Calcutta High Court
Merlyn Armstead vs Sukhlal Chandamull (P) Ltd. And Anr on 22 January, 2025
Author: Soumen Sen
Bench: Soumen Sen
OD-1
ORDER SHEET
APOT/397/2024
WITH
CS/364/2014
IA NO: GA/1/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
MERLYN ARMSTEAD
VERSUS
SUKHLAL CHANDAMULL (P) LTD. AND ANR.
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE SOUMEN SEN
AND
The Hon'ble JUSTICE BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY
Date : 22nd January, 2025.
Appearance:
Mr. Sudip Deb, Adv.
Mr. Shuvasish Sengupta, Adv.
Ms. Smruti Rekha Das, Adv.
Ms. Ipsita Ghosh, Adv.
..for the appellant
Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, Adv.
Mr. Shounak Mukhopadhyay, Adv.
Mr. Neelesh Choudhry, Adv.
Ms. Anuradha Poddar, Adv.
..for respondent no.1
Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rohit Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Altamash Alim, Adv.
...for respondent no.2
Soumen Sen, J. (Oral):
1. The appellant claims herself to be the real tenant of the premises in
question.
2
2. It is claimed that one Mr. L.D. Armstead, since deceased, was a
tenant in respect of the suit premises and she used to run a school
under the name and style of ‘Harrow Hall’ as a sole owner on payment
of monthly rent under the Karnani Properties Private Limited.
3. The appellant’s case in short was that Mrs. L.D. Armstead wrote a
letter on 19th November, 1974 to M/s. Karnani Properties Limited
bringing to the attention that somebody closed the gate of Karnani
Mansion and causing inconvenience to the school students.
Subsequently, Mrs. L.D. Armstead incorporated a registered society
under the name and style of ‘Harrow Hall’ which was registered on
13th May, 1987 having Registration No.S/55161 of 1987-88 under
the West Bengal Societies Registration Act. Although the said society
became a separate entity but Mrs. L.D. Armstead continued to be a
tenant in her individual capacity in respect of the suit property. Even
though she was not a member of the society, yet her relationship with
the society was that of an agent. Mrs. L.D. Armstead died on 21st
January, 1995.
4. The present appellant applicant claims herself to be the daughter-in-
law (son’s wife) and claims to have inherited the estate right in respect
of the suit property.
5. On the basis of such averment, the present appellant filed an
application being GA/8/2023 praying for addition of the applicant as
defendant no.2 in CS/364/2014. The aforesaid suit was a suit for
3
eviction instituted by one Sukhlal Chandanmull (P) Ltd. as plaintiff
against Harrow Hall, the society who was running the school from the
said premises. The suit was filed in the year 2014 and the application
for addition of party was filed in the year 2023.
6. In the meantime, Merlyn Armstead and Harrow Hall School filed a
suit being Title Suit No. 304 of 2022 against Karnani Properties
Limited, Sukhlal Chandanmull Private Limited and Harrow Hall for
declaration and injunction. It was alleged that although the rent
receipts might have been issued in the name of the society, for all
intent and purposes, the present applicant/appellant is a tenant in
respect of the suit property.
7. In the written statement filed by Harrow Hall in CS/364/2014 it is
stated that in course of discussion with B.K. Karnani and said Mrs.
Armstead, it was understood and agreed that the society and Harrow
Hall School would be entitled to retain perpetual possession of the two
rooms and any further rooms that came into possession of Mrs.
Armstead in Premises No. 27B, Park Street, Kolkata and that too
without payment of rent. The Society further alleged that Mr. Karnani
wanted the school to continue and it was his desire that the Society
runs the school and accordingly in or about May 13, 1987, Mrs.
Armstead registered Harrow Hall as an educational and philanthropic
society. The said society was registered in the year 1987.
4
8. Dispute arose between the parties and the plaintiff Sukhlal
Chandanmull Private Limited filed a suit for eviction upon serving a
notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The present
appellant, as stated earlier, has filed a suit before the City Civil Court
being Title Suit No. 304 of 2022 almost after eight years praying, inter
alia, for a decree of declaration that Mrs. L.D. Armstead who was a
tenant in respect of the suit property in her individual capacity till her
death and the present plaintiff i.e., Merlyn Armstead is the tenant in
respect of the suit property. Subsequent thereto, this application has
been filed for addition of parties alleging that notwithstanding the
registration of Harrow Hall as a society, the appellant continued as a
tenant in respect of the suit property. It was further claimed that Mrs.
L.D. Armstead was throughout in possession of the suit property and
the school was her own creation.
9. Harrow Hall is contesting the suit in the High Court. The defendant in
the present suit has admitted that on 13th May, 1987 Mrs. Armstead
registered an educational/philanthropic society named Harrow Hall
and since then Harrow Hall is in possession of the suit property and
the society is running the school.
10. Mr. Sudip Deb, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant has referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Others 1 and Terai
1
AIR 1958 SC 886
5
Tea Company Private Limited vs. Kumkum Mittal and Ors. 2 for
the proposition that where the subject matter of litigation is a
declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present
or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is
of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better
position to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the
controversy. It is further submitted that the Court is required to
decide whether the rights of the person may be affected if he is not
added as a party. Such right however will include necessarily an
enforceable legal right.
11. Per contra, Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, the learned Senior
Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff submits that the applicant has filed
a suit after almost eight years at City Civil Court claiming tenancy
rights. An application for addition of party was filed in this suit after
nine years after an application for summary judgment was filed. It is a
ploy to delay the hearing of the said application. The applicant has no
interest in the suit property. The learned Senior Counsel has referred
to the written statement of the defendant to show that the society has
also not acknowledged the present applicant to have any interest in
the suit property.
12. In reply, Mr. Deb has submitted that an application under Clause
13 of the Letters Patent has been filed for transfer of the City Civil
2
AIR 1994 Cal 191
6
Court suit to this High Court for being heard analogously. Mr. Deb
has also referred to the written objection filed by the plaintiff in the
application for stay of the suit T.S 304 of 2022 filed before the City
Civil Court, in which in paragraph 11 it is inter alia, stated as follows:
“What is the role of Mrs. L.D. Armstead in relation to the suit
property”.
13. It is thus argued that if the role of Mrs. L.D. Armstead in relation
to the suit property is relevant then the Court is required to decide
having regard to the nature of the controversy between the parties, if
at all any relief can be granted and issues can be decided in absence
of the appellant.
14. We first begin with Razia Begum (supra) as Mr. Deb has placed
strong reliance on the said judgment in this appeal. In Razia Begum
(supra) it appears that one Sahebzadi claiming herself to be the
“lawfully and legally wedded wife of the son of Nizam of
Hyderabad(hereinafter referred to as “Prince”) filed a petition under
Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming addition of
party in the suit instituted by Razia Begum in which Razia Begum
alleged that she is the lawfully married wife of the Prince.
15. The suit was instituted by Razia Begum against the second son of
the Nizam of Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as Prince) alleging
that she is lawfully married wife of the Prince and the marriage
ceremony was duly solemnized in accordance with the Shia Law. It
7
was averred that three daughters were born of the wedlock and the
fact of the said marriage was known to all persons acquainted with
the Prince. There was a pre-nuptial agreement where the Prince
agreed to pay Rs.2000 per month to the plaintiff as kharch-e-pandan
which allowance the Prince stopped since January, 1953. The suit
was for declaration of the status of Razia as wife of the Prince and her
entitlement to receive the said allowance of Rs.2000 per month. The
suit was filed on 22nd April, 1957. On that very date, Sahebzadi filed
an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
along with her minor son, praying for addition of party on the ground
that the said Sahebzadi is the lawfully and legally wedded wife of the
Prince and the son born of the said wedlock is the son of the said
Prince. In the said application it was averred that Razia asserted her
right as the wife of the Prince which status the Prince is denying or
interested to deny and the petitioners, namely, Sahebzadi are being
joined as parties to the suit would be equally interested in denying the
marriage of the plaintiff and her rights and status. In fact, by the said
application Sahebzadi wants to establish her status as wife of the
Prince and denying the marriage of the plaintiff with Razia.
16. In the said petition, Sahebzadi further alleged that they have
reasons to believe that the above suit was a result of collusion and the
object and motive of the plaintiff in instituting the suit is to adversely
affect the relationship of the petitioners and the defendant and also to
8
deprive the rights and interests of the petitioners (Sahebzadi) in the
defendant’s (Prince) estate. The said claim was resisted by Razia
Begum on the ground that the said application for addition was mala
fide and malicious and she further asserted that the “possibility of the
rights of the petitioners being infringed are very remote, contingent
upon their or plaintiff surviving the defendant or other circumstances
which may or may not arise.”
17. The plaintiff referred to the admission of the defendant (Prince) in
the written statement and asserted that the petitioners were neither
necessary nor proper parties to the suit. The Prince in his answer to
the application admitted that the first respondent is his wife and the
second respondent is his son and also repeated his admission of
marriage to the plaintiff in October, 1948, and the first respondent in
December, 1952. The Prince contended that when he married the first
respondent, he had already three daughters by the plaintiff, which
fact was known to the first respondent at the time of her marriage
with him. The Prince supported the plaintiff in her objection to the
intervention by asserting that the rights of the respondents 1 and 2
would not be affected in any way, and by insisting upon his Muslim
right of having four wives living at the same time. The Prince also
supported the plaintiff in her denial of the allegation of collusion. On
these allegations and counter-allegations, the Trial Judge allowed the
application of intervention, and directed the addition of the
9
respondents 1 and 2. The reasons for allowing such addition of
parties was that the record of the proceedings suggest of a possible
collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the relief
claimed under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, being
discretionary, could not be granted as of right. It was further held that
the presence of the interveners would help the court in unraveling the
mysteries of litigation and that there was force in the contention put
forward on behalf of the interveners that under Section 43 of the
Specific Relief Act, any declaration given in favour of the plaintiff,
would be binding upon the interveners. It was further held that for
the purpose of effectual and complete adjudication of the issues
involved and to settle the present controversy, the presence of the
interveners was necessary.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in such factual background construed
Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and laid down the
law in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 which are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“12. When a declaratory judgment has been given, by virtue of S.
43, it is binding not only on the persons actually parties to the
judgment but their privies also, using the term ‘privy’ not in its
restricted sense of privy in estate, but also privy in blood. Privity
may arise (1) by operation of law, for example, privity of contract;
(2) by creation of subordinate interest in property, for example,
privity in estate as between a landlord and a tenant, or a
mortgagor and a morgagee; and (3) by blood, for example, privity
in blood in the case of ancestor and heir. Otherwise, in some
10conceivable cases, the provisions of S. 43, quoted above, would
become otiose. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant,
which was strongly supported by the third respondent through
Mr. Pathak, as stated above, is that a declaratory judgment
would not bind anyone other than the party to the suit unless it
affects some property, in other words, unlees the parties were
privy in estate. But such a contention would render the provisions
of S. 43 aforesaid, applicable only to declarations in respect of
property and not declarations in respect of status. That could not
have been the intendment of the statutory rule laid down in S.
43. Sections 42 and 43, as indicated above, go together, and are
meant to be co-extensive in their operation. That being so, a
declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status, will be
binding not only upon the parties actually before the Court, but
also upon persons claiming through them respectively. The use of
the word ‘only’ in S. 43, as rightly contended on behalf of the
appellant, was meant to emphasize that a declaration in Chap.
VI of the Specific Relief Act, is not a judgment in rem. But even
through such a declaration operates only in personam, the
section proceeds further to provide that it binds not only the
parties to the suit, but also persons claiming through them,
respectively. The word ‘respectively’ has been used with a view
to showing that the parties arrayed on either side, are really
claiming adversely to one another, so far as the declaration is
concerned. This is an other indication of the sound rule that the
Court, in a particular case where it has reasons to believe that
there is no real conflict, may, in exercise of a judicial discretion,
refuse to grant the declaration asked for oblique reasons.
13. As a result of these considerations, we have arrived at the
following
11
conclusions:
(1) That the question of addition of parties under R.10 of 0.1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial
jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has
to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a
particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies
as to the power of the court, in contradistinction to its inherent
jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited
sense in which it is used in S.115 of the Code;
(2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person
may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as
distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter
of the litigation;
(3) Where the subject-matter of a litigation, is a declaration as
regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or
direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the
court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be
in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate
upon the controversy:
(4) The cases contemplated in the last proposition, have to be
determined in accordance with the statutory provisions of
Ss.42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act;
(5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions, the court is
not bound to grant the declaration prayed for, on a mere
admission of the claim by the defendant, if the court has
reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission;
(6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of
status, such as in controversy in the instant case, affects not
only the parties actually before the Court, but generations to
come, and in view of that consideration, the rule of ‘present
12interest’, as evolved by case law relating to disputes about
property does not apply with full force; and
(7) The rule laid down in S.43 of the Specific Relief Act, is not
exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and
wider in another.
14. Applying the propositions enunciated above to the facts of
the instant case, we have come to the conclusion that the
courts below did not exceed their power in directing the
addition of the respondents I and 2 as parties-defendants in
the action. Nor can it be said that the exercise of the discretion
was not sound. Furthermore, this case comes before us by
special leave, and we do not consider that it is a fit case
where we should interfere with the exercise of discretion by
the courts below. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. As
regards the question of costs, we direct that it will abide the
ultimate result of the litigation, and will be disposed of by the
trial court.” (emphasis supplied).
19. Unlike Razia Begum, in the instant case the interest of the
appellant, if any, has not been borne out from the pleadings. Merely
because the applicant is the daughter-in-law she apparently does not
acquire any interest in the suit property as the society seems to be in
control of the school since 1988 and rent receipts were being issued
in the name of the school. The society owns the school. The legally
enforceable right referred to in Terai Tea Company Private Limited
does not apply in the instant case as the Society in the written
statement has categorically stated that rents are being paid by the
13
Society. Moreover, a society registered under the West Bengal
Societies Registration Act is a juristic entity.
20. In Firm of Mahadeva Rice and Oil Mills and others v.
Chennimalai Goundar3 the Hon’ble Court laid down the following
tests required to be following in considering an application filed under
Order 1 Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure:-
“No amount of assertion on the part of the parties to a lis to the
effect that it would avoid multiplicity of suits, that it would be
convenient for purposes of trial, that it would not cause prejudice
to any party, would be of any avail. If the cardinal test, namely,
for a final adjudication of the “real controversy such addition is
necessary, is not satisfied, then it cannot be said with any
reasonable certainty that the proposed party is a proper party. I
am of the opinion that the following tests may be formulated
usefully as a guidance in the case of adding of parties under 0.1
R.10, Civil P.C.: (1) If, for the adjudication of the “real
controversy” between the parties on record, the presence of a
third party is necessary, then he can be impleaded. (2) It is
imperative to note that by such impleading of the proposed
party, all controversies arising in the suit and all issues arising
thereunder may be finally determined and set at rest, thereby
avoiding multiplicity of suits over a subject-matter which could
still have been decided in the pending suit itself; (3) The proposed
party has a defined, subsisting, direct and substantive interest in
the litigation, which interest is either legal or equitable and which
right is cognisable in law; (4) Meticulous care should be taken to
avoid the adding of a party if it is intended merely as a ruse to3
AIR 1968 Mad 287
14ventilate certain other grievances of one or the other of the parties
on record which is neither necessary or expedient to be
considered by the Court in the pending litigation; and (5) It should
always be remembered that considerable prejudice would be
caused to the opposite party when irrelevant matters are allowed
to be considered by Courts by adding a new party whose interest
has no nexus to the subject-matter of the suit” (emphasis
supplied )
21. In the case of Durga Das and Ors. v Solace and Associates 4 a
single bench comprising of one of us (Soumen Sen, J.) has considered
Order 1 Rule 10(2) while referring to the landmark case of Razia
Begum (supra) in the following manner:
“The procedure prescribed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of
Civil Procedure would apply to implead a necessary or proper
party to effectuate complete adjudication of all the disputes that
have arisen between all the necessary or proper parties who may
be bound by the decision.
The question of addition of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is generally not one of initial jurisdiction
of the Court, but of judicial discretion which has to be exercised
in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In a
suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as
a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a
commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where
the subject- matter of the litigation, is a declaration as regards
status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest
may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the4
MANU/WB/0235/2012
15opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position
effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In
Razia Begum (supra) the rule was relaxed since a declaratory
decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the
said case, affects not only the parties actually before the Court
but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the
rule of present interest, as evolved by case law relating to
disputes about property does not apply with full force.
XXX
Under sub-rule(2) of Rule 10, only two classes of persons may be
added as parties to a suit: (1) necessary party, i.e. a person who
ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no
decree or order can be passed; or (ii) proper party, ie, a person,
whose presence is necessary for complete and effectual
adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. If a person is
neither a necessary nor a proper party, he cannot be impleaded
in a suit.
A person cannot be impleaded merely because he would be
incidentally affected by the judgment, or is interested in the fruits
of the litigation, or his presence may enable the court to come to a
correct solution of the dispute before the court. What is to be seen
in allowing or disallowing an application for addition of a party is
whether such addition would be consistent with the scope of the
inquiry necessitated in the pending suit and in the absence of
such a party it would not be possible to completely and
effectively adjudicate the controversy raised before the court. The
main object of the rule is not to prevent multiplicity of actions or
avoid fresh litigation, but to consider whether the person is
directly or legally in the action” (emphasis supplied)
16
22. The Apex Court in the case of New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v
Kumkum Mittal and Others5 observed as follows:
“11. In the leading English case of Moser v. Marsden, Lindly L.J. has
held that a party who is not directly interested in the issues between
the plaintiff and the defendant but is only indirectly or commercially
affected cannot be added as a defendant because the court has no
jurisdiction under the relevant rule to bring him on record even as a
proper party. The position is no different under the Indian law. As
laid down by this Court, “in a suit relating to property in order that a
person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as
distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the
litigation”. [See: Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum³. In
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Bombay this Court has held: (SCC p. 531, para 14)“It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect….
It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or
legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that
the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that
is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule
contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is
to prosecute his own cause of action.” (emphasis supplied)
23. In Ramesh v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Bombay,6 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
5
1994(1) SCC 402
6
1992 (2) SCC 524
17“It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of actions though it may have incidentally have that effect.
But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than
its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence
is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not
merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions
involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not
merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question
involved and has thought of arguments to advance. The only reason
which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so
that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to
be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be
effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has
been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct
interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore,
necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the
action in the answer, i.e. he can say that the litigation may lead to a
result which will affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal right.
It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a
person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. In Antony Devaraj v. Aralvaimozhi (Kurusadi) Devasahayam
Mount Oor and Thuya Viagula, Annai Church rep by the
Trustee,7 the Madras High Court considered the right of a third party
to claim addition of party. It was held as follows:-
7
2004 (2) C.T.C. 183
18“(iii). The person to be added as one of the parties must be one
whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a
necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to
given on some of the questions involved, but it should make him
as necessary witness.
(iv). The third party cannot be considered to be a necessary party
for deciding the main issue framed in the suit. Mere ground that
inclusion of the proposed third party would not alter the structure
of the suit may not entitle the party to ask the Court to implead
the third party as a defendant.
(v) The Court may upon an application or suo motu, in a fit and
proper case, implead a new party as defendant, even against the
plaintiff’s consent under certain circumstances. The discretion
vested with the Court though wide is however circumscribed by
the limitations which are built in the provisions contained in Order
1 Rule 10(2), C.P.C. Where a person is neither necessary nor
proper party, the Court has no jurisdiction to add him as a party.
If the question at issue between the parties can be worked out
without anyone else being brought in, the stranger should not be
added as a party.
(vii) A person is not to be added as a defendant merely because
he or she would be incidentally affected by the judgment. The
main consideration is whether or not the presence of such a
person is necessary to enable the Court to effectually and
completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in
the suit.
(viii) Persons whose interest would be affected by the litigation are
entitled to come on record to protect their interest when those are
19
jeopardized by the persons already on record.” (emphasis
supplied)
25. In the written statement filed by Harrow Hall in C.S. No. 34 of
2014 apart from the statements made as to the contribution of Mrs.
L.D Armstead in acquiring the said premises from Mr. B.K Karnani for
establishing the school and being a member of Harrow Hall Society
there is no assertion as to her ever being a tenant in respect of the
suit premises instead of Harrow Hall.
26. The role of Mrs. L.D. Armstead in the form of a facilitator of the
suit property being granted for establishing the school, will not act as
a determinant of the rights of any of the parties. Merely owing to the
fact that Mrs. Armstead had during her social and charitable roles
assisted and facilitated in securing the said premises in the absence
of her being expressly granted such tenancy or any rent receipts being
issued in her name, such fact would not give her or her present legal
heir a defined, subsisting, direct and substantive interest in the suit
for eviction against the respondent No. 2 in CS No.364 of 2014 as a
tenant. Caution must also be exercised by the Court lest considerable
prejudice is caused to the opposite party when irrelevant matters are
allowed to be considered by Courts by adding a new party whose
interest has no nexus to the subject-matter of the suit.
27. However, for the purpose of addition of parties on the principles of
law as discussed earlier and as evident from the pleadings it would
20
not show that the defendant in the High Court suit i.e., C.S. No. 364
of 2014 has admitted or acknowledged that although the society
became a tenant in which Late Mrs. L.D. Armstead had taken a keen
interest and facilitated the society to obtain certificate of enlistment
by the Council for Indian School Certificate Examination in 1988 in
favour of the society the plaintiff acknowledged Mrs. L. D. Armstead
as tenant and in view thereof the applicant/appellant cannot be
considered to be a necessary or a proper party in the present suit. In
view of the aforesaid we do not find any reason to interfere with the
order passed by the learned Single Judge.
28. We make it clear that these observations should not be read out of
context and only limited to the issues involved in this appeal, namely,
the addition of parties of the present appellant/applicant.
29. The appeal and the application stand dismissed.
30. There shall be no order as to costs.
(SOUMEN SEN, J.)
(BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY, J.)
bp/R.Bhar
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