Jharkhand High Court
Mithilesh Kumar Thakur vs The State Of Jharkhand on 1 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A No.576 of 2024
-----
Mithilesh Kumar Thakur, aged about 50 years, son of Sri Ram Uchit
Thakur, resident of Block No. 208/2/12, Road No.-12, Adityapur-2, P.O.
and P.S.-Adityapur, District-Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand-831013
....... ... Appellant/ Writ Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Superintendent of Police, Saraikela, Kharsawan, P.O., P.S. and
District-Saraikela-Kharsawan
3. Jharkhand State Housing Board, through its Managing Director
having its office at Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. and P.S.-Harmu,
District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
4. Managing Director, Jharkhand State Housing Board, having its office
at Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. and P.S.-Harmu, District-Ranchi,
Jharkhand
5. Executive Engineer, Jharkhand State Housing Board, Adityapur, P.O.
and P.S.-Adityapur, District-Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand
... ... Respondents
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Anish Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For the Resp.-JSHB : Mr. Sachin Kumar, Sr.SC
------
Order No.5 Dated: 1st July, 2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is
directed against the order dated 20.06.2024 passed in W.P(C) No.2489 of
2024 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed by the
learned Single Judge by which the prayer of the writ petitioner for
issuance of a direction upon the Jharkhand State Housing Board (in short,
Board) to hand over the possession of a piece of land being Plot No.M/12
which, according to the writ petitioner, has been allotted in his favour
through lottery held on 16.09.2011 by the Housing Board.
2. The said writ petition has been dismissed on the ground of laches
and delay by the learned Single Judge, however, the liberty has been given
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
to the writ petitioner to claim for refund of the amount which the writ
petitioner has deposited along with interest.
3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ
petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:
(i) It is pleaded in the writ petition that in the month of July 2011
the respondent-Board published an advertisement in the local
newspaper inviting application for allotment of plots (M.I.G.,
L.I.G., L.B. etc.) at Adityapur under District Saraikella-
Kharsawan.
(ii) That in pursuant to the above advertisement the appellant/writ
petitioner submitted his application with requisite initial money
deposited by the him in favour of the respondent-Board and
thereafter the respondent-Board held a lottery in the month of
September 2011 wherein the he appellant/writ petitioner was
allotted a piece of land having an area of 1837.50 square feets
being plot no. M-12 at a cost of Rs. 11,52,956/-(Eleven Lacs
Fifty Two Thousands Nine Hundred Fifty Six) in terms of
allotment order contained in memo no. 2174 dated 13.10.2011.
(iii) That it is stated and submitted that as per the terms and conditions
of the allotment order, the appellant/writ petitioner was required
to deposit the aforesaid amount in Equal Monthly
Installments (EMI).
(iv) That it is stated and submitted that thereafter the appellant/writ
petitioner and respondent executed a higher purchase agreement
on 21.12.2011 for the aforesaid plot in the presence of witnesses
and as per the terms and conditions of the agreement the allottee
2
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
after getting possession over the land shall start their construction
within two years.
(v) That it is stated and submitted that as per terms and conditions of
the aforesaid allotment order dated 13.10.2011 the appellant/writ
petitioner started deposit the amount in form of Equal Monthly
Installments (EMI) as fixed by the respondents and the same was
to be paid for next five years and in the year 2016 the final
payment was also made by him.
(vi) That it is stated and submitted that as per the terms and conditions
of the allotment order and agreement the respondent-Board was
bound to handover the possession over the land to the
appellant/writ petitioner immediately but unfortunately, they
failed hand to over same to him in spite of the payment of entire
amount made in the year 2016 itself.
(vii) That it is stated and submitted that after execution of the
aforesaid agreement the appellant/writ petitioner approached the
respondent-Board for immediate possession of the allotted land
to him but the respondent-Board kept mum over the entire matter
and had not taken any action to give physical possession over the
land to him.
(viii) That it is stated and submitted that whensoever the appellant/writ
petitioner requested the respondent-Board to hand over the
possession of the plot in question, they are showing their
negligence in this regard.
(ix) That it is stated and submitted that all the effort made by the
appellant/writ petitioner for redressal of his grievances went in
3
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
vain and till date the respondent-Board has not handed over the
possession of the plot in question despite the fact that the entire
amount has been deposited by him in the year 2016 itself.
(x) That it is not out of place to submit here that there were more
other persons who have also submitted their applications
pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement and they have also been
allotted different piece of lands and agreements to that effect
have also been executed between them and the respondent-
Board.
(xi) That the appellant/writ petitioner has come to learn that since the
respondent-Board completely failed to give physical possession
over the land to them, the aforesaid persons had knocked the door
of this Hon’ble Court by filing a writ petition being W.P. (C)
No. 3970 of 2014 which was disposed of by this Hon’ble Court
in terms of order dated 07.01.2020 by directing the respondent-
Board to hand over the possession of the plots to the allottees (the
petitioners of the that writ petition).
(xii) That the appellant/writ petitioner has further came to learn that
since the respondent-Board failed to handover the
possession of plots, the aforesaid persons had filed contempt
case being Cont. Case (Civil) No. 813 of 2021 pursuant to which
the possession of the plots has been handed over to the allottees
(petitioners of that writ petition).
(xiii) That on the basis of the order of this Hon’ble Court, the aforesaid
persons had filed contempt case being Cont. Case (Civil) No. 813
4
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
of 2021 pursuant to which the possession of the plots has been
handed over to the allottees (petitioners of that writ petition).
(xiv) That it is stated and submitted that after coming to the knowledge
that the possession of plots has been handed over to the aforesaid
persons pursuant to the order of this Hon’ble Court, the
appellant/writ petitioner approached the respondent no. 5 in
terms of representation which has been duly received by the
respondent on 25.01.2024 and requested the respondent to hand
over the possession of the plot no. M-12 to the petitioner on the
basis of the aforesaid order.
(xv) That it is stated and submitted that inspite of the aforesaid
representation, wherein the reference of the order of this Hon’ble
Court has been given by the appellant/writ petitioner, the
respondent-Board has failed to hand over the possession of the
plot in question to him. Being constrained, the appellant/writ
petitioner has approached this Court by filing writ petition being
W.P(C) No.2489 of 2024 which was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge on the ground of delay and laches.
4. Being aggrieved, the instant appeal has been preferred by the
respondent.
Submission on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner:
5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant/writ petitioner has taken the following grounds:
(i) The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned judgment has
not appreciated the fact that the identically placed allottees have
been handed over the possession of their respective lands but the
5
2025:JHHC:17281-DBaforesaid aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration
by the learned Single Judge.
(ii) For that the order impugned dated 20.06.2024 is absolutely
arbitrary, illegal and bad in law.
(iii) That the Hon’ble Single Judge has failed to appreciate that
respondents have received the entire amount to the respondent-
Board but respondent-Board completely failed to give the
possession of the land to the appellant in spite of entire payment.
(iv) For that the Hon’ble Single Judge has failed to appreciate that there
is no delay and laches on the part of the appellant/petitioner rather
the respondent-Board is under obligation to hand over the
possession on payment of entire consideration amount. It is pleaded
that the appellant/writ petitioner approached several times before
the respondent-Board and made representations to hand over the
possession of the allotted piece of land but went in vain and the
same has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single
Judge. As such, the delay is not on the part of the appellant/writ
petitioner rather it lies on the part of the respondent-Board.
(v) That the Hon’ble Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the
appellant was constrained to approach the Court due to inaction of
the respondent-Board since the respondent-Board had failed to
hand over the possession of land to him inspite of payment of entire
amount.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner based
upon the aforesaid ground, initially, has contested the case by showing the
error in the impugned order.
6
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
Submission on behalf of the Respondent-Board:
7. Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Senior Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent-Board to defend the impugned order has
raised the ground that the learned Single Judge has not erred while passing
the impugned order on the principle of fence sitter as it is apparent that
there is delay of about 12 years on the part of the appellant/writ petitioner
to approach the Hon’ble Court and the learned Single Judge has rightly
dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. But the
learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, in
all fairness, has not disputed the fact that the identically placed allottees
have been handed over with the possession of land in their favour after
going through the order passed by the learned co-ordinate Single Judge in
W.P(C) No.3970 of 2014.
8. The learned Senior Standing Counsel based upon the aforesaid
ground has submitted that the learned Single Judge after taking into
consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter and the principle of fence
sitter has passed the judgment and, thus, the same cannot be said to suffer
from an error.
Analysis:
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge.
10. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner, in
pursuance to an advertisement issued by the respondent-Board, has made
an application for allotment of plot at Adityapur under district-Saraikella-
Kharsawan. The process begun and by virtue of lottery held in the month
of September, 2011 the writ petitioners along with the others has allotted
7
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
different pieces of land having an area of 1837.50 sq. feet being Plot No.m-
12 at a cost of Rs.11,52,956/- in terms of allotment order contained in
Memo No.2174 dated 13.10.2011.
11. It is the grievance of the writ petitioner that after the land having
been allotted in his favour the possession of the said land has not been
handed over while the physical possession of land in favour of the other
participants has been handed over, hence, the writ petitioner has
approached this Court by filing W.P(C) No.2489 of 2024 for redressal of
his grievance.
12. The ground has also been taken that he has subjected to hostile
discrimination, since, the land has been handed over to other allottees
except the writ petitioner.
13. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the
ground of delay and laches, since, the writ petition has been filed after a
lapse of 12 years. The learned Single Judge has declined to pass positive
direction in favour of the writ petitioner to hand over the possession of
the land to him. However, a liberty was given to the writ petitioner to seek
refund of the said deposited amount along with the interest.
14. The said order is under challenge in the present appeal.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner
has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that there
is no delay, since, the process was on going so far as the allotment of the
land in question is concerned. Allotment had been made in favour of the
other allottees who had been participated in the process of allotment along
with the writ petitioner and, hence, some delay has been caused in
8
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
approaching the Court when the land has not been allotted in favour of the
writ petitioner.
16. It has further been argued that the principle of delay and laches
will not be applicable in the facts of the present case, since, it is the fault
lies on the part of the respondent-Board in not handing over the possession
of the said land and, as such, a wrong doer cannot be allowed to take
advantage of the principle of delay and laches but these aspects of the
matter has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge,
hence the present appeal.
17. Per contra, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Senior Standing
Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board has submitted that the writ
petition has been filed after lapse of 12 years and that has been taken as a
ground not to entertain the writ petition.
18. The question which requires consideration in the present case is
that as to whether if the laches and delay has been committed on the part
of the respondent-Board in not handing over the possession of the land in
question in favour of the writ petitioner whereas the other allottees have
been handed over possession of their respective pieces of land on the basis
of the lottery, can the Court be allowed to take advantage of delay on
commission of its own wrong.
19. This Court, in order to consider the said issue, needs to refer
herein the position of law as has been settled that in the writ petition the
limitation is not applicable, rather the principle of delay and laches is to
be taken into consideration so as to see that the conduct of the litigant in
approaching the Court of law is not after reasonable delay. There is no
dispute about the legal position that the belated claim cannot be
9
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
entertained by the Court of law on the ground of the applicability of
principle of delay and laches as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of “U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. V. Jaswant Singh &
Anr.“, [(2006) 11 SCC 464], wherein on the ground of principle of delay
and laches as under paragraph nos. 9 to 11, it has been held that the delay
disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32
of the Constitution of India, for ready reference paragraph nos. 6, 9 and
10 of the said judgment are reproduced as under:-
“6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court
in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to
be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of
his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should
be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who
was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which
was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has
been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ
petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their
retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30-6-
2005 and 31-7-2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief
of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order.
Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file
writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether
such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 9. Similarly
in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 this
Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and
10
2025:JHHC:17281-DBthen woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot
stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542)
‘The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The
appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and
woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India
v. Virpal Singh Chauhan reported in (1995) 6 SCC 684.
The appellants’ desperate attempt to redo the seniority is
not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage’.
10. In “Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta” reported in (1997) 3 SCC
395 it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9)
‘9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that
the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi v. Union of
India gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said
judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other
person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired)
is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that
the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-
1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even
Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief.”
20. Likewise, in the judgment rendered in “Government of West
Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors.” [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Their Lordships
considered delay as serious factor and not granted relief, and hold at
paragraph 34 as under:-
“34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief
on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the
writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976
wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992.
In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been
decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been
11
2025:JHHC:17281-DBconsidered by this Court in State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar reported
in (1991) Supp (1) SCC 138. The plea of delay, which Mr
Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the
other persons similarly situated would operate against the
respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this
Court although they are ventilating their grievances before
appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would
prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to
make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to
the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to
deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by
a court of law.”
21. The law is well settled that if any wrong has been committed by
the respondent concerned then such party cannot be allowed to take
advantage of its own wrong and in that view of the matter the principle of
fence sitter will not be applicable as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of “State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vrs. Arvind
Kumar Srivastava and Ors.”, (2015) 1 SCC 347, wherein, at paragraph
18 and 19, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold:-
“18. ……… in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh reported in (2006)
11 SCC 464 where the issue was pertaining to entitlement of the
employees of U.P. Jal Nigam to continue in service up to the age of
60 years. In Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik reported
in (2005) 13 SCC 300 this Court had earlier held that these
employees were in fact entitled to continue in service up to the age of
60 years. After the aforesaid decision, a spate of writ petitions came
to be filed in the High Court by those who had retired long back. The
question that arose for consideration was as to whether the
employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement orders,
12
2025:JHHC:17281-DBand accepted the same, and had collected their post-retirement
benefits as well, could be given relief in the light of the decision
delivered in Harwindra Kumar reported in (2005) 13 SCC 300. The
Court refused to extend the benefit applying the principle of delay
and laches. It was held that an important factor in exercise of
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
laches and delay. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces into the situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after
a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted
to him as was granted to the persons similarly situated who were
vigilant about their rights and challenged their retirement. In para 7,
the Court quoted from Rup Diamonds reported in (1989) 2 SCC 356.
In para 8, S.M. Kotrayya reported in (1996) 6 SCC 267 was taken
note of.
19. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delay
are taken note of in paras 9 to 11 which are as follows: (Jaswant
Singh case reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464, SCC pp. 469-70).
“9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 6
SCC 538 this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over
the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such
person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as
follows: (SCC p. 542)
“The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants
kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they
had the impetus from Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan
reported in (1995) 6 SCC 684. The appellants‟ desperate
attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review
at this belated stage.”
10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta reported in (1997) 3 SCC
395 it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9)
13
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
“9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the
judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi v. Union of India gives
relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the
Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The
respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit
of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the
judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given
to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to
any relief.”
11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347,
Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not
granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60,
para 34)
“34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any
relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in
filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the
year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High
Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ
petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the
matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. v.
Debdas Kumar reported in (1991) Supp (1) SCC 138. The plea of
delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for
denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would
operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other
employees not being before this Court although they are
ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no
order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such
a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for
the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which
they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom
who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.”
14
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
22. The law is also settled that a wrong doer cannot be allowed to
take advantage of the principle of delay and laches as has been held by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Kusheshwar Prasad Singh vs. State
of Bihar and Ors.“, (2007) 11 SCC 447, wherein at paragraphs-14, 15
and 16, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:-
“14. In this connection, our attention has been invited by the learned
counsel for the appellant to a decision of this Court in Mrutunjay
Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal [AIR 1961 SC 1353] wherein it was
held by this Court that where an obligation is cast on a party and he
commits a breach of such obligation, he cannot be permitted to take
advantage of such situation. This is based on the Latin maxim
commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no party can take
undue advantage of his own wrong).
15. … This Court (at SCC p. 142, para 28) referred to Broom’s Legal
Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 191 wherein it was stated:
“It is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man
shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which
is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts
of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from
every branch of legal procedure.”
16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to
take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain favourable
interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who prevents a
thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance
he has occasioned. To put it differently, “a wrongdoer ought not to
be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong”.”
23. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the
ground which has been taken by the learned Single Judge by declining to
15
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
entertain the writ petition on the ground of approaching the Court after
lapse of 12 years can be said to be just and proper.
24. It is admitted case of the respondent-Board that the writ
petitioner has been declared to be successful for allotment of the land on
the basis of the decision taken based upon the lottery. It is also admitted
fact that along with the writ petitioner the other participants have also been
allotted different pieces of land. The further admitted fact is that the other
allottees, leaving aside the writ petitioner, the lands have been settled in
their favour.
25. It has been submitted by Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned Senior
Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board that the land
actually had been encroached by the encroachers and after removal of the
encroachment the possession of the land has been handed over in favour
of the other allottees. He has further submitted, on instructions, that
endeavour will be taken so far as the interest of the present writ petitioner
is concerned.
26. If that be the instructions having with the learned Senior Standing
Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, then the principle of delay
cannot be said to be applicable, rather it is laches lies on the part of the
respondent-Board by not securing the land said to be encroached so that
after allotment of the land the same be handed over in favour of the
successful allottees. The fact about the wrong said to be committed on
behalf of the respondent-Board, therefore, is apparent from the material
available on record on its face.
27. Hence, applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of “Arvind Kumar Srivastava” that it is a fit case where the
16
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
principle of fence sitter or the delay and laches cannot be said to be
applicable.
28. This Court, after having discussed the factual as well as the legal
position as above and adverting to the order passed by the learned Single
Judge is of the view that on consideration of the aforesaid aspect of the
matter i.e., the laches lies on the part of the respondent-Board in not
allotting the land in favour of the writ petitioner while the lands have been
allotted in favour of the other participants, hence, the impugned order, in
our considered view needs interference.
29. The order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
in W.P (C) No.2489 of 2024 is hereby quashed and set aside.
30. Accordingly, the instant appeal being L.P.A No.576 of 2024
stands allowed.
31. Consequently, W.P (C) No.2489 of 2024 stands allowed.
32. In view of the above, the respondent-Board is directed to hand
over the possession of the land in question to the appellant-writ petitioner
forthwith preferably within a period of two months from today.
33. As has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant-
writ petitioner that the amount has already been deposited with the
respondent-Board and the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been
disputed by the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the
respondent-Board. The submission has been made by Mr. Sachin Kumar,
the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board
that the effort will be taken to hand over the possession of the land in
question to the appellant-writ petitioner after removing the encroachment
from the land.
17
2025:JHHC:17281-DB
34. Let such exercise be completed within a period of two months so
that the land be allotted in favour of the appellant-writ petitioner within a
period of two months.
35. The respondent-Board under the Regulation is to take assistance
from the concerned District Magistrate for the purpose of removal of
encroachment over the land in question and, as such, the District
Magistrate, Saraikella-Kharsawan will ensure that all assistance by
deploying the Magistrate as also by maintaining law and order in that area
be extended in favour of the respondent-Board on the requisition made
by the Board which shall be made within a period of one week from today.
36. With the aforesaid observations and directions, L.P.A No.576 of
2024 is disposed of.
37. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Sudhir
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
18