Jharkhand High Court
Mithelesh Kumar Mishra @ Mithelesh … vs M/S Indusind Bank Limited on 29 July, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
[2025:JHHC:20946]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 688 of 2023
Mithelesh Kumar Mishra @ Mithelesh Mishra,
aged about 50 years, Son of Ramadhar Mishra,
Resident of Qtr. No. IM-55, P.O.-Sindri, P.S.-
Baliapur, Dist.-Dhanbad.
..... ... Petitioners
Versus
1. M/s Indusind Bank Limited, a banking company
incorporated under the provisions of Companies
Act, 1956 having its corporate office at 115, 116,
G.N. Chetty Road, T. Nagar, Chennai-600017
represented by Attorney Holder Rana Brijesh Singh,
Son of Rana Arjun Singh, Branch at Shastri Nagar,
Near Laxmi Petrol Pump, P.S.- Bank More, Dist.-
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
2. Rameshwar Yadav, Son of Banshi Yadav,
Resident of IM-463, Rangamatiya, P.O. & P.S.-
Sindri, Dist.-Dhanbad.
..... ... Opposite Parties
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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
——
For the Petitioner : Mr. Birendra Kumar, Advocate.
For the O.P. No. 1 : Mr. Bharat Kumar, Advocate.
——
07/ 29.07.2025 Heard Mr. Birendra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner and Mr. Bharat Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
O.P. No. 1.
2. O.P. No. 2 is said to be the proforma opposite party, in view
of that notice upon him has not been issued by the co-ordinate bench of
this court.
3. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, wherein prayer has been made for setting aside
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the order dated 18.05.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.
Division)-IX, Dhanbad, in Execution Case No. 72 of 2018, whereby,
the show cause filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the learned
court.
4. Mr. Birendra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the petitioner has taken a vehicle as per loan
agreement dated 20.11.2013 being registration No. JH-01-AC-8657 on
a loan amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- and the same was to be paid in 46
equal installments. He submits that however the petitioner has not been
able to regularly pay the EMI and in view of that arbitration clause of
the agreement was invoked by the financer and thereafter the execution
case has been filed, wherein the objection has been filed by the
petitioner, which has been rejected by the learned court. He submits that
the learned court has wrongly passed the impugned order.
5. Mr. Bharat Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the O.P.
No. 1 has opposed the prayer and submits that the learned court has
rightly decided the objection filed by the petitioner herein. He submits
that the arbitration Act is a complete jurisdiction and once the
arbitration clause is invoked, only the provision made in the arbitration
Act is required to be followed and the petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is not maintainable. He further submits that the
only ground has been taken in the petition to challenge the impugned
order that the said was entertained after the lapse of the period of
limitation. He further submits that even the petition filed under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been rejected by
the learned court on the point of limitation. He submits that in light of
the statute, the limitation cannot be condoned, as has been in the case of
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Simplex Infrastructure Limited Versus Union of India, reported in
(2019) 2 SCC 455, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-18 has
held as follows:-
“18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along
with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996
Act, shows that the application for setting
aside the award on the grounds mentioned in
sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made
within three months and the period can only
be extended for a further period of thirty
days on showing sufficient cause and not
thereafter. The use of the words “but not
thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that
the extension cannot be beyond thirty days.
Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is given to the respondent,
there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing
the application. That is beyond the strict
timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read
along with the proviso to Section 34 of the
1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be
condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is
to breach a clear statutory mandate.”
6. In view of the above and considering the statute of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to permit such objections to be
raised in this forum would undermine the finality of the arbitral awards
and circumvent the statutory scheme established by the Act. Once the
parties have availed themselves of the statutory remedies available
under the Act and has exhausted the appellate process under the Act, the
award attains finality, akin to a judgment of a court of law. Just as a
judgment of a court cannot be challenged ad infinitum through
collateral proceedings, an arbitral award cannot be subjected to endless
relitigation through writ petitions under Article 226 or Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. Moreover, the invocation of Article 227 of the
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Constitution of India to challenge arbitral proceedings after the
dismissal of objections would amount to an abuse of process and a
disregard for the principle of issue estoppel.
7. The principles of finality and judicial economy demand that
parties abide by the decisions of Arbitral Tribunals and exhaust the
statutory remedies available under the Act before seeking recourse to
collateral challenges through the writ petitions under Article 226 or
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The persistent delay and
obstructionist behavior, merit unequivocal condemnation and
necessitate the imposition of substantial costs. Delay tactics serve to
perpetuate injustice by denying parties their rightful entitlements. In the
context of arbitration proceedings, the purpose of arbitration is to
provide a swift and cost-effective alternative to traditional litigation. By
resorting to delay tactics, the petitioner has sought to frustrate this
objective and deny the respondents the benefits of a timely resolution.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sterling
Industries Versus Jayprakash Associates Limited and Ors., reported
in (2021) 18 SCC 367 has disapproved of the stand adopted by some of
the High Courts that any order passed by Arbitral Tribunal during
arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
9. In light of the above, the court finds that there is no merit in
this petition, as such, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A., if any,
stands dismissed.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Amitesh/-
[A.F.R.]
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