Mohd. Abdullah Gujjar vs Ut Of Jammu & Kashmir Through on 30 August, 2025

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Mohd. Abdullah Gujjar vs Ut Of Jammu & Kashmir Through on 30 August, 2025

                                                            Serial No. 43


        HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
                        AT JAMMU

                                                   Reserved on : 21.08.2025
                                                   Pronounced on: 30.08.2025

HCP No. 32/2025

Mohd. Abdullah Gujjar
@ Dullah @ Sher Khan,
S/O Haji Nabi Baksh Gujjar
R/O Village Sigdi Bhata,
Tehsil Mughal Maidan , District Kishtwar
Through brother Noor Din                                             ...Petitioner

                     Through: Mr. A. A. Hamal, Advocate.

                               Vs

1. UT of Jammu & Kashmir through
   Principal Secretary to Govt., (Home),
   Civil Secretariat,
   Jammu.
2. District Magistrate, Kishtwar.
3. Senior Superintendent of Police, Kishtwar.
4. Superintendent, District Jail, Kathua.
                                                              ..... Respondent(s)

                     Through: Mr. Eishaan Dadhichi, GA.


CORAM:       HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE M A CHOWDHARY, JUDGE

                                 JUDGMENT

1. Petitioner-Mohd. Abdullah Gujjar @ Dullah @ Sher Khan, S/O Haji

Nabi Baksh Gujjar R/O Village Sigdi Bhata, Tehsil Mughal Maidan, District

Kishtwar (for short ‘the detenue’) challenged the detention Order

No.3rd/DM/K/PSA of 2024 dated 07.11.2024 (‘impugned order’), issued by

respondent No.2, District Magistrate, Kishtwar (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the

detaining authority’), whereby detenue has been placed under preventive
2 HCP No.32/2025

detention, in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the

maintenance of ‘security of State’.

2. Petitioner contends that the Detaining Authority passed the impugned

detention order without there being due application of mind; that the detaining

authority has not informed the detenue about his right to file representation to

the detaining authority and also the time frame within which such a

representation must be filed to the detaining authority against his detention

order, which incapacitated him to file effective and meaningful representation

against his detention order; that allegations against the detenue are false and the

sponsoring agency suppressed the vital fact that earlier also, the detenue was

detained under preventive detention, and now same FIRs are made the basis of

detaining the detenue despite the fact that this court had quashed the earlier

detention order; that some vague DDRs are allegedly recorded against the

detenue in order to put detenue under preventive detention and not a single FIR

has been registered against the material after quashment of earlier detention

order; that whole of the material was not supplied to the detenue which

incapacitated the detenue in filing the effective and meaningful representation

against his detention order. Lastly, it is prayed that the impugned detention

order be quashed by allowing the present petition.

3. The respondents have contested the writ petition by filing counter

affidavit, wherein, it has been submitted that the impugned order of detention

has been passed by the detaining authority after carefully analyzing the dossier

dated 18.10.2024 submitted by SSP Kishtwar; that the detention order is based

on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the grounds of detention

clearly reflect the application of mind; that the detaining authority was satisfied
3 HCP No.32/2025

that the activities of the detenue were prejudicial to the security of the State and

that there was every likelihood of the detenue continuing with such activities if

he be let free; that the respondents have supplied all the material to the detenue

and have also read out and explained the contents thereof in the language he

understands; that he was also informed about his right to make a representation

to the Government as well as detaining authority; that the respondents, in order

to lend support to their contentions, have produced the detention record.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused the record and

considered the matter.

5. The detention record, as produced, reveals that the detenue was involved

in following cases registered at Chatroo and Kishtwar Police Stations:-

1) FIR No. 03/2003: U/S 366/302 RPC, 7/274 IA Act;

2) FIR No. 31/2004: U/S 395/120/121-A RPC, 7/27 IA Act;

3) FIR No. 08/2006: U/S 302 RPC, 7/27 IA Act;

4) FIR No. 11/2006: U/S 302 RPC, 7/27 IA Act;

5) FIR No. 101/2006: U/S 302 RPC, 3/25 IA Act;

6) FIR No. 41/2006: U/S 364 RPC, 7/27 IA Act;

7) FIR No. 198/2006: U/S 302/307 RPC, 7/27 IA Act;

8) FIR No. 27/2007: U/S 302 RPC; and

9) FIR No. 161/2007: U/S 302/212/109 RPC, 7/27 IA Act.

Besides the above nine FIRs, the following six DDRs have been recorded

against the petitioner at Chatroo Police Station and Mughalmaidan Police Post:

       i)    DD No.19 dated 11.05.2024;
       ii)   DD No. 11 dated 28.06.2024;
       iii) DD No. 13 dated 29.06.2024;
       iv) DD No. 11 dated 30.06.2024;
                                                4                  HCP No.32/2025


        v)    DD No. 14 dated 08.07.2024; and
        vi) DD No. 10 dated 12.07.2024

Involvement of the detenue in the aforementioned cases appears to have heavily

weighed with the detaining authority, while passing impugned detention order.

6. Though many grounds on behalf of the detenue have been raised, for

assailing the impugned order of detention, yet, during the course of arguments,

his counsel restricted his arguments to the contentions that:

i) That the detenue was not informed about his right to make representation

to the detaining authority, as also no mention of time limit in the

detention order within which detentue can make his representation to the

detaining authority as well as the Government;

ii) That the cases/FIRs of the year 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007 are made

basis for passing the detention order, in which the petitioner has already

been acquitted;

iii) That insufficient material, no compelling circumstances and vague

DDRs were made basis for passing the impugned detention order, as no

new FIR has been registered against the petitioner;

iv) That the grounds of detention do not clearly mention the charge and the

material on the basis of which the grounds of detention find support for

each of the charge;

v) That there is non-application of mind on the part of respondents vis-à-vis

no cognizance taken of the previous detention of the petitioner ordered
5 HCP No.32/2025

vide No.01/PSA of 2018 on 03.05.2018 and quashed by this court vide

order dated 06.09.2018 vitiates the impugned detention order; and

vi) That the grounds of detention of the earlier prevention detention order

should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in part even

along with fresh grounds of detention for drawing requisite subjective

satisfaction to pass a fresh detention order.

7. The first ground as argued is, that the detenue was not informed about

his right to make representation within stipulated time before the detaining

authority, thereby violating his statutory and constitutional rights. It is

translucently clear from perusal of the impugned detention order that the

Detaining Authority has neither communicated to the detenue his right to make

representation to the detaining authority as also the time limit, within which, he

could make such representation to it, till approval of the detention order by the

Government. On a perusal of the record it is found that the execution report as

well as the Receipt of Grounds of Detention, nowhere mention that the detenue

can make a representation to the detaining authority. Also, there is no mention

of time period within which the petitioner can make representation to the

detaining authority as well as Government against his order of detention, thus,

vitiating the impugned detention order. In a case of National Security Act, titled

Jitendra Vs. Dist. Magistrate, Barabanki & Ors.”, reported as 2004 Cri.L.J

2967, the Division Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, has held:-

“10. We make no bones in observing that a partial communication
of a right (in the grounds of detention) of the type in the
instant case, wherein the time limit for making a
representation is of essence and is not communicated in the
6 HCP No.32/2025

grounds of detention, would vitiate the right fundamental right
guaranteed to the detenue under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India, namely, of being communicated, as soon
as may be the grounds of detention.”

8. Since the detenue’s right to make a representation to the detaining

authority was only available to him till approval of detention order by the

Government, it follows as a logical imperative that the detaining authority

should have communicated to the detenue in the detention order, the time limit,

within which, he could make a representation to it i.e., till the approval of the

detention order by the State Government. Since the petitioner has all along

denied that he was informed of his right to make representation to the detaining

authority also the time period within which he can make representation, the

respondents ought to have filed an affidavit of the Executing Officer in this

regard. Though the Executing Officer has filed an affidavit, which is placed on

record, but it is conspicuously silent regarding the above. There is, therefore,

force in the above argument of the detenue. On this count alone, the impugned

detention order cannot sustain and is liable to be quashed.

9. So far as the second ground that 9 FIRs/cases are shown for passing

detention order against the detenue is concerned, the respondents have

themselves admitted in the grounds of detention that the detenue got acquitted in

all the FIRs. So far as DDR entries recorded against the detenue are concerned,

a perusal of the ground of detention would show that those have not culminated

in any criminal cases. Merely recording DDRs alleging no specific acts cannot

be the ground to detain a person. It is surprising that if the acts mentioned in the

DDR entries are criminal acts and are cognizable in nature, then why the State

has not filed any FIR. Law provides that if cognizable offence is committed and
7 HCP No.32/2025

is brought to the knowledge of any authority, First Information Report should be

lodged. If at all those acts mentioned in DDRs make out any criminal offence,

what prevented the State to file a First Information Report is shrouded in

mystery.

10. The third and fourth grounds, which have been urged by the learned

counsel for the detenue is that the grounds of detention do not clearly mention

the charge and the material on the basis of which the grounds of detention find

support for each of the charge. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled

„Showkat Ali V. UT of J&K & Ors‟ decided on 26.07.2024 in para 19 held as

follows:

“19. It is essential for the grounds of detention to clearly mention the
charge and the material on the basis of which the grounds of
detention find support for each of the charge. The State cannot
level bald allegations on the detenue and hand over a bunch of
documents and take the stand that all material considered by
the detaining authority has been handed over the detenue. It
would also be necessary for the detaining authority to mention
in the grounds of detention the material/evidence/documents on
the basis of which it is levelling a specific charge against the
appellant in the grounds of detention in order to accord a
viable opportunity to the appellant to give a representation to
the detaining authority or to the advisory board, as the case
may be.”

11. In so far as the fifth ground raised by the counsel for the petitioner is

concerned, it is an admitted fact as emerges from the record that the detenue

herein have had been previously detained by the respondents in terms of the

Detention Order No. 01/PSA of 2018 on 03.05.2018 which came to be quashed

by this court in terms of the judgment dated 06.09.2018. Perusal of the record
8 HCP No.32/2025

available on the file as also the detention record produced by counsel for the

respondents would manifestly demonstrate that the respondents in general and

the detaining authority in particular has remained oblivious to the said fact, thus,

rendering the impugned order legally un-sustainable more so, in view of the

judgment of the Apex Court passed in case titled as “C. B. Kahar vs. N. L.

Kalna” reported in AIR 1989 SC 1234, wherein at para 12 following has been

laid down:-

“12. It emerges from the above authoritative judicial pronouncements
that even if the order of detention comes to an end either by
revocation or by expiry of the period of detention there must be
fresh facts for passing a subsequent order. A fortiori when a
detention order is quashed by the court issuing a high prerogative
writ like habeas corpus or certiorari the grounds of the said order
should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in part
even along with the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the
requisite subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once
the court strikes down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies
the entire order.”

12. So far as the last ground is concerned, which is that the detaining

authority did not make mention of previous preventive detention order issued

against the detenue so as to take into consideration the grounds of detention and

the FIRs/Cases of the years 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007, on the basis of which,

he was taken into preventive detention vide Order No.01/PSA of 2018 dated

03.05.2018, is a plausible ground. In the considered opinion of this court, when

a detention order is quashed by the court, issuing a high prerogative writ, like

habeas corpus or certiorari, the grounds of said detention order should not be

taken into consideration, either as a whole or in part, even along with fresh
9 HCP No.32/2025

grounds of detention for drawing subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh detention

order. A perusal of the record would show that there is no single case/FIR

registered against the petitioner after quashment of earlier detention order except

the alleged six DDRs recorded against the petitioner, which point this court has

dealt with in the preceding paragraphs. In the present case, the respondents have

not referred to the earlier detention order passed against the petitioner, nor its

quashment, so as to use the same cases/FIRs to form basis and to pass the

impugned detention order. In that view of the matter, the impugned detention

order is vitiated and cannot sustain in the eye of law.

13. In the face of the aforestated legal position, it can safely be stated that

the detaining authority in the instant case has acted arbitrarily in a mechanical

manner while passing the impugned order of detention rendering it

unsustainable in law.

14. Personal liberty is one of the most cherished freedoms, perhaps more

important that the other freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. It was for

this reason that the Founding Fathers enacted the safeguards in Article 22 in the

Constitution so as to limit the power of the State to detain a person without trial,

which may otherwise pass the test of Article 21, by humanizing the harsh

authority over individual liberty. In a democracy governed by the rule of law,

the drastic power to detain a person without trial for ‘security of the State’

and/or ‘maintenance of public order’ must be strictly construed. However, where

individual liberty comes into conflict with the interest of the security of the State

or public order, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger

interest of the nation. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v.

Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 1983) held as under:

10 HCP No.32/2025

“The court has always regarded personal liberty as the most
precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal
detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a
possible renegade.

This is an area where the court has been most strict and
scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the
law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the
slightest measure, the court has not hesitated to strike down the
order of detention or to direct the release of the detenue even
though the detention may have been valid till the breach
occurred.”

15. Having regard to the facts, firstly, that not informing the detenue that

he can make representation to the detaining authority, against the detention order

besides time frame not specified in the detention order; within which detenue

can file representation against the detention order and secondly, shown

involvement in stale, remote and with no live link cases/FIRs of the year 2003,

2004, 2006 and 2007, in which, petitioner was admittedly acquitted; thirdly,

vague FIRs made basis for passing the impugned detention order as not a single

FIR was registered against the petitioner after quashment of earlier detention

order in the year 2018; fourthly, absence of charge, only allegations that too

vague allegations; fifthly non application of mind on the part of the detaining

authority vis-à-vis no mention of earlier detention order and its quashment by

this court; and lastly, no new grounds urged for passing the impugned detention

order, it can safely be held that the detenue was disabled to exercise his right to

file a meaningful and effective representation against his detention, in terms of

Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India; that the detaining authority has passed

the impugned detention order arbitrarily and mechanically, without application
11 HCP No.32/2025

of mind and the constitutional and statutory safeguards available to the detenue

were also observed in breach and trampled, vitiating the impugned detention

order, which render it unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

16. Viewed thus, the petition is allowed and the impugned detention

Order No.3rd/DM/K/PSA of 2024 dated 07.11.2024, passed by respondent No.

2, District Magistrate, Kishtwar, is hereby quashed. The detenue- Mohd.

Abdullah Gujjar @ Dullah @ Sher Khan, is directed to be released from the

preventive custody forthwith, if not required in any other case(s). No costs.

17. The record of detention be returned to the respondents through their

counsel.

18. Disposed of, accordingly, along with connected application(s).

(M A CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
JAMMU
30.08.2025
Raj Kumar
Whether the order is speaking? :Yes
Whether the order is reportable? : Yes

Raj Kumar
2025.08.30 15:17
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

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