Chattisgarh High Court
Mohammed Mateen Ahamed vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 11 July, 2025
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Digitally signed
by BHOLA NATH
KHATAI
Date: 2025.07.16
16:45:41 +0530
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1247 of 2025
Mohammed Mateen Ahamed S/o Moh. Ebrahim Qureshi Aged
About 37 Years, R/o Village Nurani Chowk Sadar Uttar Word No.
14, Tehsil And District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate,
Mahasamund, (Police Station, Patewa), District Mahasamund
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Petitioner : Mr. Virendra Kashyap, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Pranjal Shukla, P.L.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Order on Board
11.07.2025
1. The present petition under Section u/s 528 of BNSS has
been filed against the order dated 28.02.2025 passed by
learned Sessions Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Criminal
Revision No.H-09/2025 affirming the order dated
28.01.2025 passed by the JMFC, Mahasamund in Criminal
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Case No.21/2025 whereby the application filed by the
petitioner for interim custody of the seized vehicle i.e.
Pickup bearing registration No. CG 23 F 4550 was rejected.
2. The petitioner is the registered owner of the said vehicle,
which he had given to accused Gulam Hussain on rent for
11 months from 05.11.2024 to 05.10.2025, for which an
agreement was also executed between them. On
10.11.2024, the said vehicle was found cruelly transporting
6 cows from Mahasamund (CG) to Orissa. Hence, the
vehicle was seized by the police and a case was registered
for the offence under Sections 4, 6, 10 of the Chhattisgarh
Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act and Section 11 of the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act in Crime No.
182/2024 at Police Station Patewa, District Mahasamund.
3. An application was moved by the present petitioner before
the JMFC, Mahasamund for releasing the seized vehicle on
Supurdnama which was rejected vide order dated
28.01.2025 on the ground that the vehicle was seized on
11.11.2024 and as per Section 6 (3) Chhattisgarh
Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 (for short, “the
Act of 2004”), there is no provision for releasing the seized
vehicle on Supurdnama before six months from the date of
seizure. Against the said order of the trial Court, the
petitioner preferred a criminal revision before the Sessions
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Judge, Mahasamund which was rejected vide impugned
order dated 28.02.2025 affirming the order of the trial
Court. Hence, this petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 6(3)
of the Act of 2004 would attract when cattle are transported
for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the
provisions of the Act of 2004 or with the knowledge that it
will be likely to be slaughtered. If there is no allegation of
slaughter and the cattle are being transported for a valid
purpose, then Section 6 (3) of the Act of 2004 would not
apply and interim custody can be granted immediately
based on the merits of the matter. In this case, there is no
allegation of transporting the agricultural cattle for the
purpose of slaughter even in the entire prosecution case,
the place in the state of Orissa where the cattle were being
transported is not reflected, therefore, bar under section
6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not apply. Even otherwise, the
vehicle involved in the present case was seized on
11.11.2024 and now the period of six months has already
elapsed, therefore, this Court may order for releasing the
vehicle on Supurdnama.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently
opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the
appellant and supported the impugned order.
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6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and also went
through the record with utmost circumspection.
7. The Act of 2004 has been enacted in the interest of the
general public and to maintain communal harmony and
peace, for prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle.
Section 6 of the Act of 2004 provides prohibition on
transport of agricultural cattle for slaughter. At this stage,
it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained
in Section 6 of the Act of 2004 which reads as under: –
“6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural
cattle for slaughter:–
(1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to
transport or cause to be transported any
Agricultural cattle from any place within the state
to any place within the state or outside the State,
for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of
the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that
it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered.
(2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be
transported in contravention of provisions of sub-
section (1) any agricultural cattle as specified in the
Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in
transporting such animal along with such
agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by
such authority or officer as the State Government
may appoint in this behalf.
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(3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-
section (2) shall not be released by the order of the
court on bond or surety before the expiry of six
months from the date of such seizure or till the
final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and
such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at
the end of the trial.”
8. A focused perusal of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004, would
show that the provision bars transport, possession and sale
of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge
that the same may be slaughtered. Mere transport of cattle
from one place to another for the purpose other than
slaughter is not barred under the Act and in that case the
provision under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not
be applicable.
9. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed. When a specific word has been inserted by the
legislature, the provision cannot be given a different
meaning. In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India
and another1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court
pertinently observed as under:-
“10. As the statute creates an offence and imposes
a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of
the section must be strictly construed in favour of
the subject. We are not concerned so much with
what might possibly have been intended as with
1 AIR 1952 SC 156
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what has been actually said in and by the language
employed.”
10. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others
v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others2, the Supreme Court
held as under: –
“15. … when it is said that penal statutes must be
construed strictly, what is meant is that the court
must see that the thing charged is an offence within
the plain meaning of the words used and it must
not strain the words : “To put it in other words, the
rule of strict construction requires that the
language of a statute should be so construed that
no case shall be held to fall within it which does not
come within the reasonable interpretation of the
statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction
favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I
do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of
penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental
principle of interpretation, that the primary test
which can safely be applied is the language used in
the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear
and plain, the court must accept the expressed
intention of the legislature. …”
11. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of
Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954
came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in
Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024
SCC OnLine Guj 14545 in which the Gujarat High Court
2 (1982) 1 SCC 561
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considering the issue identical as involved in the present
case held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only in
a case where the animals are being transported for the
purpose of slaughter. It has been observed in paragraphs
10, 11, 12 and 13 of the report as under: –
“10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause
(1) would indicate that the same is applicable
in a case where it is found that the animals
were being transported from any place within
the State to any other place within the State
for the purpose of slaughter in contravention
of the provisions of the Act or with the
knowledge that they were likely to be
slaughtered. There is a proviso to section 6(A)
clause (1) which provides that a person shall
be deemed to be transporting such animal for
the purpose of slaughter unless contrary is
proved thereto to the satisfaction of the
concerned authority or officer by such person
or he has obtained a permission under sub-
section (2) for transporting the animal for
bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry
purpose.
11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a
restriction so far as the release of the vehicle
is concerned for a period of six months.
12. It is, therefore, manifest that section 6(A)
clause (4) would apply only in a case where
the animals are being transported for the
purpose of slaughter.
13. It is not in dispute so far as the present
case is concerned that no permit was obtained
by the petitioner herein as the registered
owner of the vehicle for the purpose of
transport. However, at the same time, the
prosecution has to, prima facie, show
something that the transport of the cattle was
for the purpose of slaughter. For such
purpose, I inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the
learned APP, regarding the materials collected
by the police in the course of investigation.
Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is
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nothing to show that the cattle were being
transported for the purpose of slaughter. It
appears that there is no investigation in that
direction. If it is the case of the prosecution
that the cattle were being transported for the
purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is
expected from the investigating officer to
investigate at which place they were being
taken and were to be handed over to whom for
the purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in
that regard. In the absence of such material,
in my view, the prosecution cannot straight
way take recourse to the deeming fiction as
provided under section 6(A)(1). In such
circumstances, I am of the view that there
should not be any legal impediment in
releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the
statutory time period i.e six months.”
12. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the
aforesaid legal position and the principle of law flowing
from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava (supra), it is established legal
position that if the agricultural cattle is being transported
for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the Act of
2004, bar under Section 6(3) would apply and vehicle
cannot be released on interim custody for a period of six
months or till the judgment is pronounced whichever is
earlier, but mere transportation of agricultural cattle from
one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is
not an offence under the said Act and in case Section 6(1)
of the Act of 2004 is not attracted, bar contained in Section
6(3) of the Act would not attract and interim custody can be
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granted without waiting for the period of six months as
provided.
13. A careful perusal of the order impugned and other
documents annexed with the petition would show that the
prosecution or the investigating agency at no place has
alleged that the petitioner’s vehicle was being used to
transport the cattle for the purpose of slaughter in
contravention of the provisions of the Act, specifically
Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. Case of the prosecution in
sum and substance is that the petitioner’s vehicle was
being used to carry the cattle from Mahasamund (CG) to
Orissa i.e. from one place to another and it was not in
contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. In the
entire prosecution case, no specific place in Orissa has
been mentioned where the cattle were being transported.
14. In the Animal Health Certificate dated 10-11-2024, the
Senior Veterinary Officer, Veterinary Hospital,
Mahasamund, has certified that all the six cattle are in
healthy condition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
agricultural cattle were in bad / injured condition to attract
the definition of “slaughter” so as to apply the bar
contained in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004.
15. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by
the trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are
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hereby set aside. It is held that bar under Section 6(3) of
the Act of 2004 is not at all attracted. Even otherwise, now
the period of six months has already elapsed. Hence, in the
light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283,
the petitioner would be entitled for the custody of the
vehicle till the conclusion of trial. Accordingly, the trial
Court is directed to give the interim custody of the vehicle
to the petitioner by imposing reasonable conditions. The
vehicle shall be released within seven days from the date of
complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court.
16. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-
above.
Sd/-
(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Judge
Khatai