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Jharkhand High Court
Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Director … on 27 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:25726
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Revision No. 1091 of 2012
---------
Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya, son of Sri Babulal Punamiya, Resident
of Room No.2001/2002, Vardhman Height Co. Hsg. Sco. Ltd., C.S
No.758, Coner of T.B. Kadam Marg, A.G. Pawar Lane, Byculla, PS-
Byculla, Mumbai, Maharashtra-400 027. … … Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand through Director of Enforcement
… … Opposite Party
With
Criminal Revision No. 1326 of 2018
———
1. Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya, son of Late Shri Babulal Punamiya,
Resident of A-.2001/-002, Vardhman Heights, District-Mumbai
Suburban, Byculla East, PO & PS-Byculla, Mumbai 400027.
2. Balaji Lifestyle Realtors Private Limited represented through its
director Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya, 118/120, Ashok House, 3rd
Floor, Opp. Khara Kuwa, Zaveri Bazaar, PO Kalbadevi, P.S L.T
Marg, District-Mumbai 400002.
3. Balaji Universal Tradelink Private Limited represented through its
director Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamiya, 118/120, Ashok House, 3rd
Floor, Opp. Khara Kuwa, Zaveri Bazaar, PO Kalbadevi, P.S L.T
Marg, District-Mumbai 400002.
… … Petitioners
Versus
State of Jharkhand through Director of Enforcement
… … Opposite Party
———
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
———-
For the Petitioners : Mr. Krishna Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Ram Kumar, Advocate
For the Opp. Party-ED : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
———-
C.A.V. on 20/08/2025 Pronounced on 27/08/2025
1. Since these matters are interlinked and, as such, both are heard together
and being disposed of by a common order.
2. Both of these criminal revision petitions have been filed under Section
397 and 401 of Cr.P.C.
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3. Criminal Revision No. 1091 of 2012 is directed against the order dated
25.09.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI cum PMLA,
Ranchi in in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the
offence under section 3 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short PMLA, 2002) whereby and
whereunder, the application filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has
been rejected.
4. Criminal Revision No.1326 of 2018 is directed against the order dated
13.06.2018 in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the
offence under section 4 of the PMLA, 2002 whereby and whereunder,
the charge has been framed against the petitioners with respect to
Supplementary Complaint.
Factual Matrix:
5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant petition
which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under:
(i) The Petitioner filed the Cr. Rev. 1091 of 2012 challenging the
Order dated 25.09.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI
cum PMLA at Ranchi in the petitioner’s application for discharge
filed under section 227 of the Cr. P. C. against the Complaint dated
06.10.2010 filed by the Opposite Party against the Petitioner under
section 45 of the PMLA, 2002.
(ii) The petitioners filed Cr. Rev. No.1326 of 2018 challenging the
Order dated 13.06.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI
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cum PMLA at Ranchi whereby charges have been framed against
the petitioners with respect to Supplementary Complaint.
(iii) It needs to refer herein that the petitioner’s (in Cr. Rev. No.1326
of 2018) application for discharge filed under section 227 of the
Cr. P. C. against the Supplementary Complaint dated 14.02.2018
filed by the Opposite Party against the petitioners-Manoj Kumar
Babulal Punamiya and his 2 companies Balaji Lifestyle Realtors
Private Limited and Balaji Universal Tradelink Private Limited
under section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 has been dismissed vide order
dated 07.06.2018 and consequent to the aforesaid dismissal of the
said discharge application charges have been framed against the
petitioners.
(iv) It is pleaded that an application under section 156(3) of the Code
was filed in the Hon’ble Court of Vigilance Judge Cum Additional
Judicial Commissioner Ranchi praying for taking cognizance of
offence u/s 409, 420, 423, 424, 465, 120-B of the Indian Penal
Code 1860 read with sections 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1988 against the accused persons and the
petitioner was not amongst the accused named in the said
complaint application;
(v) It is pleaded that pursuant to the cognizance of the above
complaint application, u/s 156(3) by the said learned Court, a
F.I.R. came to be filed bearing number 09/09 dated 02.07.2009
against the accused persons. The petitioner was not amongst such
accused persons;
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(vi) It is pleaded that pursuant to the above F.I.R. filed by the Vigilance
Police the Enforcement Directorate proceeded to file a case
bearing number ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD dated 08.10.2009 for
investigation of money laundering from the proceeds, if any,
arising out of the alleged offences under Indian Penal Code 1860
and Prevention Of Corruption Act 1988 registered in the above
F.I.R. 09/09 dated 02.07.2009 and the same being listed as
Scheduled Offences in Part B and Part C of the PMLA 2002. The
said ECIR named 9 accused persons. The petitioner was not
amongst the said accused persons;
(vii) It is pleaded that the name of the Petitioner appeared in some
records of one of the accused mentioned in the ECIR based on
which the Enforcement Directorate through/with the Income Tax
Department raided the premises of the Petitioner and based on the
presence of the name of the Petitioner in some records of one of
the accused mentioned in the ECIR made out a case that the
Petitioner was liable for prosecution for the offence of money
laundering under the provisions of the PMLA 2002;
(viii) It is pleaded that the Enforcement Directorate regularly carried out
investigations with the Petitioner from the period October 2009 to
August 2010 including personal appearance before the
Enforcement Directorate, recording of statements, submission of
various records etc. The Petitioner rendered full co-operation to
the Enforcement Directorate and the Petitioner was arrested on
11.08.2010;
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(ix) It is pleaded that thereafter on 06.10.2010 the Enforcement
Directorate filed a Complaint in respect of the Petitioner u/s 45 of
the PMLA 2002 bearing number ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD (Suppl.)
dated 06.10.2010. At such time the Enforcement Directorate held
that, further investigation in the case was continuing.
(x) The Petitioner has not been charged with any Scheduled Offences
and has been charged with the allegation of offence u/s 3 of PMLA
2002 and which in the event of conviction is punishable u/s 4 of
the said Act.
(xi) It is pleaded that the petitioner was sent to S.L. Raheja Hospital,
Mumbai for better treatment for nuero surgical complications
under custody as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
passed in Cr.M.P.No.21278 of 2011 in Writ petition (Crl.) No.82
of 2011.
(xii) Thereafter, an amalgamation petition filed by the Enforcement
Directorate on 09.02.2012 before the Court of 1st Addl. Judicial
Commissioner which was disposed of by the above-said Court on
12.04.2012.
(xiii) It is pleaded that the petitioner has been admitted to bail vide Order
dated 31.08.2012 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(xiv) Thereafter the Petitioner filed a detailed application for discharge
u/s 227 of the Code which has been dismissed on 25.09.2012.
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6. Being aggrieved with the order dated 25.09.2012, the revision
application being Cr. Revision 1091 of 2012 has been filed for revision
of the impugned order dated 25.09.2012.
7. It requires to refer herein that during pendency of the said Criminal
Revision (Cr. Revision 1091 of 2012) supplementary complaint dated
14.2.2018 was filed against the Petitioner Manoj Kumar Babulal
Punamia along with the company M/s Balaji Life Style Retailers Pvt.
Ltd. and M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd. for the offence U/s
4 of Money Laundering Act where at para 10.1, 10.8 and 11.1 total Rs.
138.18 crore shown as proceeds of crime.
8. Accordingly discharge application against the supplementary complaint
has been filed by the petitioners on the ground that the supplementary
complaint was filed by the complainant after eight years after arrest of
Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia on 11.8.10 and six years after the
accused was granted bail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 31.8.12.
Further ground has been taken that the investigation is complete and the
SAID supplementary complaint has been filed six years after framing of
charge on 25.9.12 and commencement of trial.
9. The respondent ED has taken the ground that there is no bar in filing of
supplementary complaint and the materials collected therein are
sufficient to show that there is a new facts and grounds disclosed during
the further investigation against the above said petitioners and since the
matter was under investigation against the accused M/s Balaji Life Style
Pvt. Ltd. as well as against M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd.,
the same could not be brought earlier.
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10. The learned special Judge PML Act Ranchi, after perusing the evidence
has dismissed the said discharge application vide order dated 07.06.2018
and consequent to dismissal of the said application charges have been
framed against the petitioners vide order dated 13.06.2018 under Section
3 of PML Act 2002 punishable under Section 4 of the PML Act 2002.
11. Being aggrieved with the order dated 13.06.2018 the revision application
being Cr. Revision 1326 of 2018 has been filed for revision of
the impugned order dated 13.06.2018.
12. It needs to mention herein that the petitioner has earlier moved before
this Hon’ble Court for quashing of warrant of arrest issued by the learned
Trial Court in for writ petition vide W.P. (Cr.) No.10/2010 and the said
application was dismissed vide order dated 3.2.2010 by the learned
Single Judge of this Court.
13. Thereafter, the petitioner has moved against the order dated 03.02.2010
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide S.L.P. (Crl.) No.
1779/2010 and the said SLP was directed to be withdrawn with liberty
to move an application for regular bail before the appropriate Court.
14. Thereafter, the petitioner has moved for grant of regular bail before
learned 1st A.J.C. Cum Special Judge under PMLA and the same has
been rejected vide the order dated 06.10.2010 and accordingly, the
petitioner has moved before this Hon’ble Court for grant of the Regular
Bail on 03.12.2010 in the said case ECIR/02/PAT/09 vide Bail
Application No.9104 of 2010 and it was finally withdrawn on
05.05.2011 by the petitioner.
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15. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a bail application No. 8919 of 2012
and this Hon’ble High Court vide its Order dated 13.02.2012 has rejected
the prayer of the petitioner for the grant of the regular bail and thereafter
the SLP (Crl) no. 1963/2012 with prayer for bail and the same has been
dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its Order dated 19.03.2012
since investigation is pending.
16. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a writ petition being W.P. (Crl) 54 of
2012 for stay of proceeding on trial under PMLA before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and the same is withdrawn vide its Order dtd 09.07.2012.
Thereafter petitioner has filed a bail application being B.A. No. 3565 of
2012 and this Hon’ble High Court vide its Order dtd 19.05.2012 has
rejected the prayer of the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner moved
SLP (Crl) no 4516 of 2012 with prayer for grant of regular bail before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the said prayer is allowed and the
petitioner is enlarged on regular bail.
17. These revision applications have been preferred against the impugned
orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018.
Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner:
18. Mr. Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the
following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
(i) The ground has been taken that the impugned order passed by the
learned Trial Court is completely illegal and perverse in the eyes
of law being non-application of judicial mind, hence,
unsustainable in the eyes of law;
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(ii) The ground has also been taken that the impugned findings and
order of the learned trial court suffer from an error of law and
manifestly wrong and are grossly unjust, as such, the same
deserves to be set aside.
(iii) By referring of the order dated 25.09.2012 it has been submitted
that the learned trial Court summarily rejected the Discharge
Application without recording submission of either the petitioner
or the Enforcement Directorate and without any hearing at all on
the merits of the Discharge Application.
(iv) It has been contended that the framing of charges is a procedure
of criminal law but subject to appropriate and reasoned disposal
of any discharge pending prior to it with recording of proper
submissions and meritorious hearing.
(v) It has been contended that framing of the charges on the same i.e.
on 25.09.20212, and the rejection of the discharge application on
that very day without any opportunity to know the reasons for the
rejection of the Discharge Application is untenable in the eyes of
law.
(vi) It has been that after seven years of filing of the supplementary
complaint dated 6.10.10 against Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia
and after six years an amalgamation order dated 9.2.12 where the
investigation against the accused/revisionist Manoj Kumar
Babulal Punamia was completed and charges be framed, the
supplementary complaint has been filed after lapse of six years
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when the amalgamation application was positively adjudicated
vide order dated 12.4.12.
(vii) It has been contended that petitioners never received or handled
with the proceeds of crime directly or indirectly relating to the
schedule offence and, therefore, it is not possible to sustain the
supplementary complaint alleging proceeds of crime to the tune of
Rs. 138 crores.
(viii) Further the properties prayed for confiscation in the
supplementary complaint have been acquired by M/s Balaji Life
Style Retailers Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt.
Ltd. from legitimate sources and details of each and every account
has been submitted thereof in appeal pending before the Hon’ble
Appellate Tribunal.
(ix) It has been contended that the impugned orders are entirely
incorrect and illegal as it is contrary to the express provisions of
sections 227 and 228 of the Code as also provisions of PMLA,
2002, which mandate the compliance of provisions and procedures
set out in the Code;
(x) It has been contended that the learned Court is compounding its
illegality of first summarily rejecting the Discharge Application
without submissions of the Enforcement Directorate and any
hearing by proceeding to frame charges of laundering where
charges have not framed and trial not determining the generation
and existence of proceeds of crime that are being charged to have
been laundered;
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(xi) It has been contended that the Impugned Orders are therefore
vitiated and in contravention to all necessary provisions of law,
procedures laid down by law, well settled principles of law and
principles of natural justice;
(xii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate that none of the alleged offences has been made out
against the petitioner.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order needs
to be interfered with.
Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State:
20. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the
Opposite Party-ED, has taken the following grounds in defending the
order impugned:
(i) It has been contended that sufficient material has been surfaced in
course of investigation to the effect that the involvement of the
petitioners in the commission of alleged crime is there as would
be evident from the record.
(ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the
petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been
rightly rejected. Further, there is no illegality or perversity or
material irregularity in the impugned orders calling for any
interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned
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the petitioner.
(iii) It has been contended that the present petition is not maintainable
as Directorate of Enforcement has filed Prosecution Complaint
and several Supplementary Prosecution Complaint in the matter
elaborating the close nexus of Manoj Babulal Punamia, Arvind
Vyas, Anil Bastawade with Binod Sinha and Madhu Koda.
Various steps of Money Laundering and involvement of various
persons like Manoj Babulal Punamia, Arvind Vyas, Anil
Bastawade, Vijay Joshi at various steps of laundering of corrupt
money earned by Madhu Koda by misusing his position.
Properties involved in Proceeds of Crime were identified and
attached as per PML Act, 2002. Prosecution was launched in Trial
Court and always at the time of filing Prosecution Complaint or
Supplementary Prosecution Complaint, the Prosecution craved
leave to file Supplementary Prosecution Complaint.
(iv) It has been contended that there is a clear nexus of Madhu Koda
with Manoj Babulal Punamia present revisionist through Binod
Kumar Sinha. Supplementary Prosecution Complaint has been
filed against Manoj Babulal Punamia by the Directorate of
Enforcement on 14.02.2018, clearly reveals the documentary
evidences linking Shri Manoj Babulal Punamia with Shri Binod
Kumar Sinha and other associates of Shri Madhu Koda.
(v) The said Supplementary Prosecution Complaint also reveals the
relationship of Madhu Koda with Shri Manoj Babulal Punamia
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and M/s Balaji Group Companies wherein the ill-
gotten money of Madhu Koda was parked. Income tax details,
shareholding patterns, inter-related transactions clearly show this
relation and process of money laundering. Statements of Arvind
Vyas, Binod Kumar Sinha, Anil Bastawade confirms the
transactions made in the process of hiding the tainted money
(Proceeds of Crime) and further projecting it as untainted.
(vi) It has further been contended the record of the case reveals that
earlier a complaint was filed against the accused Manoj Babulal
Punamia for the same offence of money laundering. Pending the
further investigation and cognizance was taking on the same day
against Manoj Babulal Punamia, under section 4 of PML Act and
trial was proceeded jointly against seven accused persons. In view
of the fact that cognizance was earlier taken against Manoj Babulal
Punamia for the same offence in the case as such, fresh cognizance
is not required, keep this supplementary complaint as a part of
earlier complaint in this case.
(vii) It has been contended that it is wrongly interpreted by the
petitioner that Directorate of Enforcement will have to confine
itself up to the quantum of Proceeds of Crime mentioned by the
agency investigating the scheduled offence. It is to mention here
that CBI has no purview over money laundering and is responsible
to investigate the criminality only. Even in the submission made
by Investigating Officer of CBI in the case, the term ‘Proceeds of
Crime’ is not used rather the term illegal acquiring has been used.
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On the other hand, Directorate of Enforcement has given
responsibility to investigate the Proceeds of Crime generated
through scheduled criminal activity, under Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002.
(viii) It has been contended that Directorate of Enforcement not only
deals with money directly generated from criminal activities but
also looks into the various steps of money laundering where illegal
money is routed through various channels and after going through
various points, it is projected as untainted.
(ix) It has been contended that during the investigation, it was found
that illegally acquired money of Madhu Koda through its partner
went through many inter-related transactions, was used in
acquiring many companies, was used in purchase and sale of
shares of various companies, and documentary evidences as well
as statements of various persons clearly shows that Proceeds of
Crime laundered by Manoj Babulal Punamia with the help of
Binod Sinha and other associates of Madhu Koda to the tune of
Rs. 138.18 Crore.
(x) It has been contended that so far as sections 23 and 24 of PMLA
are concerned, these sections put the onus on petitioner to prove
that proceed of crime is not involved in money-laundering. Any
inter-connected transaction relating to proceeds of crime will be
considered as money-laundering. The Special Court had issued
summon to petitioner after taking cognizance of the
supplementary complaint filed by the Directorate of Enforcement
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and accorded an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard and to
show if proceeds of crime possessed by the petitioner at the time
of the attachment were not involved in money-laundering.
(xi) It has been contended that it is evident from the abovementioned
fact that Directorate of Enforcement is not confined only to the
amount of illegal acquiring by any criminal activity of scheduled
offence, as revealed by investigation of CBI or any other agency,
rather, the Directorate of Enforcement investigate the money
laundering and whole Proceeds of Crime generated through any
scheduled criminal activity directly or indirectly.
21. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-ED, on the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned
orders to be interfered with.
Analysis:
22. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also
gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the
impugned order as also the case diary.
23. It is evident that pursuant to a PIL filed in this Court bearing W.P. No.
4700/2008 the Court directed the investigation to be conducted against
various persons by Income Tax authority, Enforcement Directorate and
CBI. Pursuant to that Enforcement Directorate has lodged the present
case numbered as ECIR/02/Pat/09/AD and after investigation
Enforcement Directorate has submitted several complaints against the
petitioner Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia and other co-accused persons
on different dates.
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24. It was alleged through these complaint petitions that Madhu Kora, the
then Chief Minister of Jharkhand State along with other co-accused have
amassed huge wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income
by abusing their official position and also through corrupt and illegal
means. Madhu Kora and his close associates Binod Sinha, Sunil Kumar
Sinha, Vikash Sinha, Sanjay Choudhary and Dhananjay Choudhary,
some others were named as associates of Madhu Kora in the alleged
criminal acts. Through those complaint petitions it was stated that in
conspiracy with each other huge investments by the aforesaid accused
persons have been done in different business streams like real estate,
mining, steel and power which are spread over in India and also abroad
like Dubai, Thailand, Indonesia etc.
25. It was alleged that Camtech Manufacturing Co., Dubai was related with
M/s KGN of Dubai and papers related to coal mines investment in
Indonesia was seized by the I.T. authorities at the residence of Arvind
Vyas on 31.10.09 which was allegedly brought by Arvind Vyas for
Manoj Punamia. The seized papers showed the payment of Rs. 25 crores
out of the total cost of US 60 million dollars and that Anil Adinath
Bastawade had sent those papers from Dubai for Babulal Punamia.
26. It was also alleged that Camptech Manufacturing Co. was a company
registered at Dubai and shares of the company were held by Sanjay
Chudhary, Dhananjay Choudhary, Anil Adinath Bastawade, Manoj
Punamia and one local person of Dubai. It was further alleged that the
petitioners were managing the illegal money of Binod Sinha in Jumerra
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village Down Town Jabel Ali Project, Dubai and handled Binod Sinha’s
fund in coal mines in Indonesia.
27. Further on perusal of the record reveals that vide court order dated
25.9.12 the discharge application filed by the petitioner was dismissed
and accordingly charges were framed. Thereafter on 14.02.2018
supplementary prosecution complaint has been filed against the
petitioners and against the aforesaid complaint the discharge application
has been filed by the petitioners which has been dismissed on 07.06.2013
and consequent to dismissal of the said application vide order dated
13.06.2018 the charge has been framed against the petitioners.
28. the aforesaid orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 is impugned
herein.
29. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues
which require consideration are–
(i) Whether the orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 by which the
application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed
and charges have been framed respectively, can be said to suffer
from an error?
(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in
course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner and
his company is made out or not?
30. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.
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31. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions
of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.
32. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a
comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering,
attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof
including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies
and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money-
laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
33. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the
urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for
preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime,
adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering
and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime.
34. It needs to refer herein the definition of “proceeds of crime” as provided
under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:
“2 (1) (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of
any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held
outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held
within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.–For the
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime”
include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled
offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be
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derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable
to the scheduled offence;]”
35. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “proceeds of crime” means
any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as
a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value
of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the
country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or
abroad.
36. In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only
derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property
which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any
criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid
explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of
2019.
37. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section
2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the
substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property
or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way
of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication
by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled
offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived
or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence.
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38. The “property” has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any
property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets,
wherever located.
39. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means
schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The
“scheduled offence” has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads
as under:
“2(y) “scheduled offence” means– (i) the offences specified
under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under
Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences
is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under
Part C of the Schedule.”
40.It is evident that the “scheduled offence” means the offences specified
under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of
the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore
rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.
41.The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of
the Act, 2002 which reads as under:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.–Whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly
is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity
connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment,
possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as
untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.
[Explanation.– For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified
that,– (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering
if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to
indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is
actually involved in one or more of the following processes or20
2025:JHHC:25726activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:– (a)
concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or
(e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted
property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity
connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and
continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying
the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or
acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or
claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]”
42. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “offence of money-
laundering” means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge
or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in
any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including
its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or
claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering.
43. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds
of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is
directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment
or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property
or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.
44. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section
4 of the Act, 2002.
45. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 alongwith interpretation of the
definition of “proceeds of crime” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs.
Union of India and Ors., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 wherein the
Bench comprising of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme
21
2025:JHHC:25726
Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and
intent of the Act, 2002.
46. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it
has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money-
laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money-
laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime,
which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner
which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation
of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the
banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain
records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions
within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act.
47. The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment
wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way
of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the “proceeds of crime” as
contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been
clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the “proceeds of
crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled
offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived
or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled
offence, meaning thereby, the words “any property which may directly
or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity
relatable to the scheduled offence” will come under the fold of the
proceeds of crime.
22
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48. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) as under
paragraph 284, it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is
to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has
reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the
person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is
further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of
involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected
with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward
for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting
thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a
standalone process.
49. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is
proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge and framing of charge.
50. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is
proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge.
51. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous
examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be
sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that
a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case.
Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the
purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record
23
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is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that
a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.
52. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the
probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials,
which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First
Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded
in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies
and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The
probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not
at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge
minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very
strong suspicion charges can be framed.
53. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge,
the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the
material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material
against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The
Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient
material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence.
Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for
framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be
determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced
and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of
framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate
inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material.
24
2025:JHHC:25726
54. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police
in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC
709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon’ble Apex
Court has been observed as under:–
“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and
the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it
is that at the time of consideration of the applications
for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the
prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order
to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so
as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of
consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to
proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record
by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and
documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging
therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all
the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage,
probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court
is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the
materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what
needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming
that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for
convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if
the court thinks that the accused might have committed the
offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative
value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court
has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the
offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.
32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh
Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No.
528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K.
Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the
materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether
that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this25
2025:JHHC:25726was not the stage where the court should have appraised the
evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order
of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a
ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N.
Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case
(MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers
from grave error and calls for rectification.
33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the
purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing
on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear
before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed
with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and
make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.
34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order
of discharge with the aforesaid observations.
55. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National
Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected
by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record
at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of
the said judgment as under:–
“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by
this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of
framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is
akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused
has been made out; where the material placed before the court
discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the
charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against
the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is
thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under
Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its
judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made
out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed
to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”
26
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56. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be
considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a
ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok
Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference Paragraph no.
11 of the said judgment are quoted below:–
“11. While considering the legality of the impugned
judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018
SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the
law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to
be referred to.
11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC
398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to
consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at
the time of framing of the charge and/or considering
the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the
said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of
Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to
find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the
sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the
evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced
before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a
conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will
frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he
will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while
exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros
and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of
evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the
court, after the trial starts.
27
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11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State
of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3
SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held
in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526)
“25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine
Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial
court was dealing with an application for discharge under the
provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern
the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several
decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the
stage of considering an application for discharge the court must
proceed on the assumption that the material which has been
brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the
material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from
the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the
ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014)
11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S)
721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court
held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)
’29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be
gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter
and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In
our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a
ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and
not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made
out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might
have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on
record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for
conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the
accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a
mini trial at this stage.'”
57. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for
framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of
Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:–
28
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“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with
a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at
their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not
expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on
record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground
for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a
ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that
stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the
court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the
factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify
the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the
commission of that offence.
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC
699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court
had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court
has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any
ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the
accused. As framing of charge affects a person’s liberty
substantially, need for proper consideration of material
warranting such order was emphasised.
14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000)
6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to
several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7)
“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing
charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court
is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the
materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the
accused.”
58. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder
Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can
also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and
appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point
of time.
29
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59. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused
was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous
trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is
reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the
Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in
criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused
and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing
any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions
Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order
in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-
restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is
a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any
matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may
be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no
ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the
High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be
taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC
715.
60. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court
should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, in the following words:–
“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is
discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these30
2025:JHHC:25726provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the
case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the
parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to
the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge.
Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court
would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed
against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This
presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction
of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an
offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for
exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima
facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression
of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228
is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly
guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is
impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has
used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element
of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference
to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt
the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to
quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to
the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black’s
Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept
upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to
the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the
matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the
witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating
material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section
313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity
to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps
that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion
and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil31
2025:JHHC:25726transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status
of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.
61. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by
the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused
person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of
the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there
is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However,
while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite
opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of
the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once the
facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that
there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge
accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.
62. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case
of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC.
The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para
21 as under:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend
upon the facts of each case.
32
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(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece
of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of
the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at
this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons
of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form
an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can
frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of
the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a
charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material
placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of
offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to
evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to
find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common
sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
63. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case
of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768, the
33
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above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the
Hon’ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave
suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of the report
are quoted as under:
“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer
to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions
viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following
principles:
17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge
at the instance of the prosecution.
17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find
out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police
or the documents produced before the Court.
17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to
prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence
evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed
offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding
with the trial”.
17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials
giving rise to the grave suspicion.
17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the
court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This,
however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into
the pros and cons.
17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of
the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material
brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.
34
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17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong
suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and
refusing to discharge the accused.
18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage
when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC
(see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the
record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be
understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by
the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused
to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge.
At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the
accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police
(see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).
28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind
ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227
CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced
by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also
documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected
to questioning through cross-examination and everything
assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges
where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it,
undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused
warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.
29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of
defence and persuade the court to discharge him.
30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials
on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of
the court’s”, which is not explained away? Can the accused
explain away the material only with reference to the materials
produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material
which he chooses to produce at the stage?
31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only
rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it
must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established
on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the
materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the
35
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accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to
persuade the court to discharge him.”
64. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a
mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but
has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.
In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence
and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the
stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order
to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold
the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents
produced before the court which ex-facie disclose that there are
suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him.
65. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC
657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held
in paragraph 27 which reads as under:
“27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is
enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of
charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The
endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is
without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in36
2025:JHHC:25726support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the
material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time
of framing charge should be the material which is produced and
relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not
to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to
find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required
at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence
collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the
accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would
suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed
before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in
terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any
other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has
direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.”
66. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if,
upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such
consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence,
the trial Court shall frame the charge.
67. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge
and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for
framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift
and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words,
the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the
evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the
37
2025:JHHC:25726
court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances
against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that
if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to
proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.
68. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution,
it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the
matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities
which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
69. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was
only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out
or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not
because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering
the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.
70. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court
is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as
to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of
investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in
the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or
not?
71. It is evident from record that present petitioner is an accused in
connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD registered for the offence under
sections 3 and punishable under section 4 of the PMLA, 2002. The
petitioner has preferred the discharge application under Section 227 of
Cr. P.C. but the same has been dismissed vide order dated 25.09.2012 by
38
2025:JHHC:25726
the court concerned by taking into consideration the entire material
available on record.
72. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically contended that
while rejecting the discharge application, rule of natural Justice has not
been adhered by the Spl. Judge PML Act, therefore the order dated
25.09.2012 is not sustainable in the eye of law.
73. This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid contention has gone
through the order dated 25.09.2012 by which the application for
discharge of the petitioner has been rejected.
74. It is evident from the aforesaid order that the case was fixed for charge
on 13.10.11 and therefore ample time was available to the accused
persons including the revisionist for filing or for taking any step but the
petitioner/revisionist did not file application for discharge, thereafter on
13.9.12 i.e. almost after one year, it had been ordered by the Court
concerned that every petition filed for discharge shall be deemed to be
rejected. Accordingly, the Spl. Judge PML Act while taking into entire
material available on record has dismissed the said discharge application
on the ground of delaying tactics which had been adopted by the
petitioner.
75. Thus, from the aforesaid order it is evident that the contention of learned
counsel that rule of natural justice has not been followed is not correct
since the accused/revisionist himself had not filed the discharge
application and consumed time in order to delay the trial.
39
2025:JHHC:25726
76. Now this Court in the backdrop of the settled position of law which has
already been discussed hereinabove is adverting to order dated
13.06.2018 by which charges has been framed against the petitioner
along with the companies namely M/s Balaji Life Style Retailers Pvt.
Ltd. And M/s Balaji Universal Trade Links Pvt. Ltd. through its
representative accused Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia.
77. But before coming to the order dated 13.06.2018 it needs to refer herein
that on the basis of supplementary prosecution complaint dated
14.02.2018 charges have been reframed against the petitioner. The
relevant paragraph of the order of re-framing of charge based upon the
said supplementary prosecution complaint has been quoted in the counter
affidavit filed by the respondent ED, for ready reference the same is
being quoted as under:
“Perused the case along with Supplementary Complaint and
documents produced by the Prosecution, it appears that the
accused Manoj Babulal Punamia has committed prima-facie
offence under section 3 read section 4 of PMLA, 2002 by using his
companies/firms cited accused no. 2 and 3 for disguising the
Proceeds of Crime to the tune of Rs. 138.18 Crore and dealt with
an investment. Further the record of the case reveals that earlier
was a complaint was filed against the accused Manoj
BabulalPunamia for the same offence of money laundering to the
tune of Rs. 58.69 Crore. Pending the further investigation and
cognizance was taking on the same day against Manoj Babulal
Punamia, under section 4 of PML Act and trial proceeded jointly
against seven accused persons. In view of the fact that cognizance
was earlier taken against Manoj Babulal Punamia for the same
offence in the case as such, fresh cognizance is not required, keep
this supplementary complaint as a part of earlier complaint in this
case…..
40
2025:JHHC:25726
78. Thereafter discharge application has been filed by the petitioners which
has been dismissed vide order dated 07.06.2013 by the Spl. Judge and
consequent to the dismissal of the said discharge application, the charges
have been framed under Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 against the
petitioners vide order dated 13.06.2018.
79. It needs to refer herein that in the present criminal Revision application
(Cr. Revision No. 1326 of 2018) the order framing charge dated
13.06.2018 has been challenged, wherein it has been mention about the
culpability of the petitioners. It has been stated therein that the petitioners
along with the other accused persons during the period from 2005 to
2008 have knowingly assisted and have been a party in the process and
activities connected with the proceed of crime and projected it as
untainted property by obtaining/acquiring huge properties and also by
showing transaction through paper companies and by obtaining
accommodation entries in such paper companies for the purpose of
projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted properties and knowingly
have obtained/acquired huge properties at different states of India and
across the border in Foreign countries such as Dubai, Sweden, Indonesia,
Thailand and Liberia, you all have directly or indirectly indulged and
knowingly assisted each other and by involving in process and activity
connected with the proceeds of crime of schedule offence of Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002, obtained/acquired properties valued
worth 36,33,11,16,240/- and US $ 2,429,990 and out of which the
petitioners has projected the proceeds of crime by its investment in the
properties valued worth Rs. 138 .18 Crores as untainted properties.
41
2025:JHHC:25726
80. So far as the allegations against the petitioners are concerned, it needs to
refer herein that It has come on record that the accused/revisionist
namely Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia and Arvind Vyas are the close
associates of co-accused Binod Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary, Anil
Adinath Bastawade, Dhananjay Choudhary who actively helped them in
investment of proceeds of crime in a suspected manner and during the
course of investigation statement of D.K. Srivastava, Senior Assistant
General Manager (Projects) of IVRCL Infrastructure and Projects Ltd.,
Lucknow was recorded on 21.7.2010 and whereby it is revealed that
Binod Sinha was a mastermind to decide the percentage of ill legal
gratification to be taken and the place where the money was to be
delivered.
81. It has come on record that Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia has also
admitted in his statement dated 6.12.2012 that the shares were transferred
to Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary on 2.8.2008, whereas the
payments were received on 17.3.2009 are going to show his nexus with
Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay Choudhary. Shares of this company were
sold at premium (at Rs. 1,000/- per share), whereas Manoj Kumar
Babulal Punamia sold these shares to Binod Kumar Sinha and Sanjay
Choudhary @ Rs. 10/-, thereby making a loss of Rs. 25,07,99,670/-.
82. Further it is alleged that Balaji Group of Companies under control of
Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia had transactions with companies
controlled by Binod Kumar Sinha through another company under
control of Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia namely Keyman Advisory
Services Pvt. Ltd. Statements of bank accounts of companies of Balaji
42
2025:JHHC:25726Group, M/s Keyman Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd., M/s Quantum
Powertech Pvt. Ltd., M/s Blue Techno Projects Ltd. reveals nexus of
these companies. The further investigation also reveals that the accused
Manoj Kumar Babulal Punamia processed the proceeds of crime through
those two companies namely M/s Balaji Lifestyle Retailers Pvt. Ltd. And
M/s Balaji Universal Tradelink Pvt. Ltd. wherein he is the Director and
maximum percentage of share of both the companies are holding by
himself or his associates or group of companies which is
owned/controlled by him.
83. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that prima facie- material is
available against the present petitioners, as such charges have been
framed under the Section 3 of the Act 2002.
84. Further it needs to refer herein that supplementary prosecution complaint
has been filed on 14.02.2018 but there is no bar in the filing of the
supplementary complaint as per the criminal procedure Code and further
as per the mandate of Section 216 Cr. P.C. the charge can be added or
alter at any stage but before pronouncement of the judgment.
85. Further it needs to refer herein that co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Directorate of Enforcement V/s Narendra Mohan Singh
and Ankita Singh, 2014 (3) JLJR 260 in para-16 and 17 it has been
observed that the “provisions as contained in Section 44 (1)(b) and 45 of
the PML Act, refers to ‘a complaint’. Even if such reference is there of
‘a complaint’, it never prevents the department from filing of
supplementary complaint inasmuch as the reference of the complaint has
43
2025:JHHC:25726been made in those provisions in the context that whenever a complaint
filed by an authority authorized, Court may take cognizance over it.”
86. Further it needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pavna
Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No.
2779/2023) held that the who could commit an offence under the PMLA
maybe not be named in the scheduled offence.
87. Further the offence of money laundering as contemplated in Section 3 of
the PMLA has been elaborately dealt with by the three Judge Bench in
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), in which it has been observed that
Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined captures every
process and activity in dealing with the proceeds of crime, directly or
indirectly, and is not limited to the happening of the final act of
integration of tainted property in the formal economy to constitute an act
of money laundering. Of course, the authority of the Authorised Officer
under the Act to prosecute any person for the offence of money
laundering gets triggered only if there exist proceeds of crime within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act and further it is involved in any
process or activity. Not even in case of existence of undisclosed income
and irrespective of its volume, the definition of “Proceeds of Crime”
under Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property has been
derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence. The property must qualify the definition of “Proceeds of Crime”
under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the
crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as
proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of
44
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“Proceeds of Crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime
properties.
88. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana Dibbur vs. The
Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has considered the effect of the
appellant not being shown as an accused in the predicate offence by
taking into consideration Section 3 of the Act, 2002.
89. Based upon the definition Clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of
the Act 2002 which defines “proceeds of crime”, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has been pleased to observe that clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section
2 of PMLA defines “property” to mean any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable,
tangible or intangible.
90. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or
obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the
proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained from
scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly
be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the
scheduled offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any
such property will also be the proceeds of crime.
91. It has further been observed by referring the decision rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union
of India and Ors.(supra) that the condition precedent for the existence
of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. At
paragraph-15 the finding has been given therein that on plain reading of
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Section 3 of the Act, 2002, an offence under Section 3 can be committed
after a scheduled offence is committed. By giving an example, it has been
clarified that if a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence,
knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly
assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be held guilty of
committing an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Therefore, it is not
necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of the
PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled
offence. For ready reference relevant paragraphs are being quoted as
under:
15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime
is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is
necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023)
12 SCC 1] . In para 109 of the said decision [Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , this Court held
thus : (SCC p. 166)
“109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity
relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds
of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to
action against any person for money laundering on an assumption
that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime
and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same
is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by
way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression
“derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to
a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event
the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction
owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing
of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there
can be no action for money laundering against such a person or46
2025:JHHC:25726person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to
the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be
countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in
particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other
view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the
express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it
obtains as of now.” (emphasis in original and supplied)
16. In paras 134 and 135, this Court held thus : (Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary case [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2023) 12 SCC 1] , SCC p. 182)
“134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is
amply clear that the offence of money laundering is an
independent offence regarding the process or activity connected
with the proceeds of crime which had been derived or obtained as
a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled
offence. The process or activity can be in any form — be it one
of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of proceeds of crime
as much as projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be
so. Thus, involvement in any one of such process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime would constitute offence of
money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with
the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence — except the
proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime.
135.Needless to mention that such process or activity can be
indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained as a
result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). It would be an
offence of money-laundering to indulge in or to assist or being
party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of
crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may
be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of
commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal
activity may have been committed before the same had been
notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but
if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or
indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained
from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as
scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of
money laundering under the 2002 Act — for continuing to
possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or47
2025:JHHC:25726retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully
exhausted. The offence of money-laundering is not dependent on
or linked to the date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may
say so, the predicate offence has been committed. The relevant
date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or
activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients
are intrinsic in the original provision (Section 3, as amended until
2013 and were in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been
merely explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause
(ii) in Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does
not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all.” (emphasis
supplied)
17. Coming back to Section 3 PMLA, on its plain reading, an
offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled
offence is committed. For example, let us take the case of a person
who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly
assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly
assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that case, he can be held
guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 PMLA. To give
a concrete example, the offences under Sections 384 to 389IPC
relating to “extortion” are scheduled offences included in Para 1
of the Schedule to PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of
extortion covered by Sections 384 to 389IPC and extort money.
Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence of extortion
may assist the said accused in the concealment of the proceeds of
extortion. In such a case, the person who assists the accused in the
scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of the crime of
extortion can be guilty of the offence of money-laundering.
Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the
offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged must have been shown
as the accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in para 135
of the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] supports the above conclusion.
The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under Section
3 PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence and that there
must be proceeds of crime in relation to the scheduled offence as
defined in clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 PMLA..
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2025:JHHC:25726
92. Be it noted that the legal presumption under Section 24(a) of the Act
2002, would apply when the person is charged with the offence of
money-laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The
existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational fact, to be
established by the prosecution, including the involvement of the person
in any process or activity connected therewith. Once these foundational
facts are established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on the
person facing charge of offence of money- laundering to rebut the legal
presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money-
laundering, by producing evidence which is within his personal
knowledge of the accused.
93. Thus, in light of the aforesaid principles and the law enunciated by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (Supra), this
Court must determine whether the foundational facts necessary to invoke
the presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA have been established
by the respondent/ED.
94. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement
and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that which reads
as under :
“30. The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of
preventing money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of
crime, thereby ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine
the financial system. Money laundering has far-reaching
consequences, not only in terms of individual acts of corruption
but also in causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The
laundering of proceeds of crime results in a significant loss to the49
2025:JHHC:25726economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions, and erodes
public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the present case
have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial
transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort
market integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such
acts, when committed by persons in positions of power, erode
public confidence in governance and lead to systemic
vulnerabilities within financial institutions.
31. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading
effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving
legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is
settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences,
judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised
with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the
absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly
argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a
trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and
to ensure accountability.
32. The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money
laundering and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal
economy. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes,
courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning
economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit
procedural loopholes to evade justice.
33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of
financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in
transactions constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks
an end to the proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively
preventing the full adjudication of facts and evidence before the
competent forum. However, as established in multiple judicial
pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate
a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events,
financial transactions, and culpability of the accused.
34. The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the
broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the
necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging
the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing. The
argument that the proceedings are unwarranted is devoid of
substance in light of the statutory objectives, the continuing
nature of the offence, and the significant financial implications
arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at this
stage would be premature and contrary to the principles
governing the prosecution in money laundering cases.
50
2025:JHHC:25726
95. From perusal of case record, statements of witnesses as referred in the
impugned order, materials available on record and in view of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is
of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are available
on the record for framing of charge against the present petitioner and his
companies.
96. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that
the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be
exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers
the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner
as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers
could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against
the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or
the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at
the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
for which the accused has been charged.
97. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to
correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion
unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be
compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot
undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is
undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only
be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings
51
2025:JHHC:25726
or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for
which the accused has been charged.
98. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road
Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in
the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the
rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction.
99. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R.
Soundirarasu,(supra) has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under:
81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled
parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power
to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court
could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant.
This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court has
completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or
considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High
Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused
persons, compared with the information compiled by the
investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the
explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be
accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability.
This entire exercise has been justified on account of the
investigating officer not taking into consideration the explanation
offered by the public servant and also not taking into
consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the public
servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein.
82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused
persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability,
the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as
“groundless”. As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D.
Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that the accused might have
52
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made statements before the investigating officer as to his alleged
sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence
in the case.
83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the
principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always
lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences
charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge
framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it
is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in
possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of
income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the
sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to
the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the
accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his
hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give
satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt
to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC.
At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only look into
the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the
prosecution is groundless.”
100. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of
power of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately
discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of
law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous
consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage
nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be
undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge
is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the
accused is required to be further tried or not.
101. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be
parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake
53
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meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the
Trial Court or the Appellate Court.
102. Hence, on the basis of discussion made herein above, this court is
of the considered view that, there is no illegality in the impugned orders
dated orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018 passed by the learned
Special Judge, PMLA Ranchi in connection with ECIR/02/PAT/09/AD.
103. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to
interfere with the impugned orders dated 25.09.2012 and 13.06.2018,
consequently, these criminal revision petitions are hereby dismissed.
104. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stands disposed
of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Sudhir/-
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated:27./08/2025
AFR
54
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