Delhi District Court
Ms Adarsh Tea And Foodproducts vs State on 13 August, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-013449-2023
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 517/2023
1. M/s. ADARSH TEA AND FOOD PRODUCTS,
Sharma Market Dhurwa,
Near Hanuman Mandir Bus Stand,
Sector-9, Dhurwa, Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834004.
2. SHRI. AWADESH UPADHYAY,
S/o. Shri. Raghunath Upadhyay,
Sharma Market Dhurwa,
Near Hanuman Mandir Bus Stand,
Sector-9, Dhurwa, Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834004. ... REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. STATE,
Through SHO, PS. Rajinder Nagar,
New Delhi.
2. M/s. CREAMY COUNTY,
Through, its Authorized Representative,
Mr. Gagandeep Singh Marwah,
Having its registered office at;
N-118, Sector-1,
Bawana Industrial Area,
New Delhi-110039. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 21.09.2023
Date of institution : 23.09.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 03.06.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 13.08.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been preferred in
terms of the provisions under Section 397 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
‘Cr.P.C./Code’) against the order dated 24.05.2023 (hereinafter
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 1 of 38
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:19 +0530
referred to as the ‘impugned order’), passed by learned
Metropolitan Magistrate-06/Ld. MM-06 (NI Act), Central, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereafter referred to as the ‘Ld. Trial
Court/Ld. MM’), in case bearing; ‘Creamy County v. Adarsh Tea
and Food Products, CC No. 4296/2020’, arising out of a
complaint under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘NI Act‘). Pertinently, by
virtue of the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court allowed the
application filed by/on behalf of respondent no. 2, in terms of the
provisions under Section 143A of NI Act and the
revisionists/petitioners were directed to jointly and severally,
pay/deposit, a sum of Rs. 2,64,504.30/- (Rupees Two Lakhs
Sixty Four Thousand Five Hundred and Four only and Thirty
paise only), being 10% (ten percent) of the amount under the
cheque in question/dishonoured cheque as interim compensation
to respondent no. 2, within a period of 60 (sixty) days of the said
order.
2. Succinctly, the genesis of the present proceedings
before this Court is a complaint, filed by/on behalf of respondent
no. 2 in terms of the provisions under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read
with Sections 138/142 of the NI Act, inter alia asserting that
respondent no. 2 was a partnership firm, engaged in the business
of trading dairy products. As per respondent no. 2, one Shri.
Sanjiv Sharma (accused no. 3 before the Ld. Trial Court,
hereinafter also referred to as ‘accused no. 3/Sanjiv Sharma’),
being the authorized representative of revisionist no. 1,
approached respondent no. 2 for the supply of skimmed milk
powder (hereinafter referred to as the ‘product/good’), in bulk
quantity(ies), owing to the good reputation of respondent no. 2.
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:27 +0530
Consequently, revisionist no. 2, being the proprietor of
revisionist no. 1, placed order of skimmed milk powder with
respondent no. 2, to be supplied at the official address of
revisionist no. 1. The complaint further chronicles that pursuant
to the said understanding/agreement, respondent no. 2 supplied
goods/products worth Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs
Forty Five Thousand and Thirty Four only) to the revisionists
against invoice no. 133, dated 01.03.2020 for the said amount of
Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five Thousand
and Thirty Four only) along with E-Way bill no. 731122758066,
dated 01.03.2020. Correspondingly, as per respondent no. 2, as
per the books of account, maintained by respondent no. 2 a sum
of Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five
Thousand and Thirty Four only) was shown as debit balance
against the revisionists. Correspondingly, respondent no. 2
asserted under its complaint that the aforesaid products were duly
delivered to revisionist no. 1 on 07.03.2020 and subsequently,
against the discharge of aforesaid liability, the revisionists, acting
through their authorized representative, Shri. Sanjiv Sharma,
issued a post-dated cheque bearing no. 225315, dated 04.05.2020
for a sum of Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty
Five Thousand and Thirty Four only), drawn on State Bank of
India, Hatia branch, Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Bihar-834004
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘dishonoured cheque/cheque in
question’) to respondent no. 2 and requested respondent no. 2 to
present the said cheque for encashment upon expiry of a period
of 02 (two) months, with an assurance that the same would be
honored on its presentation. However, when the said cheque was
presented for encashment by respondent no. 2 on 04.05.2020
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:31 +0530
with its banker, i.e., HDFC Bank, New Rajinder Nagar, New
Delhi-110060, same was returned unpaid/dishonoured on
13.05.2020 vide cheque return memo of the same date, with the
remark(s), ‘Payment Stopped By The Drawer’. Thereafter,
respondent no. 2 is asserted to have contacted the revisionists and
apprised them of the fate of the cheque in question, requesting
them to pay the outstanding amount. However, the revisionists
are asserted to have avoided the persistent requests of respondent
no. 2 on one or the other pretext. Consequently, considering the
blatant act on the part of the revisionists, respondent no. 2 is
asserted to have got issued a legal notice/legal demand notice
dated 18.06.2020 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘legal demand
notice/legal notice’) to the revisionists and accused no. 3 inter
alia seeking payment of the amount of aforesaid
cheque/dishonoured cheque. However, since the revisionists
neither replied to the said notice nor made payment of the
aforesaid amount against the cheque in question/dishonoured
cheque, respondent no. 2 filed a complaint before the Ld. Trial
Court, in terms of the provisions under Sections 138/142 NI Act.
2.1. Relevantly, upon such complaints being filed and on
consideration of the affidavit of evidence and other documents
filed by respondent no. 2, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated
24.03.2021, took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 NI
Act and issued summons against the revisionists and accused no.
3. Subsequently, on the revisionists’ and accused no. 3’s entering
appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, notice in terms of the
provisions under Section 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence under
Section 138 NI Act was framed against the revisionists and
accused no. 3 on 13.09.2022, to which the said accused persons
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:35 +0530
(including the revisionists) pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
Correspondingly, statement of the revisionists and accused no. 3
in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. was
recorded, admitting certain documents. Markedly, during the
course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the respondent
no. 2 moved an application under Section 143A NI Act, upon
which, notice was issued and the Ld. Trial Court vide its order
dated 24.05.2023/impugned order, allowed the respondent no. 2’s
application under Section 143A of NI Act, inter alia under the
following observations;
“…2. Reply was not filed on behalf of the
Accused persons since last few dates and the Ld.
Counsel stated that the matter may be decided on the
basis of pleadings and material on record. Ld. Proxy
Counsel for the Accused has submitted that Accused
is not liable to pay the cheque amount as the Accused
has categorically disputed his liability in the notice of
accusation and the matter is to be seen at the trial. It
is also stated that considering the defense of the
accused, this Court was please to dispense with the
filing of the application u/s 145(2) of the NI Act. The
Accused claims that no case for interim relief is
made out without a trial as the merits of the defence
of the Accused has not yet been examined.
3. I have heard the submissions of both sides and
I have also perused the record.
4. On the basis of submissions made and
arguments advanced, this Court finds itself in
agreement with the view taken in a recent judgement
of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in JSB Cargo &
Freight Forwarders Vs. State which had affirmed the
view taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in
LGR Enterprises & Ors. Vs. P Anbazhagan that the
power u/s 143A is not mandatory but is directory in
nature. Further, the discretion to award interim
compensation u/s 143A is to be exercised judicially
and not mechanically or capriciously and the Court is
to examine, on a case-to-case basis whether sufficient
grounds to award interim compensation are made out
or not.
*** *** ***
8. The statement of objects and reasons of the NI
(Amendment) Bill, which came to be enacted and
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:41 +0530
inserted the provision of s.143A would serve as a
starting point for consideration. The same reads:
*** *** ***
9. The phrases ‘delay tactics of unscrupulous
drawers’ & ‘discourage frivolous and unnecessary
litigation’ are quite ominous when considered in
context. The legislature has, in its wisdom, delineated
the problem and propounded the solution. Its
interpretation and application to the facts of the case
has been left to the Courts of law. The provisions
inserted by the Amendment Act of 2018 have
received interpretation by the various Hon’ble High
Courts as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
vesting of discretion to award compensation in fit
cases, to further advance the object of the Act must
embrace its corollary, i.e., the Court must also see
that frivolous or undeserving complainants do not get
unduly enriched at the cost of a luckless victim.
*** *** ***
14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the
defence of the Accused would constitute one of the
factors in deciding an application u/s 143A. The
aforesaid conclusion has been alluded to in the
judgement of LGR Enterprises in Para 8 thereof
wherein it is observed that “(the application u/s 143A
could be allowed where) the enforceable debt or
liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming
materials which the Accused person could not on the
face of it deny or where the Accused person accepts
the debt or liability partly”. (emphasis supplied). As a
corollary to the above proposition elucidated in LGR
Enterprises, a strong, prima facie plausible plea of
defence entered by the Accused may very well
constitute a sufficient ground to reject the application
u/s 143A. The judgement in JSB Cargo & Freight
Forwarders Vs. State goes one step further and
envisions consideration and admission/denial of
documents (u/s 294 Cr.P.C🙂 brought forth by the
Accused at the stage of deciding the application u/s
143A of the NI Act.
15. Perusal of the record reveals that a fit case for
exercise of discretionary power to grant interim
compensation to the Complainant is made out at this
stage for the following reasons:
(a) The Accused No. 1 & 2 have taken the
defence in the notice of accusation that the
cheque in question was issued in blank to one
Titan Nutrition pursuant to transaction in milk
products with that concern and the Accused
persons do not know as to how the cheque cameCR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 6 of 38
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.08.13
16:17:45
+0530
into the hands of the complainant. It is also stated
that the liability qua Titan Nutrition was already
discharged but no document/proof is forthcoming
within the meaning of s. 294 Cr.P.C. as adverted
to in the previous paragraphs. It is pertinent to
note herein that the signature on the cheque was
admitted by Accused No. 2.
(b) It is settled law that even a blank
signed/inchoate instrument continues to be
‘negotiable’ and can be presented by any lawful
payee for value after filling up the blanks and it is
the defence which is to establish the absence of
consideration/ liability. The statutory provisions
of s.20, 118 and 139 of the Act will apply to the
defence in full force and as such the defence plea
appears to be prima facie considerably faint at
this stage.
(c) If it was the case of the Accused persons
that the complainant has misused the cheque in
question, they did not even care to reply to the
legal demand notice. It is also seen that despite
due service of summons, the Accused persons did
not enter appearance on the date fixed for hearing
and have appeared only after non-bailable process
was issued, which has caused a delay of almost 1
year and 4 months since the date of passing of the
summoning order.
16. Accordingly, the present application hereby
allowed in favour of the Complainant. The Accused
No. 1, 2 are directed:
(a) Jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs.
2,64,504.30/- being 10% of the amount under the
cheques in question as interim compensation to
the Complainant within 60 days from today. The
quantum of 10% is being awarded keeping in
mind the fact that the cheque in question is of a
relatively large amount of Rs. 26 lakh and award
of higher proportion may likely have an effect on
the capacity of Accused persons to defend
themselves in the proceedings.
(b) The said amount shall be refunded by the
Complainant to the Accused in case the Accused
is ultimately acquitted.
(c) Neither party shall take recovery of
compensation as a ground to protract the trial…”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.3. Here it is further pertinent to reproduce the relevant
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 7 of 38
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:49 +0530
extracts of the separate order passed by the Ld. Trial Court on the
aforesaid date, whereby while acquitting accused no. 3/Sh. Sanjiv
Sharma, Ld. Trial Court noted as under;
“… Exemption application filed on behalf of the
accused no. 2. Accepted for today.
At this stage, it is stated that under instruction
from the complainant, the present matter is required
to be withdrawn against accused no. 3 Sh. Sanjiv
Sharma. Separate statement recorded. The said
accused is hereby acquitted.
At this stage, the Ld. Counsel for the complainant
has pressed his application under section 143 A of NI
Act.
Considering that reply has not been filed by the
accused no. 1 and despite due opportunity and the
accused no. 3 is acquitted today, the Ld. Proxy
counsel appearing for accused no. 1 and 2 was asked
if the said application can be decided on the basis of
pleadings. She is amenable to the proposition and the
Ld. Counsel for the complainant also agrees to the
same…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the
impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled
cannons of law, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset,
as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel
further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld.
Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent
reasons have been delineated under the said order. Even
otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was
passed by the Ld. Trial Court in a mechanical manner and utter
haste, without considering the material placed on record as well
as without appreciating the correct facts and circumstances
brought forth on record. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld.
Trial Court did not even hear the arguments addressed on behalf
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:53 +0530
of the revisionists and passed the order in an extreme hurry, to
the prejudice of the revisionists. In this regard, Ld. Counsel
submitted that on 24.05.2023, the arguing counsel for the
revisionists was engaged in a proceeding before the Hon’ble High
Court, leading to the appearance on behalf of the revisionists
having been made by ‘proxy counsel’ for the arguing counsel.
Correspondingly, request for exemption was moved on behalf of
revisionist no. 2, which was allowed by the Ld. Trial Court.
However, as per the Ld. Counsel, despite the fact that neither the
petitioners were present nor represented before the Ld. Trial
Court on the said date, the Ld. Trial Court proceeded to decide
respondent no. 2’s application under Section 143A NI Act,
without affording an opportunity of filing reply or without
hearing the arguments by/on behalf of the revisionists. As per
the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court further erred in deciding
respondent no. 2’s application in the absence of the revisionists
or their counsel, despite being fully aware that the Ld. Proxy
counsel, who had entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court
on the said date was not aware about anything of the merits of the
present case. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, even the finding of
the Ld. Trial Court that the Ld. Proxy counsel for the revisionists
was amenable to the proposition of the Ld. Trial Court deciding
the matter on the basis of pleadings/records of the Ld. Trial Court
is grossly erroneous and violative of the principles of natural
justice. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Proxy counsel was
not aware of the case and did not understand anything of the
merits of the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court and was, as
such, unauthorized to tender any concession on behalf of the
revisionists. However, Ld. Counsel asserted that the said facts
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:57 +0530
were not considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned
order. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, presuming for the
sake of argument that the Ld. Proxy counsel, had in fact rightly
entered appearance on behalf of the revisionists before the Ld.
Trial Court, same in itself would not be sufficient to waive the
right of the revisionists to contest an adverse financial directions
passed by the Ld. Trial Court, which has serious civil and
financial repercussions on the revisionists. In fact, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court was obligated to pass a reasoned
order, which the Ld. Trial Court failed to deliver in the instant
case.
3.1. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial
Court failed to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case put
forth by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists’ defence and pass
the order in contravention of the factual scenario of the present
case as well as settled law. As per the Ld. Counsel, had there
been any real evaluation by the Ld. Trial Court to the said effect,
the findings recorded under the impugned order would have been
contrastingly different. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld.
Trial Court, while recording its reasons for passing the impugned
order, failed to appreciate that even at the time of framing of
notice, the revisionists had specifically asserted that they have no
dealing with respondent no. 2 and that the milk product was
taken from one Titan Nutrition and not from respondent no. 2.
Correspondingly, the revisionists asserted that the project in
question was also issued to Titan Nutrition as blank cheque and
that the revisionists were not aware as to how the cheque in
question/dishonored cheque came into the possession of
respondent no. 2. Ergo, Ld. Counsel asserted that the revisionists
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:18:00 +0530
had duly discharged their burden under law and were not liable
towards respondent no. 2 in any manner, despite which as per the
Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court erroneously passed the order to the
prejudice of the revisionists. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel
asserted that the Ld. Trial Court passed impugned order in a
mechanical manner, without considering the serious factual
disputes raised by the revisionists, which go to the root of the
present case. Further, no discussion or finding on the objections
raised by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists were specified
under the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that
even for the sake of argument, presuming that Ld. Proxy counsel
was competent to tender no objection on behalf of the
revisionists, the impugned order ought to have been based on
assessment of correct factual scenario and judicial dictate, which
has not been carried out in the instant case. Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist further asserted that the perversity in the impugned
order is so writ large that despite there being a clear parameter
and settled law that presumption under Section 139 NI Act
cannot by, in itself, be a sole ground to direct the payment of
interim compensation and the question of applying the
presumption will arise only at the trial, yet, the Ld. Trial Court
has presumed the same to be of significance, which appear to
have overweighed the Ld. Trial Court, in passing the impugned
order. It is further submitted that the pleadings in the complaint
and the material placed on record, demonstrate no prima facie
case against the revisionists, the complainant itself, being not
maintainable against the revisionists herein. However, as per the
Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the said facts
under the impugned order, while allowing the respondent no. 2’s
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:04 +0530
application under Section 143A of the NI Act. Ergo, as per the
Ld. Counsel, the impugned order is liable to set aside on this sole
ground.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further contended
that impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. In
this regard, Ld. Counsel emphatically argued that not only
respondent no. 2 failed to place on record, any cogent evidence in
support of his assertions in the complaint, rather, also in the light
of the glaring contradictions, inconsistencies, concealment of
facts and falsehood, the assertion of respondent no. 2 to bring
home the point of commission of offence under Section 138 NI
Act by the revisionists is far-fetched and totally inconceivable.
Ld. Counsel further vehemently asserted/reiterated that the
provisions under Section 143A NI Act are discretionary and not
mandatory in nature and the Ld. Trial Court was required to
assess the defense of the revisionists, existence of a prima facie
case as well as the relationship between the parties, while
adjudicating on the said application. However, as per the Ld.
Counsel, no such assessment was conducted by the Ld. Trial
Court as notable under the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further
submitted that, even otherwise, the complaint filed before the Ld.
Trial Court is not maintainable as no notice as prescribed under
law was served upon the revisionists and that the revisionists had
duly raised their defence at the stage of framing of notice under
Section 251 Cr.P.C. that no such notice was received by them,
which has not been considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the
impugned order. Ld. Counsel further asserted that the fact that
the revisionists had not filed documents evidencing that
discharge of liability towards Titan Nutrition does not disentitle
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:18:08 +0530
them from bringing such evidence on record at an appropriate
stage of trial. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the finding of the
Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order preempts the
adjudication on the fact of non-issuance of any cheque by the
revisionists to respondent no. 2, during the trial, besides the
finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order grossly
prejudices the revisionists’ defence. As per the Ld. Counsel, it is
a settled law that mere non filing of the documents at an early
stage does not preclude a party from relying on it at a later stage,
especially in criminal proceedings where the right to fair trial is
paramount. Ergo, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the
impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court not only in
violation of the settled principles of law, besides the same is also
not in tandem with the factual circumstances brought forth.
Accordingly, Ld. Counsel prayed that the present revision
petition may be allowed, and the impugned order may be set
aside. In support of the said contentions, reliance has been placed
upon the decision(s) in; M/s. JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. State & Anr. Crl.MC 2663/2021, dated
20.12.2021 (DHC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2
submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the
present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court.
It was further submitted that all the relevant facts and
circumstances were duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court,
besides the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court,
wary of the settled judicial precedents and the material brought
forth on record. Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 further
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:12 +0530
submitted that no illegality/infirmity can be attributed to the
impugned order, so as to subject the same to any interference by
this Court under this Court’s exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2
further submitted that the entire case of the revisionists is
premised on the fact that the revisionists were not afforded
opportunity to present the case, however, the records of the Ld.
Trial Court demonstrate otherwise. As per the Ld. Counsel, the
revisionists were well aware of the fact that respondent no. 2’s
application under Section 143A NI Act was pending adjudication
before the Ld. Trial Court on 24.05.2023 and that the same was
scheduled to be taken up for arguments as already five dates had
lapsed whereby the revisionists had not filed/ submitted a reply
to the said application. In particular, as per the Ld. Counsel, the
records of the Ld. Trial Court clearly demonstrate that the said
application was moved on behalf of respondent no. 2 on
02.08.2022, whereby notice of the said application was issued to
the revisionists, followed by an opportunity to the revisionists to
file the reply again on 13.09.2022. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel
submitted that again the Ld. Trial Court had provided several
opportunities to the revisionists vide its orders dated 11.01.2023
and 01.03.2023 to file reply to the said application, however, the
revisionists deliberately failed to either file reply to the said
application or to address their arguments. In this regard, it was
further submitted that the revisionists on 24.05.2023, deliberately
appeared through proxy counsel solely to delay and frustrate the
process of law and in order to usurp the hard-earned money of
respondent no. 2. Ergo, under such circumstances, the Ld. Trial
Court was left with no option than to proceed with theCR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 14 of 38
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:16 +0530
adjudication on the said application on the basis of material
placed on record.
4.1. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned
order was rightly passed by the Ld. Trial Court being cognizant
of the settled law as well as legal provisions. In this regard, it was
submitted by the Ld. Trial Court took a preliminary view of the
criminal complaint, while applying its judicial discretion and
determining on the respondent no. 2’s application under Section
143A NI Act while passing the impugned order.
Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel asserted that the revisionists are
trying to frustrate the essence of provisions under Section 143A
NI Act, which is meant to deter/avoid undue delay in final
resolution of cheque dishonor cases. Even otherwise, as per the
Ld. Counsel, the revisionists are trying to take advantage of their
own wrong, besides, have provided no justification for their sheer
negligence, disentitling them from claiming any relief or
indulgence from this Court. It was further asserted that by means
of the present revision petition, the revisionists are trying to
endeavor to bring new facts as well as present new documents
before this Court which can neither be permitted nor adjudicated
by this Court at the present stage of revision. Even otherwise, as
per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists are trying to make
contradictory stand in the present revision petition, in utter
variance to their assertion at the time of framing of notice under
Section 251 Cr.P.C. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted that
though revisionists had asserted before the Ld. Trial Court that
they had no dealing with respondent no. 2 and that respondent
no. 2 had misused the cheque in question, however, at the time of
framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. the revisionists
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 15 of 38
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
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specifically asserted that the cheque was signed by revisionist no.
2 though the other particulars were not filled in by the said
revisionist. Under such circumstances, Ld. Counsel submitted
that the revisionists are precluded from denying their liability
under Section 138 NI Act, especially when the law is settled that
even a blank signed instrument continues to be negotiable and
can be presented by any lawful payee for value after filling up
the blanks and it is the defence which is to establish the absence
of consideration/liability qua such cheque.
4.2. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the records of the
Ld. Trial Court would clearly demonstrate that the revisionists,
despite receipt of legal notice through the medium of courier as
well as WhatsApp did not care to even reply to the said notice
and even despite due service of summons, the revisionists
deliberately omitted to appear before the Ld. Trial Court leading
to issuance of non bailable warrants against them. As per the Ld.
Counsel, the revisionists have been protracting the trial
proceeding on one or the other pretext disentitling them from
claiming any indulgence from this Court. Ergo, Ld. Counsel
reiterated that no interference is called for under the impugned
order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court being cognizant
of the facts of the present case, legal provisions and judicial
precedents. In support of the said contentions, reliance was
placed upon the decisions in; LGR Enterprises & Ors. v. P.
Anbazhagan, Crl. O.P. No. 15440/2019, dated 12.07.2019 (Mad.
HC) and Rajesh Aggarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl.
Rev. P. No. 478/2011, (DHC).
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists
and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondents have been heard as
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 16 of 38
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court record, written
submissions filed by the parties and the case laws, relied,
thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be
apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions
under law, as under;
“3971. Calling for records to exercise of powers
of revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions
Judge may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-
section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Significantly, from a perusal of the above, it is quite
discernable that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be
invoked either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a
1
Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1)
The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior
Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any
sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail
bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation–All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and
whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the
purposes of this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall
not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding ….”
(Emphasis supplied).
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 17 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:18:28 +0530
case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the
provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely
erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court while explicating the
various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in
the proceedings under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 18 of 38
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:33
+0530
8. Analogously, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar
context noted as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to
test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the
court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case, rather it considers the material only to
satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the
Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise
of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent
error in the impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted,
the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an
order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it
is a settled law2 that in a case where the order of subordinate
Court does not suffer from any illegality , “merely because of
equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction
to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine
manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the decision in
Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312 , wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded the law, as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision
petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that
Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the
Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter
se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings
2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP
958.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 19 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:18:37 +0530
of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case. A court in revision considers the material
only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety
of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence…”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, however,
before proceeding with the assessment of the rival contentions of
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and that of Ld. Counsel for the
respondent, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant
provisions under law/NI Act, for the purpose(s) of the present
discourse, as under;
“143A. Power to direct interim compensation-(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court
trying an offence under Section 138 may order the
drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to
the complainant-
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where
he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the
complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
(2) The interim compensation under sub-section
(1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of
the cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid
within sixty days from the date of the order under
sub-section (1), or within such further period not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the
Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer
of the cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the
Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the
drawer the amount of interim compensation, with
interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve
Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the
relevant financial year, within sixty days from the
date of the order, or within such further period not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by theCR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 20 of 38
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:41
+0530
Court on sufficient cause being shown by the
complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this
section may be recovered as if it were a fine under
section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section
138 or the amount of compensation awarded under
section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as
interim compensation under this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Apropos the present discourse, this Court outrightly
notes that the provision under Section 143A was inserted under
the statute book/NI Act pursuant to the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Act, 2018, w.e.f. 01.09.2018. Relevantly, the
objective behind the introduction of the said provision, was to
reduce undue delay in disposal of cheque dishonour cases as well
as to provide for temporary relief in the form of interim
compensation to the complainant, in the interregnum. Reference
in this regard is made to the relevant extract from the Statement
of Objects and Reasons, as enumerated under the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017, as under;
“…2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a
view to address the issue of undue delay in final
resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide
relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to
discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation
which would save time and money. The proposed
amendments will strengthen the credibility of
cheques and help trade and commerce in general by
allowing lending institutions, including banks, to
continue to extend financing to the productive sectors
of the economy.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to
provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:-
(i) to insert a new section 143A in the said Act to
provide that the Court trying an offence under section
138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay
interim compensation to the complainant, in aCR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 21 of 38
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:18:44 +0530
summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads
not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint,
and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The
interim compensation so payable shall be such sum
not exceeding twenty per cent. of the amount of the
cheque; …”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. However, at this stage, this Court deems it further
pertinent to note that notwithstanding the salutary object of
Section 143A NI Act, i.e., an aid to ensure speedy disposal of the
proceeding pending under Section 138 NI Act, the said provision
has been persistently held by the superior courts3 to be ‘directory’
and ‘not mandatory’ in nature. Reference in this regard is made
to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Ashwin
Ashokrao Karokar v. Laxmikant Govind Joshi, WP (Crl.) No.
48/2022, dated 07.07.2022, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
expressing similar sentimentalities, remarked as under;
“…9.4. Section 143-A of the N.I. Act, though
enacted with an intent to ensure speedy disposal of
the proceeding pending under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act, the said intent, insofar as Section143-A of the
N.I. Act is concerned, does not make the provision
mandatory, as what is conferred upon the Court by
virtue of the said provision is a discretion to direct
interim compensation and no right is created in the
complainant under it, to demand the entitlement to
compensation. Grant of interim compensation, would
be at the discretion of the Court, based upon
consideration of various factors, such as (a) whether
the requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, were
fulfilled (b) whether the pleadings disclose the
drawing of the presumption (c) whether the
proceedings were within limitation and (d) whether
prima facie a legal debt or liability was disclosed
from the complaint or the notice of demand
preceding it, and factors as such [see: B.R. Upadhya
and Anant H. Ulahalkar (supra)]…”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Clearly, it is seen from above that the discretion
3
JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5425.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 22 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:18:50 +0530
under Section 143A of NI Act entails a judicial exercise, which
the courts may exercise only upon consideration of various facts
and circumstances. As a corollary, it is quite understandable that
Ld. Magistrates/Ld. MMs/Ld. JMFCs, while exercising such
discretion are bound to provide reasons/record brief reasons,
indicating consideration of all relevant factors while granting or
denying such interim compensation. Reference in this regard is
made to the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in
L.G.R. Enterprises v. P. Anbazhagan, AIR Online 2019 Mad.
801: (2019) 3 Mad. LJ(Cri.) 423, wherein the Hon’ble Court
accentuated the importance of a reasoned order under such cases,
in the following terms;
“8. Therefore, whenever the trial Court exercises
its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, it
shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused
person (drawer of the cheque) to pay the interim
compensation to the complainant. The reasons may
be varied. For instance, the accused person would
have absconded for a longtime and thereby would
have protracted the proceedings or the accused
person would have intentionally evaded service for a
long time and only after repeated attempts, appears
before the Court, or the enforceable debt or liability
in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials
which the accused person could not on the face of it
deny or where the accused person accepts the debt or
liability partly or where the accused person does not
cross examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging
with the proceedings by filing one petition after
another or the accused person absconds and by virtue
of a non-bailable warrant he is secured and brought
before the Court after a long time or he files a recall
non-bailable warrant petition after a long time and
the Court while considering his petition for recalling
the non-bailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1)
of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more
illustrative as to the various circumstances under
which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by
directing the accused person to pay the interim
compensation of 20% to the complainant.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 23 of 38
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:18:56 +0530
9. The other reason why the order of the trial
Court under Section 143A(1) of the Act, should
contain reasons, is because it will always be
subjected to challenge before this Court. This Court
while considering the petition will only look for the
reasons given by the Court below while passing the
order under Section 143A(1) of the Act. An order
that is subjected to appeal or revision, should always
be supported by reasons. A discretionary order
without reasons is, on the face of it, illegal and it will
be set aside on that ground alone…”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Significantly, this Court deems it further germane to
refer to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Crl.
Appeal No. 741/2024, dated 15.03.2024 (SC), wherein the
Hon’ble Court, while delving into the contours, scope and ambit
of the provisions under Section 143A of NI Act, observed as
under;
“19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main
conclusions can be summarised as follows:
a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of
Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is
directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used
in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.”
b. While deciding the prayer made under Section
143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating
consideration of all relevant factors.
c. The broad parameters for exercising the
discretion under Section 143A are as follows:
i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate
the merits of the case made out by the
complainant and the merits of the defence
pleaded by the accused in the reply to the
application. The financial distress of the accused
can also be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation
can be issued, only if the complainant makes out
a prima facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be
prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise
discretion in refusing to grant interim
compensation.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 24 of 38
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:00 +0530
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made
out to grant interim compensation, it will also
have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim
compensation to be granted. While doing so, the
Court will have to consider several factors such
as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if
any, between the accused and the complainant,
etc.
v. There could be several other relevant
factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which
cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters
stated above are not exhaustive…”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, legal
provisions and judicial dictates, when the facts of the present
case are seen in conjunction with the arguments addressed by/on
behalf of the revisionists and that of respondent(s)/respondent no.
2, this Court concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court
under the impugned order. In fact, this Court is also in agreement
with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court that once the
revisionist admitted his signatures on the cheque in
question/dishonoured cheque, presumption4 under Section
118/139 of the NI Act came into play. Needless to mention that it
is trite law the presumption envisioned under Section 139 NI Act
not only pertains to the fact that the cheque in question was
drawn in discharge of debt or liability, rather, also includes5 a
presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability at the time of such drawing. Indisputably 6, the burden to
rebut the presumption lies on the revisionists herein, by
establishing probable defence, which can be only done during the
trial by the revisionists’ either leading evidence/defence evidence
or from the material placed on record by the
4
Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148; and Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
5
S. Natarajan v. Sama Dharman, (2021) 6 SCC 413.
6
Rajaram v. Maruthachalam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 48.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 25 of 38
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
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complainant/respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, it is seen from a
conscientious perusal of the impugned order that while allowing
respondent no. 2’s application under Section 143A of NI Act, the
Ld. Trial Court not only considered the facts and circumstances
brought forth on record by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists,
rather, also of the objective behind the introduction of the said
provision under the statute books and awarded a compensation to
a tune of 10% (ten percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured
cheque amount. As aforenoted, the objective behind the
introduction of the provisions under Section 143A NI Act under
the statute books was premised/aimed to address the issue of
undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases, “so as
to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to
discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would
save time and money.” Ergo, in said context, in the considered
opinion of this Court, Ld. Trial Court was well within its right to
note the conduct of the revisionists as well as the delay
occasioned in the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court,
wherein the appearance of the revisionists could only be ensured
once bailable warrants were issued against the revisionists by the
Ld. Trial Court. In fact, in this regard, even this Court records
that from a conscientious perusal of the records it is noted that
the summons qua the revisionists were issued by the Ld. Trial
Court on 24.03.2021. However, subsequently, under the order
dated 18.10.2021, Ld. Trial Court duly noted that the tracking
report filed by/on behalf of the complainant, reflected that the
summons were duly served on the revisionists, despite which, the
revisionists failed to enter appearance before the Ld. Trial Court,
leading to the issuance of bailable warrants against them.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 26 of 38
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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16:19:08
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Needless to further mention that since the revisionists/accused
continued to absent themselves before the Ld. Trail Court, non-
bailable warrants were issued against them on 08.04.2022 and it
was only subsequent thereto, the revisionists entered appearance
before the Ld. Trial Court on 12.07.2022. Clearly, in light of the
foregoing, no error/irregularity in the observation of the Ld. Trial
Court can be attributed by this Court, recording the conduct of
the revisionists under the impugned order, considering the
objective behind the introduction of provisions under Section
143A NI Act it to provide temporary respite to the payees of
dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and
unnecessary litigation. On the other hand, even in the considered
opinion of this Court, the conduct of the revisionists before the
Ld. Trial Court suggests adoption of delaying tactics on the part
of the revisionists, which is one of the determining factors, while
dealing with an application under Section 143A of NI Act.
16. Congruently, it is seen from a scrupulous analysis of
the impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court, while directing the
revisionist to deposit/pay the interim compensation amount, duly
reflected on the defence(s) raised by the revisionist , i.e., to the
effect that the dishonoured cheque/cheque in question was issued
in blank to one, Titan Nutrition pursuant to transaction in milk
products with the said concern and that the revisionists were no
aware as to how the said cheque landed in the hand of respondent
no. 2. In this regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to
outrightly make a reference to the relevant extracts of notice
under Section 251 Cr.P.C. framed against the revisionists,
wherein the revisionists inter alia proclaimed as under;
“…Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to
make?
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 27 of 38
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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16:19:12
+0530
A. (Accused no. 2) I do not plead guilty. I claim
trial…
*** *** ***
Q. Do you admit your signature on the cheques in
question?
A. (Accused no. 2) Yes. The cheques in question
had been signed by me…
Q. Did you fill the other particulars on the
cheques in question including date, name of payee
and amount?
A. (Accused no. 2) No…
*** *** ***
Q. Do you have anything else to say?
A. (Accused no. 2) My plea of defence is that I
have no dealing with the complainant. I had taken
milk products from Titan Nutrition and not the
complainant. The cheque in question was issued as
undated and blank signed in favour of Titan
Nutrition. I do not know how the cheque in question
has come into the possession of the complainant. I
am not liable under the cheque in question. I have
already discharged my liability towards the cheque in
question…”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Clearly, it is seen from above that revisionist no. 2,
at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. duly
admitted the issuance of cheque in question/dishonoured cheque
from his bank account, besides, revisionist no. 2 also admitted,
his signatures on the cheque in question. However, the defence
raised by/on behalf of the revisionists was that the cheque in
question was issued in favour of one Titan Nutrition as blank
signed cheques, with whom, the revisionists had dealing.
Correspondingly, the revisionists asserted that they had already
cleared their liability towards Titan Nutrition and that they were
not aware as to how the cheque in question, landed in the hand of
respondent no. 2. Needless to mention, the revisionists/revisionist
no. 2 further proclaimed that they/he owed nothing towards
respondent no. 2. In this regard, it is apposite to note that the
onus of proving the defence that the cheque was issued as blank
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 28 of 38
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:16 +0530
signed cheque/security and that too in favour of one Titan
Nutrition was on the revisionists. Clearly, no material to the said
effect/in support of the said defence has been brought on record
of the Ld. Trial Court at the said stage and that the same could be
determined only during the course of trial. Correspondingly, in
the considered opinion of this Court, further plea/defence of the
revisionists that the cheque in question was issued as blank
signed cheque, entailing no liability on the revisionist fails to
impress even this Court, especially when the law is settled that
filling of particulars of cheque by any person, other than the
drawer does not invalidate the cheque and the liability under
Section 138 NI Act/presumption under Section 139 NI Act would
still be attracted under such situation(s), when the signatures on
the cheque in question is duly admitted by the drawer/accused.
Reference in this regard is made to decision in Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as under;
“33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in
particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply
clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it
over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque
had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge
of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may
have been filled in by any person other than the
drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If
the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of
Section 138 would be attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily
presented to a payee, towards some payment, the
payee may fill up the amount and other particulars.
This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The
onus would still be on the accused to prove that the
cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by
adducing evidence.
*** *** *** CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 29 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:19:19 +0530
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed
and handed over by the accused, which is towards
some payment, would attract presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act , in the
absence of any cogent evidence to show that the
cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, mere blatant
assertion of the revisionists that the cheque in question was
issued as a blank signed instrument, dodging any criminal
liability against the revisionist, in the considered opinion of this
Court, would not come to the aid of the revisionist at this stage.
On the contrary, this Court is in agreement with the observation
of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order that statutory
presumptions under Sections 118 NI Act and Section 139 NI Act
would apply with full force and the defence plea of the
revisionists appears to be prima facie bleak at this stage.
19. At this stage, this Court deems it further pertinent to
note that the revisionists have zealously contested the impugned
order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, in violation of principles
of natural justice. In particular, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists
contended that neither an opportunity was granted to the
revisionists to file a reply to respondent no. 2’s application under
Section 143A NI Act nor the revisionists afforded opportunity to
address arguments, leading to violation of ‘ audi alteram partem7’
rule. However, upon a conscientious perusal of the material
placed on record, this Court finds itself difficult to concede with
the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist. In
this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to observe that it is seen
from the records of the Ld. Trial Court that the instant
application under Section 143A NI Act was moved by/on behalf
7
Latin phrase meaning, ‘let the other side be heard as well’.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 30 of 38
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:23 +0530
of respondent no. 2 on 02.08.2022. Thereafter on 13.09.2022, the
Ld. Trial Court, while inter alia framing notice under Section 251
Cr.P.C. against the revisionists and accused no. 3, adjourned the
matter to 11.01.2023, for reply and arguments on the said
application. Subsequently, on 11.01.2023, request for exemption
was moved on behalf of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial
Court and the matter for the date was again adjourned to
01.03.2023 on the inability of Ld. Counsel for accused no. 3 to
await a Passover. However, even on 11.01.2023, the Ld. Trial
Court, adjourned the matter to 01.03.2023 for reply and
arguments on the said application. Thereafter, again on
01.03.2023, matter was adjourned to 24.05.2023 for the said
purpose. Needless to mention that despite aforesaid
adjournments, no reply to respondent no. 2’s instant application
was filed by/on behalf of the revisionist. In fact, it is seen from
the records of the Ld. Trial Court that even on 01.03.2023,
appearance was entered by revisionist no. 2 before the Ld. Trial
Court only during the post lunch session, when the matter had
already been adjourned for 24.05.2023. Significantly, despite
being aware of the purpose for which the matter was listed for
24.05.2023, revisionist no. 2, again requested for an exemption,
which was permitted by the Ld. Trial Court. Correspondingly,
Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, opted to enter appearance before
the Ld. Trial Court through Ld. Proxy Counsel and the said
counsel conceded that respondent no. 2’s application under
Section 143A NI Act, may be determined on the basis of material
placed on record.
20. Relevantly, as aforenoted, Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists asserted that due to his engagement before the
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 31 of 38
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:27 +0530
Hon’ble High Court he could not appear before the Ld. Trial
Court on 24.05.2023, when the impugned order came to be
passed. However, notwithstanding such absence of the Ld.
Counsel, it is observed from a scrupulous analysis of the
impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court considered all the
submissions, assertions, averments, defence and plea, while
determining respondent no. 2’s application under Section 143A
NI Act and passed a reasoned order only after considered all the
said contentions. Needless to mention that even under the instant
revision petition, no fresh averments/contentions have been
raised by/on behalf of the revisionists, which have not already
been dealt with the Ld. Trial Court, under the impugned order.
Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court reiterates that it is not
convinced with the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists that there was a violation of the principles of natural
justice, in particular, that of ‘audi alteram partem’ rule. On the
contrary, in this regard, this Court deems it apposite here to make
a reference to the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana in M/s. Brahma Maintenance Private Limited v. The
Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum & Ors. CWP-34815-
2024, dated 13.01.2025: 2025:PHHC:010259, wherein the
Hon’ble Court, whilst being confronted with an akin situation,
noted as under;
“10. The doctrine of audi alteram partem, cannot
be used to cure the self-suffered wound, specifically,
by those persons who are sitting on the fence. From
the facts above, it is vividly postulated, that the
petitioner-firm was very much aware about the
proceedings pending before respondent no.1-Forum,
as the principal of the petitioner-firm had already
responded to the pendency proceedings. Therefore,
this Court can safely conclude that the petitioner-firm
was very well aware about the pendency of the
instant proceedings. However, with an oblique
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 32 of 38Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:32 +0530
motive to create a defence at the appellate stage,
immediately after culmination of proceedings before
the authority concerned, he approached this Court
and raised hue and cry about violation of the
principle of natural justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Unmistakably, it is seen from above that the
Hon’ble High Court in the aforenoted dictate unambiguously
noted that the doctrine of audi alteram partem, cannot be used to
cure the self-suffered wound, akin as the one, confronted before
this Court, disentitling the revisionists to agitate any plea of
violation of natural justice at this stage. Needless to reiterate that
considering the objective of insertion of provisions under Section
143A NI Act under the statute books; persistently dilatory
conduct of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court, as
demonstrable from the records of Ld. Trial Court; as well as
being wary that all the contentions of the revisionists were duly
considered under the impugned order by the Ld. Trial Court and
that the revisionists have not raised any plea before this Court in
the instant revision petition, other than that already considered
under the impugned order, in the considered opinion of this
Court, the revisionists’ plea of violation of principles of natural
justice, does not appeal to the senses of this Court.
22. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being
wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the
arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists as
well as by Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2, this Court
unambiguously reaches a conclusion that all the considerations
for exercising the discretion under Section 143A of the NI Act
were duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the
impugned order. Needless to mention that all the points and
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 33 of 38
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.08.13
16:19:36
+0530
contentions of the revisionists and that of respondent no. 2 were
duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order and
no new grounds/contentions, other than those which have not
already been considered under the impugned order, have been
raised by the revisionists in the instant petition. In fact, there is
nothing to show that the Ld. Trial Court committed any illegality
and/or impropriety while passing the impugned order or that the
Ld. Trial Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously
and perversely. Needless to reiterate that the Ld. Trial Court,
while passing the impugned order duly considered the objective
behind the said provision, establishment of a prima facie case by
respondent no. 2 in the instant case, besides duly considered the
material placed on record by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists
as well as analyzed the plausibility of the defence raised by the
revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court. At the same time, upon
determination of/conclusion of case in favour of respondent no. 2
for the grant of interim compensation, Ld. Trial Court also
applied its mind to the quantum of interim compensation
awarded, i.e., 10% (ten percent) of the cheque
amount/dishonoured cheque amount, in the instant case.
23. As a concluding remark, this Court deems it
apposite to note that against the order dated
24.05.2023/impugned order, passed by the Ld. Trial Court, the
instant criminal revision petition was preferred only on
21.09.2023, with a delay of 30 (thirty) days. Apposite to
outrightly note that as per Article 131 of the Schedule of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Limitation
Act‘), limitation of 90 (ninety) days from the date of the order,
sought to be challenged has been prescribed as the statutory
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 34 of 38
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:40 +0530
period of limitation. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
inter alia provides for condonation of delay/extension of
prescribed period in certain cases on demonstration of ‘ sufficient
cause’. Pertinently, under application seeking condonation of
delay, accompanying the instant petition, the revisionists, inter
alia asserted as under;
“…2. That on 24.05.2023, the counsel for the
accused was appearing before High Court so the
poxy counsel attend the matter before the Ld. MM
but the proxy counsel could not understand the order
and she only convey the next date of hearing to the
main counsel and initially the fact could not come in
the knowledge of the main counsel that the Ld. MM
had allowed the application of the respondent no. 2
and directed the petitioner to pau the amount of Rs.
2,64,504.30/- 10% of the cheque amount to the
respondent no. 2.
3. That on 24.08.2023 when an application was
filed by the counsel for the respondent no. 2 for
issuance of warrant of attachment against the
accused/petitioner herein then only on first time the
fact came in the knowledge of the counsel for
accused/petitioner that an order was passed on the
application u/s. 143A NI Act in favour of the
complainant.
4. That due to the above said reason he could not
file the criminal revision petition in time and there is
delay of 27 days…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Significantly, it is noted from the records, the
statutory prescribed period of limitation, i.e., 90 days period of
preferring criminal revision petition against the impugned order
dated 24.05.2023, expired on 22.08.2023. However, as
aforenoted, the instant revision petition was e-filed only on
21.09.2023. As per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists came to
know of the passing of the impugned order only on 24.08.2023,
whereupon delay of 27 days occurred. However, even upon
conscientious perusal of the said application, seeking
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 35 of 38
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:44
+0530
condonation of delay, this Court unmistakably records that the
said application has not only been drafted in an extremely casual
manner, rather, the correct period of delay, sought to be
condoned or the reasons leading to delay in filing only on
21.09.2023, presuming that the revisionists came to be aware of
the impugned order only on 24.08.2023, are not forthcoming
with precision. Undoubtedly, this Court is conscious of the
repeated avowals of the superior courts that there is no
presumption under law8 that the delay in approaching courts was
deliberate on the part of the litigant and that the courts are
advised to adopt a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach,
in variance to, technical interpretation while considering an
entreaty for condonation of delay. However, the superior courts
have also persistently avowed9 that an application for
condonation of delay, “should be drafted with careful concern
and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the
principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice
dispensation system.” As a corollary, application for condonation
of delay, which is drafted in an extremely casual manner so as to
even be bereft of material particulars, besides failing to disclose
sufficient cause such as a bald statement of a party’s taking of
opinion from some counsel, cannot, in the considered opinion of
this Court be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of
delay. Needless to reiterate that the correct period of delay,
sought to be condoned or the reasons leading to delay in filing
only on 21.09.2023, presuming that the revisionists came to be
aware of the impugned order only on 24.08.2023, are not
8
J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine
Del 1082.
9
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 36 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:19:48 +0530
forthcoming with precision in the said application, so as to
convince this Court to grant any indulgence in favour of the
revisionists even on this count.
25. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion,
this Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial
Court did not commit any illegality and/or impropriety under the
impugned order, while allowing respondent no. 2’s application
under Section 143A of NI Act, in light of the facts and
circumstances, arguments addressed, documents and the material
placed on record, as well as judicial dictates, directing the
revisionists to pay/deposit 10% (ten percent) of the amount of the
cheque in question/dishonoured cheque to respondent no. 2 as
interim compensation. Consequently, in the considered opinion
of this Court the present revision petition deserves to be
dismissed as devoid of merits as well as on limitation and is
hereby dismissed. As a corollary, the order dated 24.05.2023,
passed by Ld. MM-06 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi, in case bearing; ‘Creamy County v. Adarsh Tea and Food
Products, CC No. 4296/2020’, arising out of a complaint under
Section 138/142 of NI Act is hereby upheld/affirmed. Apposite at
this stage to further note that, though, this Court holds highest
regard for the decision(s) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the
revisionists, however, the same would not, in the considered
opinion of this Court come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth
by the revisionists in the manner as prayed, as the facts and
circumstances of the present case are clearly, distinguishable.
26. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this
order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court, with directions to
proceed as per law. Needless to mention, nothing stated herein
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 37 of 38
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:52
+0530
shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the merits of
the case.
27. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:57
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 13.08.2025. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 38 of 38
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