Chattisgarh High Court
Manish Kumar Patel vs National Thermal Power Corporation … on 31 July, 2025
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 6563 of 2021
1 - Manish Kumar Patel S/o Dhaniram Patel Aged About 28 Years R/o
Village Sukhri (Rank), Post Amarsahi, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - National Thermal Power Corporation Limited, Through Senior
Manager (Human Resource), National Thermal Power Gorporation
Limited, Post Office Ujjawal Nagar, Sipat, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
---- Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate
along with Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
31.07.2025
1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s)-:
“1] That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a writ/writs, direction/directions,
order/orders quashing the order dated
07.05.2016 (Annexure P/1) and the respondents
may kindly be directed to consider the case of
petitioner for grant of employment as per
Rehabilitation Scheme.
2] That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased
to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit
and proper in the aforesaid facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2. Mr. Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would
submit that the lands bearing Survey Nos 1413/1, 1463 & 1492
were initially recorded in the name of the grandfather of the
-2-
petitioner, namely Sukhau. He would further submit that for the
establishment of “Super Thermal Power Project, Seepat”, a large
chunk of land of various persons was acquired, including the lands
of the grandfather of the petitioner. He would contend that an
award was passed on 22.11.1999 in the name of the grandmother
of the petitioner, and compensation to the tune of Rs 2,93,334/-
was paid through a cheque. He would further contend that as per
the Rehabilitation scheme, one member of the land oustees would
be eligible and entitled to appointment. He would also contend that
the petitioner made a representation before the Collector to provide
employment according to Clause 3 of the Rehabilitation Policy, but
it has been rejected vide order dated 07.05.2016 on the ground
that one member of the family, i.e. brother of the petitioner, has
already been provided employment under the respondent against
the acquired land. He would also submit that, as the entire land of
the father of the petitioner was acquired, according to the
Rehabilitation Policy, more members of the family should have
been provided employment. He would state that the action of the
respondent is in violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of
India. He would pray to quash the order dated 07.05.2016 and to
allow this petition.
3. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Paranjpe.
He would submit that an award was passed on 22.11.1999 and
immediately thereafter, compensation was paid, which was
accepted by the father of the petitioner. He would further submit
3
that an application was moved by the petitioner seeking
employment in lieu of the acquisition of land, which was rejected
vide order dated 07.05.2016. He would contend that the said
document was collected by the petitioner under RTI, whereby the
petitioner was informed that his brother had already been provided
employment under the Rehabilitation Policy. He would further
contend that the petitioner filed this petition on 17.11.2021 without
explaining the delay. Therefore, the petition deserves to be
dismissed.
4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused
the documents placed on the record.
5. Clause 3.1.0 of RAP deals with the employment and the same is
reproduced herein below for reference:-
3.1.0 EMPLOYMENT:
As Sipat project is being installed with environment
friendly super critical technology, employment
opportunities in NTPC shall be comparatively less. In
view of this ” Land for Land” option, as described in
Chapter II has been considered as the prime
rehabilitation measure. However for direct employment in
NTPC in the unskilled category only PAPs would be
considered. In the skilled category preference would be
given to them. In both categories employment shall be
subject to eligibility as per NTPC’s R&R Policy,
availability of vacancies, NTPC’s recruitment policy and
Govt.’s policy on reservation.
6. Clause 3.1.1 talks about eligibility for employment and the same is
also reproduced herein below:-
3.1.1 ELIGIBILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT:
3.1.1.1 The basis of extending the preference in
employment will be on family basis. The family includes
husband, wife and dependant children. The eligibility
criteria will be as follows:
-4-
3.1.1.2 The broader groups of Project Affected Persons
(Khatedars) in crder of preference will be as below:
Group-1: Those Project Affected Persons
(Khatedars) who are resident of the area and are
owner of the acquired land for more than 20 years
prior to date of Sec.4 (1) Notification.
Group-2: Those Project Affected Persons
(Khatedars) who are resident of the area and are
owner of the acquired land for more than 10 years
prior to date of Sec.4 (1) Notification.
Group-3: Those Project Affected Persons
(Khatedars) who are resident of the area and are
owner of the acquired land for more than 01 year
prior to date of Sec.4 (1) Notification.
3.1.1.3 Further, each of the above three groups shall
have three sub-groups which shall, in order of group
priority, be as below and comprise of:
Sub-group (a): Those PAPs (Khatedars) whose
more than 5.0 (five) acres land is acquired.
Sub-group (b): Those PAPs (Khatedars) whose 1.0
(one) acre to 5.0 (five) acre land is acquired.
Sub-group (c): Those PAPs (Khatedars) whose
less than 1.0 (one) acre land is acquired.
3.1.1.4 In each of the above three sub-groups, the
priority list of the PAPS (Khatedars) shall be prepared in
the descending order of the percentage of land acquired
out of the total land holding of the respective PAPS
(Khatedars).
7. From a bare reading of the above-stated provisions, it is quite vivid
that the preference in employment will be on a family basis.
Admittedly, as per provisions of Clause 3.1.1 of RAP, the family
includes husband, wife and dependent children, meaning thereby,
preference would be given to one member of each family.
8. In the present case, one member of the land oustee’s family has
already been provided employment under the respondent, and this
fact is not disputed by the petitioner. According to the Rehabilitation
Policy, only one member of the family would be entitled to
5
consideration if the area of the land is one acre or more.
9. With regard to the delay and laches, the claim of the petitioner was
rejected by the respondent vide order dated 07.05.2016, and this
petition has been preferred on 17.11.2021 and in para 7 of the writ
petition, the petitioner has stated that there is no delay in filing the
instant petition. Though an affidavit has been filed by the petitioner
explaining the delay, I do not find the explanation satisfactory.
10.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tridip Kumar Dingal
& others Vs. State of W.B. & others, (2009) 1 SCC 768, in para
56 to 58 held as under:-
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the
Constitution, this Court takes into account certain
factors and one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a
writ-Court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ
is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is
that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ-Court, he should come to the Court at the
earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a
good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of
this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale
claims and exhume matters which have already been
disposed of or settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the meantime [vide State of
M.P. & Anr. V. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 6 SCR 261;
Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967
SC 1450; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1992) 2 SCR 969]. This principle applies even in
case of an infringement of fundamental right [vide
Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1
SCC 110; Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, (1969)
1 SCC 185; Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
(1970) 1 SCC 84].
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit
as to when a person can approach a Court. The
question is one of discretion and has to be decided
on the basis of facts before the Court depending on
and vary from case to case. It will depend upon what
-6-
the breach of fundamental right and the remedy
claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”
11. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous
delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of
justice. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent
persons; such delay does not deserve any indulgence, and on the
said ground alone, the writ petition may be dismissed. The doctrine
of delay and laches, or for that matter, statutes of limitation, are
considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There
must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court
for a remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to
the rights and obligations of the parties.
12.Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tridip Kumar
Dingal (supra), in my opinion, no case is made out for
interference.
13. Accordingly, the instant petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No
order as to cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Rekha