Delhi High Court
Mohd Ansar Siddiqui vs Varun Sachdeva on 2 April, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 26th March 2025
Pronounced on: 2nd April 2025
+ RFA 187/2025 & CM APPL. 11600/2025
MOHD ANSAR SIDDIQUI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Mr. Shalabh
Gupta, Ms. Lisha Arora, Mr. Himanshu
Singh, Ms. Shivangi Shokeen and Mr.
Rahul Malik, Advs.
versus
VARUN SACHDEVA .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Ruchira V. Arora and Mr.
Dhananjay Mehlawat, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed under Order XLI read with Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC‘) assailing order dated 20th September
2024 passed by the District Judge-04, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in CS
No.29/2024 (‘impugned order’).
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2. The respondent/plaintiff had filed a suit claiming ownership of
premises bearing No. G-5, First Floor, Naraina Vihar, New Delhi-110028
(‘suit property’). The respondent claimed that the suit property was owned
by Smt. Suraksha Vohra, who was resident of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K. and
they had purchased the suit property by way of a registered sale deed dated
06th November 2023 registered as Document No.6558 in Book No.1, Volume
No.2488 on pages 33-40 registered on 06th November 2023 with the Sub-
Registrar-VIIA, New Delhi.
3. Respondent/plaintiff claimed that appellant/defendant was inducted as
a tenant in the suit property by Smt. Suraksha Vohra for a period of two years
w.e.f. 07th October 2017 to 07th October 2019, by rent agreement dated 07th
October 2017 at a monthly rent of Rs.26,000/-. After the expiry of 12 months,
the rent was to be increased by 10%.
4. Subsequently, another rent agreement was entered into on 27 th
September 2019 for a period of two years from 08th October 2019 to 08th
October 2021, at a monthly rent of Rs.27,300/-. At the request of the
appellant/defendant, the tenancy period was extended till 15th January 2022,
due to the wedding of the appellant’s daughter.
5. The rent agreement expired with efflux of time in January 2022 and the
respondent/plaintiff claimed that there was no further written document
executed between the parties and, therefore, it became a month-to-month
tenancy which expired with efflux of time on 15th January 2022.
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6. Respondent/plaintiff claimed that the appellant/defendant did not pay
the rent since July 2023 and was thus, in default, the arrears being
Rs.1,63,800/- from July 2023 till December 2023. Since the
appellant/defendant was a month-to-month tenant, the tenancy was terminable
on 15 days’ notice as per Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act 1882
(‘TPA’).
7. Notice dated 02nd December 2023 was issued by the respondent
terminating the tenancy on the midnight of 31 st of December 2023. As per the
notice, failure to vacate, would attract liability of damages/mesne profits
w.e.f. 01st January 2024.The appellant failed to handover vacant possession of
the premises and, therefore, the suit for recovery of possession, arrears of
rent, mesne profits/damages and interest was filed.
8. Written statement was filed by the defendant alleging there was no
cause of action to file the suit. It was denied in the written statement by
defendant, submitting that no rent deeds were prepared between the appellant
and Smt. Suraksha Vohra and the same was forged and fabricated, and that no
notice had been received by the appellant, of termination of tenancy.
9. Appellant claimed that Smt. Suraksha Vohra was the owner of the suit
property and in September 2017, was trying to sell the suit property and
searching for a purchaser, and the appellant was in need of the property and,
therefore, it was orally agreed between Smt. Suraksha Vohra and the
appellant, that Smt. Vohra would transfer oral rights, title and interest in
favour of the appellant after agreed sale consideration.
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10. As per the appellant, an oral agreement had been arrived at on 01 st
October 2017 that the appellant shall pay an amount of Rs.50 Lacs as sale
consideration; initial amount of Rs.14 Lacs to be paid and the remaining
amount of Rs.26 Lacs to be paid along with 9% interest per annum. The
appellant claims that payments were to be made in EMI’s of Rs.26,000/- per
month and thereafter, increased with the consent of the parties.
11. Accordingly, as per the appellant, they made payments of Rs.14 Lacs
over a period of time and during months of October-December 2017 in cash
and thereafter, in instalments of Rs.26,000/- to Smt. Suraksha Vohra till
September 2018. Thereafter, instalments were increased to Rs.27,300/- per
month. The defendant was the bona fide purchaser of the suit property and
100 instalments were to be paid to Smt. Suraksha Vohra, out of which 77
instalments were paid up till December 2023.
12. An application was filed by plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC
for judgment on admissions, which was decided in favour of the respondent
by the impugned order, thereby decreeing the suit.
Submissions by counsel for appellant
13. Counsel for appellant/defendant contended that the impugned judgment
could not have been passed under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, considering that
there were specific denials, to the existence of both the rent deeds, as claimed
by the respondent/plaintiff.
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14. Firstly, a denial of the rent deeds by the respondent; secondly, that an
oral agreement to sale had been arrived at between Smt. Vohra and the
appellant, per which they paid Rs.14 Lacs in instalments as stated above; and
thirdly, that the registered sale deed in favour of the respondent was flawed
and invalid.
15. Counsel for appellant, therefore, claimed that having denied these
aspects in the written statement, the question of judgment on admissions did
not arise and a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC could not have been
passed.
16. He relied upon the decisions in Poonam Kakkar v Vaishali & Anr.
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2706 on the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, in that
it was a discretionary provision and questions which involved recording of
evidence, could not be disposed of at an early stage; S.M. Asif v Virender
Kumar Bajaj (2015) 9 SCC 287 on the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, in
that judgment on admissions is not a matter of right and is a matter of
discretion of the Court; and Karan Kapoor v Madhuri Kumar (2022) 10 SCC
496 in that the defence taken by defendant is plausible or not, is a matter of
trial, to be appreciated by the Court after granting opportunity to lead
evidence.
Submissions on behalf of respondent
17. Respondent’s counsel placed the following submissions in support of
the impugned judgment and for refuting the contentions of the appellant:
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By:MANISH KUMAR RFA 187/2025 5 of 26 Signing Date:04.04.2025 18:37:35 (i) The appellant had only propounded an oral agreement, supported
by no proof at all. Counsel relied upon provisions of Section
17(1A) of the Registration Act 1908 (‘Registration Act‘) to
state that documents relating to transfer of immovable property
for the purpose of Section 53A of TPA, shall be registered and if
not, they shall have no effect for purposes of Section 53A of
TPA.
(ii) Counsel further relied upon Section 23A of Schedule I of the
Indian Stamp Act 1899, which provided for 90% duty as a
conveyance for contracts of transfer of immovable property,
which she said was not being paid.
(iii) Counsel further relied upon the rent deeds, as per which
payments had been made by the appellant, though the appellant
was masquerading it as EMI’s towards sale of the property.
(iv) It was highlighted by the respondent’s counsel that the appellant
had not denied or disputed the existence of the registered sale
deed in favour of the respondent executed by Smt. Vohra.
(v) Notwithstanding the contentions of the appellant, the tenancy of
the appellant had expired by efflux of time and there was nothing
on record to state, as to why and on what basis the appellant is
still in possession.
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(vi) Reliance was placed on Order XVA Rule 1 of CPC to state that
the disposal of the suit can be done in the first hearing, if it
appears that the parties are not at an issue on any question of law
and fact. Further, reliance was placed on Order XIV Rule 1(6) of
CPC, which enables the Court not to frame issues and record
issues of the defendant, where the defendant in the first hearing
makes no defence.
(vii) She relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court
in PPA Impex Pvt. Ltd. v Mangal Sen & Metal 2009 SCC
OnLine Del 3866 where the Court in disposal of an RFA against
decree of a suit, on the basis of admissions, dismissed the appeal,
stating that the Court must look into the status of the defendant
and the defence was total moonshine; the decree was to be
sustained.
(viii) Reliance was also placed on the decision in Prashant Goyal v
Indranil Wadhwa2020:DHC:3243 where a Coordinate Bench of
this Court while disposing of an RFA against a decree of
possession, relied upon Order XIV Rule 1(6) of CPC and stated
that the judgment can be passed straightway if the defence was
not made out. Reliance was also placed on Section 17(1A) of the
Registration Act.
Analysis
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18. Having perused the pleadings of the parties and having heard the
submissions of the counsels, this Court is not inclined to entertain the appeal
inter alia for the following reasons:
(i) The defence set up by the appellant is ex facie specious,
untenable and mala fide. Firstly, the appellant claims a
possessory right on the basis of an oral agreement to sell. It is
trite law that there can be no defence of possession of a
transferee, based on part performance, on the basis of an
unregistered document. This is crystallized in Section 53A of
TPA read with Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, which are
reproduced as under, for ease of reference:
Section 53A of TPA
“53A. Part performance–Where any person contracts
to transfer for consideration any immoveable property
by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which
the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty,and the
transferee has, in part performance of the contract,
taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or
the transferee, being already in possession, continues
in possession in part performance of the contract and
has done some act in furtherance of the contract,and
the transferee has performed or is willing to perform
his part of the contract,then, notwithstanding that,
where there is an instrument of transfer, that the
transfer has not been completed in the manner
prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in
force, the transferor or any person claiming under him
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shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee
and persons claiming under him any right in respect of
the property of which the transferee has taken or
continued in possession, other than a right expressly
provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the
rights of a transferee for consideration who has no
notice of the contract or of the part performance
thereof.”
(emphasis added)
Section 17(1A) of Registration Act
“17(1A). The documents containing contracts to
transfer for consideration, any immovable property for
the purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), shall be registered if they have
been executed on or after the commencement of the
Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)
Act, 2001 and, if such documents are not registered on
or after such commencement, then, they shall have no
effect for the purposes of the said Section 53A.”
(emphasis added)
(ii) Even the assertion of the appellant that as per the oral agreement
they had agreed to pay the advance money of Rs.14 Lacs through
EMI’s, initially of Rs.26,000/- per month and later of
Rs.27,300/- per month, is in itself incredulous. To think that an
owner of a property would agree to be bound by an oral
agreement to sell, without having received any consideration at
all, is quite illogical and untenable.
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(iii) In any event, these figures of Rs.26,000/- per month and
Rs.27,300/- per month strangely and significantly coincide with
the monthly rent of Rs.26,000/- (as per the rent agreement of
07th October 2017) and of Rs. 27,300/- (as per rent agreement
dated 27th September 2019), respectively. The attempt by the
appellant is quite apparent i.e. to retrofit rents that they paid
under these agreements as EMI’s towards purported advance
consideration of a purported agreement to sell. Further, even as
per the written statement, the appellant claims that they had
made payments of 77 instalments upto December 2023, which
again strikingly coincide with the assertion of the respondent that
the payment of rent stopped from July 2023 and the suit was
filed in December 2023.
(iv) Considering that the respondent had filed their suit subsequently,
there is no assertion by the appellant that they would have
asserted their right for fructifying their alleged agreement to sell
against Smt. Suraksha Vohra. No such suit was ever filed.
(v) On the other hand, the title of the property in the hands of the
respondent was well documented through the registered sale
deed. The registered sale deed was executed through a special
power of attorney of Smt. Suraksha Vohra, who being a resident
abroad in U.K., had given a general power of attorney to Mr.
Sanjeev Sachdeva through a GPA duly attested by the AssistantSignature Not Verified
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Counsellor Officer, Consulate General of India, Edinburgh on
11th July 2023, which was duly received and stamped in India.
Counsel for the appellant stated that the power of attorney was
the father of the respondent, and therefore, invalid. But that
assertion is untenable, considering that there is no legal bar in the
father of a purchaser being given the power of attorney, in order
for convenience of execution. Besides, the registered sale deed
notes, that the total sale consideration of Rs.70 Lacs had been
paid via bank transfer on 02nd November 2023 and 01st
November 2021.
(vi) In any event, even if the rent agreements are not considered, any
occupation of the property can at best, be month-to-month
tenancy, terminable per Section 106 of the TPA.
(vii) As regards the issue of the denial in the written statement, the
Court has perused the same and found that they had been made
cursorily, for the sake of refuting the assertions in the plaint, but
for the reasons stated above, itself don’t have any basis, ground,
or support. Moreover, there is no denial of the existence of the
sale deed executed in favour of the respondent, the only issue
being raised is that it was executed through the GPA given to the
father of the respondent, which as noted above, has no legal
merit.
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(viii) The sale deed having been not denied, the suit property would
certainly be considered as ownership of the respondent and the
occupancy by the appellant, would undoubtedly be at best, as a
month-to-month tenancy. The assertion that they had entered into
an oral agreement to sell, as noted above, cannot come to the
benefit of the appellant, as per law. The written statement is,
therefore, bereft of any legal defence that the appellant can have.
(ix) In this regard, the following passages of PPA Impex (supra) are
instructive, which are extracted as under. In the said decision by
Division Bench of this Court, it is highlighted that no document
has been filed evidencing an agreement to sell between the
appellant and the respondent or even the predecessor-in-title.
Importantly, the Division Bench notes that if pleadings of this
nature, which are total moonshine, are taken note of, the
provision of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, would be virtually
annihilated.
“6. The argument of Mr. Mahendroo, learned Counsel
for the Appellant, is that the learned Single Judge has
erred in decreeing the Suit on the basis of
“admissions”, ignoring the Defendant’s case that an
Agreement to Sell had been entered into between the
Appellant and the Respondent. According to him, this
allegation could only be substantiated after a Trial had
been conducted and concluded. Reliance has been
placed on the decision in Manisha Commercial
Ltd. v. N.R. Dongre, 85 (2000) DLT 211 in which one
of us [Vikramajit Sen, J.] had dismissed an Application
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under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC observing that it
was wholly inappropriate to permit any party to
employ this provision where vexed and complicated
questions or issues of law had arisen. The facts in that
case, however, are totally distinct to the factual matrix
before us rendering that decision to be of no avail to
the Appellant. Reliance has also been placed
on Varivax Seva Sansthan v. Dr. (Mrs.) Veena Kalra,
86 (2000) DLT 817, which, on perusal, militates
against the Appellant’s case. This is evident from a
reading of the following paragraph which learned
Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon:
9. Bare perusal of the above rule shows, that it
confers very wide powers on the Court, to
pronounce judgment on admission at any stage of
the proceedings. The admission may have been
made either in pleadings, or otherwise. The
admission may have been made orally or in
writing. The Court can act on such admission,
either on an application of any party or oh its own
motion without determining the other questions.
This provision is discretionary, which has to be
exercised on well established
principles.Admission must be clear and
unequivocal; it must be taken as a whole and it is
not permissible to rely on a part of the admission
ignoring the other part; even a constructive
admission firmly made can be made the basis. Any
plea raised against the contents of the documents
only for delaying trial being barred by the
Sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act or other
statutory provisions, can be ignored. These
principles are well settled by catena of decisions.
Reference on this regard be made to the decisions
in Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra
Bhattasali, (1986) 3 SCC 360 : AIR 1986 SC
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1509; Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Air India,
65 (1997) DLT 533; Surjit Sachdev v. Kazakhstan
Investment Services Pvt. Ltd., 1997 II AD (Delhi)
518; Abdul Hamid v. Charnajit Lal, 74 (1998)
DLT 476; and Lakshmikant Shreekant v. M.N.
Dasturand Co., 51 (1998) DLT 564.
…
11. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge
has correctly approached the matter and arrived at
conclusion in accordance with law. When a Suit for
Possession is presented, the Court must look into the
status of the Defendant. The Defendant may be in
possession by virtue of part performance of an
agreement. In such a case, he may be immune from
eviction by virtue of Section 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (“TP” Act for short) as has been
opined by our learned Brother, Madan B. Lokur, J.
in D.R. Puri v. Kamlesh Sawhney, 2001 (60) DRJ 738,
a decision which has been relied upon by learned
Counsel for the Appellant, but without contextual
justification. In this regard, no document whatsoever
has been filed evidencing an Agreement to Sell the
demised premises between the Appellant and the
Respondent or even the predecessor-in-title, namely,
Smt. Raj Rani Sethi. If the Trial Court had been
confronted with a Receipt for the alleged sum of
Rupees six lacs, it may have thought it appropriate to
send the matter for Trial. If pleadings of this nature,
which we see as total moonshine, are taken note of, the
provision of Order 12 Rule 6 would be virtually
annihilated.
…
13. It is the case of the Appellant before us that the
initial period of lease had expired by efflux of time. No
cogent evidence is forthcoming that the Appellant had
sought a renewal of the Lease Deed and had
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simultaneously agreed to pay an increase of 15 per
cent of the rental. Instead, its claim is that due to the
harassment meted out to the Appellant by the
Respondent, the entire business of the former had come
to an end. The parties had subsequently agreed that a
renewal would be evidenced by a fresh Lease Deed for
each successive periods. Not only has this event not
occurred, but on the contrary it is not even the case of
the Appellant that it had asked for a renewal in terms
of the then prevailing Lease Deed. Significantly, for
whatever reasons that may have motivated the
Appellant to do so, the rent is also in arrears. The
issuance of a notice to quit, terminating month-to-
month tenancy, also stands admitted. The only defence
put forward is that the Plaintiff had agreed to sell the
property to the Appellant, which we have already
concluded is total moonshine.
14. It has also been contended that the Defendant had
not accepted the Plaintiff as the Lessor. In this
connection, Section 109 of the TP Act immediately
comes into play. It deals with a situation where the
lessor transfers the leased property, in which event the
transferee comes to enjoy all the rights and is
burdened by all the liabilities of the Lease Agreement
previously executed between the erstwhile lessor/owner
with the lessee. Since the Appellant is in arrears of
rent, the proviso to Section 109 clarifies that had the
Appellant paid rent before the transfer to the previous
owner/lessor, that is, Smt. Raj Rani Sethi or even M/s.
Kanhaiya Lal Bishan Chand, the present owner, that is
the Respondent, could not have made a claim for it.
Section 111 of the TP Act is also relevant, since in the
present case the lease is determined by efflux of time in
accordance with Sub-section (a) thereof. Section
111(g) of the TP Act contemplates forfeiture of the
lease where the lessee breaks any express condition,
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such as responsibility for payment of rent. Section
111(h) of the TP Act speaks of the determination of a
lease on the expiration of a notice to quit. The learned
Single Judge had rightly found admissions on these
vital issues and was, therefore, correct in decreeing the
suit. This is quite clearly a case where keeping in
perspective admissions made in the Written Statement
on these vital facts, the suit could rightly have been
decreed without subjecting the Plaintiff to the needless
travails and excruciating delays of a Trial.”
(emphasis added)
(x) The following paragraphs in Prashant Goyal (supra), are also
relevant, extracts of which are as under:
“5. Appellant entered appearance in the suit and filed a
written statement alongwith reply to the application
under Order XVA of the CPC taking a defence that
theRespondent had not approached the Court with
clean hands.The Appellant disputed the landlord-
tenant relationship as it was a practice between the
parties to register a lease deed as was done for the
deeds executed for the years 2013-2015. Post 2015 no
lease deed was executed as the Respondent had offered
to sell the property and had acted on this offer by
handing over possession to the Appellant.Appellant
agreed to purchase the property for a total sale
consideration of Rs.1.3 Crores. It was orally agreed
that the Appellant will initially pay Rs.30 Lakhs and
the remaining shall be paid at the time of executing the
sale deed. Between August 2015 and July 2019
Respondent had been accepting the alleged rent in his
account as well as in cash which is reflected in bank
statement and calculation sheet placed on record
before the Trial Court.
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6. As per the chronology of dates, matter was listed for
arguments on 28.09.2020 before the Trial Court on the
Application under Order XVA Rule 1 CPC and the
Court also heard arguments on the issue of passing
judgement without holding a trial as per Order XII
Rule 6 read with Order XIV Rule 1(6) CPC. On
07.10.2020 the Trial Court partly decreed the suit for
recovery of possession of the property and the
Appellant was directed to hand over vacant possession
to the Respondent within 30 days.
…
12. I have perused the judgment of the Trial Court.
Trial Court has decreed the suit on the ground that in
the written statement the Appellant admitted payment
of rental amount from time to time and did not claim
that the status of the Appellant was severed as a tenant
completely. Even assuming that the Appellant had
entered into an agreement to sell for purchasing the
suit property from the Respondent and had paid part
consideration, at best, the Appellant could rely on the
agreement for two purposes i.e. (i) file a suit for
specific performance seeking execution of the sale
deed; and (ii) claim protection under Section 53A of
the Act. It was also an admitted case that there was no
written Agreement to Sell ever executed between the
parties and the defence of the Appellant was based on
an oral agreement. Based on the amendment to Section
17 of the Registration Act, whereby the Registration of
an Agreement to Sell hasbeen made compulsory as well
as amendment to Section 53A of the Act and the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899, the Trial Court concluded that in the
absence of a registered Agreement to Sell the Appellant
could not claim protection under Section 53A of the
Act. Based on the proposition of law laid down in
Sudhir Sabharwal vs. Rajesh Pruthi 2014 AIR CC 2850
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by this Court that mere Agreement to Sell of
immovable property will not terminate the landlord-
tenant relationship, the Trial Court was of the view
that no purpose would be served to put the matter to
trial and passed the judgment, noting that while there
was no admission, however, if the defendant has no
legal defence, then under Order XIV Rule 1(6) CPC,
judgment can be straightaway passed.
…
14. Appellant in the written statement admitted that he
was inducted as a tenant in the year 2013 vide a
registered lease deed dated 09.09.2013 and also
admitted the renewal of the lease till 2015. Appellant,
however, set up an oral agreement to sell and also
pleaded payment of Rs.30 Lakhs towards part
consideration of the sale price.
…
16. The answer to the above question in my view can
only be against the Appellant. The legal position on
this aspect is no longer res integra. Section 17 of the
Registration Act was amended by the Registration and
Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, Act No.48
of 2001, by insertion of Section 1(A) therein and by
virtue of the Amendment, registration of an Agreement
to Sell has been made compulsory with effect from
24.09.2001. Section 17(1-A) reads as follows:-
“Section (1A). The documents containing
contracts to transfer for consideration, any
immovable property for the purpose of Section
53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of
1882) shall be registered if they have been
executed on or after the commencement of the
Registration and other Related Laws
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(Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are
not registered on or after such commencement
(i.e. w.e.f. 24.09.2001), then, they shall have no
effect for the purposes of the said Section 53A.”
17. Therefore, a buyer cannot avail the benefit of
Section 53A of the Act if the agreement to sell is not
registered. When a tenant enters into an agreement to
sell for buying the tenanted premises but the agreement
to sell is not in conformity with law, the relationship
continues as landlord-tenant and while the tenant can
seek specific performance, but he acquires no right to
retain possession, till a sale deed is registered in his
favour. This has been clearly held by this Court in
Sudhir Sabharwal (supra). The relevant portion of
which is as follows :-
“The plaintiff had filed a suit seeking decree of
possession against the defendant in respect of the
premises in dispute. The application sought
decree on the basis of admissions made by the
defendant in his written statement. The plaintiff is
a landlord of property No. G-27/4, Rajouri
Garden, New Delhi and its ground floor was let
out to the defendant at the rent of Rs. 25,000/- per
month. The plaintiff issued notice to the tenant on
29.6.2011 followed by a reminder on 11.1.2012
asking them to vacate the premises. But there was
no compliance of theplaintiff’s request therefore
the suit was filed to seek possession as well as
damages. The defendant had admitted the
enhanced rent of Rs. 27.500/- from 1.7.2011 and
that the tenancy period had been extended by
another seven months by the plaintiff. But he also
claimed in the written statement that the plaintiff
had agreed to sell the rental premises to the
defendant for a total consideration of Rs.
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2,10,00,000/- for which the defendant had paid
bayana/advance payment of Rs. 21,20,000/- i.e.
10% of the total sale consideration and that the
plaintiff had duly executed receipt in this regard.
What follows is that even if the /defendant were to
succeed in his suit for specific performance of
agreement to sell, till the execution of a
conveyance deed in pursuance to the decree, if
any, in favour of the defendant, the defendant has
no ground in law to save his possession of the
premises. The status of the defendant would
continue to be as before i.e. of a tenant whose
tenancy has been determined.
In view of the legal position that “mere agreement
to sell of immovable property does not create any
right in the property save the right to enforce the
said agreement” and in view of the preceding
discussion that “mere agreement of sale will not
terminate landlord-tenant relationship unless
there is specification to that effect in agreement
itself”, this Court is of the view defendant has not
right to occupy the said property.”
18. In Shiv Kumar vs. Sumit Gulati, RSA No.417/2015,
decided on 04.12.2015, the Court held that when the
defendant claims possession on the basis of an oral
agreement to sell, the same cannot be recognized in
view of the amended Section 53A of the Act. The same
view has been taken by the Courts in other judgments
in Babita Joshi vs. Dilip Rawat,(2015) 219 DLT 697
and Kaushal Aggarwal vs. Ashok Malhotra, CS (OS)
165/2009 decided on 17.02.2009.”
19. Significantly in the present case the relationship
between the parties as landlord-tenant is an admitted
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position. It is also admitted that the rent of the
premises was over Rs.3,500/- as also that the
Respondent terminated the lease by sending a notice
under Section 106 of the Act.In view of the said
position and in the absence of the alleged oral
agreement being registered, the Trial Court has rightly
passed a decree for recovery of the suit property and
no infirmity can be found. The suit is pending on other
reliefs and shall be continued and adjudicated in
accordance with law.”
(emphasis added)
(xi) Coordinate Bench of this Court in Prashant Goyal (supra) has,
therefore, confirmed that, in similar circumstances, the oral
agreement to sell though set up by the appellant, appellant could
not claim retention of the suit property on that basis. The Court
had relied upon Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act read with
Section 53A of the TPA where the transferee cannot avail benefit
with the agreement to sell, if not registered. The Court relied
upon the decision in Sudhir Sabharwal (supra) which forms part
of the extracts above. Reliance was also placed on Shiv Kumar
(supra), Babita Joshi (supra) and Kaushal Aggarwal (supra)
which also form part of the extracts above.
(xii) Counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish the decision in
Prashant Goyal (supra) by stating that the relationship between
landlord and tenant was admitted in that matter. This argument is
unmerited, considering the continued possession which was
being asserted by the appellant in this case, was basis the oral
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agreement to sell which in Prashant Goyal (supra) has been
rejected, as a valid basis to continue in possession.
(xiii) It is undeniable that the scope and purview of Order XII Rule 6
of CPC is not to be unduly narrowed down and will not extend
only to plain admissions, but also when there is a clear admission
of facts, in which it is impossible for the party making such
admission to succeed. This was unequivocally laid down by the
Supreme Court in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v United
Bank of India & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120; relevant extract as
under:
“12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we need not
say anything more than what the legislature itself has
said when the said provision came to be amended. In
the Objects and Reasons set out while amending the
said Rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted,
the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the
plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The
object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a
speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to
which according to the admission of the defendant, the
plaintiff is entitled”. We should not unduly narrow
down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to
enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the
other party has made a plain admission entitling the
former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever
there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which
it is impossible for the party making such admission to
succeed.”
(emphasis added)
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(xiv) This principle was recognized not only in PPA Impex (supra)
but also in Madalsa Sood v Maunicka Makkar & Anr. 2021
SCC OnLine Del 5217 and in Monika Tyagi & Ors. v Subhash
Tyagi & Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5400 which cited PPA
Impex with approval. The following passage of Monika Tyagi
(supra) is relevant, extracted as under:
“26. Thus, while disposing of an application under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the court is fully justified in
considering the averments in the written statement to
see whether essential facts have been pleaded or
whether the defence is a complete moonshine,
requiring the Court to not send the case for trial.”
(emphasis added)
(xv) The enunciation in Uttam Singh Duggal (supra) was also cited,
with approval, by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sh.
Dinesh Sharma v Mrs. Krishna Kainth 2022:DHC:1454. The
relevant extract is as under:
“29. From the reading of the aforesaid judgments, it
cannot be disputed that Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
can also be invoked when the objections raised against
rendering a judgment are such, which goes to the root
of the matter or whether the objections are
inconsequential, making it impossible for the party to
succeed, even if entertained…”
(emphasis added)
(xvi) For further embellishment, reference may also be made to
decision of Division Bench of this Court in Vijaya Myne v Satya
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Bhushan Kaura 2007 SCC OnLine Del 828; relevant extracts as
under:
“12. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by
extracting from the aforesaid authoritative
pronouncent as the learned Single Judge has
accomplished this exercise with prudence and
dexterity. Purpose would be served by summarizing the
legal position which is that the purpose and objective
in enacting the provision like Order 12 Rule 6, CPC is
to enable the Court to pronounce the judgment on
admission when the admissions are sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to get the decree, inasmuch as such a
provision is enacted to render speedy judgments and
save the parties from going through the rigmarole of a
protracted trial. The admissions can be in the
pleadings or otherwise, namely in documents,
correspondence etc. These can be oral or in writing.
The admissions can even be constructive admissions
and need not be specific or expressive which can be
inferred from the vague and evasive denial in the
written statement while answering specific pleas raised
by the plaintiff. The admissions can even be inferred
from the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt,
for this purpose, the Court has to scrutinize the
pleadings in their detail and has to come to the
conclusion that the admissions are unequivocal,
unqualified and unambiguous. In the process, the
Court is also required to ignore vague, evasive and
unspecific denials as well as inconsistent pleas taken in
the written statement and replies. Even a contrary
stand taken while arguing the matter would be
required to be ignored.”
(emphasis added)
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(xvii) Reference may also be made to Delhi Jal Board v Surendra P.
Malik 2003 SCC OnLine Del 292; relevant extracts as under:
“9. The test, therefore, is (i) whether admissions of fact
arise in the suit (ii) whether such admissions are plain
unambiguous and unequivocal, (iii) whether the
defense set up is such that it requires evidence for
determination of the issues and (iv) whether objections
raised against rendering the judgment are such which
go to the root of the matter or whether these are
inconsequential making it impossible for the party to
succeed even if entertained. It is immaterial at what
stage the judgment is sought or whether admissions of
fact are found expressly in the pleadings or not
because such admissions could be gathered even
constructively for the purpose of rendering a speedy
judgment.”
(emphasis added)
(xviii) These principles enunciated in Vijaya Myne (supra) and Delhi
Jal Board (supra) were usefully relied upon in Tani Sandhu
Bhargava v Shumita Didi Sandhu 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5195,
where the Court concluded as under:
“35. Clearly, vague, unsubstantiated and evasive pleas
have been held to be sufficient ground to hold that
there are admissions in the pleadings and a decree is
liable to be passed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. As
noted above, the pleas taken by the defendant in the
written statement are vague, inconsistent and do not in
any manner whatsoever show that any worthwhile
defence is raised or any right exists in favour of the
defendant to enable her to continue to occupy the suit
property.”
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19. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed and
the judgment and decree in favour of respondent, stands confirmed.
20. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
APRIL 2, 2025/MK/na
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