Mr.Ma.Subramanian vs The State Represented By on 28 March, 2025

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Madras High Court

Mr.Ma.Subramanian vs The State Represented By on 28 March, 2025

Author: P.Velmurugan

Bench: P.Velmurugan

                                                                                            Crl.O.P.No.15240 of 2020

                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                        RESERVED ON                        :        20.12.2024
                                        PRONOUNCED ON                      :         28.03.2025

                                                               CORAM :

                                  THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN

                                                Crl.O.P.No.15240 of 2020 and
                                                  Crl.M.P.No.5807 of 2020

                              1. Mr.Ma.Subramanian
                              2. Mrs.Kanchana                                                  ... Petitioners
                                                                    Vs.
                              1. The State represented by
                                 The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
                                 Organized Crime Uni-II,
                                 Crime Branch CID, Egmore,
                                 Chennai – 600 008.

                              2. Sathiyamoorthy
                                 Investigation Officer,
                                 Deputy Superintendent of Police
                                 OCU-II, CBCID, Chennai.

                              3. S.Parthiban                                                      ..Respondents

                         Prayer: Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, to call
                         for the records pertaining to the Final Report dated 02.11.2019 filed in
                         C.C.No.39 of 2020 in Crime No.478 of 2019 pending before the
                         Additional Special Court for Trial of Cases related to Members of
                         Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamilnadu and
                         quash the same.


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                                        For Petitioners         : Dr.S.Muralidhar, Senior Advocate
                                                                  Assisted by Mr.Richardson Wilson
                                                                  for the first petitioner

                                                                   Mr.P.Wilson, Senior Advocate for
                                                                   M/s.P.Wilson Associates
                                                                   for the second petitioner

                                       For Respondent           : Mr.J.Ravindran, AAG, Assisted by
                                                                  Mr.S.Vinoth Kumar,
                                                                  Govt. Advocate (Crl.Side) for R1 & R2
                                                                  Mr.D.Selvam for R3
                                                                  ******

                                                               ORDER

This petition has been filed seeking to quash the proceedings in

C.C.No.39 of 2020 in Crime No.478 of 2019, pending before the

Additional Special Court for Trial of Cases related to Members of

Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamilnadu.

2 Based on the complaint given by the third

respondent/defacto complainant, a case in Cr.No.478 of 2019 has been

registered against the petitioners herein for the offence under Sections

420, 464, 465, 466, 468 r/w 120-B of IPC and subsequently the complaint

was transferred to CB CID for completion of investigation and the same

was registered in Cr.No.1 of 2019. It is the case of the prosecution that the

first petitioner was serving as Ward Councilor from 1996-2011, as ward

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and zonal councilor from 2001 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2011 as Mayor

of Chennai Corporation. In the year 1995 first petitioner purchased

Labour Tenement No.4 in the name of his wife/A2, the second petitioner

herein from the original allottee one S.K.Kannan, which was allotted by

TANSIDCO, for a valuable sale consideration of Rs.2.30 lakhs knowing

fully well that the property belongs to TANSIDCO. In the year 1997,

when the Government issued an order for transfer of ownerships and

when TANSIDCO started processing applications for issue of sale deeds,

A1 and A2 conspired together and produced an application on 30.05.1997

to the Project Officer/Branch Manager TANSIDCO signed by

S.K.Kannan original allottee, wherein A2 the second petitioner was

shown as daughter of S.K.Kannan. The application was given enclosing a

copy of family card of the first accused issued for the year 1993-1998, in

which S.K.Kannan was shown as father-in-law of A1 and subsequently

the same was processed by TANSIDCO and a demand notice dated

27.02.1998 was issued in the name of A2 for collection of rental dues,

water charges, cost of tenement and maintenance charges all amount to

Rs.28,827/-and in the year 1998 in order to legalize the occupancy. To

grab the property of TANSIDCO, A1 obtained an affidavit from

S.K.Kannan and produced the said document for transfer of Labour

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Tenement No.4 in the name of A2 and thereby committed an offence

under Section 420 r/w 120B IPC. In continuation of the said offence, A1

and A2 entered into conspiracy, due to which, S.K.Kannan made a request

to TANSIDCO to transfer the allotment of Labour Tenement No.4 in

favour of A2 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section

468 IPC. Further, in continuation of the demand notice issued by

TANSIDCO, A1 and A2 have obtained various services from

Government Department and committed offence punishable under Section

420 IPC. During the year 2006-2011, when A1 was Mayor of Chennai

Corporation, he abused his official position and got the property tax for

Labour tenement No.4 assessed in the name of A2 and paid property tax

to the tune of Rs.11,725/- on 20.04.2007 and obtained four EB

connections in the name of A2 between 2006-2009 and regularized his

unauthorized occupation in Labour Tenement and thereby committed the

offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of

Corruption Act.

3 After completing investigation, the respondent police filed a

charge sheet before the learned Additional Special Judge for Trial of

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Cases related to Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative

Assembly of Tamilnadu, which was taken on file in C.C.No.39 of 2020.

The said case is pending at the stage of ‘framing of charges’. Now the

petitioners are before this Court seeking to quash the above case.

4 Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would submit that

the third respondent, backed by political opponent belonging to AIADMK

party, who has lost the 2016 Assembly elections against the first petitioner

has been knocking on the doors of this Court by way of various frivolous

petitions and it is very clear that the entire criminal case is a foisted one

with the blessing of the then ruling party at the time of complaint,

misusing and abusing the legal process. Hence, the complaint is

absolutely politically motivated. The complainant was set up by the

defeated candidate of the then ruling party to tarnish the image of the first

petitioner and hence with malafide intention, the complaint has been given

and even if it is read as a whole, no criminal offence is made out.

4.1 Admittedly the tenement No.4 belongs to the TANSIDCO,

was allotted to one S.K.Kannan, who had alienated his tenancy rights over

the said property in favour of the second petitioner for valuable sale

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consideration. TANSIDCO finding that the tenements having changed

hands from the original allottees, decided to sell the tenements itself in

favour of the occupants and therefore the TANSIDCO, by its letter

R.C.No.15437/R5/02 dated 13.02.2008 addressed to the Secretary to

Government, proposing to sell the tenements to the occupants. In the

annexure enclosed along with the letter requesting execution of sale deed

in favour of unauthorized occupants in Labour Tenements, 2nd petitioner’s

name alone is reflected as ‘unauthorized occupant’ and hence there is no

criminality and the first petitioner is no way connected to the above

transaction.

4.2 There is no law governing allotment of tenements relating to

TANSIDCO and hence purchase of rights of Tenement No.4 by the

second petitioner from the original allottee is not in violation of any

provisions of law. Under the Transfer of Property Act, such rights are

alienable and are transferable for valuable sale consideration. It is for the

owner of the property either to regularize it or not. Therefore ingredients

of Section 420 IPC are not made out and there is no cheating at all.

TANSIDCO has not made any complaint that it has been cheated. In the

final report filed by the respondent police, no where it is stated that what

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property has been delivered by TANSIDCO as it is the consistent stand of

TANSIDCO that they never acted upon on the application given by

S.K.Kannan and no change of allotment was made and hence there is no

wrongful gain or wrongful loss within the meaning of Section 420 IPC,

which is proved in the counter affidavit filed by TANSIDCO in the

W.P.No.10939 of 2018, which was filed by the third respondent herein

seeking directions to the official respondents therein to remove the alleged

encroachment by the petitioners herein. The said counter affidavit filed by

the TANSIDCO would clearly establish that only S.K.Kannan, the person

who sold his rights to the second petitioner had approached TANSIDCO

and furnished all the documents and not by the first petitioner and even

the application of S.K.Kannan was also not processed and hence Sections

420, 464, 465, 466 and 468 r/w 120B are not attracted.

4.3 Despite knowing the fact that the complaint is inherently

improbable, reeling under the terrible pressure from the then ruling party,

the Investigating Officer has not only implicated the petitioners under

repealed provisions of Section 13(i)(d)(i) and (ii) of Prevention of

Corruption Act, but also filed the final report, which is an abuse of

process of law and intent to wreck vengeance against the first petitioner.

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Even otherwise, the first petitioner has no role at all and he is

unnecessarily dragged by the third respondent herein.

4.4 It is admitted by the TANSIDCO through their counter

affidavit filed in W.P.No.10939 of 2018 that S.K.Kannan has produced

only copy of the ration card for the year 1993-1998 and no originals are

available either with TANSIDCO or prosecution to prove the alleged

interpretation and inclusion of the name of S.K.Kannan in the ration card.

However, since there is no transfer of allotment in the name of the

petitioners and the documents allegedly produced by S.K.Kannan were

only a xerox copy, the offence under Section 468 IPC is not made out.

4.5 It is alleged by the prosecution that the first petitioner being a

public servant, holding the office of the Mayor of Chennai Corporation,

abused his position to regularize and legalize the illegal occupation of

Labour Tenement No.4 in the name of the second petitioner and got the

assessment of property tax on 20.04.2007 and obtained four electricity

connections. The assessment of property tax in favour of the second

petitioner cannot be at any stretch of imagination be a valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage. The word assessment is a liability, which is revenue

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to the Corporation of Chennai. Likewise obtaining electricity service

connection by the second petitioner for her own use cannot be offence

attracting Prevention of Corruption Act. The first petitioner, while he was

a Mayor, had no dominion nor control over assessment, which has to be

done by the Commissioner in exercise of his statutory powers under

Section 9 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 and also

he has no dominion or control over TANGEDCO to abuse the power to

provide electricity service connection to the residence of the second

petitioner by TANGEDCO in exercise of powers under the Board’s

Terms and Conditions framed pursuant to powers under the Indian

Electricity Act. Assessment by a revenue officer also cannot be said to be

a valuable thing or a pecuniary advantage as directed under Section

13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Per contra, it is a

liability and in case of non-payment, prosecution is contemplated. Neither

in FIR nor in the Final Report, no official is named for having assessed

due to the abuse of power of the first petitioner. Only in case, where tax is

payable by the Commissioner, the original assessment shall be made by

the Mayor. The first petitioner, who was a Mayor during 2006 to 2011, by

no stretch of imagination could have had access to records maintained by

the Corporation Commissioner.

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4.6 As far as obtaining of four electricity service connections

from TANGEDCO, the same are governed by Tamilnadu Electricity

Supply Code, which is framed pursuant to powers conferred under Section

50 r/w Section 181 of Indian Electricity Act, 2003. The final report does

not spell out whether any officials in TNEB were influenced by the first

petitioner. The first petitioner, who was only Mayor had no dominion or

official control over TANGEDCO. Electricity connections are provided

even to huts on Government properties. Even the encroacher is entitled to

electricity service connection. Thus, mere possession of an immovable

property is sufficient for effecting electricity service connection, which

cannot be imagined to be a valuable or pecuniary advantage.

4.7 Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,

has been substituted by Act 16/2018 on 26.07.2018. The FIR was

registered on 31.05.2019 and on the date of registering FIR, Section

13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, already stands

substituted. Hence after substitution with new provisions, the question of

registration of FIR on a non-existing penal provision does not arise at all.

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4.8 It is the stand of TANSIDCO that even unauthorized

occupants are entitled for Sale Deed and hence the question of grabbing

property or cheating does not arise. What does not amount to land

grabbing is defined by Hon’ble First Bench of this Court reported in

2015(1) LW 673 in the case of Thamarai Selvan vs. Government of

Tamilnadu, wherein, it was held that mere transfer of actionable rights

does not come under the land grabbing unless there is penal provisions.

4.9 Further it is alleged by the prosecution that at the time of

commission of offence, the petitioner was Mayor of Corporation of

Chennai, but no sanction under Section 17A of Prevention of Corruption

Act was obtained before investigation from the Government, rather

sanction was obtained from the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.

Hence the case suffers from want of proper sanction and the entire

prosecution is liable to be set aside since it is a fatal defect on the side of

the prosecution. Further cognizance of complaint under Section 197

Cr.P.C. by any Court is barred, unless proper sanction is obtained from

the proper authority. Further the respondent failed to conduct preliminary

enquiry, which is clear violation of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Lalitha Kumari reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1, which is

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also fatal to the case of the prosecution.

4.10 The malafide prosecution by the second respondent is evident

in all the correspondences filed as documents along with final report such

as Doc.Nos.20, 21 and 31 as there are 94 unauthorized occupants in the

Chennai tenemants of TANSIDCO. In Tamilnadu 1099 tenements are

there and no criminal complaint has been registered against them and

TANSIDCO has not preferred any criminal complaint, as there are

thousands of occupants, who are similarly situated like that of the second

petitioner throughout Tamil Nadu and hence the complaint by political

opponent is for malafide reason and the same cannot be entertained.

4.11 The issue of ‘unauthorized occupation’ is a matter of civil

nature and a cloak of criminality cannot be given. The final report is

vindictive and malafide as the second respondent was acting at the behest

of the ruling AIADMK party. The final report together with the

documents filed by the prosecution does not attract any offences set out in

the impugned final report and no case is admittedly made out warranting a

full-fledged trial and therefore it is waste of judicial time if the petitioners

are allowed to face the trial.

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5 Learned Additional Advocate General assisted by the learned

Government Advocate (Crl.Side) for the respondents 1 and 2 would

submit that Tenement No.4 belongs to the TANSIDCO and when the

land belongs to the Government, allottee S.K.Kannan cannot alienate the

Government property to the accused or any individual for sale

consideration and hence it is amounting to illegal transfer of Government

property through forgery and creation of false documents. Allottee or

lessees have no right to alienate the Government land for valuable sale

consideration and thereby the sale consideration by itself is null and void.

The documents whatsoever with the accused pertaining to Tenement No.4

are all false and forged one.

5.1 Document No.11 annexed with the final report is a

membership form (dated 09.06.1997) of Thiru.Vi.Ka.Employee

Residential Association, No.57 Guindy, Chennai – 600 032, which shows

that the first petitioner is resident of Tenement No.4. Hence it is clear that

the first petitioner is knowingly residing in the Government property in

collusion with the second petitioner/A2, who is none other than his wife.

Further Doc.No.7 is tenancy details, which clearly shows that

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“Ma.Subramani” is the occupant and his signature also found on the same,

however, the same have been scored out and his wife name viz. the

second accused namely Tmt.Kanchana and her signature has been added.

Therefore, it is clear that the first petitioner/A1, in order to grab the

Government property, has created false and fabricated documents as if the

Tenement No.4 is in the name of his wife, who has been shown as

daughter of S.K.Kannan, the original allottee.

5.2 Section 463 IPC defines forgery, as per which, it is clear that

Tenement No.4 belonging to the Government and allotted to S.K.Kannan,

has been taken over by the first petitioner A1, through an illegal sale deed.

Further the first petitioner/A1 with an intention to take over this property,

created false and forged documents to claim ownership of the property,

abusing his position as the Mayor of Chennai Corporation and hence it is

clear that the petitioners are residing in the Government property on the

strength of forged and fabricated documents.

5.3 With regard to offence under Section 420 IPC, which deals

with cheating, the petitioners/A1 and A2 dishonestly induced the original

allottee S.K.Kannan to deliver Labour Tenement No.4 and subsequently

altered all the Government records initially in the name of the first

petitioner and later in the name of the second petitioner. It is an admitted
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fact that the original allottee S.K.Kannan, approached TANSIDCO in the

year 1998 for allotment of Labour Tenement No.4 in favour of his only

daughter Tmt.Kanchana, who is A2 and who is not a daughter of

S.K.Kannan. Document No.17 is Passport application form submitted by

A2 Tmt.Kanchana, in which it is clearly stated that her father name is

“Sarangabani”. Document No.18 Legal Heir Certificate, dated 17.06.2016

of allottee S.K.Kannan shows that he had 5 daughters and one son,

wherein Tmt.Kanchana/A2 name has not been found as legal heir.

Therefore the petitioners/A1 and A2 are under the illegal possession of

TANSIDCO tenement belonging to the Government from the year 1995.

The entire conspiracy has been done with the knowledge of the first

petitioner/A1, who at that time, was holding an important post, as Mayor

of Chennai Corporation. Hence Section 420 IPC is clearly made out.

5.4 The petitioners/A1 and A2 entered into criminal conspiracy

to illegally grab the TANSIDCO Tenement No.4, although they are not

entitled for the same as per the Government rules. Hence, they entered

into a sale agreement with S.K.Kannan, the original allottee of the Labour

Tenement No.4 and thereafter took possession of the property. Since,

there is provision for the allottee to pass on the property to his legal heir,

the first petitioner/A1 submitted forged documents claiming his wife A2
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as daughter of S.K.Kannan to whom the tenement was initially allotted.

But, in reality, A2 is wife of A1 Thiru. Ma. Subramanian and she is not

the daughter of the S.K.Kannan. It is also clear, that the first petitioner/A1

has also submitted fake ration card, in which S.K.Kannan has been shown

as his father-in-law. Further the first petitioner/A1 got the property tax

assessed in the name of A2 from the year 1998 onward till 2007 for

TANSIDCO Labour Tenement No.4 and he had paid it. Thereby A1 by

abusing his official position, influenced the property tax department to get

the work done, from the concerned officer and using this property tax

receipt, he got four electricity service connections in the name of his wife

A2 by misusing his position as Mayor of Chennai Corporation.

5.5 The property tax has not been assessed directly by the first

petitioner and it was assessed by the Chennai Corporation in the name of

A2 Tmt. Kanchana wife of the first petitioner/A1 Thiru.Ma.Subramanian.

When TANSIDCO Labour Tenement No.4 belongs to the Government

and A2 is not owner of the property, assessing the property tax in her

name is incorrect and illegal and the same has been done with the

influence and pressure from A1, who was the Mayor of Chennai

Corporation at that time. Property tax receipt and sewerage & water tax

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receipts are the basic important documents required to get electricity

service connection. Hence, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel

that A1 has no role in the assessment of tax cannot be accepted. Further,

the first petitioner/A1 cannot claim to be unaware or ignorant of the

submission of such false and fabricated documents, to obtain ownership of

tenement since, he was holding a very high and responsible post of Mayor

of Chennai Corporation at that time. Hence, section 13(1)(d) (i)(ii) r/w

13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, rightly invoked against

A1, which is proper. The first petitioner holding the high office of Mayor

of Corporation of Chennai, is very well aware that property tax, sewerage

tax receipt and electricity service connection etc., cannot be obtained in

the name of his wife for a Government property that has been allotted to

S.K.Kannan, which has not been allotted to him, and on which he has no

ownership. The first petitioner has used his influence, as Mayor of

Corporation of Chennai to pressurise and obtain all these from the

concerned department circumventing the Government rules and

regulations.

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5.6 The contention of the petitioners that the effect of

substitution in the Prevention of Corruption Act on 26.07.2018 bars

registration of fresh FIR by invoking offences under previous Act is

totally incorrect and unsustainable, as the offence was committed prior to

the amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act and hence the penal

provisions which were in existence at the time of the offence can only be

invoked as per settled position of law. Therefore, the question of sanction

under section 17A contemplated in the Amendment does not arise as the

offence invoked is only under section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii), which was in

existence during the period in which offence was committed and however

proper sanction was obtained under Section 19 of Prevention of

Corruption Act.

5.7 Unauthorised occupants by way of forged documents cannot

be entitled for Sale Deeds and so far, no Sale Deed issued to any

unauthorised occupants. Further, TANSIDCO Tenement No.4 which

belongs to Government cannot be alienated by way of sale consideration

by any person. Obtaining forged documents like property tax, water &

sewerage tax, electricity service connections on obtaining forged sale

consideration cannot be treated as actionable rights. All the forged

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documents have been submitted to TANSIDCO, as if the same are

original for obtaining sale deed. Admittedly the first petitioner/A1 was

the Mayor of Chennai Corporation at the time of committing the offences

and subsequently ceased to be a Mayor and now elected as a Member of

the State Assembly, during the Assembly Election held in the year 2016.

It is the settled position of law that sanction to prosecute the public

servant as per section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act is not required,

when the said public servant ceased to be public servant at the time of

filing the charge sheet. However, since the offence is continuing offence

in nature and the first petitioner/A1 continues to abuse his position and

office even while he was a Member of Legislative Assembly, the previous

sanction was scrupulously obtained from the Hon’ble Speaker of the

Legislative Assembly under section 197 Cr. P.C. and Section 19 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, the case does not suffer from want

of proper sanction.

5.8 It is not a suo-motu action by the police and cognizance taken

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based on the complaint given by the third respondent and hence, police

action is in order. “Unauthorized occupation” with forged documents is

criminal in nature. TANSIDCO Tenement No.4 has been grabbed by way

of forged documents by abuse of power originally in the name of the first

petitioner/A1 and further forged documents in favour of A2. Hence, it is

not civil nature as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners.

5.9 There is sufficient evidence in the form of documents and

statements of witnesses to substantiate the charges against the

petitioners/A1 and A2 and they have to face trial to meet the ends of

justice. The scrutiny of documents in connection with this case and the

deposition of witnesses reveal the part played by the petitioners.

5.10 The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs

CBI reported in AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 1537 has held that if there is a strong

suspicion, which leads the court to think that there is ground for

presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open

to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused. In this case there are sufficient evidences to prove the guilt of

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the accused and for framing of charges. Further the case is at pre-trial

stage and charges have to be framed by the trial court against the accused

and in the event of any prima facie materials available on record the Court

will proceed further or else the petitioners will be discharged.

5.11 While exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this

Court cannot sit as a court of appeal or revision. The jurisdiction vested in

this court is inherent. Though it is wide, it has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully and with caution, that too, when such exercise is justified by the

tests specifically laid down in the section itself. In the case of “State of

Karnataka Vs. Devendrappa” reported in AIR 2002 SC 671, that courts

exist for advancement of justice and that section 482 Cr.P.C. is not an

instrument handed over to the accused to cut short prosecution and bring

about its sudden death in the form of quashing proceedings. Inherent

power should not be exercised, according to the Hon’ble Apex Court, to

stifle a legitimate prosecution. Therefore the case in C.C.No.39 of 2020

against the petitioners/A1 and A2 cannot be quashed and they have to

necessarily face trial.

6 The learned counsel for the third respondent would submit

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that the third respondent had contested the Tamil Nadu Assembly

Elections – 2016 in Saidapet Assembly Constituency as an independent

candidate. The official candidate set up by DMK party, namely

Ma.Subramanian has also filed the nomination giving various false

information in the nomination form. In Form No.26 in Column No.B(iv),

he has stated that the property situate at Adayar Village, old Door No4,

present Door No.7-1/4, Labour Colony, Guindy, Chennai-32, was owned

by TANSIDCO and the said property stands in the name of his wife the

second petitioner by way of lease-cum-sale agreement with TANSIDCO.

But the said property was originally allotted to S.K.Kannan, son of

Sundaramurthy by the Industries and Commerce Department on

14.02.1959. The records available in the TANSIDCO in respect of Labour

Tenement No.4 have all been entered and maintained in the name of

S.K.Kannan. The said S.K.Kannan died on 15.10.2015 by leaving behind

his daughters, namely (1) K.Saiyeelakshmi, (ii) Sabitha, (iii) Shanthi, (iv)

Sasikala and (v) Sankari and his only son (6) K.Srinivasan. The Village

Administrative Officer-cum-Registrar of Birth and Death had issued a

Death Certificate on 17.06.2016 and the Tahsildar, Mambalam Taluk, had

also issued legal heirship certificate through his proceedings

Ni.Mu.E.1/5417/16, dated 17.06.2016. In the said legal heirship

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certificate, the name of the second petitioner/A2 Kanchana, is not found.

Since the said Ma.Subramanian has submitted false information in his

nomination papers in the Tamil Nadu Assembly Election-2016 in Saidapet

Assembly Constituency, the third respondent had filed Election Petition

before this Court in ELP.No.10 of 2016 and the same was rejected by this

Court by order dated 06.04.2018 and the third respondent is taking action

to file appeal before the competent Court.

6.1 The first petitioner is a Lawyer and he also became Mayor

for Corporation of Chennai and by using the said power and political

influence, he has created so many documents to grab the above said

Government property and the same was produced before TANSIDCO and

other authorities with an intention to grab the above said property. The

third respondent came to understand that the said Ma.Subramanian,

submitted an Affidavit before TANSIDCO by stating that the said

S.K.Kannan has requested TANSIDCO to allot his Labour Tenement to

his daughter, namely Kanchana through Notary Affidavit, but it is to be

noted that in the said Legal Heirship certificate of S.K.Kannan,

Kanchana’s name was not found. From the said illegal act, it is clear that

the first petitioner has committed forgery to grab the Government

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property. The first petitioner had demolished the said building and

constructed house in the said land for ground floor, first floor and second

floor, without getting proper approval and planning permission from the

Corporation of Chennai. When the said Kanchana is not the owner of the

property, how Corporation of Chennai can make property tax assessment

and how can the Corporation of Chennai can collect the property tax for

Government property in the name of the said Kanchana. The first

petitioner has submitted false affidavit before the TNEB. as if the said

Kanchana is the owner of the property and obtained the electricity

connection for the said premises illegally. S.K.Kannan’s name was deleted

during the year 2005-2009 in the Family Card of the first petitioner. It is

pertinent to note that originally, in the nomination form, Ma.Subramanian

has stated that TANSIDCO has allotted the said property under the lease-

cum-sale agreement in favour of his wife Kanchana/A2. Thereafter, he

claims that S.K.Kannan, who was original allottee, has given a letter to

TANSIDCO to transfer allotment in his wife’s name, which is not

permitted under law. TANSIDCO can allot the Labour Tenement only for

labourers and not to any others as per the Government Order and therefore

it is very clear that the petitioners have created the documents to grab the

said Government property.

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6.2 The first petitioner has also grabbed the Labour Tenement

No.3 of TANSIDCO property and demolished the original structure and

constructed house without obtaining proper approval and permission from

the competent authorities. The property of TANSIDCO had been grabbed

by creating forged documents and the officials of the TANSIDCO have

also colluded with the the first petitioner. As on today, the the petitioners

are in possession of the said property. The third respondent made

representation and also reminders to the second respondent seeking action

to recover the property in Labour Tenement No.4, Labour Colony,

Guindy, Chennai-32, from the petitioners by removing the said

encroachment, but till date, TANSIDCO authorities have not taken any

action on the third respondent’s representation. Whenever the third

respondent approaches, TANSIDCO authorities themselves stated that

since the first petitioner is sitting MLA for Saidapet Constituency, they

are unable to recover the said property from the petitioners.

6.3 Therefore, the third respondent had filed a Writ Petition in

W.P.No.10939 of 2018 seeking to remove the encroachments made by the

petitioners herein and after the hot contest between the parties to the said

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writ petition, this Court, by order dated 21.02.2019 in W.P.No.10939 of

2018, disposed of the above said writ petition by directing the respondent

therein to consider the representation, dated 12.04.2018 and pass orders in

accordance with law by providing opportunity of hearing to all concerned.

6.4 There are manipulation of documents, forgery and fraudulent

documents in grabbing the above said TANSIDCO properties and hence

the third respondent had made detailed complaint on 11.04.2018 before

the Commissioner of Police, which was forwarded to Deputy

Commissioner, Adayar, Chennai, for necessary action and thereafter since

no action was taken on the said complaint, the third respondent had filed

Crl.O.P.No.9706 of 2019 seeking direction to register the complaint,

dated 11.04.2018 and the said petition was disposed of by this Court with

direction to register the complaint. Only thereafter, a case was registered

in Crime No.478 of 2019 on 31.05.2019 for the offences under Sections

420, 464, 465, 466, 468 and 120-B of IPC. Subsequently, the said

complaint was transferred to the first respondent and the same was

registered in FIR No.1 of 2019 for the offences under Sections 420, 464,

465, 466, 468 and 120-B IPC. Thereafter since no action was taken after

registering the case, the third respondent filed Crl.O.P.No.25336 of 2019

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seeking direction to the first respondent therein to file final report in

Crime No.1 of 2019 within the time stipulated by this Court. This Court,

by an order dated 20.09.2019 in Crl.OP.No.25336 of 2019, directed the

first respondent therein to complete the investigation in Crime No.1 of

2019 and file a final report as expeditiously as possible. Thereafter, the

first respondent has filed final report before XI Metropolitan Magistrate,

Saidapet, Chennai and the same was taken on file in C.C.No.4280 of 2019

by the said learned Magistrate and since the first petitioner is the sitting

MLA for Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, the third respondent herein

filed Crl.O.P.No.2213 of 2020 seeking direction to transfer the case in

C.C.No.4280 of 2019 from the file of the XI Metropolitan Magistrate,

Saidapet, Chennai to the Special Court, Chennai, constituted for MP and

MLA Court, or the Special Court, Chennai, constituted under the

Prevention of Corruption Act. Pending the above said case, the case was

transferred to the Additional Special Court for MP and MLA case and re-

numbered as C.C.No.39 of 2020.

6.5 The petitioners have claimed that this Court dismissed the

various cases filed by the third respondent, but, it is to be noted that the

third respondent had filed Election Petition No.10 of 2016 as against the

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first petitioner and the said petition was rejected, against which, an appeal

was filed before the Supreme Court of India and the same is pending

consideration. The dismissal of the said Election Petition is no way

connected to the offence committed by the petitioners herein and the

Election Petition is only for purely election dispute and the said dispute

will not have any advantage to suppress all the illegal activities in

grabbing the Government property. Except the said Election Petition,

none of the third respondent’s cases dismissed by this Court as alleged and

claimed by the petitioners. Therefore, it is clear fact that the petitioners

are mis-leading this Court in all aspects and the same cannot be permitted

in any event. The counter filed by TANSIDCO in W.P.No.10939 of 2018

is clearly exposing the fraudulent criminal acts of the petitioners, but in

the present quash-petition, the petitioners have totally misled everything.

Further, the order passed in the Anticipatory Bail in Crl.O.P.No.14802 of

2019, would not give any right for the petitioners to file the present quash

petition and even in the said order, it is categorically held that they are in

possession of the subject matter of the property which itself proves that

the petitioners have committed all the offences as claimed by the

prosecution for the reason that the labour tenements are only provided for

the labourers and not for any other persons like petitioners.

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6.6 The third respondent does not belong to any of the political

party, including AIADMK. The third respondent’s election nomination

papers which were submitted to the Election Officer for Saidapet

Constituency during the Tamil Nadu State Assembly Election, 2016,

would prove the same, since the third respondent had contested the said

election as an independent candidate. The third respondent has no

personal vengeance or mala-fide intention to defame the petitioners and

their own documents would show that they have committed the offences.

The reply of TANSIDCO, which is given under the Right to Information

Act, would clearly prove that the Labour Tenement Nos.3 and 4 have not

at all allotted to the petitioners, but in the sworn affidavit of the first

petitioner filed along with the Nomination, it has been claimed that the

superstructure is vested with the second petitioner and the land belongs to

TANSIDCO. When the land has not been allotted to the second petitioner,

how the first petitioner can declare that the said tenement has been

allotted to the second petitioner. From the above said facts, the mens-rea

of the petitioners in committing the offences, are proved.

6.7 It is to be noted that in the anticipatory bail petition filed by

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the petitioners, it is clearly admitted by the petitioner that they have got

assignment on 16.06.1996 from the said S.K.Kannan, but the said

document has not been produced till date before the Court in any of the

proceedings. The Letter Rc.No.15437/R5/02, dated 13.02.2008 will not

have bearing on the claim of the petitioners that they become the

unauthorised occupants, since the entire forgery, fraudulent act,

manipulation of documents and etc., have been committed by the

petitioners as early as during 1995-1996 itself and the said letter is only

recommendation and the same cannot supersede G.O.No.128, dated

24.03.1997, since there is specific condition that the allotment cannot be

transferred to any other persons, except the legal heirs of original allottee.

6.8 It is to be noted that S.K.Kannan himself is not the owner of

the above said property as per G.O.No.128, dated 24.03.1997. Further, the

labour tenements have been allotted to the poor labourers for their

upliftment and admittedly, neither the first petitioner nor the second

petitioner is labour. Therefore, the entire acts of the petitioners in

grabbing the properties from the poor labourers are against the

Government rules, which are offence under IPC. The second petitioner

was impersonating herself as daughter of S.K.Kannan, but the fact

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remains that the second petitioner is the daughter of Sarangapani, which is

very clear from Doc.No.17 the Passport application form of the second

petitioner and therefore, the second petitioner is to be punished under

Section 419 of IPC., and the same penal provision has been added in the

final report in C.C.No.39 of 2020.

6.9 The petitioners have forged several documents and now they

claimed that S.K.Kannan only has given those documents and the said

claim itself shows that there is clear prima-facie triable issues are

involved in the final report. The list of documents relied on by the

prosecution and the statement of witnesses have clearly proved the

offence committed by the petitioners herein. The explanation of the

petitioners can be decided only through the full-fledged trial and

definitely not through the present quash-petition. The offences under

Section 13(i)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, is clearly made out, since the first petitioner has

mutated the property tax documents during his tenure of Mayor of

Chennai Corporation. It is to be noted that the old structures which were

available in Labour Tenement Nos.3 and 4 have been demolished without

proper permission from the Corporation and the houses have been

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constructed without proper approval and sanction from the competent

authorities. In pursuance of several forgery and fraudulent documents, the

petitioners have taken possession of the property, and hence, all the

offences under Sections 420, 464, 465, 466, 468 and r/w Section 120-B of

IPC and Section 13(i)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 are made out. Admittedly, TANSIDCO has not

even accepted the un-authorised occupation of the petitioners and hence,

the petitioners have committed all the above said offences and they are

liable to be punished under the above said Sections.

6.10 The petitioners are making claim that they have no

connections in regard to the document which stands in their names and in

such event, there must be full-fledged trial to be conducted and hence, the

present quash-petition cannot be maintained. The property of TANSIDCO

has been grabbed and whether the petitioners are involved or not to be

decided only through the process of trial by letting the oral and

documentary evidences. It is well settled law that the validity of

sanctioning authority shall be challenged only before the Constitutional

Court and hence if the petitioners have any grievances against the order of

sanction passed by the Speaker, they may approach the Constitutional

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Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not before this

Court. The intention of the Legislature is that no Court shall stay the

proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied

that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice,

and no Court, shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other

ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to

any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other

proceedings.

6.11 Time and again, the Honourable Supreme Court in many

number of judgments has passed verdicts stating that, the duty of the

Court is that any anti-corruption law, has to be interpreted and worked out

in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption, and the

High Court should exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., very

very sparingly in corruption cases. Therefore the petitioners/A1 and A2

have to face trial and the case against them need not be quashed.

7 Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and the

learned Additional Advocate General assisted by the learned Government

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Advocate (Crl.Side) for the respondents 1 and 2 and the learned counsel

for the third respondent and perused the materials available on record.

8 The prosecution has made a specific allegation that the first

petitioner, being a public servant holding the office of the Mayor of

Chennai Corporation, abused his position in order to grab the government

property viz. Tenement No.4 belongs to TANSIDCO, which was

originally allotted to eligible allottee S.K.Kannan. The prosecution alleges

that the first petitioner knowingly residing in the property by creating

false and fabricated documents to make it appear as though the property

stood in the name of his wife (A2), the second petitioner. Furthermore, he

allegedly regularized and legalized Labour Tenement No.4 in the name of

the second petitioner, by obtaining property tax assessment on 20.04.2007

and secured four electricity service connections. The original allottee

S.K.Kannan has no right to alienate the Government land for valuable sale

consideration and thereby the sale consideration itself is null and void and

the documents whatsoever with the petitioners/accused pertaining Labour

Tenement No.4 are all false and forged one.

9 To defend the allegations of the prosecution and to quash the

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present case against the petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners contended that the case is politically motivated with malafide

intention and in fact the original allottee S.K.Kannan, alienated his

tenancy rights over Labour Tenement No.4 in favour of the second

petitioner for valuable sale consideration and hence there is no violation

of any provisions of law. The sanction obtained by the prosecution is

invalid and not in consonance with Section 17A of Prevention of

Corruption Act. Further the owner of the land viz. TANSIDCO did not

prefer any complaint against the petitioners, rather, it stated the petitioners

as ‘unauthorised occupants’ and the counter filed by TANSIDCO, in the

writ petition in W.P.No.10939 of 2018 filed by the defacto complainant

seeking to remove the occupation of the petitioners, would demolish the

entire case of the prosecution. The learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners also placed reliance on the following various decisions of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High Courts to support his contentions.

1. (2014) 7 SCC 215 (Rishipal Singh vs. State of UP)

2. (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Lalita Kumari vs. Government of UP)

3. (2020) 2 SCC 338 (Yashwant Sinha and Ors vs. CBI)

4. AIR 1965 SC 444 (Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan vs. State of

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Punjab)

5. (2014) 13 SCC 55 (B.Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh)

6. (2009) 6 SCC 587 (A.Subair vs. State of Kerala)

7. (1983) 1 SCC 177 (T.Barani vs. Henry Ah Hoe & Anr)

8. (2003) 7 SCC 713 (New India Assurance Co. Ltde.,vs. C.Padma

9. (2018) 17 SCC 448 (Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan)

10.(2007) 12 SCC 1 (Inder Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal

11.(1977) 2 SCC 699 ( State of Karnataka vs. LO.Muniswamy

12.(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 (State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal)

13.(2015) 1 LW 673 (R.Thamaraiselvan vs. Government of Tamil

Nadu)

14.(2000) 2 SCC 636 (G.Sagar Suri vs. State of UP)

15.2013 (6) CTC 849 (T.M.Prakash vs. The District Collector

16.(2019) 17 SCC 590 (Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraj vs. Union

of India)

17.(2000) 2 SCC 536 ( Kohlapur Canesugar Works Ltd., and Anr vs.

Union of India)

18.W.P.No.31640 of 2012 (G. Murugan vs. The Chairman)

19.(2024) 10 SCC 1 (Mineral Area Development Authority vs. SAIL)

20. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 (Mariam Fasihuddin vs. State)

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21.2024 SCC OnLine SC 339 (A.M.Mohan vs. State)

22.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1184 (Parveen vs. State of Haryana)

23. (2018 7 SCC 581 (Sheila Sebastian vs. R. Jawaharaj)

24.(2017) 8 SCC 791 (Rajiv Kumar vs. State of UP)

25.2015 SCC OnLine Mad 2089 (R.Thamaraiselvan vs. State of T.N.)

26.2014 SCC OnLine Mad 777 (G.Murugan vs. Tamil Nadu

Electricity Board)

27. 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3001 ( T.M.Prakash vs. District Collector)

28.(2007) 12 SCC 1 (Inder Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal)

29.(2003) 3 SCC 641 ( Ram Narayan Popli vs. CBI

30.1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal

10 It is an admitted fact that the petitioners are in occupation of

the disputed property LT No.4, which belongs to TANSIDCO. The

Housing and Urban Development Department issued G.O.Ms.No.128

dated 24.03.1997 to issue house sites to the eligible poor labours at a low

prize, on conditions. As per condition No.7 of the said Government Order,

the petitioners, who are described as unauthorised occupants by

TANSIDCO, are not eligible to get the benefits under the said

Government Order, since neither the petitioners nor their parents are

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industrial labours. Even as per the admission made by the petitioners, they

took right over the disputed property from the original allottee

S.K.Kannan for valuable sale consideration, which is not permissible as

per the Government Order. Even the original allottee S.K.Kannan has no

right to alienate the property and hence the occupation of the petitioners in

the property is not legal. Even though it is contended by the learned

Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the case is politically motivated, it

is to be noted that the first petitioner is a Law Graduate and was holding

very responsible post of Mayor of Chennai Corporation, he knows the

procedures contemplated under Law. Therefore the contention of the

learned Senior Counsel could not be accepted.

11 The learned Senior Counsel contended that preliminary

enquiry was not conducted which is in violation of the decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalaitha Kumari stated (supra). As

far as preliminary enquiry is concerned, subsequently the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of CBI vs. Thommandru Hannah

Vijayalakshmi Alias T.H.Vijayalakshmi and another reported in (2021) 18

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SCC 135 has clarified regarding conduct of preliminary enquiry and scope

and object of conducting preliminary enquiry and the relevant portion is

extracted hereunder:

“21. The judgment provides the following conclusions : (Lalita
Kumari
case [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of
the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable
offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation.

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable
offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary
inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable
offence is disclosed or not.

***
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity
or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain
whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to
be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be
made are as under:

***

(d) Corruption cases
***

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The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all
conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.”

22. The Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari case [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39, 83-

86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-112, 114-119 and 120 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] thus held that a preliminary enquiry is
not mandatory when the information received discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. Even when it is conducted, the
scope of a preliminary enquiry is not to ascertain the veracity of
the information, but only whether it reveals the commission of a
cognizable offence. The need for a preliminary enquiry will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. As an illustration,
“corruption cases” fall in that category of cases where a
preliminary enquiry “may be made”. The use of the expression
“may be made” goes to emphasise that holding a preliminary
enquiry is not mandatory. Dwelling on the CBI Manual, the
Constitution Bench held that : (i) it is not a statute enacted by the
legislature; and (ii) it is a compendium of administrative orders for
the internal guidance of CBI.

23. The judgment in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] was analysed by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Yashwant Sinha [Yashwant
Sinha v. CBI
, (2020) 2 SCC 338] where the Court refused to grant
the relief of registration of an FIR based on information submitted

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by the appellant-informant. In his concurring opinion, K.M.
Joseph, J. described that a barrier to granting the relief of
registration of an FIR against a public figure would be the
observations of this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State
of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] noting that a
preliminary enquiry may be desirable before doing so. Joseph, J.

observed : (Yashwant Sinha case [Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2
SCC 338, paras 114-115 and 117] , SCC pp. 385 & 387-89, paras
108, 110, 112 & 114)
“108.
Para 120.6 [of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] ] deals with the
type of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made.
Corruption cases are one of the categories of cases where a
preliminary inquiry may be conducted. …
***

110. In para 117 of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , this Court referred to
the decision in P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
240] and took the view that in the context of offences related to
corruption in the said decision, the Court has expressed a need for
a preliminary inquiry before proceeding against public servants.

***

112. In Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , one of the contentions which
was pressed before the Court was that in certain situations,

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preliminary inquiry is necessary. In this regard, attention of the
Court was drawn to CBI Crime Manual. …
***

114. The Constitution Bench inLalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
, had before it, the CBI Crime Manual. It also considered the
decision of this Court inP. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of
Madras
, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] which declared
the necessity for preliminary inquiry in offences relating to
corruption. Therefore, the petitioners may not be justified in
approaching this Court seeking the relief of registration of an FIR
and investigation on the same as such. This is for the reason that
one of the exceptions where immediate registration of FIR may not
be resorted to, would be a case pointing fingers at a public figure
and raising the allegation of corruption. This Court also has
permitted preliminary inquiry when there is delay, laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over three months.
A
preliminary inquiry, it is to be noticed in para 120.7 of Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] , is to be completed within seven days.”(emphasis
supplied

24. The decision of a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of
Telangana v. Managipet
, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri)
702] thereafter has noted that while the decision in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] held that a preliminary enquiry was desirable in

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cases of alleged corruption, that does not vest a right in the
accused to demand a preliminary enquiry. Whether a preliminary
enquiry is required or not will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and it cannot be said to be mandatory
requirement without which a case cannot be registered against the
accused in corruption cases. Hemant Gupta, J. held thus :

(Managipet case [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC
87, paras 33-34 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] , SCC pp. 103-105,
paras 28-30 & 32-34)
“28.
InLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] the Court has laid down the
cases in which a preliminary inquiry is warranted, more so, to
avoid an abuse of the process of law rather than vesting any right
in favour of an accused. Herein, the argument made was that if a
police officer is doubtful about the veracity of an accusation, he
has to conduct a preliminary inquiry and that in certain
appropriate cases, it would be proper for such officer, on the
receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence, to satisfy himself
that prima facie, the allegations levelled against the accused in the
complaint are credible. …

29. The Court concluded that the registration of an FIR is
mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information
discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation. …

30. It must be pointed out that this Court has not held that a
preliminary inquiry is a must in all cases. A preliminary enquiry

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may be conducted pertaining to matrimonial disputes/family
disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases,
corruption cases, etc. The judgment of this Court inLalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] does not state that proceedings cannot be initiated
against an accused without conducting a preliminary inquiry.

***

32. … The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry being
necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon the facts of
each case. There is no set format or manner in which a
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The objective of the same is
only to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not initiated
on a frivolous and untenable complaint. That is the test laid down
inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] .

33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the information
collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of the accused
officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly
frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly
and objectively. Herein, relevant information was available with
the informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR
is satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed against the
accused even without conducting any inquiry or by any other
manner on the basis of the credible information received by him. It
cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason

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that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can only
be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426] wherein, this Court held inter alia that where the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused and
also where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry warranted
inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required to be mandatorily
conducted in all corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this
Court in multiple instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to
be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. There are no fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be
said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal
collection of information disclosing a cognizable offence to the
satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied

25. In Charansingh [Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021)
5 SCC 469 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 617 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 52] ,

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the two-Judge Bench was confronted with a challenge to a decision
to hold a preliminary enquiry. The Court adverted to the ACB
Manual in Maharashtra and held that a statement provided by an
individual in an “open inquiry” in the nature of a preliminary
enquiry would not be confessional in nature and hence, the
individual cannot refuse to appear in such an inquiry on that basis.

M.R. Shah, J. writing for the two-Judge Bench consisting also of
one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) held : (SCC pp. 479-82, paras
11, 14 & 15)
“11. However, whether in a case of a complaint against a public
servant regarding accumulating the assets disproportionate to his
known sources of income, which can be said to be an offence under
Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, an
enquiry at pre-FIR stage is permissible or not and/or it is desirable
or not, if any decision is required, the same is governed by the
decision of this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] .

11.1. While considering the larger question, whether police is
duty-bound to register an FIR and/or it is mandatory for
registration of FIR on receipt of information disclosing a
cognizable offence and whether it is mandatory or the police
officer has option, discretion or latitude of conducting preliminary
enquiry before registering FIR, this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P.
, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
has observed that it is mandatory to register an FIR on receipt of
information disclosing a cognizable offence and it is the general

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rule. However, while holding so, this Court has also considered
the situations/cases in which preliminary enquiry is
permissible/desirable. While holding that the registration of FIR is
mandatory under Section 154, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is
permissible in such a situation and the same is the general rule
and must be strictly complied with, this Court has carved out
certain situations/cases in which the preliminary enquiry is held to
be permissible/desirable before registering/lodging of an FIR. It is
further observed that if the information received does not disclose
a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a
preliminary enquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not. It is observed that as to
what type and in which cases the preliminary enquiry is to be
conducted will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.

***

14. In the context of offences relating to corruption, in para 117
in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , this Court also took note of the decision
of this Court in P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
240] in which case this Court expressed the need for a preliminary
enquiry before proceeding against public servants.

***

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15.1. Thus, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to be permissible
and not only permissible but desirable, more particularly in cases
where the allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice
acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to his known
sources of income. After the enquiry/enquiry at pre-registration of
FIR stage/preliminary enquiry, if, on the basis of the material
collected during such enquiry, it is found that the complaint is
vexatious and/or there is no substance at all in the complaint, the
FIR shall not be lodged. However, if the material discloses prima
facie a commission of the offence alleged, the FIR will be lodged
and the criminal proceedings will be put in motion and the further
investigation will be carried out in terms of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
. Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry would be
permissible only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is
disclosed or not and only thereafter FIR would be registered.
Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry would be in the interest of
the alleged accused also against whom the complaint is made.
15.2. Even as held by this Court in CBI v. Tapan Kumar
Singh [CBI
v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1305] , a GD entry recording the information by the
informant disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence can
be treated as FIR in a given case and the police has the power and
jurisdiction to investigate the same. However, in an appropriate
case, such as allegations of misconduct of corrupt practice by a
public servant, before lodging the first information report and
further conducting the investigation, if the preliminary enquiry is

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conducted to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed
or not, no fault can be found. Even at the stage of registering the
FIR, what is required to be considered is whether the information
given discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and the
information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to
suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, it is
enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given
suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he
must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been
committed. Despite the proposition of law laid down by this Court
in a catena of decisions that at the stage of lodging the first
information report, the police officer need not be satisfied or
convinced that a cognizable offence has been committed,
considering the observations made by this Court inP.
Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 :

1970 SCC (Cri) 240] and considering the observations by this
Court inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] before lodging the FIR, an
enquiry is held and/or conducted after following the procedure as
per Maharashtra State Anti-Corruption & Prohibition Intelligence
Bureau Manual, it cannot be said that the same is illegal and/or
the police officer, Anti-Corruption Bureau has no jurisdiction
and/or authority and/or power at all to conduct such an enquiry at
pre-registration of FIR stage.”(emphasis supplied

26. Hence, all these decisions do not mandate that a preliminary
enquiry must be conducted before the registration of an FIR in

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corruption cases. An FIR will not stand vitiated because a
preliminary enquiry has not been conducted. The decision
in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87
: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] dealt specifically with a case of
disproportionate assets. In that context, the judgment holds that
where relevant information regarding prima facie allegations
disclosing a cognizable offence is available, the officer recording
the FIR can proceed against the accused on the basis of the
information without conducting a preliminary enquiry.

27. This conclusion is also supported by the judgment of another
Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami [K. Veeraswami v. Union of
India
, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] . The judgment was
in context of Section 5(1)(e) of the old Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947
, which is similar to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. It was
argued that : (i) a public servant must be afforded an opportunity to
explain the alleged disproportionate assets before an investigating
officer; (ii) this must then be included and explained by the
investigating officer while filing the charge-sheet; and (iii) the
failure to do so would render the charge-sheet invalid. Rejecting
this submission, the Constitution Bench held that doing so would
elevate the investigating officer to the role of an enquiry officer or a
Judge and that their role was limited only to collect material in
order to ascertain whether the alleged offence has been committed
by the public servant.”

12 In view of the above settled position, this Court is of the view

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that no preliminary enquiry is required, as the matter pertains to

corruption. Particularly, in the case on hand, the allegation is that the

property viz. Labour Tenement No.4, which is meant for labourers, was

fraudulently obtained. Furthermore, the first petitioner, while holding the

post of Mayor, by abusing his official position, obtained property tax

assessment, and using the same, he secured four electricity service

connections in the name of his wife A2, by misusing the official position

as Mayor.

13 As far as the contention regarding the validity of sanction is

concerned, mere defect in sanction would not affect the case of the

prosecution and in this regard it is useful to refer the decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 15 SCC 537 in the case of

V.Padmanabham vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors and the

relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

“8. So far as the defect in sanction aspect is concerned, the
circular on which the High Court has placed reliance needs to be
noted. The Circular in question is dated 9-2-1988 the relevant
portion reads as follows:

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The Government also decided that before giving approval of
prosecutions, the Principal Secretary, Law and Legal
Department will obtain the advice of department concerned.”
A bare perusal of the paragraph shows that before giving
approval for prosecution, advice of the department concerned
was necessary. The question arises whether the absence of
advice renders the sanction inoperative. Undisputedly the
sanction has been given by the Department of Law and
Legislative Affairs. The State Government had granted
approval of the prosecution. As noted above, the sanction was
granted in the name of the Governor of the State by the
Additional Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative
Affairs. The advice at the most is an interdepartmental matter.

9. Further, the High Court has failed to consider the effect of
Section 19(3) of the Act. The said provision makes it clear
that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge
shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal on the
ground of absence of/or any error, omission or irregularity in
sanction required under sub-section (1) of Section 19 unless
in the opinion of the court a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby.

10. In the instant case there was not even a whisper or
pleading about any failure of justice. The stage when this
failure is to be established is yet to be reached since the case

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is at the stage of framing of charge whether or not failure has
in fact been occasioned was to be determined once the trial
commenced and evidence was led. In this connection the
decisions of this Court in State v. T. Venkatesh
Murthy
[(2004) 7 SCC 763 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2140] and
in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1 :

(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] need to be noted. That being so the
High Court’s view quashing the proceedings cannot be
sustained and the State’s appeal deserves to be allowed which
we direct.

11. Coming to the appeal filed by the accused one of the
questions is whether the investigating officer was authorised
to conduct the investigation. The investigation was carried on
by the duly authorised officer, namely, the Deputy
Superintendent of Police under Section 17(c) of the Act. The
broader issues raised need not be looked into. The function of
investigation was merely to collect evidence and any
irregularity and illegality in the course of collection of
evidence can hardly be considered by itself to affect the
legality of trial by a competent court of the offence so
investigated.”

14 The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the decision reported in

(2004) 7 SCC 763 in the case of State by Police Inspector vs. T.Venkatesh

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Murthy, further held as follows:

7. A combined reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) makes the
position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special
Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal,
confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or
any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required
under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court a
failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

8. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) is also relevant. It shows that
no court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on the
ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction
granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such
error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of
justice.

9. Sub-section (4) postulates that in determining under sub-

section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction has occasioned or resulted in a
failure of justice, the court shall have regard to the fact
whether the objection could and should have been raised at
any earlier stage in the proceedings.

10. Explanation appended to the section is also of
significance. It provides, that for the purpose of Section 19,
error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction.

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15 Yet another decision reported in (2023) 1 SCC 329 in the

case of Vijay Rajmohan vs CBI (Anti Corruption Branch) held as follows:

22. Statutory provisions requiring sanction before
prosecution either under Section 197CrPC or under Section
97
of the PC Act also intend to serve the very same purpose
of protecting a public servant. These protections are not
available to other citizens because of the inherent
vulnerabilities of a public servant and the need to protect
them. However, the said protection is neither a shield
against dereliction of duty nor an absolute immunity against
corrupt practices. The limited immunity or bar is only
subject to a sanction by the appointing authority.

16 The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the recent judgment in the case

of State vs. Easwaran (2025 INSC 397)held that the High Court

committed an error in quashing the prosecution on the grounds that the

sanction to prosecute was illegal and invalid. The Hon’ble Apex Court has

reiterated that the validity of a sanction is an issue that must be examined

during the course of trial.

17 Admittedly in the case on hand, the order of sanction was

passed by the Speaker and if the petitioners are aggrieved over the same,

they should have approached the Court by invoking Article 226 of the

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Constitution of India. Furthermore, the criminal case has now reached the

stage of framing charges and the petitioners can very well raise their

defence before the trial Court and hence such a challenge cannot be

entertained at the threshold, especially on a mere technicality, the criminal

case cannot be set aside and their defence also remains open before the

trial Court. Therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel with

regard to defect in sanction is not acceptable and the decisions relied on

by the learned Senior Counsel in this aspect are not applicable to the case

on hand.

18 It is the main contention of the learned Senior Counsel for

the petitioners that TANSIDCO, who is the owner of the land has not filed

any complaint against the petitioners and the counter filed by TANSIDCO

in the Writ Petition filed by the defacto complainant to remove the

petitioners from the property, would demolish the case of the prosecution.

A bare perusal of the said counter filed by TANSIDCO would show that

the petitioners are not eligible to get sale deed in their favour and they are

considered as ‘unauthorised occupants’. The proposal to regularize the

unauthorised occupation has been sent to Government and the

Government by its letter dated 14.12.2017 directed TANSIDCO to verify

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and establish each of the unauthorised occupant as labour with specific

proof such as EPF and ESI, but none of unauthorised occupants including

the petitioners have submitted any proof as required by the Government.

Further in the counter TANSIDCO has clearly stated that without NOC

from TANSIDCO and requisite approval for putting up the construction,

the petitioners, who occupied Tenement No.3 demolished the original

building and reconstructed with adjoining Tenement No.4, which was

originally allotted to S.K.Kannan.

19 Further it is an admitted fact that the said S.K.Kannan

requested TANSIDCO for allotment of Tenement No.4 in favour of the

second petitioner/A2 Tmt.S.Kanchana stating that she is his only legal

heir. But, in document No.17 passport application form of the second

petitioner, she clearly mentioned her father’s name as ‘Sarangabani’.

Therefore the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel that the

petitioners’ occupation is not illegal and the allegations of the prosecution

is motivated one, are not acceptable.

20 The learned Senior Counsel contended that this complaint by

political opponent is for malafide reason, which cannot be entertained. In

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this regard it is useful to refer the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

reported in (2004) 1 SCC 691 in the case of State of M.P. Vs Awadh

Kishore Gupta and Ors. and the relevant portion reads as follows:

“8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It
only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the
Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for
proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them
by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex

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aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa
esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it
gives him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising powers under the section, the Court does not
function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse
of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts
to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to
be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.

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9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960
Cri LJ 1239] this Court summarized some categories of
cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to
quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is
no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

10. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is
the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt,
should not be an instrument of oppression or needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and

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circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest
it would be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument
handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and
bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases
where the High Court may exercise its power under it
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set
out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] . A note of caution was, however, added that the
power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the
rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated
by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under

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an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

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the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”

11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
High Court being the highest court of a State should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case
where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so,
when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or
legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-
and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceedings at any stage. (See Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary
[(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri)
36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr) v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .) It would not be
proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on
such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings
are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the

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material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with. In proceedings instituted on complaint,
exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is
called for only in a case where the complaint does not
disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.
If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute
the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in
exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be
meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out
whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The
complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement
made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the
offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to
show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious,
in that event there would be no justification for interference
by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the
police station and an offence is registered, then the mala
fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is
the material collected during the investigation and evidence
led in the court which decide the fate of the accused person.
The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing
the proceedings.

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21 Therefore while exercising powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. the Court cannot function as a Court of appeal or revision, and

the inherent jurisdiction, even though wide, it has to be exercised

sparingly, carefully and with caution. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that the High Court, while dealing with the petition seeking quash,

cannot appreciate the evidence, but can evaluate material and documents

on records to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence

of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Section

should not be an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a

prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The Court has to see

whether there exist prima facie allegations and sufficient grounds to

proceed against the accused.

22 This Court carefully has gone through the allegations, charge

sheet and the documents, which reveal that there is prima facie materials

to proceed further. Admittedly, the prosecution alleges that the

petitioners conspired to unlawfully acquire property meant for labourers

viz., Labour Tenement No.4. As part of this conspiracy, S.K.Kannan

submitted a request to TANSIDCO for the transfer of the allotment of

Labour Tenement No.4 in favour of A2. The first petitioner, by abusing

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his official position, ensured that the property tax for the labour tenement

was assessed in the name of A2 and subsequently paid the property tax

and obtained four electricity service connections. While engaging in

these activities, they involved S.K.Kannan, who was claimed to be the

father-in-law of the first petitioner. However, the prosecution’s stance is

that, according to the legal heir certificate (Document No.18, dated

17.06.2016), the said S.K.Kannan had five daughters and one son,

wherein Kanchana, the second petitioner, has not been mentioned as a

legal heir. As such, the prosecution alleges that the entire conspiracy was

carried out with the knowledge of the first petitioner, who, at that time,

was holding the post of Mayor. It is also apposite to mention that the

validity and veracity of the documents can only be tested during trial.

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions observed that

invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not automatic and it should be exercised

very very sparingly especially when the offence is under the Prevention

of Corruption Act. Once the complaint discloses prima facie allegations,

the malafide intention of the complainant is of no consequence. There is

no quarrel with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which

are relied on by the learned Senior Counsel, but, however, considering

the facts and circumstances of this case and decisions cited supra, the

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cases relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners are not

applicable to the facts of the present case on hand.

23 Furthermore, the grounds raised by the learned Senior

Counsel for the petitioners are all matter for trial and the case cannot be

quashed on that grounds and this is not the fit case to quash.

24 In view of the foregoing observations and reasons, this

Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed. However, the petitioners can

take all their defence during trial. The trial Court is directed to frame

charges against the accused, if not done sofar, and proceed with the

matter in accordance with law. Consequently, connected miscellaneous

petition is closed.

28.03.2025

Speaking Order/Non Speaking Order

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To

1. The Additional Special Court for Trial of Cases related to Members
of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamilnadu.

2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Organized Crime Uni-II,
Crime Branch CID, Egmore, Chennai – 600 008.

3. The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court.

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P.VELMURUGAN, J.,

cgi

Pre-Delivery Orders in
Crl.O.P.No.15240 of 2020

28.03.2025

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