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Supreme Court of India
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid vs The State Of Manipur on 22 April, 2025
Author: Rajesh Bindal
Bench: Rajesh Bindal
2025 INSC 535
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3797 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2138 of 2024)
MD. FIROZ AHMAD KHALID …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3798 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8642 of 2024)
JUDGMENT
M. M. Sundresh, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SWETA BALODI
Date: 2025.04.22
17:07:52 IST
1. Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the Union
Reason:
territory (hereinafter referred to as “the Bar Council”), duly elected as
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 1 of 25
a Member of the Waqf Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”)
constituted under Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred
to as “the 1995 Act”), can continue to hold the said position, even after
the expiry of his tenure in the Bar Council, is the short issue that arises
for consideration in these appeals.
2. The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows :–
A Gazette notification had been issued by the Bar Council of Manipur
on 26.12.2022, vide which the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3797 of
2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “appellant”), had been elected as a
Member of the Bar Council. Subsequently, an order was issued by the
Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Minority Affairs), Government of
Manipur, on 08.02.2023, appointing the appellant as one of the
Members of the 7th Waqf Board Committee, in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 14(1)(b)(iii) and Section 14(3) of the 1995 Act,
since respondent No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 2025 (hereinafter
referred to as “respondent No. 3”), being an earlier Member of the
Board, had ceased to be a Member of the Bar Council of Manipur.
3. Respondent No. 3 had filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023 before
the High Court of Manipur at Imphal, praying for the order dated
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 2 of 25
08.02.2023, vide which the appellant had been appointed to the Board,
to be quashed. The challenge to the said order was on the ground that
there is no provision under the 1995 Act, which stipulates that a
Member of the Board shall cease to continue in his position, if he is no
longer a Member of the Bar Council. Vide judgment and order dated
23.08.2023, the Single Judge dismissed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of
2023 as respondent No. 3 had lost the Bar Council election held on
17.12.2022, and therefore, as per the mandate of Explanation II to
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, he cannot be a Member of the Board,
any longer.
4. Vide impugned judgment dated 23.11.2023, the Division Bench of the
High Court, placing reliance on Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of
the 1995 Act, has arrived at the conclusion that the said Explanation
only speaks about instances wherein a Member of the Board, who
ceases to be a Member of Parliament or Member of the State Legislative
Assembly, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have vacated their
position in the Board. The Division Bench has further concluded that
the said Explanation does not apply to a Member of the Board, who
ceases to hold their position as a Muslim Member of the concerned Bar
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 3 of 25
Council, and that they would continue to hold their position as a
Member of the Board, regardless of them having ceased to be a Muslim
Member of the Bar Council. Consequently, the order dated 08.02.2023
issued by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Minority Affairs),
Government of Manipur appointing the appellant as a Member of the
Board in place of respondent No. 3, was set aside, and the State of
Manipur was directed to continue the services of respondent No. 3 as a
Member of the 7th Waqf Board Committee, till the completion of the
term of his office as stipulated under Section 15 of the 1995 Act.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and learned counsel
appearing for the State of Manipur submit that Section 14 of the 1995
Act, is clear and unambiguous. Sub-section (1) which deals with the
composition of the Board, stipulates that the Board shall mandatorily
consist of a Chairperson, and amongst other members, it would
comprise Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or the National
Capital Territory of Delhi, Muslim Members of the State Legislative
Assembly, and Muslim Members of the Bar Council. Explanation II to
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act merely clarifies that an individual who
ceases to be either a Member of Parliament or a Member of the State
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 4 of 25
Legislative Assembly, from the said community, would be deemed to
have vacated their office as a Member of the Board. The interpretation
as rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court, vide the impugned
judgment, would militate against the very legislative intent of the
substantial part of the provision, and, therefore, the same ought to be
interfered with.
6. Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 by placing
reliance upon the decision of this Court in The State of Maharashtra vs.
Shaikh Mahemud & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.2784 of 2022 arising out of
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11652 of 2021) decided on
06.04.2022, and the decision of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o. Shaukat Qureshi vs.
The State of Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2016)
decided on 22.12.2016, submits that one shall read the provision as a
whole, and not in piecemeal. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has
thought it fit to apply Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Act, only to a Member of Parliament, or a Member of the State
Legislative Assembly, who ceases to hold the said posts. Placing
reliance on the maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, he
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 5 of 25
submits that there is a conscious omission on the part of the Legislature
to the effect that a Member of the Bar Council is excluded from the
purview of Explanation II. In such view of the matter, there is no need
for interference in the impugned judgment.
7. On a conspectus of the arguments advanced by both the sides, we deem
it fit to firstly extract Section 14 of the 1995 Act:
Section 14 of the 1995 Act
“14. Composition of Board.- (1) The Board for a State and the National
Capital Territory of Delhi shall consist of-
(a) a Chairperson;
(b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think
fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of-
(i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be,
the National Capital Territory of Delhi;
(ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature;
(iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the concerned State or
Union territory:
Provided that in case there is no Muslim member of the Bar Council of a
State or a Union territory, the State Government or the Union territory
administration, as the case may be, may nominate any senior Muslim
advocate from that State or the Union territory, and
(iv) mutawallis of the auqaf having an annual income of rupees one lakh
and above.
Explanation I – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the
members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be
elected from the electoral college constituted for each category.
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 6 of 25
Explanation II. – For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that in
case a Muslim member ceases to be a Member of Parliament from the
State or National Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub-clause
(i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State Legislative
Assembly as required under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), such member
shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the member of the Board
for the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the case may be,
from the date from which such member ceased to be a Member of
Parliament from the State National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a
Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be;
(c) one person from amongst Muslims, who has professional experience in
town planning or business management, social work, finance or revenue,
agriculture and development activities, to be nominated by the State
Government;
(d) one person each from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State
Government from recognised scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic Theology;
(e) one person from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State
Government from amongst the officers of the State Government not below
the rank of Joint Secretary to the State Government;
(1-A) No Minister of the Central Government or, as the case may be, a State
Government, shall be elected or nominated as a member of the Board:
Provided that in case of a Union territory, the Board shall consist of not less
than five and not more than seven members to be appointed by the Central
Government from categories specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause
(b) or clauses (c) to (e) in sub-section (1):
Provided further that at least two Members appointed on the Board shall be
women:
Provided also that in every case where the system of mutawalli exists, there
shall be one mutawalli as the member of the Board.
(2) Election of the members specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall
be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by
means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament,
the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is
only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected
on the Board:
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 7 of 25
Provided further that where there are no Muslim Members in any or
the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-
section (1), the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State
Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be,
shall constitute the electoral college.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State
Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not
reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the
categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section
(1), the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of
the Board as it deems fit.
(4) The number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more
than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under sub-
section (3).
(6) In determining the number of Shia members or Sunni members of the
Board, the State Government shall have regard to the number and value of
Shia auqaf and Sunni auqaf to be administered by the Board and
appointment of the members shall be made, so far as may be, in accordance
with such determination.
(8) Whenever the Board is constituted or re-constituted, the members of the
Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from
amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board.
(9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government
by notification in the Official Gazette.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. Section 14 of the 1995 Act, as extracted above, has two parts to it. While
Section 14(1) of the 1995 Act concerns itself with the composition of
the Board, and lists out the eligibility criteria for membership to the
Board, Section 14(2) of the 1995 Act provides for the mode of election,
and the eventualities in case of a lack of, or unavailability of eligible
Muslim Members as provided for under Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 8 of 25
Act. Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act facilitates for one and at the most
two Members each to be elected from the electoral colleges comprising
(i) Muslim Members of Parliament, (ii) Muslim Members of the State
Legislative Assembly and (iii) Muslim Members of the Bar Council.
Only in the event that there is no Muslim Member of the Bar Council
available, the State Government or the Union territory administration,
as the case may be is given the discretion to nominate any Senior
Muslim advocate to the electoral college. As is evident from the
language of Section 14 of the 1995 Act, this is a mandatory provision.
9. Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act merely clarifies that
in case a Member of the Board ceases to be a Member of Parliament or
a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, such Member shall be
deemed to have vacated the office of the Member of the Board from the
date on which they ceased to be a Member of Parliament or Member of
the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be. The difficulty
herein has arisen on account of the fact that a Muslim Member of the
Bar Council serving as a Member of the Board, does not find a specific
mention in Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act with
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 9 of 25
respect to their deemed vacation of office, pursuant to ceasing to be a
Member of the concerned Bar Council.
10.To interpret a legislative provision, what must be primarily considered
is its substantive part. An explanation simply performs a clarifying
function. In other words, the substantive part of a provision cannot be
understood solely from the point of view of an explanation.
11.The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to Section
14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature of the
said Explanation. Although Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the
1995 Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim Member
of the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with their term in
the Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied, upon a reading
of the provision as a whole. This is because the eligibility of persons
under the categories listed in Section 14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii), and 14(b)(iii)
of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in either the Parliament,
or the State Legislative Assembly, or the Bar Council respectively.
Without such membership in the Parliament, or the State Legislative
Assembly or the Bar Council, the very basis for their membership in the
Board ceases to exist. There is no satisfactory justification to exclude
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 10 of 25
the applicability of Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act,
to a Member of the Bar Council. Such an exclusion would, in fact, run
contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute.
12.Upon reading the provision as a whole, we find that the implied
inclusion, as aforestated, is also supported by the two provisos
appended to Section 14(2) of the 1995 Act. Section 14(2) of the 1995
Act provides that the election of the Members specified in Section
14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, shall be held in accordance with the system
of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in
such manner as may be prescribed. The first proviso makes it clear that
where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, State Legislative
Assembly, or Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, the said
person shall be declared to have been elected as a Member of the Board.
More pertinently, the second proviso clarifies that where there are no
Muslim Members in any of the three categories mentioned in Section
14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, State
Legislative Assembly or ex-Member of Bar Council, as the case may
be, shall constitute the electoral college. In simpler terms, the first
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 11 of 25
proviso reiterates the fact that there are twin conditions, to be eligible
to be a Member of the Board, namely:
1. The candidate must be from the Muslim community, and
2. The candidate must hold a position either as a Member of
Parliament, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, or a
Member of the Bar Council.
The aforementioned conditions are reiterated with further clarity in the
second proviso. The second proviso states that by way of an exception
based on a factual contingency, in the event that there are no Muslim
Members available in any of the categories listed in Section 14(1)(b) of
the 1995 Act, an ex-Member of Parliament, State Legislative Assembly
or an ex-Member of the Bar Council, as the case may be, would
constitute the electoral college.
13.This makes it clear that an ex-Member of the Bar Council would
constitute the electoral college only when there is no eligible Member
as provided for in Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, and the proviso
contained therein. This means that if there is no serving Muslim
Member in the Bar Council and also no Senior Muslim advocate who
is available, only then would an ex-Member of the Bar Council be
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 12 of 25
eligible to be a Member of the Board. It is thus, axiomatic to state that
an existing Muslim Member of the Board from the Bar Council, would
cease to be a Member of the Board, upon the completion of their tenure
as a Member of the Bar Council, when there is another Muslim Member
available to replace them from within the Bar Council. Thus, upon a
reading of the entire provision, it is clear that there is no conscious
intention on the part of the Legislature to omit the applicability of
Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to Muslim Members
of the Board elected from the Bar Council.
14.The object of any provision must be seen in light of the provisions
surrounding it, which includes the proviso(s) and the explanation(s)
appended to it. When a right accrues to a person pursuant to a position
that they hold, it ultimately becomes a qualification. Once such
qualification ceases to exist, that person would not be eligible to hold
any other post based on his earlier position, unless the statute
categorically facilitates the same. An explanation, which is simply in
the nature of a clarification as regards certain categories, cannot be read
in a manner which is violative of the substantive part of the provision.
Although normally, a proviso cannot be used to understand the
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 13 of 25
substantive part of the provision, there is no absolute bar in doing so,
particularly in cases where the statute is peculiar and the proviso does
not create any exception. For the aforementioned purpose, an
explanation can also be understood through the proviso. In other words,
if a proviso or an explanation, as the case may be, is phrased in a manner
which throws more light on the objective behind the substantive part of
the provision, there would be no difficulty in appreciating the same.
Ultimately, a proviso or an explanation may be used for several
purposes. Therefore, what is required is that Courts appreciate the
context of such usage before rendering an interpretation to a provision
vis-a-vis the proviso or explanation contained therein.
15.On another footing, extending the applicability of Explanation II to
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar
Council, is only but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable
classification that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Article 14 of
the Constitution of India, 1950, which provides for equality before the
law and equal protection of the law. A classification would be
reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a
rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute.
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 14 of 25
In the instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to Explanation
II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a Muslim Member
of the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership in the Board,
despite losing their position in the former post, would amount to treating
Members of Parliament and Members of the State Legislative Assembly
differently from Members of the Bar Council. No intelligible differentia
is discernible for such a classification from the scheme of the provision.
In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting the provision in its entirety. On this
ground also, we find that Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Act must be given a harmonious construction and purposive
interpretation to mean that the term of a Member of the Bar Council
serving on the Board, is co-terminus with their membership in the Bar
Council itself.
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548
“9. …It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the
meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and
to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention
of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot
control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the
legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis
the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the
intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to
the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the
provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 15 of 25
it according to its plain language and not on any a priori
considerations….”
S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
“46. …It is now well settled that an Explanation added to a statutory
provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as
the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain
or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory
provision. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes while dwelling on the
various aspects of an Explanation observes as follows:
(a) The object of an Explanation is to understand the Act in the light of
the explanation.
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which
it explains, but only makes the meaning clear beyond dispute. (p. 329)
47. Swarup in Legislation and Interpretation very aptly sums up the scope
and effect of an Explanation thus:
“Sometimes an Explanation is appended to stress upon a particular
thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly from the provisions of
the section. The proper function of an Explanation is to make plain or
elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or
subtract from it. Thus an Explanation does not either restrict or extend
the enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain…. The Explanation must
be interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is meant to explain
and not vice versa.” (pp. 297-98)
48. Bindra in Interpretation of Statutes (5th Edn.) at p. 67 states thus:
“An Explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original section that
it is supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that an Explanation only
explains and does not expand or add to the scope of the original
section… The purpose of an Explanation is, however, not to limit the
scope of the main provision…. The construction of the Explanation
must depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be
entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. An
‘Explanation’ must be interpreted according to its own tenor.”Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 16 of 25
49. The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are fully supported
by various authorities of this Court. To quote only a few, in Burmah Shell
Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. CTO [(1961) 1 SCR 902 :
AIR 1961 SC 315 : (1960) 11 STC 764] a Constitution Bench decision,
Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed thus:
“Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor, and
it is meant to explain clause (1)(fl) of the Article and not vice versa. It is an
error to explain the Explanation with the aid of the Article, because this
reverses their roles.”
50. In Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank
of Bihar [(1967) 1 SCR 848 : AIR 1967 SC 389 : 37 Com Cas 98] this Court
observed thus:
“The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and clear up
any ambiguity in the main section. It should not be so construed as to
widen the ambit of the section.”
51. In Hiralal Rattanlal case [(1973) 1 SCC 216 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 307]
this Court observed thus: [SCC para 25, p. 225: SCC (Tax) p. 316]
“On the basis of the language of the Explanation this Court held that it did
not widen the scope of clause (c). But from what has been said in the case,
it is clear that if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears that it
has widened the scope of the main section, effect be given to legislative
intent notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature named that
provision as an Explanation.”
*** *** ***
53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it is
manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is—
“(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment,
to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object
which it seems to subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act
in order to make it meaningful and purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the
enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is
relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the
mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the
Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the
enactment, andCivil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 17 of 25
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any
person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working
of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the
same.””(emphasis supplied)
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank, (2007) 9 SCC 55
“12. In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of
construction is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and
if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into
aid the other rules of construction. The other rules of construction are
invoked when the legislative intent is not clear. In Bihta Co-op.
Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [AIR 1967
SC 389] this Court was called upon to consider Explanation to Section
48(1) of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. This Court
observed that the Court should not go only by the label. The Court
observed that an explanation must be read ordinarily to clear up any
ambiguity in the main section and it cannot be construed to widen the
ambit of the section. However, if on a true reading of an Explanation it
appears to the Court in a given case that the effect of the Explanation
is to widen the scope of the main section then effect must be given to
the legislative intent. It was held that in all such cases the Court has to
find out the true intention of the legislature. Therefore, there is no
single yardstick to decide whether an Explanation is enacted to clarify
the ambiguity or whether it is enacted to widen the scope of the main
section….”
(emphasis supplied)
Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC
695
“66. What can be discerned from the above is that an explanation must be
read so as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section.
It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. An
explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original section that it is
supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that an explanation only explains and
does not expand or add to the scope of the original section. The purpose of
an explanation is, however, not to limit the scope of the main provision.
The construction of the explanation must depend upon its terms, and no
theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the
language used. An “explanation” must be interpreted according to its
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 18 of 25
own tenor. Sometimes an explanation is appended to stress upon a
particular thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly from the
provisions of the section. The proper function of an explanation is to
make plain or elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision
and not to add or subtract from it. Thus, an explanation does not either
restrict or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down
the scope of the original section that it is supposed to explain. The
Explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is
meant to explain and not vice versa. Explanation added to a statutory
provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as
the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain
or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory
provision.”
Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC
619
“31. …The principle of “purposive interpretation” or “purposive
construction” is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to
attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind
such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed
to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the court
is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise.
As Aharon Barak puts it:
“Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language,
purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic
possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the
interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of
the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The
semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting
the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public
or private) language.” [ Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law
(Princeton University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and
discretion “of the court”, insofar as purposive component is concerned, this
is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the
values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation of a provision
is never static but is always dynamic. Though the literal rule of
interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the “golden rule”, it is nowCivil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 19 of 25
the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly
in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may
lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the
purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process
thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand
strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered
purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the courts not only
in this country but in many other legal systems as well.”Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys,
(2011) 11 SCC 334
“25. …The golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute
have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular
sense. Where however the words used are capable of bearing two or
more constructions, it is necessary to adopt purposive construction, to
identify the construction to be preferred, by posing the following
questions: (i) What is the purpose for which the provision is made? (ii)
What was the position before making the provision? (iii) Whether any
of the constructions proposed would lead to an absurd result or would
render any part of the provision redundant? (iv) Which of the
interpretations will advance the object of the provision? The answers
to these questions will enable the court to identify the purposive
interpretation to be preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise
involving ascertainment of the object of the provision and choosing the
interpretation that will advance the object of the provision can be
undertaken, only where the language of the provision is capable of more
than one construction….”(emphasis supplied)
16.We further add that the legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius” finds absolutely no application to the instant case, as applying
the same would render an interpretation contrary to the intent of the
provision, resulting in an unreasonable and unjust classification. The
aforesaid maxim is not one of universal and absolute application.
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 20 of 25
Before the said principle can be applied, the Court must discern whether
a natural interpretation flows from a reading of the provision as a whole,
which in the instant case is possible by reading Section 14(2) along with
Section 14(1) of the 1995 Act.
Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC
560
“30. …This rule flows from the maxim: “Expressio unius ast exclusio
alterius”. But, as was pointed out by Wills, J., in Colguoboun v. Brooks,
[(1888) 21 QBD 52, 62] this maxim “is often a valuable servant, but a
dangerous master….”. The rule is subservient to the basic principle
that Courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and
purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather
than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of prohibition by
necessary implication could be applied only where a specified
procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty….”
(emphasis supplied)
Union of India v. B.C. Nawn and others, 1971 SCC OnLine Cal 180
: (1972) 84 ITR 526 : 1971 Tax LR 1198
“8. The maxim is not of universal application. Crawford in his book The
Construction of Statutes, 1940 edition, at pages 335-336, has pointed out
that this maxim does not apply to matters “where it clearly appears that
something was expressly mentioned for another reason or merely because
of caution” and “this maxim, or general principle of construction, as must
be apparent, is based upon the probable intention of the legislature. Hence,
where that intention clearly reveals that the law-makers did not mean
that the express mention of one thing should operate to exclude all
others, of course, the principle is not applicable. Consequently, when the
statutory language is plain and the meaning is clear, there can be no implied
exclusion. In other words, the principle is to be used as a means of
ascertaining the legislature’s intent where it is doubtful and not as a
means of defeating the apparent intent of the legislature.
9. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh edition, at page 306
observes:
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 21 of 25
“Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting imperfectly or for
particular cases only that which was already and more widely the law,
has occasionally furnished ground for the contention that an intention
to alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited
enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius. But,
that maxim is inapplicable in such cases. The only inference which a
court can draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally find
a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is that
the legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the
law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive caution. If the law
be different from what the legislature supposed it to be, the implication
arising from the statute, it has been said, cannot operate as a negation
of its existence, and any legislation founded on such a mistake has not
the effect of making that law which the legislature erroneously assumed
to be so.”
(emphasis supplied)
State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608
“80. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the principle relied
upon by the plaintiffs learned Counsel repeatedly, in support of which a
passage from Crawford’s “Statutory Construction” (1940 Edn.) (Paragraph
195 at pp. 334-335) was also cited, as the basis of the submissions of the
learned Counsel, was that what is expressly provided for by the
Constitution must necessarily exclude what is not so provided for. This
reasoning is an attempted misapplication of the principle of
construction “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”. Before the
principle can be applied at all the Court must find an express mode of
doing something that is provided in a statute, which, by its necessary
implication, could exclude the doing of that very thing and not
something else in some other way. ……..That maxim has been aptly
described as a “useful servant but a dangerous master” (per Lopes L.J. in
Colquhoun v. Brooks [(1888) 21 QBD 52, 65]). The limitations or
conditions under which this principle of construction operates are
frequently overlooked by those who attempt to apply it.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.At this juncture, we take note of Lord Denning’s words of wisdom in
Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [(1949) 2 K.B. 481]
“…when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and
blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 22 of 25
finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from
the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word sc as to give
“force and life” to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid
down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon’s case, and it is the
safest guide to-day. Good practical advice on the subject was given
about the same time by Plowden in his second volume Eyston v. Studd.
Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge should ask himself the
question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck
in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must
then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material
of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.”
(emphasis supplied)
18.In the case at hand, the State of Manipur has deemed it fit to accept the
membership of the appellant, who is admittedly serving as a Muslim
Member of the Bar Council, to the Board. A Gazette notification had
been issued by the Bar Council of Manipur, stating that the appellant
had been elected as a Member of the Bar Council. Therefore, as such, a
Member of the Bar Council was available, who was subsequently
elected as a Member of the Board, in accordance with Section
14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act. Respondent No. 3, who is no longer
holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot
be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member of
the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the
Board.
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 23 of 25
19.We also note that presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member
in the concerned Bar Council – a fact that has been rightly taken note of
by the State of Manipur, while appointing him as a Member of the
Board. In any case, there is no dispute with respect to the appellant’s
eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of his membership in
the Bar Council.
20.Based on the aforesaid discussion and reasoning, we are not inclined to
concur with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the High
Court in the impugned judgment. Thus, we hold that the decision
rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o Shaukat Qureshi Versus The State of
Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2016) decided on
22.12.2016, is not a good law.
21.Accordingly, the impugned judgment stands set aside, and the judgment
and order of the Single Judge of the High Court dated 23.08.2023,
dismissing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023, stands restored.
22.The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 24 of 25
23.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………. J.
(M. M. SUNDRESH)
…………………………. J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 22, 2025 Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 25 of 25
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