R.T.C cannot simply say that somebody has entered into the
premises without its knowledge, somebody has driven the bus without its
permission or knowledge and that some unauthorized person has driven the
vehicle. Such kind of loose and irresponsible pleas from a responsible institution
like a A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot be appreciated. On the contrary, it is a lamentable
state of affair. Taking a defense for the sake of defense is different from parties
21
with certain reasonable backdrop taking acceptable defenses. The clauses in
agreement, if provide for the liability inter se the contracting agency and the
A.P.S.R.T.C. A.P.S.R.T.C. is at liberty to take appropriate legal proceedings for
any loss or damage in terms of its private agreement between the R.T.C. and the
agency with which has entered an agreement.
40. For all above reasons, the organization like APSRTC cannot disown its
liability and point No.3 is answered accordingly concluding that even if an
outsourced functionary drives the vehicle with a knowledge and permission of the
owner of the offending vehicle who engaged the services of outsourcing agency,
the owner and all other persons connected there with are responsible for any
tortious act of such outsourcing employee and the owner including an
organization like A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot disown its liability.
Point No.4:
41. Non-joinder of the necessary party appears to be the defense but the
defense is not taken in clear terms by A.P.S.R.T.C. in its pleadings, even after
long travel and facing trial also no steps were taken for getting such an issue
framed is answered. Even otherwise for any reason that the contentions are
sufficient to address such issue, it can be safely inferred and answered that a
contract between the agencies that provided functionaries including drivers to the
22
A.P.S.R.T.C is purely a private one and does not bind the claimants who are third
parties to implead outsourcing Agency.
42. Liability to a claimant cannot be disowned on the ground of private
contract between the owner of the vehicle and a third-party agency. The
claimants have no privity of contract with the third party agency viz.
M/s. K.L. Facility Management Services with whom the A.P.S.R.T.C is having a
contract to provide outsourcing functionaries for attending some work in
A.P.S.R.T.C. depot, that contract may have a clause to make good the loss
suffered by A.P.S.R.T.C. for the deeds of such outsourcing personnel sponsored.
Such contract is an independent contract. Such third party is accountable to only
A.P.S.R.T.C, but not to the claimants directly. The liability, if any of the third
party agency is towards A.P.S.R.T.C. alone. Therefore, lapse on the part of the
claimants to include or implead the outsourcing agency viz. M/s. K.L. Facility
Management Services cannot be found as a defect; dismiss the claim.
43. Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) reads as
follows:
9. Misjoinder and non-joinder:- No suit shall be defeated by reason
of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every
suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights
and interests of the parties actually before it:
23
44. The rigor of Order 1 Rule 9 of the CPC applies to non-joinder of necessary
parties, even if any reason, the A.P.S.R.T.C feels that M/s. K.L.Facility
Management Services should have been added. Such parties only a proper
party but not a necessary party to non-suit the claimants. The remedies of
A.P.S.R.T.C. are independent.
45. Here in this context it is relevant to note the conditions in Ex.B1 agreement
vide Condition Nos.28, 29 and 42, which read as follows:
28. The Contractor is liable to pay the Damages, if any, or movable
or immovable property of the Corporation, by him or by his agents
or representatives, as determined by the Licensor. The Licensor
shall have the right to recover such amounts towards the damages
caused, from the monthly remuneration or Security Deposit of the
Contractor.
29. Any violation or breach of terms and conditions of the contract
including unsatisfactory performance shall render the contract liable
to be terminated duly forfeiting the Security Deposit.
42. In the event of any statutory authority imposing any punishment
like fines etc., and if the corporation is made a party in such panel
action, the corporation has got the authority to keep and recover
such amount due to the contractor like remuneration / Security
deposit etc., with it until it is proved to the satisfaction of the
corporation that such penal actions are ceased. Such action may
also be reason for termination of contract.
24
46. Upon considering the factual and legal scenario, unhesitantly it is found
that there is no necessity of presence of M/s. K.L. Facility Management Services
in the present proceedings and the observations contra by the learned MACT
and the defense of the A.P.S.R.T.C. are not tenable and point No.4 is answered
accordingly against the A.P.S.R.T.C. and in favour of the claimants / appellants.
Point No.5:
Quantum of Compensation:
A. Precedential guidance for quantifying the compensation in case of
claims arising out of Motor Vehicles Accidents causing death:-
a) Adoption of Multiplier, Multiplicand and Calculation:
47.(i). Hon‟ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in
awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.)
and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.6 vide paragraph Nos.18
and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier
mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment
the claimants have to establish the following:
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents.
6
2009 (6) SCC 121
25
47.(ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the
compensation, they are:
Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he /
she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived
after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier. This shall be with reference to the table provided
and table is provided in judgment itself.
Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads
towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport,
cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are
advised.
b) Adding of future prospects:
48(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others7 case
guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50%
7
2017(16) SCC 680
26where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years
and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
48(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes. Further, in
respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the
deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years,
at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years. Further, adding of
compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at
Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by
Hon‟ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay
Sethi‘s case.
c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:
49. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable
compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and
Others8, Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under
the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children
and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
8
(2018) 18 SCC 130
27
d) Just Compensation:
50. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others9, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in
excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in
this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh,
(2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was
held as follows: (SCC p. 280)
“10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make
an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it
to be just‟. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the
compensation is that it must be „just‟. There is no other limitation or
restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.”
The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1213]
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard
to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now
become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or
technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate,
as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the
compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the
vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned
by the victim.
Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are
otherwise entitled:-
51. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what
claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding
that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For
9
(2013) 9 SCC 54
28the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following
observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:
(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others10, at para 21 of the
judgment, that –
“..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation
amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is
to award “just” compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence
produced on record.”
(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors.11 at para 33 of the judgment, as
follows:-
“33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount
claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim
petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just
compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded
especially where the claimant is a minor.”
(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and
Others12 at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-
“5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs.25,00,000
in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation
which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned
supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation
exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court
under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award “just
compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation.
A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence
produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further,
there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The
courts are duty-bound to award just compensation.”
10
(2003) 2 SCC 274
11
2020 (04) SCC 413
12
(2019) 2 SCC 192
29
B. Analysis of Evidence and Findings:
52. There is evidence that the deceased was served as a driver. It is claimed
that deceased was earning Rs.400/- per day. In one breath, the claimants said
that the deceased was medically invalidated, on the other breath it is said that he
was working as on daily wage basis. It is clear that his an ex-employee of
A.P.S.R.T.C. Even according to the claim petition and other material, he went to
A.P.S.R.T.C. office / depot to enquire about the amounts payable to him, after
retirement. Therefore, the age of the deceased is „58‟ adding of future prospects
at that age also may not be possible in the context of the case. Therefore, the
income taken notionally at Rs.4,500/- by the learned MACT and deducting 1/3rd
towards personal expenditure found proper.
53. However, the compensation awarded under the heads of loss of
consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenditure etc. are not in tune with the
directives of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi‘s case. Therefore,
revisiting and revamp is necessary. The entitlement of the claimants for
compensation under the head of loss of dependency is at Rs.3,24,000/- , loss of
estate is at Rs.15,000/-, funeral expenditure is at Rs.15,000/-, loss of consortium
i.e. spousal consortium for claimant No.1 is at Rs.40,000/-, parental consortium
for Claimant No.2 is at Rs.40,000/-, Transportation and other incidental
expenditure at Rs.5,000/-.
30
54. In the light of precedential guidance and in view of the reasons and
evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable
compensation in comparison to compensation awarded by the learned MACT is
as follows:
Sl. Head Arrived by the Fixed by this
No. learned MACT Appellate
Court
1. Loss of dependency Rs.3,24,000/- Rs.3,24,000/-
2. Transport Rs.5,000/- Rs.5,000/-
expenditure and
other incidental
expenditure
3. Funeral Expenditure Rs.25,000/- Rs.15,000/-
4. Loss of estate Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/-
5. Loss of consortium Rs.30,000/- Rs.80,000/-
(Spousal and
parental
consortium to
Claimant Nos.1
and 2 @
Rs.40,000/-
each)
Total: Rs.3,94,000 /- Rs.4,39,000/-
55. For the aforesaid reasons, point No.5 is answered in favour of the
claimants concluding that they are entitled for compensation of Rs.4,39,000/-.
31
Point No.6:
56. For the reasons stated and conclusions drawn under Point Nos.1 to 5 and
in the result it is found that all the respondents are liable to pay the compensation
jointly and severally and Point No.6 is answered accordingly.
Summary of findings:
Point Point Held in favour of
No.
1. Whether the pleaded The point touching the negligence is
accident dated 03.12.2013
answered in favor of the claimants and
has occurred due to rash
and negligent driving of the against the Respondents.
offending vehicle by
Respondent No.1?
2. Whether the accident place The deceased was an ex-employee of
viz. the RTC depot premises
the A.P.S.R.T.C and who went to the
and garage, is not a public
place and whether on the depot for enquiring about his
ground of deceased
retirement benefits etc. His presence
presence is not proper at the
time of the accident and no at the accident spot within the RTC
liability can be imposed on
premises cannot be considered as
the APSRTC?
unauthorized and the garage or the
depot of A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot be
considered as privileged place as
against its serving on retired
employees visiting for some
administrative and reasonable
purposes.
32
3. When outsourcing Even if an outsourced functionary
employees are sponsored
drive the vehicle with a knowledge and
by an agency and when
such an outsourced permission of the owner of the
functionary drives a vehicle?
offending vehicle who engaged the
Whether the owner of the
offending vehicle like services of outsourcing agency, the
APSRTC, an organization,
owner and all other persons
who has engaged the
services of an outsourcing connected there with are responsible
agency can disown the
for any tortious act for such
liability?
outsourcing employee and the owner
including an organization like
A.P.S.R.T.C. cannot disown its
liability.
4. Whether the petition is bad There is no necessity of presence of
and liable to be dismissed
M/s. K.L. Facility Management
for non-joinder of the
agency, M/s.K.L. Facility Services to the accident claim
Management Services,
proceedings and the defense of
which provided the
outsourcing functionaries for A.P.S.R.T.C is not tenable. Point is
maintenance etc. of the
answered against the A.P.S.R.T.C
vehicles of the A.P.S.R.T.C.
viz. the Respondents? and in favour of the claimants.
5. Whether the claimants are They are entitled for compensation of
entitled to compensation, if
Rs.4,39,000/-.
so, to what quantum?
6. What is the liability of the All the respondents are liable to
Respondents?
pay the compensation jointly and
severally.
33
Point No.7:
57. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1,to 6,
Point No.7 is answered as follows:
In the result,
(i) The appeal is allowed.
(ii) The order and decree dated 15.12.2016 passed by the learned MACT
are set-aside.
(iii) M.V.O.P.No.276 of 2015 is allowed as follows:
(a) Claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.4,39,000/- with
interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till the
date of realization.
(b) All the Respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and
severally.
(c) Claimant No.1 is entitled for Rs.3,00,000/- with proportionate
interest and total costs.
(d) Claimant No.2 is entitled for Rs.1,39,000/- with proportionate
interest and costs.
(e) Both the claimants are permitted to withdraw the entire amount at
once on deposit.
(iv) There shall be no order as to costs, in this appeal.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall
stand closed.
____________________________
A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J
Date:20th June, 2025
Note: L.R. Copy be marked
(B/o.)
Knr
34
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A No.537 of 2017
20th June, 2025
Note:
L.R. Copy be marked
(B/o.)
Knr