Mr. Abdul Rahman Baig vs The Competent Authority on 3 June, 2025

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Karnataka High Court

Mr. Abdul Rahman Baig vs The Competent Authority on 3 June, 2025

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

          DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF JUNE, 2025

                         PRESENT

        THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

                           AND

          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K

     MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 948 OF 2024
                     (KPIDFA)


BETWEEN:

MR. ABDUL RAHMAN BAIG
S/O OBEDULLA BAIG
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
R/AT No.301, 3RD FLOOR
CRESCENT HEIGHTS
AMC LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 032
                                             ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ABHILASH RAJU, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY
       FOR M/S. AMBIDANT MARKETING PRIVATE LIMITED
       3RD FLOOR, MINI V.V. TOWER
       PODIUM BLOCK
       DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
       BENGALURU-560 001
       REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPETENT AUTHORITY
       DR. ASHOKA D.R.
       JOINT SECRETARY
       AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS

2.     M/S. AMBIDANT MARKETING PRIVATE LIMITED
       REGD. OFFICE AT No.9A
       K.H.B. MAIN ROAD
       KANAKANAGARA, R.T. NAGAR POST
 -

                           2




     BENGALURU-560 032
     REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
     SYED FAREED AHMED
     S/O D.S. JALALUDDIN
     AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
     R/AT No.374, KUSHAL NAGARA
     OPPOSITE HANIFIYA MASJID
     VENKATESHAPURAM
     BENGALURU-560 045

3.   SABIRA BEGUM
     W/O SYED FAREED AHMED
     AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
     TRUSTEE OF
     M/S. AMBIDANT TRUST MANAGEMENT
     R/AT No.302, 3RD FLOOR
     CRESCENT HEIGHT
     AMC LAYOUT
     BENGALURU-560 032
     AND
     No.345, 2ND CROSS
     RAMA TENT ROAD
     NEAR HANIFA MASZID
     KUSHAL NAGAR
     BENGALURU-560 045

4.   NABEELA BEGUM
     W/O SYED AFAQ AHMED
     AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS
     TRUSTEE OF
     M/S. AMBIDANT TRUST MANAGEMENT
     R/AT No.345, 2ND CROSS
     RAMA TENT ROAD
     NEAR HANIFA MASZID
     KUSHAL NAGAR
     BENGALURU-560 045
                                            ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
    V.C.O. DATED 21.03.2024 - SERVICE OF NOTICE TO
    R2 TO R4 ARE DISPENSED WITH)

    THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.16 OF THE KARNATAKA
PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN FINANCIAL
 -

                             3




ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 2004, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
06.06.2023 PASSED IN MISC. No.994/2022 ON THE FILE OF THE
XCI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BENGALURU, (CCH-92), ALLOWING THE PETITION FILED
U/S.5(2) OF THE KPIDFE ACT, 2004 AND ETC.

      THIS MFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT    ON   06.03.2025  AND COMING   ON   FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM:    HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
          and
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K



                     CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)

This MFA is filed assailing the order dated 06.06.2023

passed by the XCI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge

and Special Judge for KPIDFE cases, Bengaluru (CCH-92) in

Misc. No.994/2022.

2. We have heard Shri. Abhilash Raju, learned

counsel for the appellant and Shri. Veeresh R. Budihal,

learned counsel for respondent No.1. Notice to respondents

No.2 to 4 are dispensed with vide order dated 21.03.2024.

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3. The brief facts of the case are:

The appellant was managing a small business of

supplying stone materials, he wanted to purchase a flat to

reside with his family in Bengaluru. Respondents No.3 and 4

offered to sell the schedule property for a total sale

consideration of Rs.40,00,000/- and the appellant has

accepted the said offer. In furtherance to that, the appellant

had transferred an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- through NEFT

(Rs.10,00,000/- by way of NEFT UTR

No.ANBBN18219522495 dated 19.03.2018 and

Rs.10,00,000/- by way of NEFT UTR

No.ANBBN18219522810 dated 19.03.2018) and agreed to

pay the balance sale consideration before execution of the

sale deed. Respondents No.3 and 4 have acknowledged the

receipt of the advance sale consideration. They have entered

into an agreement for sale on 25.01.2019 and the same was

registered in Book-1 No.KCH-1-05353-2018-19 in the Office

of Sub-Registrar, Gandhi Nagar, Bengaluru. Subsequently,

the appellant had performed his part of contract and paid

the balance sale consideration. Respondents No.3 and 4

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have executed a sale deed on 04.02.2019 in favour of the

appellant and the same was duly registered in the office of

Sub-Registrar, Gandhi Nagar, Bengaluru. The Bruhat

Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) has issued Form-B,

Property Register Extract incorporating the name of the

appellant as owner of the schedule property on 04.04.2019

and accepted Property Tax.

4. Respondent No.1 had issued a notice dated

20.10.2023 to respondents No.3 and 4 calling upon them to

hand over possession of the schedule property and the same

was affixed on the door of schedule/house property. Said

notice disclosed provisional attachment by the Government

of Karnataka under Section 3 of the Karnataka Protection of

Interests of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act,

2004, (‘KPIDFE Act‘ for short). Then, it came to the notice

of appellant that respondent No.2 was alleged to be involved

in fraudulent transaction and had failed to return the

deposits on maturity to depositors.

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5. The appellant had challenged the notice dated

20.10.2023 in Writ Petition No.24108/2023 before this Court

and this Court had disposed of the said Writ Petition on

08.11.2023, permitting the appellant to make a

representation to respondent No.1 for appropriate reliefs. In

compliance with the order dated 08.11.2023 passed by this

Court, the appellant had submitted his representation to first

respondent on 22.11.2023.

6. The first respondent has issued an endorsement

dated 11.01.2024 without extending an opportunity of

hearing to the appellant. The said endorsement was

questioned before this Court in Writ Petition No.2029/2024

and this Court has disposed of the Writ Petition on

20.01.2024 by granting liberty to the appellant to approach

the Special Court and respondent No.1 was directed not to

precipitate the matter for a period of four weeks from the

date of the said order. However, the trial Court on

06.06.2023, passed an order making the interim order of

attachment absolute which is under challenge herein.

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7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant

contends that respondent No.1 was fully aware of the

registered agreement of sale. Without issuing notice to the

appellant and without making any inquiry or investigation

into the transaction, the respondent committed a grave

error in law, without application of mind or proper

investigation by issuing the Notification dated 31.01.2019.

The said Notification neither discloses the names of

respondents No.3 and 4 nor the appellant; the amount of

sale consideration is mentioned as Rs.50,00,000/- but sale

consideration paid by the vendors of the appellant was

Rs.44,90,000/- as mentioned in the sale deed dated

04.02.2019. It is further contended that in the notification,

column of “details of documents” says that “A-2 – Afaq wife’s

name”. Mrs. Nabeela Begum (wife of Syed Afaq Ahmed) is

the one who conveyed the property to the appellant, which

is available in the sale deed, neither the details of the sale

deed nor the name of title holders was shown by way of

description of documents. It clearly indicates the non-

application of mind on the part of respondent No.1.

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8. The action of interim attachment of the schedule

property, without an enquiry over its true owner and

extending an opportunity of hearing has resulted in violation

of right of appellant to hold immovable property. The action

on the part of the 1st respondent is violative of the rule of

audi-alteram-partem has resulted in vexing the appellant

with malafide intention. No materials are produced to show

that the money used by the appellant’s vendors-in-title was

from the alleged scam. Therefore, the order dated

06.06.2023 is arbitrary, illegal, violative of principles of

natural justice and without authority of law. Further, it is

contended that the copy of proceedings or order dated

06.06.2023 was not made available to appellant even after

the submission of the representation dated 23.11.2023,

therefore, denying the reasonable opportunity to question

the order of the Special Court which is said to be the basis

and foundation for the endorsement dated 11.01.2024,

which amounts to denial of justice. The endorsement dated

11.01.2024 is not a speaking order since it lacks in material

particulars and does not make reference to representation

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dated 23.11.2023, more particularly, the payment of

consideration amount in the year 2018, much prior to the

alleged notification dated 31.01.2019. Even the sale deed

was also registered much prior to the Notification.

Endorsement dated 11.01.2024 states that schedule

property was purchased by the appellant after the interim

order for attachment dated 31.01.2019 and hence property

stood vested with competent authority. Said aspect is

incorrect in view of the agreement of sale dated 25.01.2019,

the endorsement must necessarily fail for not furnishing the

information or the factum of involvement of respondents

No.3 and 4.

9. The learned counsel for respondent No.1

contended that the appellant claims to be in possession of

schedule property since the date of execution of sale deed in

his favour i.e., from 04.02.2019. However, he neither

appeared before the Special Court nor filed any objections to

the prayer sought by the respondent seeking an order

making the ad-interim attachment issued by the

Government of Karnataka under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE

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Act as absolute. The appeal is filed along with an application,

seeking the leave of this Court to file an appeal as interested

party and he is aggrieved by the impugned order. Appellant

sought to set aside the impugned order and remand the

appeal to the Special Court for fresh consideration after

affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant on the

ground that he has an interest in and over the property in

question. Both the Interlocutory Applications seeking leave

to file an appeal and also the appeal under Section 16 of the

KPIDFE Act deserves to be dismissed because Section 12(3)

of the KPIDFE Act clearly says that even where no notice has

been served upon any person by the Special Court, if any

person is claiming any interest in the property the ad-

interim and provisional attachment of which is sought to be

made absolute, such person shall have to appear before the

Special Court and object the same.

10. It is further contended that notification issued by

the Government under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act was

published in two newspapers having wide publication and it

was also affixed on a conspicuous place of the property and

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the same is not disputed by the appellant. This aspect is

admitted by the appellant in his appeal memorandum.

11. Though this being the situation appellant had

chosen not to appear before the Trial Court or object to the

ad-interim attachment being made absolute. Hence, the

order passed by the Special Court cannot be found fault

with. Section 12(4) of the KPIDFE Act says that Special

Court shall pass an order making the order of attachment

absolute and found that no cause is shown and no objections

are made by the respondents.

12. It is further contended that no averment can be

found that the appellant was ignorant or that he had no

opportunity to know about the notification issued under

Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act by the Government of

Karnataka. Hence, it is presumed that the appellant was

aware about the ad-interim attachment. Hence, appellant

ought to have appeared before the Special Court and filed

the objections. This being the situation now the appellant

cannot claim that he has not been afforded with an

opportunity of hearing. The statute has given an opportunity

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to the appellant to object the attachment being made

absolute and it is the appellant who has chosen not to utilise

the same. Hence, he cannot claim that he was denied an

opportunity and also he cannot claim for remand of the

matter.

13. It is well settled principle of law that nullus

commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. It means

no man can take advantage of his own wrong. In support

of the said contention, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.1 has relied upon the dictum of the Apex

Court in “Muncipal Committee Katra & Ors. v. Ashwani

Kumar” by judgment dated 09.05.2024 passed in Civil

Appeal No (s).14970-71/2017. He further contended

that if the opportunity of hearing is not availed, it cannot be

said that the order was passed without affording an

opportunity of being heard. In support of the said

contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the dictum

of Gujarath High Court in the case of Vinayakrao S. Desai

v. Interlink Petroleum Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2001)

GLR 3 2649.

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14. The primary contention raised by the proposed

appellant is that the order of the Special Court was passed

without notice to him and that it is therefore bad in law. It is

contended that the agreement for sale of the apartment is

question was executed on 25.01.2019 and the provisional

attachment under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act was issued

only on 06.06.2023. Further, the attachment was notified in

newspapers only on 21.02.2019, much after the sale deed

itself was executed on 04.02.2019. It is contended that the

competent authority, which filed the application under

Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act, ought to have made the

purchaser a party to the proceedings before the Special

Court and the failure to do so has resulted in denying him an

opportunity to defend the case.

15. The learned counsel for respondent

No.1/competent authority takes us through the provisions of

the Act and contends that admittedly, the attachment of the

property was given wide publicity by publishing Section 3(2)

Notification in two newspapers having wide coverage.

Further, the notice of the petition under Section 5(2) of the

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KPIDFE Act was also affixed on the apartment which the

petitioner claims ownership and possession of. Therefore,

drawing our attention to Section 12(3) of the KPIDFE Act.

It is contended that it was for the appellant to appear before

the Special Court and raised his contentions, if any, which

he failed to do so. It is submitted that the Sale Deed relied

on by the appellant is void ab initio in terms of Section 3(2)

of the KPIDFE Act since it was admittedly entered into only

after the Notification had been issued under Section 3(2) of

the KPIDFE Act, which reads as follows:-

“3(2) Not withstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force,-

(i) where, suo moto or based on the market
intelligence reports or upon complaint received from any
depositors or otherwise, the Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department is satisfied that any financial
establishment has failed,-

(a) to return the deposit after maturity or on
demand by depositor; or

(b) to pay interest or other assured benefit; or

(c) to provide the service against such deposit;

or;)

(ii) Where the Government has reason to believe
that any Financial Establishment is acting in and
detrimental to the interest of the depositors with an
intention to defraud them; or

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(iii) Where the Government is satisfied that such
Financial Establishment is not likely to return the
deposits or make payment of interest or other benefits
assured or to provide the services against which the
deposit is received.

the Government may, in order to protect the
interests of the depositors of such Financial
Establishments, after recording reasons in writing, issue
an order by publishing it in the official gazette, attaching
the money or property believed to have been acquired
by such financial establishment either in its own name or
in the name of any other person from and out of the
deposits collected by the financial establishments, and
where it transpires that such money or other property is
not available for attachment or not sufficient for the
repayment of the deposits, such other property of the
said financial establishments, or the personal assets of
the promoters, partners, directors, managers or
members or any other person of the said Financial
Establishments.”

16. Section 5 provides for the appointment of an

officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner to

be the Competent Authority for the purposes of the Act.

Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act reads as follows:-

“5(2) The Competent Authority shall, within thirty
days from the date of receipt of the order made under
section 3, apply to the special Court for further order of
attachment absolute.”

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17. Section 5(3) of the KPIDFE Act provides for an

application supported by affidavits stating the grounds on

which the order is made under Section 3 and the amount of

money or other property believed to have been acquired

from out of the deposits and the details of persons in whose

name such property is believed to have been invested or

acquired or any property attached under Section 3.

18. Section 7 of the KPIDFE Act provides for an

assessment of assets and deposit liabilities in respect of the

financial establishment and the submission of a report to the

Special Court.

Section 12 of the KPIDFE Act reads as under:-

“12. Powers of Special Court regarding
attachment.- (1) Upon receipt of an application under
section 5, the Special Court shall issue to the Financial
Establishment and to any other person if any, whose
property is attached by the designated authority under
section 3, a notice accompanied by the copies of the
application and affidavits and of the record of evidence, if
any, calling upon them to show cause on or before a
date to be specified in the notice why the order of
attachment should not be made absolute.

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(2) The Special Court shall also issue such notice,
to all other persons represented to it as having or being
likely to claim, any interest or title in the property of the
Financial Establishment or the person to whom the notice
is issued under sub section (1), calling upon all such
persons to appear on the same date as that specified in
the notice and make objection if they so desire to the
attachment of the property or any portion thereof on the
ground that they have interest in such property or
portion thereof.

(3) Any person claiming an interest in the property
attached or any portion thereof may, notwithstanding
that no notice has been served upon him under this
section, make an objection as aforesaid to the Special
Court at any time before an order is passed under sub-

section (4) or sub-section (6).

(4) The Special Court shall, if no cause is shown
and no objections are made on or before the specified
date, forthwith pass an order making the order of
attachment absolute, and issue such direction as may be
necessary for realization of the assets attached and for
the equitable distribution among the depositors of the
money realized from out of the property attached.”

19. It is therefore clear that on a provisional

attachment being made in respect of a property, notice is to

be issued to the financial establishment and to any other

person whose property is attached under Section 3.

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20. In the instant case, at the time of the provisional

attachment under Section 3, admittedly, the properties

stood in the name of Respondents No.3 and 4, who were put

on notice. Though Section 12(2) of the KPIDFE Act provides

for issuance of notice to other persons “represented to it” as

having or being likely to claim any interest or title in the

property, the appellant has no case that there was any such

representation made to the Special Court that the appellant

has any interest or title in the property. Section 12(3) of the

KPIDFE Act specifically provides that any person having any

interest in the property can approach the Special Court

notwithstanding the fact that no notice had been served

upon him and such person can also raise an objection.

21. In the instant case, admittedly, notice had been

served by affixture on the apartment in respect of which the

appellant claims title by virtue of the Sale Deed entered into

after the Section 3(2) Notification has been issued. It was

therefore always open for him to approach the Special Court

and raise his objections. Admittedly, he did not do so.

Further, apart from stating that he had not been issued with

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notice, appellant has no contention that he was unaware of

the proceedings or that he was prevented from approaching

the Special Court and raising his objections. Having perused

the appeal, we notice that no tenable contentions as against

the order of the Special Court have been raised apart from

contending that notice was not issued to the purchaser. In

the light of the specific provision of the statute, we are not

inclined to accept the contentions raised.

22. In the result, we are of the opinion that the

contentions raised in the appeal are devoid of merits.

Therefore, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly

dismissed.

All pending interlocutory applications shall stand

disposed of.

Sd/-

(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE

Sd/-

(RAJESH RAI K)
JUDGE
cp*

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