Delhi High Court – Orders
Meera Gupta vs Assistanat Commissioner Of Income Tax … on 2 May, 2025
Author: Vibhu Bakhru
Bench: Vibhu Bakhru
$~45
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 5781/2025 & CM APPL. 26369-71/2025
MEERA GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr Aditya Kumar Garg, Advocate.
versus
ASSISTANAT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr Sanjay Kumar, SSC, Ms Monica
Benjamin and Ms Easha Kadian,
JSCs for the Revenue.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
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ORDER
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1.
02.05.2025 nl
The petitioner has filed the present petition, inter alia, impugning the
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notice dated 21.02.2024 [impugned notice] issued under Section 148 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 [the Act] in respect of the Assessment Year [AY]
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2011-12.
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2. The petitioner had filed its return of income for AY 2011-12 on
28.07.2011, declaring an income of ₹16,06,270/-. On 11.11.2014, a search
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was conducted under Section 132 of the Act in the case of Sh. Y.K. Gupta
and his family members (Smt. Meera Gupta and Mukul Gupta).
3. It is the petitioner’s contention that no incriminating material
pertaining to the searched persons was found during the said search, thus no
further proceedings were warranted.
4. Pursuant to the search, proceedings under Section 153A of the Act
were initiated against the petitioner by issuance of a notice dated
22.12.2016. Thereafter, the assessment order dated 30.12.2016 was passed
under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) of the Act. The petitioner
W.P.(C) 5781/2025 Page 1 of 5
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contends that the assessment year in question was a completed assessment
and, in the absence of any incriminating material found during the course of
the search, the addition of ₹14,82,60,830/- made by the Assessing Officer
[AO] was without jurisdiction and contrary to the settled legal principles.
5. Aggrieved by the assessment order dated 30.12.2016 passed by the
AO, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income
Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. By an order dated 12.09.2019, the CIT(A) deleted
the additions made by the AO, by relying on Commissioner of Income-tax
v. Kabul Chawla: (2016) 380 ITR 573 and Principal Commissioner of
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Income-tax v. Meeta Gutgutia (2017) 395 ITR 526, that no addition was
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permissible in the absence of incriminating material, as the year in question
was not an abated assessment year.
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6. The Revenue appealed against the order dated 12.09.2019 passed by
the CIT(A) before the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [ITAT]. The
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learned ITAT dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue by the order
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dated 12.10.2022, relying upon Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kabul
Chawla (supra) and Chintels India Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of
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Income-tax: (2017) 397 ITR 416.
7. On 11.01.2024, relying on the CBDT Instruction No.1/2023, dated
23.08.2023, the AO issued a notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act
requiring the petitioner to show cause why the assessment for the relevant
assessment year [AY 2011-12] should not be reopened under Section 148 of
the Act.
8. In response to the aforesaid notice, the petitioner filed a reply on
25.01.2024, challenging the initiation of the reassessment proceedings. The
petitioner claimed that the notice dated 11.01.2024 was time barred and was
W.P.(C) 5781/2025 Page 2 of 5
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not valid as the said notice did not contain the signatures of the AO.
9. On 21.02.2024, the AO rejected the petitioner’s reply and passed an
order under Section 148A(d) of the Act, deeming the case fit for reopening
and further issued a notice under Section 148 of the Act, asserting that the
proceedings were within the limitation period by invoking Section 150 of
the Act.
10. The impugned notice is clearly beyond the period as stipulated under
Section 149(1) of the Act. However, it is the Revenue’s case that the
impugned notice has been issued within the stipulated time by virtue of the
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non-obstante clause under Section 150 of the Act. The Revenue claims that
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the impugned notice is premised on the ‘findings and directions’ as
embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner
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of Income-tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd.: (2024) 2 SCC 433.
In the said decision, the Supreme Court had held that in certain cases, the
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assessing officer (AO) could exercise its powers under Section 147/148 of
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the Act, even in cases which are related to a search conducted under Section
132 of the Act or a requisition made under Section 132A of the Act. The
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Revenue construes the said decision as constituting a finding or a direction
for issuing such notices in respect of cases such as that of the assessee’s.
11. The question whether the decision in the case of Principal
Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd.
(supra) constitutes a finding and/or a direction for issuance of notices under
Section 148 of the Act in cases, which are otherwise beyond the period as
stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is no longer res integra. This court
in the case of ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of
Income Tax Cental Circle-28 Delhi & Ors.: Neutral Citation
W.P.(C) 5781/2025 Page 3 of 5
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No.:2024:DHC:7423-DB had rejected a similar contention. The relevant
extract of the said decision is set out below:
“38. It is pertinent to note that a reference to Sections 147
and 148 of the Act in Abhisar Buildwell firstly appears in
paragraph 33 of the report and where the Supreme Court
observed that in cases where a search does not result in any
incriminating material being found, the only remedy that
would be available to the Revenue would be to resort to
reassessment.
39. However, the Supreme Court caveated that observation
by observing that the initiation of reassessment would be
“…..subject to fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in
Sections 147/148, as in such a situation, the Revenue cannoty
be left with no remedy”. This sentiment came to be
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reiterated with the Supreme Court observing that the power
of the Revenue to initiate reassessment must be saved
failing which it would be left with no remedy. It was
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thereafter observed in paragraph 36.4 of the report that
insofar as completed or unabated assessments were
concerned, they could be reopened by the AO by invocation
ftof Sections 147/148 of the Act, subject to the fulfillment of
the conditions “……as envisaged/mentioned under Sections
ra147/148 of the Act and those powers are saved”.
40. It thus becomes apparent that the liberty which the
Supreme Court accorded and the limited right inhering in
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the Revenue to initiate reassessment was subject to that
power being otherwise compliant with the Chapter
pertaining to reassessment as contained in the Act. The
observations of the Supreme Court cannot possibly be read
or construed as a carte blanche enabling the respondents to
overcome and override the restrictions that otherwise appear
in Section 149 of the Act. The observations of the Supreme
Court in Abhisar Buildwell were thus intended to merely
convey that the annulment of the search assessments would
not deprive or denude the Revenue of its power to reassess
and which independently existed. However, the Supreme
Court being mindful of the statutory prescriptions, which
W.P.(C) 5781/2025 Page 4 of 5
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
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otherwise imbue the commencement of reassessment,
qualified that observation by providing that such an action
would have to be in accordance with law. This note of
caution appears at more than one place in that judgment and
is apparent from the Supreme Court observing that the
power to reassess would be subject to the fulfilment of the
conditions mentioned in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act.”
12. Plainly, the controversy involved in this petition is covered by the
decision of this Court in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax Cental Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. (supra). The
contention that the time period as stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is
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not applicable, in the given facts, is erroneous and thus, rejected.
13.
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The petition is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned notice is set
aside. The pending applications are also disposed of.
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VIBHU BAKHRU, J
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TEJAS KARIA, J
MAY 02, 2025/M
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W.P.(C) 5781/2025 Page 5 of 5
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 29/06/2025 at 16:36:50