Kerala High Court
Mohankumar K vs The Union Of India on 12 June, 2025
Author: P.V.Kunhikrishnan
Bench: P.V.Kunhikrishnan
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WP(CRL.) NO. 722 OF 2025
1
"CR"
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
THURSDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 22ND JYAISHTA, 1947
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PETITIONERS:
1 MOHANKUMAR K
AGED 62 YEARS
S/O.KUTTAN PILLAI, SREE MOHANAM', EDAVAKKODE,
SREEKARYAM P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695017
2 SREEKALA MOHAN
AGED 56 YEARS
W/O.MOHANKUMAR, SREE MOHANAM',
EDAVAKKODE, SREEKARYAM P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695017
BY ADVS.
SRI.BABU S. NAIR
SMT.SMITHA BABU
SRI.P.A.RAJESH
SHRI.PRANAV
SRI.K.P.DHANEESH
SHRI.SIDDHARTH KARUN PISHARODY
SMT.FARSANA NOUSHAD
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RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NEW DELHI, PIN - 110001
2 THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, 1ST AND 2ND FLOOR,
MTNL BUILDING, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU MARG, NEW DELHI,
PIN - 110002
3 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE, KANOOS CASTLE, A.K.
SHESHADRI ROAD, COCHIN, PIN - 682011
4 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
PEROORKADA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 695005
OTHER PRESENT:
JAISANKAR V NAIR -SC
SMT CHRISTY THERESA SURESH
SMT.O.M.SHALINA, DSGI
SMT.SEETHA S, SR PP
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 12.06.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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"CR"
P.V. KUNHIKRISHNAN, J.
--------------------------------
W.P.(Crl.).No.722 of 2025
----------------------------------------------
th
Dated this the 12 day of June, 2025
JUDGMENT
The short point to be decided in this Writ Petition is
whether this Court should exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
against the decision of the adjudicating authority under the
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (for short ‘PML
Act‘), evenif there is an arguable case, when there is an
efficacious alternative remedy available to the aggrieved
person.
2. The petitioners received Ext.P1 provisional
attachment order under Section 5(1) of the PML Act.
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Petitioners submitted Ext.P2 detailed reply with supporting
documents. According to the petitioners, the properties
owned by the petitioners cannot be proceeded against, as
the same cannot be termed as ‘proceeds of crime’. It is also
the case of the petitioners that they purchased the
properties after paying the entire sale consideration, and
are the absolute owners of the property. Therefore, it is
contended that those properties cannot be termed as
‘proceeds of crime’. Hence, the provisional attachment
order is unsustainable, was the contention. But, the
adjudicating authority, without considering Ext.P2 reply,
issued Ext.P3 order confirming the provisional attachment
order, under Section 8 of the PML Act, is the grievance.
Aggrieved by the same, this Writ Petition (Crl.) is filed.
3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners and Advocate Cristy Therasa Suresh
representing the learned Standing Counsel appearing for
respondents 2 and 3.
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4. When this Writ petition came up for
consideration, this Court requested the petitioners’ counsel
to address the maintainability of this writ petition when an
efficacious alternative remedy is available to the
petitioners. Therefore, this Court heard in detail about the
maintainability of this writ petition.
5. Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Adv. Babu
S. Nair argued the matter in detail. The counsel submitted
that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can be invoked in cases where there is
a total lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders, and where
the impugned orders are not sustainable. The counsel for
the petitioners took me through the impugned orders and
also the supporting documents produced along with this
writ petition. Adv. Babu S. Nair argued that the action of
respondents 1 to 3 to proceed against the properties of the
petitioners is illegal, arbitrary, and unjust, and the very
inception of the proceedings against the properties of the
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petitioners is per se unsustainable and liable to be
interfered with by this Court. The counsel submitted that,
though the Ext.P3 order confirming the provisional
attachment order is appealable under Section 26 of the PML
Act before the appellate tribunal, this writ petition is
maintainable because the initiation of the proceedings at
the inception itself is illegal. According to the counsel, the
petitioners have no connection with the crime registered by
the Enforcement Directorate or the predicate crimes
registered by the police. It is also submitted that, for a
property to be qualified as ‘proceeds of crime’, it must have
a direct nexus with the crimes committed, or the same
should have been obtained or derived on account of the
commission of the offences. Adv. Babu S. Nair submitted
that the petitioners purchased the properties from the
accused in the predicate offence on 04.05.2016. The
accused persons in that case purchased the said properties
in the year 2012 as per Document Nos. 4527/2012 and
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4688/2012. Thereafter, they have obtained a building
permit for the construction of a multi-storied residential
complex and collected amounts from the prospective
buyers and cheated them is the case. Therefore, the
purchase of properties is much before the commission of
the offence, and the same cannot be termed as ‘proceeds
of crime’, is the sum and substance of the argument of the
petitioners. The counsel for the petitioners also relied on
the judgment of this Court in Satish Motilal Bidri v.
Union of India & Ors. [2024 (4) KLT 198] and Davy
Varghese & Another v. Deputy Director, Directorate
of Enforcement & Others [2025 (1) KLT 223]. Counsel
for the petitioners submitted that, in the light of the above
binding precedents, this Court is justified in interfering with
the impugned orders in this case. The counsel also
submitted that, if this Court is not agreeing with the dictum
laid down in the above judgments, the matter may be
referred to the Division Bench, and till then the impugned
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orders may be kept in abeyance. The counsel also relied on
the judgment of the Apex Court in Pavana Dibbur v. The
Directorate of Enforcement [AIR 2024 SC 117].
6. Advocate Cristy Therasa Suresh, appearing for
the respondents 2 and 3, seriously opposed the contentions
of the petitioners. She submitted that the petitioners have
an efficacious alternative remedy. She also submitted that
an appeal is maintainable against the impugned order
under Section 26 of the PML Act, and thereafter an appeal is
maintainable before this Court under Section 42 of the PML
Act. Therefore, it is submitted that this Court may not
interfere with the impugned orders. She relied on the
judgment dated 21.09.2023 of the Division Bench of this
Court in W.A. No.1450/2023. It is also submitted by her
that the decision in Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra) is
already stayed by the Apex Court.
7. This Court considered the contentions of the
petitioners and the respondents. Admittedly, the impugned
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order is an order passed by the adjudicating authority under
Section 8 of the PML Act. It is also an admitted fact that an
appeal is maintainable against such orders to the appellate
tribunal constituted under Section 25 of the PML Act. It is
also an admitted fact that, as per Section 42 of the PML Act,
any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Appellate Tribunal can file an appeal to the High Court on
any question of law or fact arising out of such order.
Therefore, the PML Act is a complete code in which there is
an adjudication provided under Section 8, an appeal is
provided under Section 26, and a further appeal is provided
to this Court as per Section 42 of the PML Act. The question
to be decided is whether this Court should invoke the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
when an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the
petitioners.
8. This Court in Controller of Examination,
Kannur and another v. Sreya N [2021(5) KHC 537]
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considered the scope of interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India against the orders of the District
Consumer Forum, when the Consumer Protection Act
provides a hierarchy of forums, for the aggrieved parties to
challenge such orders, and when the said Act is a complete
code in itself. Thereafter, in Union Bank of India v. K.J.
Jose and Others [2022 (2) KHC 739], this court, after
referring to Sreya‘s (supra) case, observed that, even if a
writ petition is admitted long back, this court need not
entertain writ petitions in all cases, only for the reason that,
it is already admitted long back, when there is an
efficacious alternative remedy available. Relevant portion of
the judgment in K.J.Jose case is extracted hereunder:
“10. This Court considered the judgments relied
by the petitioners to strengthen the argument raised to
the effect that, this Court can entertain a writ petition
even if there is an alternative remedy available as per
the Consumer Protection Act. There is no dispute with
that proposition. In almost all cases cited by the
petitioners, it is stated that it is the discretion of this
Court to decide whether or not to entertain such
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petition and the normal rule is not to entertain because
the Consumer Protection Act is a complete code in
which there is a hierarchy of forums to challenge
orders.
11. Moreover in Controller of Examination‘s case
(supra), this Court already found that Writ Court need
not entertain a challenge against the orders passed by
the Consumer Forum in all situations. A different view
is not at all necessary to that proposition. The question
raised in these writ petitions by the petitioners is that,
since these writ petitions were already admitted long
back and are pending before this Court for the last
several years, the writ petitions may not be dismissed
for the reason that, there is an alternative remedy
available to the petitioners. This proposition cannot be
accepted as a universal principle in the light of the
decision of the Apex Court in Genpact’s India Pvt. Ltd.’s
case (supra), in which the earlier decision of the Apex
Court in Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam’s case (supra) is also
relied. In Genpact India Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), the
Apex Court considered this point in detail in paragraph
No.16, which is extracted hereunder:
“16. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in
the approach adopted by the High Court in refusing to
entertain the Writ Petition. The submission that once
the threshold was crossed despite the preliminary
objection being raised, the High Court ought not to
have considered the issue regarding alternate
remedy, may not be correct. The first order dated
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25/01/2017 passed by the High Court did record the
preliminary objection but was prima facie of the view
that the transactions defined in S.115QA were initially
confined only to those covered by S.77A of the
Companies Act. Therefore, without rejecting the
preliminary objection, notice was issued in the
matter. The subsequent order undoubtedly made the
earlier interim order absolute. However, the
preliminary objection having not been dealt with and
disposed of, the matter was still at large. In State of
U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti and Others, 2008 (12) SCC 675, this Court
dealt with an issue whether after admission, the Writ
Petition could not be dismissed on the ground of
alternate remedy.
The submission was considered by this Court as
under:
“38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither
the legal position nor such a proposition has been laid
down in Suresh Chandra Tewari, (AIR 1992 All 331
(Suresh Chandra Tewari vs. District Supply Officer),
that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is
no doubt correct that in the headnote of All India
Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that “petition cannot be
rejected on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy of filing appeal”. But it has not been so held
in the actual decision of the Court. The relevant para
2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh Chandra Tewari
case, AIR p. 331)
“2. At the time of hearing of this petition a
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threshold question, as to its maintainability was
raised on the ground that the impugned order was an
appealable one and, therefore, before approaching
this Court the petitioner should have approached the
appellate authority. Though there is much substance
in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to
reject this petition on the ground of alternative
remedy having regard to the fact that the petition has
been entertained and an interim order passed,”
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right
in law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of
interim orders is a relevant consideration for not
dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court
that the matter could be decided by a Writ Court. It
has been so held even by this Court in several cases
that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot
be held that a writ petition is not maintainable. In our
judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a
proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it
could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative
remedy. If such bald contention is upheld, even this
Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which
ought not to have been entertained by the High Court
under Art.226 of the Constitution in view of
availability of alternative and equally efficacious
remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court
has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and
granted the relief to the petitioner.”
12. The Apex Court held that it is neither the legal
position nor a proposition that once a petition is
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admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of an
alternative remedy. The Apex Court in an unambiguous
manner observed that it cannot be laid down as a
proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it
could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative
remedy. The Apex Court observed that if such bald
contention is upheld, even the Apex Court cannot order
the dismissal of the writ petition, which ought not to
have been entertained by the High Court under Art.226
of the Constitution of India in view of the availability of
alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the
aggrieved party once the High Court has entertained a
writ petition, albeit wrongly and granted the relief to
the petitioner.”
9. Keeping in mind the above principle, this Court
considered the contentions of the petitioners. It is true that
there is no limitation on exercising the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if there is any
violation of fundamental rights or if any orders are passed
without jurisdiction. But each case has to be decided based
on its facts. The jurisdiction of this Court may be wide, but if
this Court interferes in each and every case in which there
is an illegality or impropriety, this Court will be burdened
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with litigation. That is why the PML Act provide a separate
procedure for filing an appeal and a second appeal. Unless
there is an extraordinary situation, this Court need not
interfere with an order passed under Section 8 of the PML
Act.
10. The counsel for the petitioners raised a
contention that in the light of the decisions in Satish
Motilar Bidri’s case (supra) and Davy Varghese’s case
(supra), this Court is bound to follow the dictum in these
cases and should entertain this writ petition. First of all, I
will consider the judgment in Satish Motilal Bidri’s case
(supra). Admittedly, the above judgment is stayed by the
Apex Court, and the Apex Court clearly stated that the High
Court should not have entertained the writ petition when an
alternative and equally efficacious statutory remedy was
available. It will be better to extract the stay order passed
by the Apex Court in the Petition for Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.13429/2024 dated 18.10.2024.:
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“1. The learned A.S.G., Mr. Raju has drawn the
attention of this Court to paragraph 298 of the
judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., 2022 SCC Online
SC 929.
2. That apart, we are of the prima facie opinion
that the High Court should not have entertained the
writ petition when alternative equally efficacious
statutory remedy was available to the respondent –
writ petitioner.
3. Hence, issue notice to the respondent.
4. Mr. Manish Kumar Jha, learned counsel
representing Mr. Anil Kumar, learned AOR appearing
on caveat for the sole respondent accepts notice and
waives further service of notice.
5. List after four weeks.
6. In the meantime, the operation of the
impugned order shall remain stayed.
7. In the meantime, pleadings be also
completed.”
11. In the light of the above interim order of the apex
court, it is not proper for this Court to rely on the judgment
in Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra). Moreover, after
Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra), the same learned
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Judge (the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas)
refused to interfere with an order passed by the
adjudicating authority under Section 8 of the PML Act, as
per the judgment dated 07.08.2024 in W.P.(Crl.)
No.871/2024. It will be better to extract the above
judgment:
“Petitioner is challenging Ext.P3 order issued by
the fourth respondent Adjudicating Authority under
Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (for short, ‘the Act’).
2. I have heard Sri. P.T.Jose, the learned counsel
for the petitioner and Sri. Jaishankar.V.Nair, the
learned Standing Counsel for the third respondent.
3. Though petitioner alleges that the property
which was succeeded by him and not even remotely
connected with any proceeds of crime had been
provisionally attached and confirmed by the
impugned order without even referring to the
contentions advanced, I am of the view that, under
Section 26 of the Act, petitioner has a remedy before
the Appellate Tribunal.
4. Since an effective and alternative remedy is
provided under the statute, the contentions raised by
the petitioner can be adjudicated by the said Tribunal.
When an alternative and efficacious remedy is
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available, normally, this Court should avoid interfering
or exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. No exceptional circumstances
are pointed out to warrant invocation of the extra
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in the instant
case. Therefore, I am of the view that the petitioner
ought to be relegated to his alternative remedies.
5. On noticing the disinclination of this Court to
invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226, it was
submitted that the time to prefer an appeal will expire
soon and the said period may be extended. The
provisions of PMLA provide for condonation of delay
for filing the appeal. Since such remedies are
available, a direction to extend the time is not called
for.
Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed,
reserving the liberty of the petitioner to approach the
Appellate Tribunal, in accordance with law.”
12. The above judgment itself shows that the learned
Judge invoked the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution in Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra),
considering the facts and circumstances of that particular
case. Therefore, there is no dictum laid down by this Court
which is applicable in all cases. In addition to that, as I said
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earlier, the Apex Court already stayed the operation of the
judgment in Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra).
Therefore, I am not in a position to accept the contention of
the petitioners that Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra) is
a binding precedent to this Court.
13. The counsel for the petitioners then argued based
on the decision in Davy Varghese’s case (supra). This
Court anxiously considered the facts in that case. The
counsel for the petitioners relied on paragraphs 11 and 15
of the judgment in Davy Varghese’s case, which is
extracted hereunder:
11. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High
Court has a discretion to or not to entertain a Writ
Petition, depending on the facts of each case.
Amongst the self-imposed restrictions, though,
availability of an effective and efficacious alternative
remedy is one, the same by itself, would not operate
as a bar in at least four contingencies, namely, where
the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of
any of the fundamental rights or where there has
been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the impugned order is without jurisdiction or
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the vires of an Act is challenged, as held in the often
quoted decision of Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others
[(1998) 8 SCC 1] and the Constitution Bench decision
in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs,
Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and
Another [AIR 1961 SC 1506]. Further when a
question of law is involved, the alternative remedy
under a statute shall not be a restraint to entertain a
writ petition.
15. The scheme of section 5(3) of the PML Act
indicates that a person aggrieved by a provisional
order of attachment cannot challenge such an order
before any authority. In Santiago Martin v. Union
of India (supra) at paragraph 38 it was observed that
there is no appeal against a provisional attachment
order. The statute contemplates a complaint to be
filed by the Officer who issued the attachment order
to prefer a complaint to the Adjudicating Authority
under section 5(2) of the PML Act. If the provisional
attachment is found to be illegal, the Adjudicating
Authority’s order will be effective only from such a
date and not the date of the provisional order. Even if
the attachment is wholly illegal, still, at least for the
period during which the provisional attachment
remained in force, the property would have the taint
of a proceeds of crime. The stigma on the property
will not be effaced at least for the said period. Thus, if
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an order of attachment of a property is without
jurisdiction or a non est, the remedy under the statute
may not be a completely efficacious and alternative
mechanism. Hence, if the order of provisional
attachment under section 5 of PML Act is without
jurisdiction, a writ petition is maintainable and can
even be entertained.”
The starting sentence in paragraph 11 itself shows that the
High Court has the “discretion to or not to entertain a writ
petition” depending on the facts of each case. The learned
Judge interfered with the order in that particular case,
invoking the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
That itself shows that there is no dictum laid down in Davy
Varghese’s case (supra) that, in all cases, where there is
some illegality in the order passed by the adjudicating
authority under Section 8 of the PML Act, or in the
provisional Attachment order under Section 5(1) of the PML
Act, this Court should interfere with the order invoking the
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
14. The counsel for the petitioners also relied on the
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judgment of the Apex Court in Pavana Dhibbur‘s case
(supra), paragraph 15 of which is extracted hereunder:
15. Coming back to Section 3 of the PMLA, on its
plain reading, an offence under Section 3 can be
committed after a scheduled offence is committed.
For example, let us take the case of a person who is
unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly
assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or
knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that
case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence
under Section 3 of the PMLA. To give a concrete
example, the offences under Sections 384 to 389 of
the IPC relating to “extortion” are scheduled offences
included in Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the PMLA.
An accused may commit a crime of extortion covered
by Sections 384 to 389 of IPC and extort money.
Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence
of extortion may assist the said accused in the
concealment of the proceeds of extortion. In such a
case, the person who assists the accused in the
scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of the
crime of extortion can be guilty of the offence of
money laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary that
a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of
the PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the
accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in
paragraph 270 of the decision of this Court in the
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case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [2022 SCC OnLine
SC 929] supports the above conclusion. The
conditions precedent for attracting the offence under
Section 3 of the PMLA are that there must be a
scheduled offence and that there must be proceeds of
crime in relation to the scheduled offence as defined
in clause (u) of subsection (1) of Section 3 of the
PMLA.
15. I failed to understand how this judgment would
help the petitioner to persuade this court to entertain this
writ petition. I am of the considered opinion that there is no
binding precedent to the effect that whenever there is any
illegality in an order passed under Section 8 of the PML Act,
or in a provisional attachment order under Section 5(1) of
the PML Act, this Court should invoke the powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution, especially when there is an
efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioners
as per PML Act. The constitutional courts need not step into
the shoes of statutory authorities in such cases.
16. Then the counsel for the petitioners submitted
that, since there are two judgments in which this Court
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interfered in the orders passed under the PML Act, if this
Court is not inclined to agree with those decisions, the case
may kindly be referred to the Division Bench after keeping
in abeyance the impugned orders. I cannot agree with the
above submission of the counsel for the petitioners. First of
all, I am not disagreeing with the judgment of this Court in
Davy Varghese’s case (supra). I am not saying that this
Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed
by the adjudicating authority under Section 8 of the PML
Act. Each case is to be decided based on the facts in that
case. The Court has to exercise its discretion. Simply
because, in one case, a learned Judge exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction vested with him while invoking
Article 226 of the Constitution, the same cannot be treated
as a precedent unless a dictum is laid down to that effect. I
find no dictum laid down in Davy Varghese’s case
(supra), except the fact that the High Court can exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
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Constitution in appropriate cases. Therefore, there is
nothing to differ with the judgment in Davy Varghese’s
case (supra). As far as Satish Motilal Bidri’s case (supra)
is concerned, as I mentioned earlier, the same is already
stayed by the Apex Court. As I mentioned earlier, Section
25 of the PML Act says that the appellate tribunal
constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulation (Forfeiture
of Property) Act, 1976 shall be the Appellate Tribunal for
hearing appeals against the orders of the adjudicating
authority and the other authorities under the PML Act.
Section 26 of the PML Act says about appeal to the
appellate tribunal, which is extracted hereunder:
“26. Appeals to Appellate Tribunal. –
(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), the
Director or any person aggrieved by an order made
by the Adjudicating Authority under this Act, may
prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Any reporting entity aggrieved by any order of the
Director made under sub-section (2) of section 13,
may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
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(3) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) shall be filed within a period of forty-
five days from the date on which a copy of the order
made by the Adjudicating Authority or Director is
received and it shall be in such form and be
accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal after giving an
opportunity of being heard entertain an appeal after
the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it
within that period.
(4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2), the Appellate Tribunal may, after
giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of
being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit,
confirming, modifying or setting aside the order
appealed against.
(5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every
order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to
the concerned Adjudicating Authority or the Director,
as the case may be.
(6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be dealt
with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour
shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally
within six months from the date of filing of the
appeal.”
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17. A detailed procedure is prescribed for filing an
appeal and hearing of an appeal as per Section 26 of the
PML Act. The composition, etc., of the appellate tribunal is
narrated in detail in Section 27 of the PML Act. The
qualification for appointment in the tribunal is also
mentioned in Section 28 of the PML Act, which is also
extracted hereunder:
“28. Qualifications for appointment.
(1)A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
Chairperson unless he is or has been a Judge of the
Supreme Court or of a [High Court or is qualified to
be a Judge of the High Court] [Substituted by Act 20
of 2005, Section 3, for “High Court” (w.e.f.
1.7.2005).].
(2)A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
a Member unless he
[xxxx]
(b) has been a Member of the Indian Legal
Service and has held a post in Grade I of that
Service for at least three years; or
(c) has been a member of the Indian Revenue
Service and has held the post of
Commissioner of Income-tax or equivalent
post in that Service for at least three years; or
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(d) has been a member of the Indian Economic
Service and has held the post of Joint
Secretary or equivalent post in that Service
for at least three years;
(e) has been a member of the Indian Customs
and Central Excise Service and has held the
post of a Joint Secretary or equivalent post in
that Service for at least three years; or
(f) has been in the practice of accountancy as a
chartered accountant under the Chartered
Accountants Act, 1949 (38 of 1949) or as a
registered accountant under any law for the
time being in force or partly as a registered
accountant and partly as a chartered
accountant for at least ten years:Provided
that one of the members of the Appellate
Tribunal shall be from category mentioned in
clause (f); or
(g) has been a member of the Indian Audit and
Accounts Service and has held the post of
Joint Secretary or equivalent post in that
Service for at least three years.
(3) No sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or of a
High Court shall be appointed under this section
except after consultation with the Chief Justice of
India.
(4) The Chairperson or a Member holding a post as
such in any other Tribunal, established under any law
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for the time being in force, in addition to his being
the Chairperson or a Member of that Tribunal, may be
appointed as the Chairperson or a Member, as the
case may be, of the Appellate Tribunal under this
Act.”
18. The appellate tribunal is constituted with
competent persons. In addition to that, as per Section 42 of
the PML Act, any person aggrieved by any decision or order
of the appellate tribunal may file an appeal to the High
Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the
decision or order of the appellate tribunal to him on any
question of law or fact arising out of such order. Therefore,
this Court need not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order under
Section 8 of the PML Act unless there is an extraordinary
situation. This Court considered the contention raised by
the counsel for the petitioners on merit. I do not want to
make any observation about the same. There may be valid
points for the petitioners to challenge the orders passed by
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the adjudicating authority. Every illegal order need not be
entertained by this Court by invoking the powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution, especially when the PML Act
is a complete Code, containing provisions for an appeal to
the appellate tribunal and thereafter further appeal to this
Court. This Court is burdened with thousands of cases.
Convicts are in jail waiting for a decision in their appeal
against conviction and sentence. In such circumstances,
when efficacious alternative remedies are available, this
Court need not interfere with the orders passed by the
adjudicating authority invoking the powers under Article
226 of the Constitution unless there is an extraordinary
situation. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that this
writ petition is to be dismissed, as not maintainable. All the
contentions raised by the petitioners in this writ petition are
left open, and they are free to agitate the same before the
appellate tribunal in accordance with law.
Granting liberty to the petitioners to raise all the
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contentions before the appellate tribunal, this writ petition
is dismissed.
Sd/-
P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
DM/JV JUDGE
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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 722/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROVISIONAL
ATTACHMENT ORDER DATED, 26-11-2024 AS
NO.ECIR/01/KCZO/2019/4752 OF THE 3RD
RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY SUBMITTED BY
THE 2ND PETITIONER DATED, 18-2-2025
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE
ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY IN PAO
NO.22/2024 DATED, 29-4-2025
Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN
O.S.NO.96/2019 OF THE SUB COURT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED, 30-4-2019
Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN
O.S.NO.104/2019 OF THE SUB COURT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED, 3-5-2019