Jharkhand High Court
Mohan Lal Jain vs State Of Jharkhand on 23 June, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
2025:JHHC:16520
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
----
Mohan Lal Jain, aged about 59 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Jain Singh
having his residence at C-38, City Centre, Sector – 4, PO and PS –
Sector – 4, District – Bokaro, as the proprietor of M/s Mohan
Timber having its principle place of business at Ukrid More, PO –
Sector – 12, PS – Bokaro Steel City, District – Bokaro
…. Petitioner
— Versus —
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Bokaro Steel Limited, through its Director – In-charge, officiating
from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel City, Sector –
4, PO and PS – Ram Mandir, District – Bokaro
3. The Executive Director (P & A), officiating from his office at Bokaro
Steel City, Sector – 4, PO and PS – Ram Mandir, District – Bokaro
4. Chief General Manager, Town Services, Bokaro Steel Limited,
officiating from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel
City, Sector – 4, PO and PS – Ram Mandir, District – Bokaro
5. Sudesh Verma, aged about 59 years, S/o not known to the
petitioner, Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Limited, an authority
appointed under Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, officiating from his office at
Ram Mandir Camp Office, PO and PS – Ram Mandir, District –
Bokaro
6. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, aged about 50 years, S/o not know to the
petitioner, Assistant Chief General Manager (Town
Administration/Land & Estate), Town Services, Bokaro Steel Limited,
officiating from his office at Administrative Building, Bokaro Steel
City, Sector – 4, PO and PS – Ram Mandir, District – Bokaro
7. Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, officiating from his office at
Collectorate Building, PO and PS – Bokaro, District – Bokaro
8. Sub-Divisional Officer, Bokaro, officiating from his office at
Collectorate Building, PO and PS – Chas, District – Bokaro.
…. Opposite Parties
—-
–1– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
—
For the Petitioner :- Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
:- Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate
For O.P. Nos.2 to 6 :- Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
:- Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate
For O.P. Nos.7 & 8 :- Mr. Kumar Pawan, Advocate
:- Ms. Rukmini Kumari, Advocate
—-
05/23.06.2025 Heard Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner along with Mr. Parth Jalan, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner, Mr. Indrajit Sinha along with Mr. Shresth Gautam,
learned counsel appearing for the opposite party Nos.2 to 6 and
learned counsel appearing for the State.
2. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 15.04.2025
passed in Civil Appeal No.13 of 2024 whereby the learned Principal
District Judge, Bokaro adjudicated the appeal and has been pleased
to dismiss the appeal preferred under Section 9 of Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
3. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the proprietorship firm operating in the
name and style of M/s Mohan Timber was started by the petitioner’s
father in 1970 over the land situated within Mouza – Ukrid, Thana
No.37, in the area falling under North – Bokaro Steel Limited (here-
in-after referred to as BSL) Land, South BSL Land, East Road from
NH-23 bypass to Nayamore (Old NH-23) West BSL Land, Bokaro
Steel City allotted to him by respondent No.2 vide license contained
in TA/A/25/031/1106 dated March 14, 1977 contained in
–2– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
Annexure-1. He further submits that the respondent – company
accepted the license fee from the petitioner till 1988, however,
thereafter stopped accepting the fee and the petitioner continued to
operate the business of the proprietorship firm over the said
premises since past more than 45 years. He further submits that the
present proceeding was initiated on 8th August, 2014 wherein the
respondent – company issued notices to 4000 (four thousand)
persons for removing their unauthorized construction over the land
claimed by them under the said act which was challenged by some
of the aggrieved persons before this Court in W.P. (C.) Nos.7296 of
2023 as well as 7210 of 2023 which was allowed by a co-ordinate
bench of this Court setting aside the said notice and liberty was
provided to the respondent – company to proceed afresh strictly as
per the provisions of the said act. He then submits that thereafter a
new petition was filed by the respondent No.2 which was registered
as Case No. A/E 59 of 2004 and the respondent issued a fresh
notice dated 5th February, 2024 upon the petitioner and initiated
proceedings under Section 5A (1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. He submits that the ground of
issuing the said notice was that the petitioner has erected a timber
and plywood factory building over the land. He submits that the
petitioner herein filed a preliminary objection to the aforesaid
notice, wherein the petitioner stated that it was operating the firm
under the license granted by the respondent – company and in
absence of any determination of the said license, the petitioner
–3– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
could not be treated to be an unauthorized occupant. He submits,
however, by the order dated 16.04.2024 one of the witnesses was
discharged and for that the petitioner filed a petition for recalling
the witness which was rejected by order dated 23.04.2024. He
submits that the rejection order has been challenged before this
Court in W.P. (C.) No.2914 of 2024 which is still pending and
according to him, in the meantime, the present proceeding is
proceeded before the Estate Officer and the petitioner was held to
be an unauthorized occupant and the direction has been issued to
vacate the land. He further submits that the said order of the Estate
Officer was assailed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 before the
learned Court of Principal District Judge, Bokaro which was
registered as Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.13 of 2024. He submits
that the learned appellate court has dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the order of the Estate Officer. In this background, he
further submits that the occupied area has already been
demolished. He draws the attention of the Court to paragraph No.7
of the petition filed in the form of preliminary objection and submits
that the occupied area has already been demolished. He further
draws the attention of the Court to the notice of eviction by way of
referring to the rejoinder and submits that one witness has stated
that the license fee was not being paid and the license was not
further extended. By way of relying on this statement, he submits
that in light of this dispute, it is proved that the petitioner herein is
–4– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
in occupation of the land which has been licensed by the BSL to the
father of the petitioner. He refers to paragraph No.24, 37 and 39 of
the counter affidavit filed by the BSL and submits that a second
case has been tried to be made out by BSL to the effect that the
land in encroachment is another land and not the licensee land. He
draws the attention of the Court to definition of “unauthorized
occupation” that is sub-section (g) of Section 2 of the Act and
submits that even in the said definition the petitioner is not coming
under the said act. According to him, Section 5A is a section which
gives power to remove the unauthorized construction and in view of
that wrongly the order has been passed under Section 5A of the
Act. According to him, it is not clear from two orders of two Courts
that on which land the petitioner is having the occupation. He
submits that once a license is granted a right is accrued to the
person and without following the due process a person cannot be
evicted. To buttress this argument, he relied in the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Express Newspapers Pvt.
Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others reported in
(1986) 1 SCC 133, wherein at paragraph No.86 it has been held
as under:
86. The Express Buildings constructed by Express
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. with the sanction of the lessor i.e. the
Union of India, Ministry of Works & Housing on plots Nos. 9
and 10, Bahadurshah Zafar Marg demised on perpetual lease
by registered lease-deed dated March 17, 1958 can, by no
process of reasoning, be regarded as public premises
belonging to the Central Government under Section 2(e).
That being so, there is no question of the lessor applying for
–5– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
eviction of the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. under section
5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971 nor has the Estate Officer any
authority or jurisdiction to direct their eviction under sub-
s.(2) thereof by summary process. Due process of Law in a
case like the present necessarily implies the filing of suit by
the lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of Works &
Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re- entry,
if any upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of
the lease.
4. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that remedy to
the BSL is elsewhere in spite of that the shorter root has been
chosen by the BSL by way of filing the petition under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. He also
refers to paragraph No.59 of the counter affidavit and submits that
on this ground the impugned order may kindly be set aside
5. Per contra, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for
the opposite party Nos.2 to 6 – BSL submits that it has been
recorded in the order dated 05.05.2025 of this Court that so far
prayer (a) is concerned that has not been pressed by the petitioner
herein and prayer (b) and (c) have only been pressed. He further
submits that the land which is said to be evicted is different and the
licensee land is another. He then submits that the license is not
heritable. He submits that even if the contention of the petitioner is
correct, he is utilizing the land in light of the license that is not
permissible as the license is not heritable. He refers to Annexure-1
which is the allotment letter in the name of father of the petitioner
and particularly submits that in light of Clause 1B only the allotee is
required to use the premises. By way of referring to Clause 12 (ii),
–6– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
he submits that the said license is not transferable either to any
person or agents of constituted authority. By way of referring to
Clause 15(ii), he submits that interest cannot be created in the said
plot or land. On the point of license, he relied in the judgment of
Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Y. Duraisamy Vs. The
Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, Ripon Buildings
Chennai and Ors. reported in 2002-2-L.W. 302, wherein at
paragraph No.5 it has been held as under :-
5. A licence is only a right to do or continue to do
something which, in the absence of such right be unlawful.
In general, licence is only a personal privilege as such it is
neither transferable nor heritable. A licence is not annexed
to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed nor is it a
transferable or heritable right but is a right purely personal
between the grantor and licencee. Unless a different
intention appears, it cannot even be exercised by the
licencee, servants or agents. Such an intention must be
gathered from the terms of the grant, be inferred from
surrounding circumstances or be found as an incident of
legal usage. In order to be irrevocable under Section 60 of
the Easement Act, a licence is to be coupled with a transfer
of property. In this case, the license held by the deceased
Hasarathiah was annexed to the property in respect of which
it is enjoyed is descendible and heritable.
6. He submits that this judgment of Hon’ble Madras High Court
has been further considered by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case
of Shashank Shekhar vs. Surinder Kumar Jain and Anr.
reported in 2016 DHC 4819.
7. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that in
paragraph No.13 Hon’ble Delhi High Court has further reiterated
that a license is only a right to do or continue to do something
–7– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
which in the absence of such right would be unlawful. A license is
only a personal privilege and it is neither transferable nor heritable.
8. Relying on the above two judgments, he submits that even
the case based by the petitioner on the point of license is not
helping the petitioner herein. He submits that if the license period is
over, the proceeding under the said act can be initiated and that is
well settled. To buttress this argument, he relied in the case of
Corporation of Calicut Versus K. Sreenivasan reported in
(2002) 5 SCC 361, wherein at paragraph No.16 it has been held
as under :-
16. It is true that a licensee does not acquire any interest
in the property by virtue of grant of licence in his favour in
relation to any immovable property, but once the authority
to occupy and use the same is granted in his favour by way
of licence, he continues to exercise that right so long the
authority has not expired or has not been determined for
any reason whatsoever, meaning thereby so long the period
of licence has not expired or the same has not been
determined on the grounds permissible under the contract or
law. Occupation of licensee is permissive by virtue of the
grant of licence in his favour, though he does not acquire
any right in the property and the property remains in
possession and control of the grantor, but by virtue of such a
grant, he acquires a right to remain in occupation so long
the licence is not revoked and/or he is not evicted from its
occupation either in accordance with law or otherwise. Main
thrust of Section 2(f) of the Act is upon the expression
`occupation’ with authority or without authority. If a person
without any authority occupies any public building he would
be a trespasser and his case would be covered by first part
of Section 2(f) and would be liable to be evicted under the
provisions of the Act instead of taking recourse to ordinary
law by filing a properly constituted suit which is dragged on–8– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520for years together. Second part of Section 2(f) deals with
cases where a person is in occupation by virtue of an
authority granted in his favour irrespective of the fact
whether the authority is in the form of lease or licence or in
any other form. So far as case of lease of a public building is
concerned, upon expiry of the period limited thereby or its
determination in accordance with law, the special procedure
prescribed under the Act providing speedy remedy for
eviction would apply even though some interest in the
immovable property is created in favour of the lessee by
virtue of creation of lease in his favour. But in a case of
licence, no interest in the property is created by virtue of the
grant, but a person acquires a right to continue his
occupation by virtue of the authority granted in his favour
under the licence unless the period of licence has expired or
the same has been determined or licence has been revoked
and/or the licensee is evicted by the grantor. If it is held
that Section 2(f) would apply only in case of lease and not in
the case of licence, the position will be very incongruous as
in the case of lease, though a lessee acquires interest in the
property which is a higher right, but he can be evicted under
the special procedure prescribed under the law providing
much speedy remedy whereas in case of licence, a licensee,
who does not acquire any interest in the property and has
only some sort of right of occupation by virtue of the nature
of grant in his favour so long he is not evicted, can be
evicted through long drawn ordinary procedure of filing a
civil suit. This could not have been the intention of the
Legislature. Apart from that, out of the expressions
`whether by way of lease’ or `any other mode of transfer’,
the expression `any other mode of transfer’ is very wide and
would not necessarily mean only that mode of transfer
whereby a right has been created in immovable property.
The expression `transfer’ under the Transfer of Property
Act connotes creation of some interest in immovable
property. But under Section 2(f) of the Act such a restricted
meaning would defeat the purpose of legislation which is
impermissible. The expression “any other mode of transfer”
would definitely bring within its sweep the case of a licensee
–9– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520where right of the grantor to occupy and continue to occupy
immovable property is transferred though under law, the
property remains in possession and control of the grantor. In
view of the foregoing discussions, we hold that the
expression `unauthorised occupation’ within the meaning
of Section 2(f) of the Act would embrace within its ambit the
case of licensee as well after expiry of the period of licence
or upon its determination for any reason whatsoever, as
such the Estate Officer was quite justified in initiating
proceeding under the Act and passing eviction order therein.
9. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that both the
orders, the Estate Officer as well as the First Appellate Court is a
well-reasoned order and there is no perversity. This Court, sitting
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, may not review and
re-appreciate the entire facts as there is no apparent error and
perversity in the orders of two courts. On the point of Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, he relied in the case of Celina Coelho
Pereira (Ms) and Others versus Ulhas Mahabaleshwar
Kholkar and Others reported in (2010) 1 SCC 217, wherein at
paragraph Nos. 30 to 33 it has been held as under :-
30. In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta And
Another11, this Court held :
“The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court
of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a
right of appeal and made the decision of the
subordinate court or tribunal final on facts.”
31. In State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot
Sandhu alias Afshan Guru And Others12 this Court explained
the power of the High Court under Article 227 thus :
“Thus the law is that Article 227 of the
Constitution of India gives the High Court the power
of superintendence over all courts and tribunals–10– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be
limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature.
The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the
subordinate tribunals within the limits of their
authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The
powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used,
to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to
interfere even with an interlocutory order. However
the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power
and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High
Court, such a source of power, when the High Court
itself does not in terms purport to exercise any
such (1975) 1 SCC 858 (2003) 6 SCC
641 discretionary power. It is settled law that this
power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227,
must be exercised sparingly and only to keep
subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of
their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further,
where the statute bans the exercise of revisional
powers it would require very exceptional
circumstances to warrant interference under Article
227 of the Constitution of India since the power of
superintendence was not meant to circumvent
statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction
under Article 227 could not be exercised “as the cloak
of an appeal in disguise”.”
32. The aforesaid two decisions and few other decisions,
namely, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S.
Guram13 , State of Maharashtra v. Milind & Ors.14, Ranjeet
Singh v. Ravi Prakash15, came to be considered by this
Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. v. Tilak Raj
Bajaj (Deceased) through LRs. And Others16 and this Court
held :
“Though powers of a High Court under Articles
226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all
courts and tribunals throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers
must be exercised within the limits of law. The power
–11– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act
as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither
review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence
upon which determination of a subordinate court or
inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct
errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own
decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal.
The (1986) 4 SCC 447 (2001) 1 SCC 4 (2004) 3 SCC
682 (2008) 9 SCC 1 powers are required to be
exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases
in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior
tribunals within the limits of law.”
33. In light of the aforesaid legal position concerning
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, which the
High Court failed to keep in mind, it must be held that in the
facts and circumstances of the case and the findings
recorded by the Additional Rent Controller as well as the
Administrative Tribunal, High Court was not justified in
interfering with the concurrent orders of eviction based on
the ground of sub- letting in exercise of its power
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that the High
Court is required to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India keeping in mind the concurrent orders of two
Courts and there is no perversity. He submits that so far judgment
relied by learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the
case of Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) is
concerned the facts of that case are completely different. He
submits that in paragraph No.86 of the said judgment, it has been
clearly held that there was a perpetual registered lease deed in
favour of the Express Newspapers and in light of that the judgment
has been passed. He further submits that since 1988 not even a
–12– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
farthing has been paid, so far the license fee is concerned. On this
ground he submits that this petition may kindly be dismissed.
11. In view of above submission of learned counsel appearing
for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record
and has examined the relevant documents as has been placed by
learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is an admitted position
that by way of Annexure-1 dated 14.03.1977, the grant of license
was made in the name of the father of the petitioner on a license
basis. It was not denied by the petitioner that since 1988, the
license fee was not paid. Initially, a notice was issued for eviction
upon 4,000 (four thousand) persons which has been challenged in
two W.P. (Cs.) and this Court set aside the said notice on conceding
of the opposite parties herein and liberty was provided to the BSL to
start afresh proceeding. Pursuant thereto, BSL has instituted the
present proceeding before the Estate Officer of BSL. The petitioner
herein has appeared before the Estate Officer and after providing
opportunities the said authority has passed the order of eviction
against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the same through
appeal under Section 9 of the Act before the Principal District Judge,
who has been further dismissed the appeal and the said appeal was
preferred by the petitioner none other than else. The petitioner
herein has not been able to show by way of leading any evidence or
document that on what lands construction have been made or
business is being done and the onus lies upon the petitioner to
show that the land of the BSL is not being used or occupied by the
–13– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
petitioner, however, it has been admitted by the petitioner that the
land granted on the basis license to his father is being utilized by
the petitioner herein and it is an admitted position that since 1988
the license fee has not been paid. Clause 1B of the allotment letter
speaks that allottee shall mean the person who is given the
permission to use the plot. Clause 12 (II) speaks as under :
12(ii). The permission given by the Bokaro Steel
Limited to the allottee for use of the plot being personal the
allottee shall not allow or permit any other persons as
agents or constituted attorney or otherwise run or remain in-
charge of the plot without obtaining prior permission in
writing of Town Administrator nor shall the allottee sublet
the plot or enter into partnership with anyone else for
running the business on the plot or in any way assign or
transfer the right to use conferred on him under these
presents.
12. In light of the above clause, it is crystal clear that the
allottee was restricted not to allow or permit any other persons or
agents or constituted attorney or otherwise run or remain in-charge
of the plot without obtaining prior permission in writing of Town
Administrator of BSL. It has not been shown either before the
Estate Officer or before the Appellate Authority that the permission
in this regard has been taken by the petitioner herein and in light of
this clause as well as the two of judgments relied by the petitioner
herein in the case of Y. Duraisamy Vs. The Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai, Ripon Buildings Chennai and Ors.
(supra) and Shashank Shekhar vs. Surinder Kumar Jain and
Anr. (supra) it is clear that a license is only a personal privilege
and it is neither transferrable nor heritable.
–14– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
13. Arguments have been advanced on behalf of petitioner that
on the wrong provision of law, the petition has been filed before the
Estate Officer, however, it is well settled that merely mentioning of a
wrong provision of any law is not sufficient to take away the
jurisdiction of the Court and the reference may be made to the case
of J. Kumaradasan Nair and Another Versus Iric Sohan and
Others reported in (2009) 12 SCC 175, wherein at paragraph
No.18 it has been held as under :-
18. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that
mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any
provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take
away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it
in law. While exercising its power, the court will merely
consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or
not. The court will not apply the beneficient provisions
like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic
manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact
found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court
will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision
has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section
(2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be
applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles
thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation
of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof.
14. Thus, the argument advanced on this point is not being
accepted by this Court. The Court finds that the Estate Officer is
having the jurisdiction under the said Act in light of definition of the
Act the premises in question is unauthorized. Petitioner herein has
not been able to show that on which land he is in occupation and
onus lies upon him to show about the use of a particular land and in
–15– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
view of that the contention of the petitioner herein that the BSL has
taken two stands so far the land in question is not being accepted
by the Court as the petitioner has not been able to show by way of
adducing any evidence or document that which land is being used
by the petitioner. In view of that the petitioner has not been able to
make out his case either on the point of license or occupation of
another land.
15. The petitioner herein has already surrendered to the
jurisdiction of the said authorities under the said act. The petitioner
himself has preferred the appeal under Section 9 of the said Act.
The procedure as prescribed under the Act is admittedly a summary
procedure. The question of title is not involved in the proceeding
before the Estate Officer but it is the issue to be decided as to
whether the petitioner is an unauthorized occupant of the public
premises. The burden is not to prove the title of either party but to
show that the petitioner is not an authorized occupant of the land in
question and he is not required to seek any license or permission
from the Estate Officer in order to possess the premises under his
occupation while doing so it cannot be inferred that the dispute of
title is relevant in the proceeding before the Estate Officer but it is
the burden to be discharged once the petitioner decides to contest
the finding of the Estate Officer and the burden is the principal
burden inasmuch as the petitioner is required to show that the land
under the possession of the petitioner is not within the ambit and
scope of definition of public premises or unauthorized occupation.
–16– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
The order passed by the Estate Officer has its finality including the
one passed by the prescribed appellate authority and there is a
specific provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court because
Section 10 of the Act speaks about the finality of the order and
Section 9 prescribes the remedial measures if the Estate Officer fails
to take any step before declaring him as an authorized occupant.
This Court is having the view that the act is sufficiently acute for
redressal of the grievances of the petitioner and there is adequate
remedy.
16. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and it is well settled that under the said
jurisdiction the High Court cannot convert that proceeding into a
court of appeal, however, the power is discretionary power and that
can be exercised in facts and circumstances of each case and
apparent error and perversity in both the two orders have not been
shown before this Court. So far the judgment relied by Mr. Ajit
Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the
case of Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. Union
of India and Others (supra) is concerned that is not in dispute
and in that case by way of perpetual registered lease deed, the
property in question was the subject matter. It is well settled that by
way of registered lease a right is accrued in favour of the persons in
whose favour lease has been executed and in this background the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed that judgment. Coming to the
facts of the present case, what has been discussed here-in-above,
–17– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025
2025:JHHC:16520
that case is not helping the petitioner.
17. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, this Court
comes to the conclusion that there is no perversity in the order of
either of the authorities and no interference of this Court is
required. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. However, keeping in
view that the petitioner herein is having a timber sawmill in that
plot, the opposite party herein shall not initiate any action for his
eviction within the next four months starting with effect from the
date of judgment.
18. Pending petition, if any, is also disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Sangam/
A.F.R.
–18– C.M.P. No. 442 of 2025