Patna High Court
Mantu Rai vs The State Of Bihar on 4 August, 2025
Author: Sudhir Singh
Bench: Sudhir Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.793 of 2024
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-372 Year-2016 Thana- BIHTA District- Patna
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Mantu Rai, aged about 48 years, Male, son of Nagina Rai, Resident of
Village- Tikaitpur P.S.- Bihta District- Patna.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Guddu Kumar @ Upendra Kumar, aged about 35 years, Son of Shokhi
Gope.
3. Ripu Rai @ Surendra Kumar, aged about 40 years, Son of Shokhi Gop.
4. Manish Kumar, aged about 29 years, Son of Shokhi Gop.
5. Bittu Kumar, aged about 27 years, Son of Vineshwar Prasad.
6. Vikash Kumar, aged about 25 years, Son of Vineshwar Prasad.
All are Resident of Village- Tikaitpur P.S.- Bihta District- Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Sujeet Kumar Gupta, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Binod Bihari Singh, Additional P.P.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Bikas Kumar Sharma, Advocate
Ms. Madhuri Kumari, Advocate
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND
MALVIYA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH)
Date: 04-08-2025
The present criminal appeal has been preferred
under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against
the judgment of acquittal dated 17.08.2023 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge-VII-cum-Special Judge
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POCSO, Patna in Case No.: CIS No. Special (POCSO) Case
No. 76 of 2016, arising out of Bihta P.S. Case No. 372 of
2016, whereby Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were held guilty by
the trial court under the charge of Sections 323 and 341 of
Indian Penal Code, and after due admonition under Section 3
of the Probation and Offender Act, the accused were
released. Although the accused were charged for trial under
Sections 354 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 12 of the POCSO Act, but they were
not found guilty of these offences.
2. Vide order dated 05.10.2024, notices were issued
to the Respondent Nos. 2 to 6, upon which they appeared by
filing Vakalatnama through learned Advocate, Mr Bikash
Kumar Sharma.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on
04.06.2016
at about 9:15 AM in the morning when the
informant was at his house, all of a sudden, Ripu Rai @
Surendra Kumar, Guddu Kumar @ Upendra Kumar, Manish
Kumar, Bittu Kumar and Vikash Kumar came to his house
armed with lathi and danda and abused him, and as soon as
the informant came out of his house, they all started
assaulting him with lathi and danda on his head, due to
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which he sustained severe injuries and blood started oozing
out from his head. The motive behind the occurrence is that
he had purchased one katha of land, about 5-6 years ago,
from one Ripu Rai @ Surendra Kumar, and in retaliation the
accused namely, Guddu Kumar @ Upendra Kumar used to
ask his daughter to talk with him while she was on her way to
school, and it is also alleged that the accused would hold her
hand and threaten to shoot her if she didn’t talk with him.
4. On the basis of the written statement of the
informant, Bihta P.S. Case No. 372 of 2016 dated 04.06.2016
was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 504, 506, 354
and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 8 and 12 of
the POCSO Act, and the investigation was taken up by the
police. The police, after investigation, submitted charge-sheet
against the respondents under the said sections and,
accordingly, cognizance was taken. Thereafter the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions. Charges were framed
against the accused persons, to which they pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
5. During the trial, the prosecution examined
altogether eight witnesses in this case. Out of which PW-1
the victim of the case, PW2 Buddh Deo Rai, PW3 Malti
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Devi, PW4 Mantu Rai, PW5 grandfather of the victim, PW6
Kamlesh Kumar (I.O.), PW7 Dr. Digvijay Narayan Singh
and PW8 Suresh Ram. No witness has been examined on
behalf of the defence. After closure of prosecution evidence,
the statements of the accused persons were recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. and after conclusion of trial, trial court
acquitted the accused persons.
6. From the perusal of the judgment of the trial
court, the following ground was considered by the trial court
while acquitting the Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 from the charge
framed under Section 12 of the POCSO Act:
“From the analysis and appreciation of the
aforesaid facts, circumstances and evidence
available on record and as discussed above, in my
view, the prosecution has failed to prove that the
said accused had committed any sexual
harassment upon the victim girl with any sexual
intention or uttered any word or made any sound
or made any gesture or exhibited any object or
part of the body with the intention that said word
or sound shall be heard or such gesture or object
or part of the body shall be seen by the victim girl.
The element of sexual intention has not been
proved by the prosecution.”
7. With respect to the offence charged under
Section 307 of the IPC, the trial court observed the
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following:
“The doctor has opined that both the injuries are
simple in nature. Considering the materials and
evidences available on record, in my opinion
ingredients necessary to constitute an offence
under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are
wanting in the present case. The prosecution has
failed to prove the same.”
“Although the prosecution has failed to prove
charge under section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code but the prosecution has well been successful
in bringing home that the accused-persons had
assaulted the informant and inflicted simple
injury and in due course of their assault they had
wrongfully restrained the informant constituting
the offence punishable under section 323 and 341
of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, the accused-
persons deserve to be punished in lesser sections
for the offences committed by them which are
punishable under Sections 341 and 323 of the
Indian Penal Code. Thus, in my considered view
the prosecution has well proved that on the date
and time of the occurrence, the accused-persons
with common cbject had restrained and assaulted
the informant. The prosecution has been
successful in bringing home the guilty of the
accused-persons for the offences punishable
under Sections 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal
Code beyond the shadow of all reasonable
doubts.”
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the learned court below has wrongly held that forcibly
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catching the victim girl’s hand and threatening her to talk
with the accused, does not come under the purview of sexual
harassment; as such, Section 12 of the POCSO Act and
Section 354 of the IPC do not attract. The learned counsel
had further submitted that the trial court wrongly held that
the informant/appellant has sustained only one injury on his
head; as such, Section 307 of the IPC does not attract though
he has got two injuries on his person which was fully
supported by the doctor (PW-7). The learned counsel for the
appellant further submitted that the learned court below has
wrongly held that the main genesis of the occurrence is a
land dispute and the convicts are first offenders and the
charges established against them are not serious in nature and
hence, they are released by giving the benefit of Section 3 of
the Probation of Offenders Act.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the trial court has rightly acquitted the
respondents and gave sufficient reasons for acquittal.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court requires no
interference.
10. After going through the submissions made by
the parties and the facts available on record, the sole question
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that requires consideration by this Court is whether the
impugned judgment of acquittal requires any interference by
this Court.
11. As per the prosecution, no dangerous weapon
had been used, nor was there any repetition of blows. The
alleged injury inflicted on the person of the informant is not
sufficient to be causing death. The entire prosecution
evidence nowhere suggests that there was any intervening
circumstance which might have saved the life of the injured.
The nature of the injury as opined by the doctor is simple.
Therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, as discussed
above, no offence punishable under Section 307 is made out
against the accused. Rather, at best, it could be a case of
simple hurt punishable under Section 323 of the IPC.
12. After going through the evidence available on
record, we do not find that there is sufficient evidence to
make out an offence of sexual harassment punishable under
Section 12 of the POCSO Act. Except for the daughter of the
informant, there is none who had witnessed the occurrence.
So far the informant (P.W. 4) and the wife of the informant
(P.W. 3) are concerned, they are not eyewitnesses to the
occurrence. They have narrated the incident as told by their
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daughter (P.W. 1). However, P.W. 1, namely, Radha Kumari,
nowhere disclosed in her deposition that the Respondent No.
2 used to catch her hand with sexual intention. In the absence
of sexual intent, the offence of sexual harassment does not
make out.
13. At this juncture it is worth referring to the
explanation of Section 11 of the POCSO Act, which says that
any question which involves sexual intent shall be a question
of fact. The expression ‘fact’ has already been defined under
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, which says that
anything, state of things or relation of things capable of being
perceived by the senses and any mental condition of which
any person is conscious. Therefore, it is the victim girl who
was only competent to say whether the Respondent No. 2
used to catch hold of her hand with sexual intent or not,
because such intention could be perceived by the senses of
the victim girl, whereas she has not deposed regarding the
intention of the accused. Therefore, in the absence of
evidence to prove the sexual intent, no offence defined under
Section 11 and punishable under Section 12 of the POCSO
Act is made out.
14. The appellant has not been able to prove the
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finding of the acquittal of the trial court, under Section 12 of
the POCSO Act and Section 307 of the IPC, has been
perverse or erroneous.
15. In our view, the findings recorded by the trial
court do not suffer from any illegality and perversity. In a
criminal case, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
the guilt beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt. Wherever
any doubt is cast upon the case of the prosecution, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
16. In a criminal appeal against acquittal, what the
Appellate Court has to examine is whether the finding of the
learned court below is perverse and prima facie illegal. Once
the Appellate Court comes to the finding that the grounds on
which the judgment is based are not perverse, the scope of
appeal against acquittal is limited, considering the fact that
the legal presumption about the innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by the finding of the court. At this point,
it is imperative to consider the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura
reported in (2011) 9 SCC 479, paragraphs 13 & 14 of which
read as under:
“13. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal
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order, interference by this Court exercising its
extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted.
However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate
court, it being the final court of fact, is fully
competent to reappreciate, reconsider and review
the evidence and take its own decision. In other
words, the law does not prescribe any limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power
and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own
conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal
provides for presumption in favour of the accused.
The presumption of innocence is available to the
person and in criminal jurisprudence every
person is presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by the competent court. If two
reasonable views are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the findings of acquittal.
14. There is no limitation on the part of the
appellate court to review the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is found and to come to its
own conclusion. The appellate court can also
review the conclusion arrived at by the trial court
with respect to both facts and law. While dealing
with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the
State, it is the duty of the appellate court to
marshal the entire evidence on record and only by
giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the
judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to
be interfered with only when there are
“compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
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17. In the case of Ghurey Lal versus State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in (2008) 10 SCC 450 in paragraph 75, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the said view and
observed as under:
“75. The trial Court has the advantage of
watching the demeanour of the witnesses who
have given evidence, therefore, the appellate
court should be slow to interfere with the
decisions of the trial court. An acquittal by the
trial court should not be interfered with unless it
is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”
18. Thus, an order of acquittal is to be interfered
with only for compelling and substantial reasons. In case the
order is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for
interference. But where there is no perversity in the finding
of the impugned judgment of acquittal, the Appellate Court
must not take a different view only because another view is
possible. It is because the trial court has the privilege of
seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, therefore, its
decision must not be upset in the absence of strong and
compelling grounds.
19. In view of the above, we do not find any
illegality and perversity in the findings recorded by the trial
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court.
20. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed.
(Sudhir Singh, J)
( Ramesh Chand Malviya, J)
Sujit/-
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